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Abstract  
This neo institutional study analyses the dynamic interaction between 
formal/informal rules and agentV¶ behaviour inside a political institution, 
examining these relationships through primary research on local partnerships in 
Greece.  
 
The theoretical assumptions of this analysis derive mainly from normative neo 
institutionalism but also include insights from rational choice and the historical 
institutionalism. Consideration is also given to the way in which theories of the 
structure/agent duality are related to neo institutional propositions on the 
relationship between rules and agents¶VWUDWHJLFEHKDYLRXUThe neo 
institutional approach to local partnerships is also situated in relation to 
concepts and empirical observations from the literature on urban governance, 
urban regimes and Europeanisation.   
 
This research adopts the critical realism stance which acknowledges a reflexive 
approach to reality and it applies an embedded case study strategy. The case 
study consists of two local partnerships in the region of Crete, which were 
established under the EU Community Initiatives Programmes EQUAL II and 
LEADER+ and coordinated by the Local Development Agency of Heraklion. 
A triangulation method is selected, making use of interviews, storytelling, a 
short questionnaire, direct observation and secondary analysis of 
documentation.  
 
The research data reveal that the formal rules of the partnerships are not 
indicative of what actually happens. It is the configuration of formal and 
informal rules that offers a deep understanding of partnership. It is concluded 
that some formal rules are realised (albeit with deviations along the way), like 
partnership and programming, while others are remained mostly on paper, like 
community participation, decentralisation and innovation. In these cases, the 
informal rules appear to be conflicting with the formal rules, leading to 
different results than those expected.  
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The research also shows the importance of agents' intentionality in the process 
of institutional change. Specific actors within the partnership, such as 
established local leaders and institutional entrepreneurs, select and reinforce 
particular features of formal rules that restrict paUWQHUV¶IUHedom and promote 
values of efficiency within the partners.  
 
Moreover, the findings confirm a gradual changing of local policy making and 
an increase of local social capital. EQUAL II and LEADER+ partnerships 
create new possibilities for the empowerment and participation of new actors 
such as NGOs and vulnerable groups in the local policy-making process. They 
also promote the establishment of policy networks and enhance the 
development of collaborative learning processes (trust building and sharing 
understanding). Finally, they lead to the re-articulation of mayors-chief 
H[HFXWLYHV¶UHODWLRQVKLSLQVLGHORFDODXWKRULWLHVDQGRI central state¶VSRVLWLRQ
by creating new possibilities for EURDGHQLQJORFDODXWKRULWLHV¶DXWRQRP\.  
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Introduction  
It is not a very original observation that in West European countries most of 
local policies are implemented by partnerships between local government, 
businesses and civil society organisations. The rise of partnerships mirrors the 
broader concern of governments at national and European level to harness the 
benefits of urban governance. This phenomenon is followed by an extensive 
JURZWKRIXUEDQSROLF\WKHRULHVDQDO\VLQJGLYHUVHDVSHFWVRIORFDOSDUWQHUVKLSV¶
development. The various positions of urban Marxism, urban regime and urban 
JRYHUQDQFHWKHRULHVXVHGLIIHUHQWOHQVHVOLNHWKHHFRQRP\RISODFHDJHQWV¶
behaviour or the territorial levels of governance for analysing this type of 
collaborative activity.    
 
This study aims to further advance a new dimension to local partnerships 
study, that of the neo institutional (NI) approach. Although in the last fifty 
years, there has been a NI turn in the social enquiry (Jessop, 2001), it is only 
recently, in the mid 90s that the NI approach of local partnerships has arisen in 
the broader discipline of urban politics. Based on the fundamental assumptions 
of neo-institutionalism, this NI approach to local partnerships assumes that 
partnerships are not just organisations but institutional arrangements in which 
formal/ informal rules embedded in the larger socio-economic context interact 
ZLWKSDUWQHUV¶PRWLYDWLRQVDQGSUDFWLFHV&RQVHTXHQWO\QHZTXHVWLRQVDERXW
the study of partnerships arise: a. How do informal conventions and coalitions 
interact with formal partnership rules? b. How do informal rules constrain and 
enable agency, besides formal rules? c. In which way do partners 
interpret/change rules according to their interests? d. Which contextual factors 
do affect this particular process at all territorial levels? However, the 
importance that is given to the above components of a partnership as 
LQVWLWXWLRQLHUXOHV¶FRQILJXUDWLRQW\SHVRIDFWRUV¶EHKDYLRXU and contextual 
factors) by the NI study to local partnership depends each time on the 
theoretical NI tradition to which it belongs.  
 
The aim of this thesis is to take forward the theoretical understanding of what 
constitutes an institution of local partnership and test it empirically in order to 
11 
 
enlighten new perspectives of partnership development and broader political 
institutions of governance. In particular, the research intends to highlight the 
G\QDPLFLQWHUDFWLRQEHWZHHQIRUPDOLQIRUPDOUXOHVDQGDJHQWV¶EHKDYLRXU
inside a local partnership and to emphasise the importance of the distinctive 
local context from which it has emerged.  
 
In addition to new insights into the NI approach on local partnership, my study 
attempts to fill the existing gap in studies regarding local partnerships in 
Greece. During the last fifteen years in Greece, the introduction of a number of 
EU funding programmes for municipalities has paved the way for the 
development of partnerships. These have been aimed at sharing responsibility 
and action between the traditional local government and other actors of the 
local society, especially semi-public organisations and NGOs. Since then, 
partnerships have started to spread all over Greek cities. These partnerships 
were imposed by the EU programmes since, in most cases, traditional local 
policy and culture did not offer a favourable climate for the growth of such 
collaborations. However, these partnerships have not been explored in depth by 
the Greek scientific community. Although in West Europe and mainly in the 
UK, partnerships have been extensively analysed by studies investigating how 
partnerships work, this field of study in Greece is not yet well developed. The 
lack of such studies reflects a general lack of political research concerning 
issues of local politics. Nevertheless, the recent growth of partnerships of 
various sizes and types creates a clear need for their further study.   
 
My research aim is informed by four ontological assumptions about 
institutions: First, studying the formal rules of a partnership may not establish 
what is actually happening in practice. So, attention must simultaneously be 
SDLGWRLQIRUPDOUXOHVDQGDJHQWV¶EHKDYLRXU,WLVDVVXPHGWKDWLWLVWKH
configuration of formal and informal rules that offers opportunities and sets 
limits to partners by defining what action is considered appropriate and 
SRVVLEOH%XWLWGHSHQGVRQWKHDFWRUV¶FDSDFLW\WRFKRRVHWRXVHQRWXVHWKH
whole space of action offered by the institutions and sustain/alter the 
established institutional rules. Second, the institution of partnership is a 
dynamic process of policy-making during which forces of continuity and 
12 
 
change coexist (Lowndes, 2005). Partnerships as well as the context from 
which they emerge are not a unified or rigid object of analysis that is stuck in 
time; it is a complex multi-level phenomenon evolving in time, and its 
evolution sustains/ changes other institutions and also impacts on the broader 
context. The third ontological assumption is related directly with the selection 
of the research strategy. As Ostrom (2005: 3-31) argues, a NI analysis of 
partnership should avoid generalisations and has to progress through a case-by-
case study. This is because each institution is characterised by a specific 
interdependence of variables and the researcher should provide a sufficient 
explanation of this diversity.  
 
Fourth, starting from an ontological assumption of reflexivity, this research 
aims to build a theoretical synthesis that combines different NI approaches 
with sociological theories of power and agency, and wider theories of urban 
politics. This synthesis reveals the diversity and complexity of political 
institutions. Although this multidisciplinary and multi-theoretical research 
approach could appear very ambitious, it is necessary to capture the diverse 
components of a meso-level phenomenon like that of a partnership institution. 
Hence, many variables are involved and there is a danger of confusion. So, a 
concern of this research is to clearly and precisely define the formal/ informal 
rules as far as possible and analyse the relationship between them and with 
DFWRUV¶EHKDYLRXU 
 
Four main research questions have been developed by the research aim:   
a. Which are the formal and informal rules governing partnerships? Besides the 
formal institutional rules that one can usually recognise in the constitutional 
set-up of partnerships, there are some unwritten rules like norms and 
conventions. Despite their informal character, these rules are usually more 
powerful than the formal ones sanctiRQLQJSDUWQHUV¶LQDSSURSULDWHEHKDYLRXU
Consequently, their recognition and the understanding of their relationship with 
formal rules are fundamental to the study of partnership operation.       
 
b. Who are the partners strategically pursuing their interests? The broader 
context and partnership rules embody different power relations. Established 
13 
 
local leaders and institutional entrepreneurs seem to have the capacity to use 
the available power resources and play a strategic role in partnership 
development by altering, preserving or changing the configuration of rules.  
 
c. Which contextual factors contribute to explaining the formal/informal rules 
and agency configuration at all territorial levels? Even though the interplay 
between partnership institutional UXOHVDQGVWUDWHJLFDFWRUV¶EHKDYLRXULV
significant for the partnership development, they still embody and contest at 
the same time the wider environment. There are a distinctive socio-economic 
FRQWH[WDQGDVWRFNRIVRFLDOFDSLWDOWKDWDIIHFWDFWRUV¶PRWivations and 
resources as well as the empowerment /dis-empowerment of informal rules. 
The interdependence of institutions operating horizontally and vertically, as 
well as their history, also play a significant role to this institutional process. 
 
d. Which are the changes that the institution of partnership brings to local 
politics? There is an extensive debate about the potential benefits of the 
partnership as a policy tool that enhances democracy and efficiency (Kooiman, 
2002; Huxham, 1996; Jessop, 2002; Schmitter, 2002). Advocates argue that 
partnerships improve the effectiveness of a policy by taking advantage of the 
collaboration processes and opening up the decision making process by giving 
SRZHUWRQHZSDUWQHUV2SSRQHQWVDUJXHWKDWSDUWQHUV¶SDUWLFLSation is selective 
and unequal, while problem solving is not always secured. However, the extent 
to which these partnership attributes are actually realised is a matter of 
LQYHVWLJDWLRQLQHDFKFDVHVWXG\EHFDXVHLWGHSHQGVQRWRQO\RQWKHSDUWQHUVKLS¶
s constituent features but also on the circumstances from which it has emerged 
DQGWKHDFWRUV¶FDSDFLW\WRSURPRWHSUHYHQWWKHVHIHDWXUHV 
 
The above research propositions will be investigated through a primarily 
qualitative research design, which looks at two local partnerships in Greece 
funded by the EU Community Initiatives Programmes EQUAL II and 
LEADER+ respectively. The analytical understanding of informal rules as well 
as the cultural and institutional environment in which partnerships are 
developed requires a more in depth analysis through case studies rather than 
large scale surveys (Ostrom, 1999: 53). The selected partnerships operated in 
14 
 
the region of Crete. In particular, LEADER+ partnership, which started in 2002 
and finished in 2009, developed in the Heraklion prefecture of Crete and 
focused on local development. EQUAL II partnership started two years later 
than LEADER+ and was implemented in all the four Cretan prefectures. Its 
main policy aim was to tackle discrimination and disadvantage in the labour 
market. Both partnerships were coordinated by the Local Development Agency 
of Heraklion which is an inter-municipal enterprise comprising all the elected 
local authorities of Heraklion prefecture. In the partnership design and 
implementation, diverse partners coming from the public, semi public and 
social sector were involved. Although the partnerships were locally developed 
and implemented, they were initiated by the EU and overall they were 
organised by the central state. Consequently there were also partners from 
different geographical levels of governance.  
 
BHIRUH,SUHVHQWDQRYHUYLHZRIWKHWKHVLV¶FKDSWHUVLWLVXVHIXOWRSUHVHQWDQ
operational definition of partnership in order to distinguish this from other 
types of collaborative action such as networks and contracts. The use of the 
partnership concept by different policy field and academic approaches had led 
to the attribution of different definitions (Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002: 4-5; 
Murray, 2005:155). However, Sullivan and Skelcher (2002) go forward by 
identifying the main characteristics of partnership as negotiation among people 
from diverse agencies committed to work together long term, providing added 
value benefits which could not have been provided by any single agency and 
requiring a formal articulation of the purpose of the negotiation. Consequently, 
partnerships have at the centre of their operation the concept of collaboration, 
³of joint decision-PDNLQJDQGSURGXFWLRQ´ (Klijn and Teisman, 2000:85-86 
quoted in Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002: 5). Moreover, they differ from contracts 
and networks since there is a stable and long-term cooperation among many 
parties on the one hand and they operated according to defining formal rules on 
the other hand (Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002:6).  
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Overview of the chapters  
The first two chapters provide a literature review of the main NI theories and 
theories of urban politics respectively. In particular, chapter one offers a 
critical account of NI theories and seeks to understand the existing debate on 
the relationship between the rules, agency and context of a political institution. 
For this purpose, it assumes that NI theories need to be enriched with concepts 
and tools from other theories. So, the chapter continues with concepts from the 
critical realism approach and theories of power and social capital. This leads to 
the formulation of the research questions and protocol, which guide the 
primary research.  
 
Chapter two then outlines the way that a NI theory has to be grounded to the 
particular needs of a local partnership study. To do this, it identifies three 
theories of urban politics: urban governance, urban regime and urban 
leadership. The empirical observations, concepts and arguments of these 
theories seek to relate the NI approaches to local cooperative contexts. In 
addition, the chapter explores the potential contribution of NI approaches to 
these theories. This leads to more precise and detailed research propositions 
necessary for the development of a good research design.  
 
Chapter three introduces the research, outlines the methods used to collect the 
data and provides the analytical techniques that guided data analysis. It also 
presents reflections on the strengths and weaknesses of the research design and 
a discussion on the research ethical issues.  
 
The following four chapters present and analyse the research findings. Chapter 
four outlines the context in which both partnerships have operated. First, it 
offers some basic information about the case study under research and the 
broader Greek political context in which it has developed. Second, it seeks to 
understand how the local endogenous socio-economic context, institutional 
legacies and social capital stocks have affected the power relations of 
IRUPDOLQIRUPDOUXOHVDQGSDUWQHUV¶EHKDYLRXUWRZDUGVFROODERUDWLRn. Chapter 
ILYHGHVFULEHVDQGJURXSVWKHSDUWQHUVKLSV¶IRUPDOUXOHVWKDWVKDSHWKH
cooperative action and looks into the way that these rules have been 
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implemented. Chapter six outlines and categorises the informal rules and 
explores the links between them and the formal rules.  Chapter seven identifies 
the actors who behave strategically, i.e. established local leaders and 
institutional entrepreneurs, and their role in partnership development and 
sustainability is discussed.       
 
Finally, the concluding chapter provides a summary of the findings and the 
original theoretical and empirical contribution of this study. It also explores the 
limitations of the research and concludes with suggestions for further research.  
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Chapter 1: The NI approach: rules, agency and context  
Introduction  
The current chapter will provide a critical review of the existing debate 
regarding NI approaches and will identify the main theoretical assumptions that 
guide the empirical work of this study. The presentation will be developed 
around three key issues that broadly transcend the NI approaches: what we 
mean by institutions and rules, the role of the agency and its impact on 
institutional change, and finally which contextual variables influence 
institutions.  
Closely related to the above aim, will be the operationalisation of the 
formulated theoretical assumptions for my primary research. This suggests the 
building of an analytical framework that further elaborated by theories of urban 
politics in the following chapter, will direct the research methodology. For that 
reason, at the end of each section, I will state the research questions that derive 
from the relevant theoretical framework and consequently guide my research 
project.   
What is fascinating in this chapter is the combination of different approaches of 
neo institutionalism as well as of political and sociological theories based on 
analytical concepts beyond institutions like power and agency. These various 
approaches do not only have different ontological and epistemological 
positions but they also focus on different levels of explanation as the most 
appropriate way to understand political behaviour. 
I apply multiple theories in approaching institutions for two reasons. First, 
EHLQJLQWXQHZLWK5KRGHV¶DIILUPDWLRQDbout the engagement of different 
theoretical traditions as the future of political science (Rhodes, 2006), I attempt 
to focus more on synthesis than embrace in an axiomatic way one theoretical 
approach. Ȃy position about the need for reflexivity by the researcher is also 
presented in the methodological chapter.  
Second, it is the nature of institutions themselves as a meso level phenomenon, 
in which different features of political life like micro level relations and macro 
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structural phenomena are related that favours the use of multi theories analysis. 
As Jessop (2001: 2-5) argues, it is this meso level feature of institutions that 
permits the convergence and the overcoming of traditional dichotomies in 
social sciences like holism and individualism, structural determination and 
social agency, necessity and contingency offering a capacity to bridge different 
theoretical approaches. Additionally, and because of that, Lowndes (2010) 
claims that neo institutionalism should not be treated as a new theory but as a 
QHZDSSURDFK6KHQRWHVWKDW³WKHVWUHQJWKRIQHZLQVWLWXWLRQDOLVPPD\EH
found precisely in its multi theoretical character, which allows for the 
assessment of competing propositions drawn from different political theories 
(Lowndes, 2010: 78). 
 
Section 1: Institutions and Rules  
,QWKHµV, there has been a revival of NI theories in political science to the 
extent that some authors have talked about an institutional turn in the social 
enquiry (Jessop, 2001). New institutionalism emerges in a variety of different 
disciplinary contexts such as history, economics, sociology and political 
sciences as well as in a variety of different theoretical approaches such as 
rational choice theory, organisational theory, neo-Marxist theory, feminist 
perspectives, constructivism, etc. Consequently, neo institutionalism is not a 
XQLILHGERG\RIWKRXJKWLQGHHGWKHUHLV³DYDVWVFKRODUVKLSWKDWIDOOVXQGHUWKH
KHDGLQJRIQHRLQVWLWXWLRQDOLVP´5KRGHVet al, 2006: xiii). 
 
The insights of the new institutionalism are very often derived from its 
comparison with the old institutionalism. Focusing exclusively on the legal 
analysis of the political life, the old institutionalism has been criticised by the 
NI approaches for its descriptive and normative analysis (Peters, 1999). Even if 
the new institutionalism reflects many features of the old approach, it is 
enriched by theories of behaviouralism, rational choice analysis, sociological 
and interpretative theories which focus on the actions of the actors, the beliefs 
and ideas that are embedded in institutions as well as on the historical 
evolution and change of institutions (Rhodes, 2006: 91).    
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1.1 The theoretical debate in political science 
In political science, two approaches are dominant to new institutionalism, those 
of the normative and rational choice traditions. The first tradition has been 
influenced by the seminal work of March and Olsen (1989) as well as of new 
sociological institutionalists like Putnam (1993) and Granovetter (1973) and 
radical sociologists like Giddens (1984). The second tradition has been 
influenced by the work of Elinor Ostron (1986) and economist institutionalists 
such as Douglass North (1990). The main differences are focused on the 
definition of LQVWLWXWLRQVRQWKHIRUPDWLRQRIDFWRUV¶SUHIHUHQFHVDQGRQWKH
level of interaction between individuals and institutions (see more analytically 
in Peters, 1999:141-151). In particular, the last factor relates to different 
ontological approaches regarding the relationship between institutions and 
EHKDYLRXURURWKHUZLVHWKHIDPRXVFRQWURYHUV\EHWZHHQ³FDOFXOXV´DQG
³FXOWXUDO´DSSURDFKRIWKLVUHODWLRQVKLS+DOODQG7D\ORU 
 
In rational choice theory, human intentionality dominated by rational driven 
goals plays a determining role in political outcomes. Politics is a series of 
collective action dilemmas where actors constrained by the institutional context 
aimed to maximise the attainment of their own preferences (Peters, 1999:43-
62). In this context, institutions do not shape preferences since preferences are 
uniform and fixed by the principle of maximum benefit in each individual, but 
they do set the rules of the game. So, institutions are positive structural 
constraints supporting solutions of collective action problems. By offering 
information and available choices for their members, institutions provide the 
context in which individuals select their strategies (Ostrom, 1999).   
 
In normative neo institutionalism, institutions embody cultural conventions, 
norms and cognitive frames that influence the preferences and identities of the 
actors. So, norms and values become the dominant explanatory factors of 
DJHQWV¶EHKDYLRXULQVWHDGRIUDWLRQDOLW\$QDO\VLQJ0DUFKDQG2OVHQ
Peters (1999:147) arguHVWKDW³LQGLYLGXDOVGRSRVVHVVVHWVRIEDVLFYDOXHV
before they become involved with institutions but their involvement also 
VKDSHVSUHIHUHQFHV´6RLQVWLWXWLRQVGHWHUPLQHµWKHDSSURSULDWHEHKDYLRXU´
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(March and Olsen, 2006:7) of their members by the process of embedding rules 
DQGURXWLQHVWKDWSURGXFH³UHFXUULQJPRGHVRIDFWLRQVDQGRUJDQLVDWLRQDO
SDWWHUQV´0DUFKDQG2OVHQ)RUQRUPDWLYHLQVWLWXWLRQDOLVWV
LQVWLWXWLRQVFUHDWH³HOHPHQWVRIRUGHUDQGSUHGLFWDELOLW\´WKDWVLPSOLI\WKH
political lifHSURYLGLQJ³ERQGVWKDWWLHFLWL]HQVWRJHWKHULQVSLWHRIWKHPDQ\
WKLQJVWKDWGLYLGHWKHP´0DUFKDQG2OVHQ 
 
Regardless the difference between NI approaches, whether ontological and/or 
theoretical, they share one common feature: institutions matter in political life. 
Starting from this basic assumption, the new institutionalism offers a new 
perspective to the study of political science because it claims that political life 
itself and its institutional organisation are not simple mirrors of the social 
UHDOLW\LQVWLWXWLRQVDFWXDOO\VKDSHSROLWLFDOEHKDYLRXU³:LWKRXWGHQ\LQJWKH
importance of both the social context of politics and the motives of individual 
DFWRUV´0DUFKDQG2OVHQWKHQHZLQVWLWXWLRQDOLVPWUHDWVWKH
political institutions as factors that construct and change the polity. As a result, 
institutions become a dominant explanatory factor of political behaviour.  
 
Lowndes (2010) argues that researchers who are working in the context of a 
good institutionalist analysis may have a more sophisticated and reflexive 
appreciation of the various approaches of neo institutionalism by adapting and 
borrowing insights from each one, but they should beware of the dangers a 
crude synthesis of the different ontological premises of each approach might 
HQWDLO³7KHUHDUHFUHDWLYHVSDFHV´/RZQGHVEHWZHHQWKHFRUH
axioms of each approach and it is these spaces that the researcher had to 
understand by learning from the different institutionalisms and adapting them 
to the challenge of their empirical evidence.     
 
Following this argument, I apply various concepts from different NI 
approaches. At the core of my analysis, I adopt a normative approach of new 
institutionalism due to its assumptions regarding the normative elements of the 
institutions (values, symbols, ideas) and as shown more analytically in the 
following section, the central role assigned to the individuals in shaping and 
changing the rules of the institutions. Although its conceptualisation on 
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institutions places more emphasis on the logic of appropriateness, it also 
focuses on individual behavioural realisation of an institutional rule, i.e. the 
way that the agents interpret and apply the game rules (March and Olsen, 
1989:39-52). So, as Peters (1996:939) notes, normative institutionalism 
HPSKDVLVH³WKHGHJUHHWRZKLFKWKHFKRLFHRIDFRXUVHRIDFWLRQGHSHQGVRQWKH
LQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIDVLWXDWLRQUDWKHUWKDQRQSXUHO\LQVWUXPHQWDOFDOFXODWLRQ´
Additionally, it gives an important consideration to institutions as structures of 
power, unlike the rational choice where power is not part of its analytical core 
(Moe, 2003).  
 
Moreover, I borrow inputs from rational choice, in particular the role assigned 
to the strategic behaviour of actors in pursuing their interests and the more 
systematic and precise methodology on the conception of the relationship 
between institutions and behaviour (Peters, 1996:950). The work of Ostrom, 
especially concerning the interdependence of institutions, the multiple levels of 
analysis and the concept of rules-in-use (Ostrom, 1986, 1999) allow for a 
concrete mapping and analysis of rules in an institutional context. Although 
these concepts have to be used carefully due to different ontological origins 
than the normative institutionalism, they could facilitate the linking of rules 
ZLWKRWKHUUXOHVDQGDFWRUV¶EHKDYLRXU$GGLWLRQDOO\,ERUURZFRQFHSWVIURP
historical institutionalism like the concept of path dependency and its 
distinctive view of the relationship between structure and agency (Hay and 
Wincott, 1998). Because historical institutionalism does not have a cohesive 
conceptual framework, Sanders (2006:44) speaks about its undisciplined 
nature, I have to note that particularly the work of Streeck and Thelen (2005) 
about incremental change and Hall (1993) about policy paradigm have mostly 
influenced my research. Moreover, the constructivist institutionalism 
introduced by Hay (2006) has emphasised the role played by ideas in the 
determination of institutional outcomes; this has also informed my study.  
 
In the following table (1), I present the distinctive contribution in terms of 
theories and concepts of each NI approach to the building up of my theoretical 
framework. These theories and concepts are analysed in the following relevant 
sections. Bearing in mind that NI approaches not only have differences but also 
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points of convergence like the common recognition of formal and informal 
rules and the interdependence of agency/institution relationship; I mention in 
the table the unique inputs of each approach in the sense that these inputs could 
not be found in other approaches.    
NI approaches  
Contribution to my theoretical 
framework of analysis 
Normative institutionalism  
Embodiment of values and norms by 
the institutions, cultural behaviour.   
Rational choice theory 
Multiple levels of analysis, 
institutional interdependence, rules-in-
use.  
Historic institutionalism  
Path dependency, incremental change 
of institutions, policy paradigm. 
Constructivist institutionalism  
Ideas and narratives as explanatory 
factors of political behaviour inside 
institution. 
Table 1: The contribution of each NI approach to the theoretical framework of my 
study  
 
1.2 Definition of institution and rules  
As mentioned above, the difference in the two main NI approaches in political 
science is also reflected in the different definition of institution and thus of 
rules that constitute the main component of institution. For normative neo 
institutionalism1LQVWLWXWLRQVDUHVHHQDV³UXOHVDQGRUJDQLVHGSUDFWLFHV
embedded in structures of meaning and resources that are relatively invariant in 
the face of the turnover of individuals and relatively resilient to the 
idiosyncratic preferences and expectations of individuals and changing external 
FLUFXPVWDQFHV´0DUFKDQG2OVHQ06:3). For institutional rational choice, 
³LQVWLWXWLRQVUHIHUWRVKDUHGFRQFHSWVXVHGE\KXPDQVLQUHSHWLWLYHVLWXDWLRQV
RUJDQLVHGE\UXOHVQRUPVDQGVWUDWHJLHV´2VWURP'HVSLWHWKHVH
differences, both definitions provide to institutions autonomy vis as vis 
                                                 
1
 The ontological frontiers between sociological and normative NI are difficult to be 
distinguished.  Sociological NI is usually applied in the research of social institutions while the 
normative NI for political institutions. However, sociological NI had pURYLGHG³LPSRUWDQW
WKHRUHWLFDOEXLOGLQJEORFNVIRUQRUPDWLYHLQVWLWXWLRQDOLVPZLWKLQSROLWLFDOVFLHQFH´/RZQGHV
2010:65). 
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individual behaviour and context and they identify in them a more or less 
VWDEOHUHSHWLWLYHVLWXDWLRQ,QWKLVZD\LQVWLWXWLRQVUHVHPEOHWR³VWUXFWXUHV´RID
lower level with regards to the way in which they shape individual behaviour. 
 
As shown in figure 1, my approach to institutions follows the definition of the 
normative institutionalism, which does not distinguish rules from norms. 
$GGLWLRQDOO\,LQWHJUDWHWKHUDWLRQDOFKRLFHSRVLWLRQDERXWWKHDJHQWV¶SXUSRVH
and goals2 as a central institutional component. I will elaborate this point in the 
next section while in the current section, I focus on the analysis of rules.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The components of an institution 
 
Analysing in detail the normative NI definition (March and Olsen, 1989), 
political institutions embody rules and practices that define the appropriate 
behaviour of the individuals in each situation called the logic of 
DSSURSULDWHQHVV³7KHLQVWLWXWLRQVGHILQHDVHWRIEHKDYLRXUDO expectations for 
individuals in positions within the institution and then reinforce behaviour that 
LVDSSURSULDWHIRUWKHUROHDQGVDQFWLRQEHKDYLRXUWKDWLVLQDSSURSULDWH´3HWHUV, 
1999: 30). For doing that, normative institutionalism recognises two features of 
institutions: the construction of meanings and the distribution of resources. 
Political institutions could transform the preferences of the individuals through 
the construction of meaning and by affecting the distributions of resources. So, 
as shown more analytically in the next section about power and change, 
institutions are not neutral mechanisms but they are directly related to power 
DQGGRPLQDWLRQ³,QVWLWXWLRQVHPSRZHUDQGFRQVWUDLQDFWRUVGLIIHUHQWO\DQG
make them more or less capable of acting according to prescriptive rules of 
DSSURSULDWHQHVV´0DUFKDQG2OVHQ)RULQVWDQFHE\FRQWUROOLQJ
                                                 
2
 ,DYRLGWKHWHUP³VWUDWHJ\´WKDW2VWURPPHQWLRQVLQKHUGHILQLWLRQVLQFHLWVXJJHVWVD
rational only driven behaviour. 
Rules 
Agent 
purpose 
Institution 
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whose voices get heard, institutions may recognise certain actors and exclude 
others. As Moe argues ³LQVWLWXWLRQVPD\EHVWUXFWXUHVRIFRRSHUDWLRn. But they 
PD\DOVREHVWUXFWXUHVRISRZHU´DQGKHFRQWLQXHVVD\LQJ³WKDWDUHEHQHILFLDO
WRVRPHRIWHQKDUPIXOWRRWKHUV´0RH 
(ODERUDWLQJPRUHRQWKHQDWXUHRIUXOHV,XQGHUVWDQGUXOHVDV³VKDULQJ
understandings among those involved that refer to enforced prescriptions about 
ZKDWDFWLRQVRUVWDWHVRIWKHZRUOGDUHUHTXLUHGSURKLELWHGRUSHUPLWWHG´
(Ostrom, 1999:50). This definition supports three features of rules: First, rules 
are recognised by all the actors of the specific institutions. In this way they are 
distinguished from personal habits and attitudes (Lowndes, 2010) since the 
rules relate to social (collaborative) actions. Second, rules are followed (not 
always) by the involved actors. They have a regulative character by prescribing 
the appropriate behaviour for each actor. Rules stand above each individual 
DQGLIQRWIROORZHGWKHUHLVD³VDQFWLRQLQJRIQRQ- FRPSOLDQFH´0DUFKDQG
Olsen, 2006: 3). In particular, March and Olsen (1989, 2006) as well Giddens 
(1984: 1-40) argue that rules are not only related to the construction of 
PHDQLQJEXWDOVRZLWKVDQFWLRQLQJ³E\WKLUGSDUWLHV´0DUFKDQG2OVHQ, 
2006:3).  Finally, rules include a wide range of features that guide human 
behaviour like values, beliefs, attitudes and practices but their power is 
restricted to specific actors in specific institutions.  
Although the rules features are wide and extensive (Peters, 1999; Lowndes, 
2010), they remain directly related to structures of meaning embedded in them. 
,QWKLVZD\+D\¶V analytical emphasis on ideas could also be integrated 
in the rules definition of this research. In particular, I am looking for the 
normative schemes of an institution that are internalised by the policy actors 
DQGGHILQH³WKHUDQJHRIOHJLWLPDWHSROLF\Wechniques, mechanisms, and 
instruments, thereby delimiting the very targets and goals of policy itself´ 
(Hay, 2006: 66). In my primary research, it is the policy paradigm of 
partnerships emanating from the EU policy principles that became a prism 
WKURXJKZKLFKWKHSDUWQHUVDQGSROLF\PDNHUVVDZFROOHFWLYHDFWLRQDQG³WKHLU
own role within [...] without challenging the overall terms of the given policy 
SDUDGLJP´+DOO, 1993: 279). 
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The following table (2) summarises the above discussion by demonstrating the 
attributes of rules and their operation in collaborative action.  
Attributes of rules Effects  
Sharing understanding  Recognised and followed  
Regulative  Sanctioning of non  compliance  
Normative  Structure of meaning  
Table 2: 5XOHV¶DWWULEXWHVDQGWheir effects on collaborative action  
 
1.3 Formal/ informal rules  
Neo institutionalism recognises that institutional rules could be formal and/or 
informal. Some rules are written in paper; for instance the legal framework that 
directs the partnership. These rules are the formal ones because they are 
official and directly identifiable on paper. However, there are rules that are 
GHYHORSHGGXULQJWKHSDUWQHUV¶LQWHUDFWLRQV7KHVHUXOHVDUHLQIRUPDOWKH\DUH
not written and could take the form of conventions, practices and customs 
(Lowndes, 2005). However, they have the same power as formal ones do, i.e. 
to order and regulate the behaviour and interactions of the involved partners by 
GHILQLQJWKHµPXVWPXVWQRWDQGPD\¶2VWURP$PDLQGLVWLQFWLRQ
between formal and informal rules is that formal rules are enforced by 
officially sanctioned channels, while informal rules are self enforced because 
they are deeply rooted in cultural tradition or they are unofficially enforced by 
other institutions, i.e. the local government or the state. Whichever does, 
breaking informDOUXOHV³FDUULHVVRPHIRUPRIFUHGLEOHVDQFWLRQ´+HOPNHDQG
Levitsky, 2006: 5) like social disapproval or restriction from resources. Based 
on empirical evidence, North (1990: 3, 36-45) argues that although the 
informal institutions operate outside the officially sanctioned channels, they 
RIWHQDUHDVLPSRUWDQWDVWKHIRUPDOLQVWLWXWLRQVLQVWUXFWXULQJWKH³UXOHVRIWKH
JDPH´ 
 
As to be seen in the next chapter, urban regime theory highlights the 
VLJQLILFDQFHRIWKHLQIRUPDOLQWHUHVWV¶FRDOLWLRQVLQJRYernance process. Rhodes 
and MarcKDOVRH[DPLQHQHWZRUNVDQGWKH\GHPRQVWUDWHKRZ³LQIRUPDO
but regulated contacts between particular interests and different sections of 
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JRYHUQPHQWDIIHFWSROLF\RXWFRPHV´,QGHHG$QVHOOUHIHUs to 
³QHWZRUNLQVWLWXWLRQDOLVP´VLQFHDQHWZRUNFRXOGEHVHHQDVDQLQVWLWXWLRQWR
WKHH[WHQWWKDWLW³UHSUHVHQWVDVWDEOHRUUHFXUUHQWSDWWHUQRIEHKDYLRXUDO
LQWHUDFWLRQRUH[FKDQJHEHWZHHQLQGLYLGXDOVRURUJDQLVDWLRQV´ 
 
An institutionalist analysis must identify the configuration of formal and 
informal rules inside the partnership or as Osrtom argues the rules-in-XVHµWKH
GRVDQGGRQ¶WVWKDWRQHOHDUQVRQWKHJURXQGWKDWPD\QRWH[LVWLQDQ\ZULWWHQ
GRFXPHQW¶2VWURP%\WKLVZD\WKHUHVHDUFKHUV³DUHDEOHto build a 
more finely grained and realistic picture of what really constrains political 
EHKDYLRXUDQGGHFLVLRQPDNLQJ´/RZQGHV 
 
In most cases, formal and informal rules cohabit but the question is the nature 
of their relationship. I have founG/DXWK¶VW\SRORJ\DPRQJ
complementary, conflicting and substitutive informal institutions very useful 
for my research. This typology, further elaborated by Helmke and Levitsky 
(2006)3, treats informal rules in a more sophisticated way because it 
distinguishes between the results of the rules and the process put in place to 
obtain these results. In some cases, informal rules could achieve the same 
results as the formal ones but through a different process or could achieve 
results, which the formal ones fail to achieve. Consequently, it liberates the 
formal- informal rules relation from their traditional disfunctionality 
undermining the performance of the formal institutions (March and Olsen, 
1989) to a dynamic and mutual existence of formal and informal rules in which 
informal rules could at times reinforce or substitute the formal rules instead of 
undermine them (Helmke and Levitsky, 2006).  
 
  
                                                 
3
 Helmke and Levitsky (2006) use the terms institution and rules interchangeably without 
GLVWLQFWLRQVRLQP\RZQDQDO\WLFDOSXUSRVH,XVHWKHWHUP³UXOHV´LQVWHDGRILQVWLWXWLRQ.  
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In the following table (3), I present the interaction of formal and informal 
LQVWLWXWLRQVEDVHGRQ/DXWK¶V2000) typology. 
Typology  
Relation of formal/informal 
rules  
Complementary 
Formal and informal rules 
support each other  
Substitutive  
Informal rules do the work for 
the formal ones 
Conflicting 
Incompatibility of formal and 
informal rules (persist or 
change)  
Table 3: Typology of formal/informal rules relationship  
 
In the case of the rules being complementary, the informal rules coexist with 
the formal ones enhancing the stability and efficiency of the latter in two ways. 
They could fill the gap in formal rules by offering to actors practices that 
facilitate coordination and decision making. Furthermore, informal rules could 
VHUYH³DVWKHXQGHUO\LQJIRXQGDWLRQIRUIRUPDOLQVWLWXWLRQV´+HOPNHDQd 
Levitsky, 2006:14) because though they are not an intrinsic part of formal 
institutions they are attached to them, and thus may complement and reinforce 
formal institutions. In the case of conflicting, the informal rules are 
incompatible with the formal ones. If one actor follows informal rules, then this 
actor will be breaking formal rules.  
 
Finally, the substitutive informal rules exist in environments where the formal 
rules are not systematically enforced. In this case, the informal rules achieve 
what the formal rules were designed for but never achieved. This category 
seems to be related to the distinction between rules-in-use and rules in form 
(Ostrom, 1999: 37-38), which offers more insights in the understanding of 
which rules are actually used for the regulation of the behaviour and which 
rules remain ineffective by their weak or even non implementation.  
 
In the case of conflicting informal rules, Knight (1992: 171-173) has informed 
my research further because he stresses the power relation between 
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formal/informal rules. There are cases where the informal rules may persist in 
the face of new formal rules or even change the direction of formal institutional 
outcomes due to their influence on the distribution of resources within the 
institution and/or in the community.  
 
However, a further question that is still important for the understanding of the 
formal/informal relationship is when conflicting informal rules lose their 
resilience. According to Helmke and Levitsky (2006:22-25) there are three 
sources of informal institutional change (figure 2). As shown in the next 
section on power and institutional change, these sources are also identified as 
factors that support institutional change in general. 
a. )RUPDOLQVWLWXWLRQDOFKDQJHLQIRUPDOUXOHV¶FKDQJHFRXOGEHGULYHQE\
new formal rules which are considered by the players more efficient 
than the informal ones. The existing formal rules increase their 
effectiveness in terms of credible outcomes compared with the informal 
ones or, as also North (1990:83-91) points out, of changes in the level 
of enforcement.  
b. Changes in distribution of power and resources: an alternative source of 
change which is also mentioned by Knight (1992) is the change in 
distribution of resources and power in the institution and/or in the 
community. This redistribution could weaken those actors that benefit 
from the informal rules and strengthen new actors that benefit from the 
formal rules.  
c. Changes in beliefs and collective experiences: in this case, the 
ZHDNHQLQJRILQIRUPDOUXOHVLVSURGXFHGE\FKDQJHVLQDFWRUV¶EHOLHIV
about the opportunities and benefits of formal rules. Gradual learning 
SURFHVVHVDQGWKHDFFXPXODWLRQRIH[SHULHQFHFRXOGDOWHUWKHDFWRUV¶
expectations about the formal institutions. This aspect is very important 
because it could be related with the key role of ideas as introduced by 
+D\¶VFRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQRILQVWLWXWLRQV6RDWWLPHVRILQVWLWXWLRQDO
changes, there could be an ideational contestation where the ³ROG´LGHDV
are replaced with new ones (Hay, 2006). 
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d.    
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Factors that change the formal/informal relationship  
 
Although Helmke and Levitsky (2006) underplay the interpretation of rules by 
actors and their strategic choices in this varying institutional context (see my 
argument in the next section), they make a significant contribution to the 
identification of the sources of informal institutional change. 
 
Summary  
The above analysis has expanded theoretically my first main research question 
UHJDUGLQJLQVWLWXWLRQV¶IRUPDOLQIRUPDOUXOHVFRQILJXUDWLRQ7KHIROORZLQJVXE
questions illuminate in detail this research question and guide my primary 
research:  
1. What constitXWHVDQ³LQVWLWXWLRQ´LQP\VWXG\" 
2. At which level the formal rules have been implemented in the selected 
institutions?  
3. Which informal rules enable, substitute or contradict the formal rules? 
4.  Which actually are the rules-in-use inside the selected partnerships? 
5. To what extent do the formal rules lead to a change in informal rules 
during partnership process and outcomes?   
  
Changes of formal rules  
Changes in distribution 
of power and resources 
distiribution  
Changes of beliefs and 
expectations  
Change of 
formal/informal 
relationship  
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Section 2:  Agency, power and institutional change  
In the previous section, I analysed one component of the institution, i.e. rules. 
In this section, the main topic of analysis is agency and its relation with rules, 
SRZHUDQGFKDQJH2VWURPDUJXHVWKDWµLQVWLWXWLRQVWKHPVHOYHVDUHLQYLVLEOH¶
(1999: 36) because institutions are more than organisations since they are 
composed by the rules-in-XVHDQGWKHDJHQWV¶DFWLRQVLQUHODWLRQWRUXOHV 
 
So, there is the need to understand the interaction between the individual and 
rules for the explanation of institutional outcomes (Rhodes et al, 2006; Hay, 
2006). As Hay and Wincott argue (1998: 951³LILQVWLWXWLRQDOLVPLVWRGHYHORS
to its full potential, it must consider the relationship between structure and 
DJHQF\´7KHQRUPDWLYHLQVWLWXWLRQDOLVPand to a lesser extent historical 
institutionalism) adopted by this research have not adequately conceptualised 
the relationship between institution and agency (Hay and Wincott, 2001:6). 
³$OWKRXJKLWLVFOHDUWKDWLQVWLWXWLRQVFDQVKDSHWKHEHKDYLRXURILQGLYLGXDOV
WKHUHFLSURFDOSURFHVVLVQRWQHDUO\DVFOHDU´3HWHUV 
 
The question of structure/agency relationship is central not only for NI but for 
every political scientist, since this issue offers explanation about the power 
balance of the constituent parts of social life. However, this relationship is one 
of the long-standing issues of controversy between the different approaches in 
social science. Indeed, it is directly related with different ontological and 
epistemological positions (Marsh, 2010: 212). Hay (2002:89-93) acknowledges 
that structure and agency should not be a problem that needs to be solved 
HPSLULFDOO\RQFHDQGIRUHYHU5DWKHU³LW¶VDODQJXDJHE\ZKLFKRQWRORJLFDO
GLIIHUHQFHVEHWZHHQFRQWHQGLQJDFFRXQWVPXVWEHUHJLVWHUHG´+D\ 
 
In the first part of the current section, I will outline the existing debate on this 
issue and relate to NI theory. In the second part of the section, I will identify 
the theoretical links of the structure/agency debate with the notions of power 
and institutional change. Throughout the section, I will raise questions as to the 
ways that this discussion enlightens my research by revealing concepts and 
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analytical tools and as to what extent my primary research could contribute into 
this discussion.  
 
2.1 Agency/structure relationship  
In order to avoid general assumptions in the already well-known debate to the 
benefit of more detailed and sophisticated accounts, I briefly state the main 
ontological arguments about structure and agency. I then explore in more depth 
the role of agency in sociological institutionalism and the way the particular 
theory of critical realism (in its various versions) could be operationalised in NI 
theory. When I refer to agency and structure through the institutional lens, 
structure is largely viewed in institutional terms, meaning the rules of political 
institutions that present regularity over time, while agency is understood as the 
DFWRUV¶EHKDYLRXULQWKHVHLQVWLWXWLRQVIf structure refers to bigger social 
regulatory frameworks like economy, religion, gender, rule refers to the micro 
level regulatory framework of the institution itself.    
 
The existing literature on agency and structure identifies three groups of 
approaches: 1. the structural, 2. the intentional and 3. the dialectical. In the first 
two approaches, the relation of structure and agency is treated as a dualistic one 
that means that structure and agency are separate units which depending on the 
approach, one or the other is privileged. Indeed, they stand as oppositional 
poles; if an explanation privileges structure, it has to down play the role of 
agency and vice versa (Hay, 2002:95; Marsh, 2010: 213) In the third, the 
dialectical one, structure and agency are not separated but are coupled. As Hay 
XQGHUOLQHV³VWDWHGPRVWVLPSO\WKHQQHLWKHUDJHQWVQRUVWUXFWXUHVDUHUHDO
since neither has an existence in isolation from the other; their existence is 
UHODWLRQDO´+D\ 
 
Structuralism and intentionalism have a lot of limitations since they are related 
to holistic and reductionist positions of social life that are unable to understand 
the complexities of social life processes. Facing all these problems, there are 
theorists that attempt to e rase the tension of agency/structure showing how 
structure and agency could work together in a dialectical way by contrast to 
dualism where structure and agency are conceived as different entities. In the 
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8.OLWHUDWXUHWZRGRPLQDQWGLDOHFWLFDODSSURDFKHVDUHLGHQWLILHG*LGGHQV¶
VWUXFWXUDWLRQWKHRU\DQGFULWLFDOUHDOLVPDVH[SUHVVHGE\$UFKHU¶V(2010) 
PRUSKRJHQHWLFDSSURDFKDQG-HVVRSDQG+D\¶V (2002) strategic 
relational approach. Despite their differences with regards to the way that they 
conceptualise the dialectical relation between structure/agency (Archer, 2010), 
all these approaches have the same ontological core: the context does influence 
the agency by setting opportunities and constrains for action but actors inside 
this context pursue their preferences and their objectives and by acting they 
influence the development of this context (Hay, 2002). In this perspective, 
³DFWLRQ´DQG³VWUXFWXUH´SUHVXSSRVHRQHDQRWKHU³VWUXFWXral patterning is 
LQH[WULFDEO\JURXQGHGLQSUDFWLFDOLQWHUDFWLRQ´$UFKHU 
 
The theoretical assumptions that underpin this research are developed around 
the principle that agency and structure have to be conceived and analysed in a 
dialectical way. Or, through an institutional lens, institutional outcomes are the 
product of the interaction between agency and rules. However, I do not 
exclusively adopt one of the above-mentioned approaches of this theoretical 
strand but I instead mix and match those inputs that have an analytical utility 
for my research. Although this could be faced with criticism by empiricism and 
eclecticism, I propose that these three different strands are not rivals; by 
contrast they have a lot of common ontological and epistemological themes 
leaving room for combining these different strands.      
 
*LGGHQV¶VWUXFWXUDWLRQWKHRU\DFFRXQWVIRUWKHDJHQF\DVDVXEMHFW
acting in society. This is to be achieved by recognising the flexibility and 
knowledge ability of actors, wKLFKPHDQWKDW³DOOKXPDQEHLQJVDUHKLJKO\
learned in respect of knowledge which they possess and apply in the 
SURGXFWLRQDQGUHSURGXFWLRQRIGD\WRGD\VRFLDOHQFRXQWHUV´*LGGHQV
22). Nevertheless, he underlines that agency employs structural properties in 
this process. So, the dualism of structure/agency is conceptualised in his theory 
DVWKHGXDOLW\RIVWUXFWXUHZKHUH³DJHQF\DQGVWUXFWXUHDUHPXWXDOO\
FRQVWLWXWHG´+LVDSSURDFKLQYROYHVWZRSRLQWVVLJQLILFDQWIRUP\DQDO\VLV 
a.  the agency is deeply embedded in regularised institutional elements, 
while institutions could be conceived as embodiments of action. So, as 
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-HVVRSDUJXHVYHU\FOHDUO\³LQVWLWXWLRQVQHYHUH[LVWRXWVLGHRIVSHFLILF
DFWLRQFRQWH[WV´-HVVRS5HODWLQJWKHDERYHGLVFXssion to the 
study of institutions, I am looking at the way that partnership involve 
multiple partners who might otherwise not cooperate into processes of 
negotiation and collective action for achieving particular outcomes. At 
the same time, I am looking at the way that these partners, following 
their strategies, interpret the rules and take advantages of their 
opportunities, transforming the institutional processes and outcomes of 
WKHSDUWQHUVKLS$V/RZQGHVDQG5REHUWVXQGHUOLQHIRUWKFRPLQJ³WKH
enactment of a role is never perfect and there is always a gap between 
³WKHLGHDOSDWWHUQRIDUXOH´DQGKRZWKDWSDWWHUQLVSOD\HGRXWLQVLWX´
So the gap between them draws out significant points for the strategic 
action on the part of actors (Streeck and Thelen, 2005).    
b. the image of the purposive agent who is acting but their action, 
independently of their intentions, could have unintended consequences. 
Although the consequences are unintended, they could change beliefs 
and attitudes influencing the politicDOFRQWH[W³$JHQWV¶FRQGXFWUDUHO\
if ever, leaves the social/political context in which it arises entirely 
XQDOWHUHG´+D\7KLVLVVXHLVIXUWKHUUHODWHGZLWK+D\¶V
account of power and institutional change analysed further down.  
But how could the dynamic interplay of structure and agency could be 
understood analytically? Starting from another standpoint, that of critical 
realism, Archer with her analytical separation of structure and agency and Hay 
DQG-HVVRS¶VFRQFHSWRIVWUDWHJLFDFWRURIIer a more realistic understanding of 
WKLVUHODWLRQ$FFRUGLQJWR$UFKHU¶VWKHRU\³DQDO\WLFDOGXDOLVP´LV
welcomed when dealing with structure and action. For her, structure predates 
agency and she identifies a three-stage cycle of change over time: 1. the pre-
H[LVWLQJFRQWH[WWKHVWUXFWXUHVFRQGLWLRQDQGWKHDJHQWV¶DFWLRQ'XULQJ
social interaction, agents are not only influenced by the structure but they also 
pursue their interests affecting in this way the outcomes leading or not to 
structural elaboration (morphogenesis).  
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So, Archer (2010) opens up the discussion of the autonomous power of 
structural constraints and the different capacities of actors to change structures. 
She argues that it is important to specify when, under which conditions or 
circumstances, an actor could be transformative and when they have to serve 
replication logic. These circumstances are related to the nature of the structure, 
i.e. the stringency of its constraints and by this the degree of freedom that it 
leaves to the agency. 
 
But how do we trace the degree of freedom that the rules of an institution leave 
to the agent? Although starting from a different field, that of institutional 
design, the identification of some desirable institutional criteria could support 
my effort to analyse the existing formal institutional rules of partnerships and 
specifying the degree of opportunities and constraints that these leave to the 
agency. According to Goodin (1996), there are two main criteria of 
institutional design, that of revisability and robustness. Institutions must evolve 
during time adopting innovative ways of doing things on the one hand and 
institutions must be stable in order not to be easily destroyed by changes 
initiating by individuals or the socio-economic context on the other hand. 
:KLOHWKHOHYHORI³DSSURSULDWH´VWDELOLW\YHUVXVFKDQJHRQD³JRRGGHVLJQ´LVD
³PDWWHURIFRQWHQWLRQDQGSROLWLFDOFRQWURYHUV\´*RRGLQWKHVH
criteria nevertheless guide the research empirically in order to identify the way 
that the actors conceive the formal rules.  
 
The above two main criteria comprise another internal criteria that of 
sensibility to motivational complexity of individuals (Goodin, 1996). The 
institutions must offer a space for alternative manoeuvres to individuals 
offering them the potential to pursue their motives, self-seeking or altruistic. 
One tool for doing that is publicity. Institutions should be accountable and 
legitimated to the public; this is a precondition for the embracement of people 
by these institutions. Lowndes and Wilson (2003) go further adding a new 
criterion that of clarity about values. They argue that publicity requires a clear 
recording of the values being promoted by the new institutions.  
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One more criterion is that of variability. The institutional design could take into 
account that one institutional paradigm could not fit into every circumstance. In 
this context, the institution must offer a repertoire of combining rules in order 
to be better embedded in the local environment (Goodin, 1996; Lowndes and 
Wilson, 2003). The criteria of clarity and variability are important in my 
research because I deal with EU programmes that had introduced new 
LQVWLWXWLRQVDQGSUDFWLFHVLQWKH*UHHNPXQLFLSDOLWLHV7KHVH³IRUHLJQ´
practices, if not clear and flexible, could confront problems due to lack of 
correspondence in local circumstances.  
 
The following table (4) presents the above criteria of rules and their impact on 
DJHQWV¶IUHHGRPWRDFW 
   Criteria of formal rules  'HJUHHRIDJHQW¶VIreedom  
Stability Rules do not allow room for ³GHYLDWLRQ´ 
Revisability  
 
x Sensibility  
 
 
x Publicity  
 
 
x Clarity  
 
5XOHVUHVSRQGWRDJHQW¶VSXUSRVHVDQG
goals  
x Rules permit alternative 
DJHQWV¶PRWLYHVVHOILQWHUHVW
versus altruistic  
x Rules being publicly 
acceptable facilitate/control 
DJHQWV¶DFWLRQ 
x Clear rules of the game 
IDFLOLWDWHFRQWURODJHQWV¶DFWLRQ 
Variability  Rules could adapt to local 
environment   
Table 4: Types of formal rules and agency freedom 
 
Finally, the strategic relational approach, which, as Jessop (2005) argues, could 
be interpreted-among others- as a particular version of critical realism, offers 
IUXLWIXOLQVLJKWVDERXWWKHDJHQWV¶FRQGXFWDQGWKHSURFHVVRIOHDUQLQJ7KLV
WKHRU\WUHDWVDFWRUVDV³VWUDWHJLF´PHDQLQJWKDWWKH\³FDQEH reflexive, can 
formulate within their limits their own identities, and can engage in strategic 
FDOFXODWLRQDERXWWKH³REMHFWLYH´LQWHUHVWVWKDWIORZIURPWKHVHDOWHUQDWLYH
LGHQWLWLHVLQSDUWLFXODUFRQMXQFWXUHV´-HVVRS7KLVVWUDWHJLFDFWLRQ
deSHQGVRQWKHLQGLYLGXDOV¶OHDUQLQJFDSDFLWLHVDQGRQWKH³H[SHULHQFH´RIWKH
pursuit of different strategies.  
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Consequently, this approach introduces a number of themes for my case study 
such as the identification of the motivation and goals of the partners, their 
capacity to integrate knowledge into their activities, to programme their own 
activity and finally to produce evolution in the institutional setting. The issue 
of learning in partnerships is further developed in detail in the next chapter. 
 
Following the concept of strategic action, agency in institutions encompasses 
two aspects: the selection of rules-in-use from the pool of formal and informal 
rules, and the preservation/change of rules-in-use (Ostrom, 1999). The 
difficulty here lies in the distinction of the rules-in-use, especially the informal 
rules, from the agentV¶ strategy to change them. Since the rules-in-use are 
shared concepts in the minds of the involved people and they take meaning 
through their interpretation by them, (the rules-in-use start existing the moment 
they are applied by the involved people) i.e. when they explain and justify their 
action, it is difficult for the researcher to distinguish if the transformation of 
IRUPDOUXOHVLVOHGE\WKHDJHQF\¶VSXUSRVHIRUFKDQJHRUE\WKe informal rules, 
in particular in cases where the change is incremental.  
 
In the following figure (3), I present the contribution of each approach to my 
analytical framework for the study of the relationship between agency and 
rules.   
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Figure 3: &RQWULEXWLRQRIHDFK³GXDOLVWLF´DSSURDFKWRP\WKHRUHWLFDOIUDPHZRUNRQ
rules/agency relationship in political institution  
 
,QFRQFOXVLRQ*LGGHQV¶WKHRU\ZKLFKZDVRQHRIWKHILUVWWKDWZHQWEH\RQGWKH
opposition of structure and agency, introduces an image of a recursive social 
reproduction through the repetitiveness of activities by acting intuitively and by 
habit. These normative features are related to tradition and routinisation. By 
contrast, the approaches of critical realism recognise tensions and 
contradictions in social reproduction, which derive from variations, 
contradictions and dilemmas inherent in the structural configurations and the 
DJHQWV¶FKRLFHV,WDOVRSD\VDWWHQWLRQWRWKHVWUDWHJLFIHDWXUHVRIDJHQF\LHWKH
pursuit of interests in the available institutional context and differential 
capacities and specificities.  
 
If normative and rational choice NI approaches embody an opposition between 
calculus and cultural agency, critical realism tries to balance this opposition by 
supporting socialised agents through their calculus. So, critical realism could 
bridge the opposition between the normative character of institutions, which 
conveys the logic of appropriateness, and the functional role of institutions as 
supporters of collective problems which conveys the logic of consequentially. 
+D\DUJXHV³WKHUHLVDFOHDUGDQJHU´WR³UHGXFHDOOPRWLYHVIRUSROLWLFDODction 
Structuration theory  
x Duality:                    rule and agent mutually constituted: purposive    
                                                 agent with unintended consequences     
                    
x Institutions:              routinisation and appropriate behaviour  
Critical realism  
Morphogenetic approach  
x Analytical duality:       rules pre exist and constrain-enable agents  
x Conflictual society:      institutions have tensions and 
contradictions  
Strategic relational approach  
x Strategic agent:             agent pursue its interests by learning and                  
                                                              experience    
 
                                             procedural character of institutions         
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WRWKHOHYHORISXUHLQVWUXPHQWDOLW\´LQWHUPVRI³JRDORULHQWHGSXUVXLWRI
material self-LQWHUHVW´+D\+RZHYHUWKHVDPHGDQJHUH[LVWVLIWKH
studies project only normative structurally embodied motivations onto political 
conduct.  
 
2.2 Power and institutional change 
2.2.1 Power  
The rules embody different power relations (Moe, 2003; Goodin 1996). Rules 
enable/constrain the agents but they do not do that in the same way for all the 
agents. But if I end here my analysis, I, on the one hand, stand off from the 
intentional approach of power like that found in pluralist and elitist theories 
ZKHUHWKHDJHQWDFWV³ODUJHO\XQFRQVWUDLQHGE\WKHLQVWLWXWLRQV´Lowndes and 
Roberts,  forthcoming). On the other hand, I define rules in a deterministic 
ZD\DVSRZHUVWUXFWXUHVWKDWVKDSHDJHQWV¶EHKDYLRXUOLNHLQWKHFODVVLFDO
Marxist account. In this way, I fail to relate structure and agency in terms of 
power relations.  
 
For Giddens as for all the others supporters of the structure/ agency duality, 
structures and institutional rules are not identified with the exercise of power 
but with resources conferred to the agent. The rules, formal and informal, 
prescribe power positions to the agent but it is the agent that has the capacity to 
use or change them. So, power relies on the transformative capacity of the 
agent in action. Here again structure and agency become interrelated leaving to 
the agent a significant role to play in the process of (re)production of power 
relations. Since power is a question of agency and agency action/inaction 
influence structure and social change, power and change are integral parts of 
the relationship of agency/structure and for this reason they also appear 
systematically in the relative discussion.  
 
But in what concrete ways does the agent interact with structures in the 
production of power? Hay (2002:184-187) recognises that the agent could have 
WZRW\SHVRISRZHUWKHFDSDFLW\IRUGLUHFWSRZHUGHILQHGDV³FRQGXFW
VKDSLQJ´DQGWKHFDSDFLW\IRULQGLUHFWSRZHURU³FRQWH[WVKDSLQJ´,QWKH
former, power is immediate and it refers to the classical pluralist account of 
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power where A gets B to do something that B would not otherwise do. As 
shown in the following figure (4), practices relating to direct powers are 
³GHcision making, physical and psychological coercion, persuasion and 
EODFNPDLO´+D\7KHODWWHUUHIHUVWRWKHFDSDFLW\RILQGLYLGXDOVWR
shape structures, institutions and organisations in a way that changes the 
conditions of what is possible for oWKHUV$V+D\QRWHV´WKLVLVDQ
indirect form of power in which power is mediated by and instantiated in 
VWUXFWXUHV´ 
 
Speaking in institutional terms, this is the capacity of the individual to play 
with the interpretation of the rules, redefining the institutional context where 
WKHRWKHUSOD\HUVFRQWLQXHWRDFW7KLVSRZHULVXVXDOO\³LQGLUHFWODWHQWDQG
RIWHQDQXQLQWHQGHGFRQVHTXHQFH´+D\EXWLWFDQDOVRSURYLGH³D
SRZHUUHVRXUFHIRUWKHSRWHQWLDOH[HUFLVHRIGLUHFWSRZHU´+D\1997:7). 
Indirect power could be identified in the norms and values of informal rules for 
appropriate behaviour, the narratives that ground the activities of the 
institutions and the agenda setting. In the following figure (4), I demonstrate 
the way that HD\V¶FRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQRISRZHULQIRUPVP\SULPDU\UHVHDUFK
regarding the identification and mapping of power relations inside partnerships.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4+D\¶VFRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQRISRZHUDGDSWHGLQWKHDQDO\VLVRISDUWQHUVKLS
power relations  
 
+D\¶V DFFRXQWRILQGLUHFWSRZHUNHHSVOLQNVFORVHO\WR/XNHV¶³third 
IDFHRISRZHU´EXWKHIROORZVDQDQDO\WLFDODSSURDFKWRSRZHUZLWKRXW
normative premises and negative assumptions. Additionally, this enabling 
perception of power that allows agents to KDYH³DQHIIHFW´XSRQWKHFRQWH[WILWV
Power: 
SDUWQHUV¶
capacity  
Indirect 
power  
Direct 
power  
-Strategies and struggles during 
partnership decision - making  
-Persuasion 
-Coercion  
-Agenda setting 
-Norms and values of the 
SDUWQHUVKLS¶VLQIRUPDOUXOHV 
-Dominant discourses  
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ZLWK6WRQH¶VSRVLWLYHSHUFHSWLRQRISRZHUUHJDUGLQJFROOHFWLYHDFWLRQLQUHJLPH
theory (Stone, 2005). As is analysed in the next chapter, Stone talks about the 
generative power of collective action for solutions to be found in common 
problems.    
 
2.2.2 Institutional change  
The recognition of the interaction between agent and institution as well as 
EHLQJSRZHUFRQVLGHUHGDV³FRQWH[WVKDSLQJ´DUHGLUHFWO\UHODWHGZLWKTXHVWLRQV
of institutional change. As mentioned in the first section, institutions offer 
standards of behaviour providing regulation in social life and so are directly 
related to stability. However, institutions are not stagnant objects but processes 
that are changed over time (Lowndes, 2001; Goodin, 1996; Offe, 1996). In this 
way, on the one hand, institutions realise order and stability in political life by 
shaping the situations and the role that must be fulfilled by the individual.  On 
the other hand, institutions express flexibility and adaptation by associating 
DJHQWV¶DFWLRQVZLWKQHZUXOHVLQQHZVLWXDWLRQV$V0DUFKDQG2OVHQ
QRWH³LQVWLWXWLRQVDUHQRWVWDWLFDQGLQVWLWXWLRQDOLVDWLRQLVQRWDQLQHYLWDEOH
SURFHVV>«@KRZHYHUWKHLULQWHUQDOVWUXFWXUHVDQGUXOHVFDQQRWEHFKDQJHG
arbitrarily´ 
 
Institutional change is a concept that transcends all my research because it is 
mentioned by the partners as something that occurred through their learning in 
previous collaboration and thematic networks; as something that is realised 
during the partnership development during the exercise of agency and as 
something that will happen in the future due to the effect of rules and agency 
on other institutions. So, change is an ongoing process throughout time  
 
In terms of the way that new institutions replace the old ones, Goodin 
(1996:24-30) argues that there are three models of change: 1. accident, 2. 
evolution and 3. intentional intervention by goal seeking individuals or 
organised groups. In the combination of evolution and intentional intervention 
resides the interaction between structure and agent. On the one hand, the 
process of evolution of the institution itself and on the other hand, the 
intentional agents that interpret and apply this evolution create a new social 
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arrangement (Goodin, 1996). Goodin further argues that even the process of 
institutional evolution, according to which the institutions that better respond to 
WKHLUHQYLURQPHQWILQDOO\VXUYLYH³LQYROYHVWKHLQWHQWLRQDODFWLRQVRISXUSRVLYH
DJHQWVHLWKHUGLUHFWO\RULQGLUHFWO\´.  It is through the intentional 
DJHQWV¶LQWHUSUHWDWLRQDQGLQWHUDFWLRQVWKDWWKHVHOHFWLYHLQVWLWXWLRQZLOOVXUYLYH
³$QLQVWLWXWLRQFDQWKXVEHWKHSURGXFWRILQWHQWLRQDODFWLRQZLWKRXWLWVKDYLQJ
EHLQJOLWHUDOO\WKHLQWHQWLRQDOSURGXFWRIDQ\RQH¶VDFWLRQV´*RRGLQ 
 
As a result, institutional change depends heavily upon actors who seek to 
reshape the rules in order to respond to their intentions. In the case of 
externally imposed institutions, as in my primary research, interestingly 
enough, HPSLULFDOHYLGHQFHGHPRQVWUDWLQJWKDW³OHDGHUVPDWWHUPRUHWKDQ
LQVWLWXWLRQV´-RZLWWTXRWHGLQ6WUHHFNDQG7KHOHQUHVSRQGV
GLUHFWO\WR*RRGLQ¶VDUJXPHQWDERXWWKHVLJQLILFDQFHRILQWHQWLRQDOLW\,Q
particular, when new formal institutions are established, the traditional formal 
and informal institutions strongly oppose the new ones. In this context, which  
is almost similar to that of unsettled times or to periods of social transformation 
as mentioned by Ann Swidler (1986 quoted in Streeck and Thelen, 2005:10), 
agency has more opportunities to select strategic actions from the old or the 
new institutional context with significant results in the direction of change. As 
the Europeanisation theories underline, crucial to the implementation of foreign 
institutional rules is also the role of entrepreneurs who are playing the 
mediating role for the smooth introduction of the new rules to the existing 
institutional environment (Borzel and Risse, 2000) (see more analytically in the 
next chapter).       
 
In terms of the types of institutional change (table 5), I found very useful the 
Streeck and Thelen (2005) distinction between the incremental/ disruptive 
process of change and the continuity /discontinuity in terms of the results of 
change. In the first case of change UHVXOWVWKHUHLVQRWD³GHHS´FKDQJHOLke in 
the second one, that of discontinuity, where change is evident.  From this 
typology, particularly interesting is the gradual transformation which 
FRPSULVHVD³JUDGXDOLQFUHPHQWDOFKDQJHZLWKWUDQVIRUPDWLYHUHVXOWV´6WUHHFN
and Thelen, 2005: 13).  
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Result of change 
Continuity  Discontinuity  
 
Process of 
change 
Incremental 
Reproduction by 
adaptation 
Gradual 
transformation 
Disruptive 
Survival and 
return 
Breakdown and 
replacement 
Table 5: Types of institutional change: processes and results, by Streeck and Thelen 
(2005)  
 
Although the new practices gain salience at the expense of traditional 
institutional rules and behaviours, opposing the former as anachronistic and 
corruptive, this change is under development since these recent practices have 
nRWFRPHWRGRPLQDWHWKHROGRQH³%RWKFR-exist, but with the existence of the 
IRUPHUFDOOLQJLQWRTXHVWLRQWKHSULPDF\DQGWDNHQIRUJUDQWHGRIWKHODWWHU´
(Streeck and Thelen, 2005: 31). The potential power relations of old and new 
institutions in the case of gradual transformation could be linked with the 
discussion of Lauth (2000) about the reasons of disempowerment of informal 
rules vis-a-vis new formal ones, as presented in the first section of this chapter.   
 
Summary  
From the above analysis, the following sub-questions further illuminate my 
main theoretical questions regarding the interplay between rules and agency 
inside an institution as well as institutional change.  
1. Based on the aforementioned criteria of institutional design, what are 
the implications of the partnership formal rules for the capacity of the 
partners to act strategically? 
2. To what extent do partnership rules transmit norms (values, beliefs, 
practices) to partners? How do these norms influence the power 
relations of partners?  
3. :KLFKDQGZKRVHLQWHUHVWVGRWKHLQVWLWXWLRQDOUXOHVDQGWKHDJHQWV¶
strategies serve during agenda setting and decision making? Which 
DJHQWV¶VWUDWHJLHVDUHUHODWHGWRGLUHFWDQGLQGLUHFWSRZHU" 
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4. To what extent do learning processes and capacity building (gained 
WKURXJKH[SHULHQFHLPSDFWRQDJHQWV¶VWUDWHJLHV" 
5. Where are traces of institutional change located and what form do they 
take?   
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Section 3:  Institutions and context    
Institutions do not stand alone in society. Indeed, they emerge in a surrounding 
society that creates opportunities, constraints, values and narratives (Streeck 
and Thelen, 2005). Additionally, as Ostrom (2005: 6) argues in relation to the 
GLYHUVLW\DQGPXOWLOHYHODQDO\VLVRIKXPDQEHKDYLRXU³ZKHQHYHU
interdependent individuals are thought to be acting in an organised fashion, 
several layers of universal components create the structure that affects their 
EHKDYLRXUDQGWKHRXWFRPHVWKH\DFKLHYH´&RQVHTXHQWO\WKHSDUWQHUVKLSVRI
my primary research do not start from a socio-economic and political void but 
build on past and existing relations.  
 
 Although there is a myriad of variables that could influence institutions, the 
challenge for institutional theorists is to select the appropriate range of 
explanatory variables, which fit the type of situation under analysis (Ostrom, 
2005). In my research, I have identified two bigger structures that influence the 
strategic development of partnerships, economy and culture; and two meso 
level structures; institutional legacies and institutional configuration. I treat 
both as exogenous variables, which influence the strategic action of the 
SDUWQHUVDVZHOODVWKHLQWHUDFWLRQEHWZHHQIRUPDOLQIRUPDOUXOHVDQGDJHQWV¶
action. However, coming from a normative approach to neo institutionalism, 
the factors of institutional legacies and configuration as well as the cultural 
embodiment of institutions are mostly highlighted in this section. By this, 
lesser attention is given to socio-economic factors without denying their 
significant power.    
 
In case I could be criticised of an eclectic selection of variables and level of 
analysis, I have to mention that the selection of the following contextual 
variables was the result of both ontological and empirical procedures. First, it is 
the primary research that defined these variables as the most significant ones 
and second it is the theoretical framework that provided a pool of possible 
explanatory variables. 
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Additionally, the significance of time and space where these structures are 
GHYHORSHGQHHGVPRUHH[SODQDWLRQ,QP\DSSURDFK,IROORZ-HVVRS¶V
2005) argument that the structural constraints could not be conceptualised 
RXWVLGHVSHFLILFWHPSRUDODQGVSDWLDOIUDPHZRUNVLQFH³VSDWLR-temporal 
SURSHUWLHVKDYHWKHLURZQVSHFLILFFDSDFLWLHVWRVWUHWFKVRFLDOUHODWLRQV´-HVVRS
2001: 9). With reference to my primary research, I have to identify the unique 
local context and time horizon where these broad structures affect the 
partnership collaborative capacity and dynamics of change.  
 
1HYHUWKHOHVVZKDWGRZHVSHFLILFDOO\PHDQE\³WHPSRUDODQGVSDWLDOORFDWLRQ
of structXUDOHQGRZPHQWV´RIWKHFDVHVWXG\SDUWQHUVKLSV" 
 
3.1 Socio-economic factors 
Firstly, the larger local socio-economic context in which partnerships evolve. 
$V/RZQGHVVXPPDULVHVSROLWLFDOLQVWLWXWLRQVDQGDJHQWV¶SUHIHUHQFHV
are not independent from other areas of socio- economic life. There are macro-
economic and socio demographic properties that both structure the overall set 
of incentives that the agent faces in a situation and affect institutional processes 
(Ostrom, 2005:22; Jessop, 2001:2). In particular, my research analyses three 
groups of indicators in detail: 1. the demographic changes in the population 
(ageing, juvenility, size of population and urbanisation), 2. the economic 
changes (production sectors, GNP per region, employment) and finally 3. the 
geo political position (geographical position, size, and administrative 
organisation.).  
 
3.2 Institutional configuration  
Secondly, there exists a wide set of vertical and horizontal institutional 
configuration which impacts on the partnership working. Especially in my 
primary research, where three territorial levels of governance are involved, that 
of EU, the state and the local government, it is important to understand 
partnership processes within the whole system of governance and to assess the 
barriers and opportunities for collaboration imposed by the existing political 
configuration. So, I briefly discuss the extent to which the existing forms and 
practices of European and national governance as well as the existing role of 
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local government shape the policy context, values and practices of both 
partnerships. In addition to political institutions, I also refer to the horizontal 
interactions of local government with the institutions of civil society (NGOs, 
political parties, and cooperatives, etc) and the private sector (Chambers of 
&RPPHUFHORFDOLQWHUHVWVHWFWKDWOHDGWRSDUWLFXODUSDWKVRISDUWQHUV¶
behaviour. These issues are analytically discussed in the next chapter on local 
politics and partnerships by outlining theories of Europeanisation, urban 
politics and NI researches on local partnerships.      
 
3.3 Institutional legacies 
Moreover, the existing institutional configuration has its traces on the past. 
Institutions have historical roots and historical institutionalism has precisely 
focused on the legacies of the past. Indeed, it has a view of institutional 
development that emphasises path dependence and unintended consequences 
(Hall and Taylor, 1996: 938). Different historical contexts offer different 
opportunities and constraints WRLQVWLWXWLRQVDQGWRDFWRUV¶EHKDYLRXU0DUFK
and Olsen, 2006:11-15). However, different strands inside historic 
institutionalism accord different levels of influence to the historical context4. 
 
In this research, I use a broad conception of path dependency as defined by 
Sewell (1996:262-263 quoted in Pierson, 2000: 252) ³WKDWZKDWKDSSHQHGDWDQ
earlier point in time will affect the possible outcomes of a sequence of events 
RFFXUULQJDWDODWHUSRLQWLQWLPH´7KHLPSRUWDQWQRWLRQKHUHLVWKDWZHFDQQRW 
understand a particular political institution without understanding its history, 
WKHSDWKWKDWLWIROORZHGWRJHWWKHUH$V3LHUVRQSXWVLW³SDWKGHSHQGHQF\LV
XVHGWRVXSSRUWWKHFODLPWKDWVSHFLILFSDWWHUQVRIWLPLQJDQGVHTXHQFHVPDWWHU´
(Pierson, 2000:251). In the following chapter, I also outline empirical evidence 
from NI studies on local partnerships regarding institutional legacies.  
 
                                                 
4
 There is the soft version, which recognises how previous practices and perceptions of 
bureaucratic and political institutions constrain new practices and future possibilities of change 
and the hard version of the argument of path dependency which maintains the idea of the 
difficulties in changing practices and ideas due to resistance to change (Pierson 2000).  
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In my primary research, I study the history of collaborative projects as well as 
local socio political institutional legacies. Moreover, I identify the distinct 
culture, practices and problems that have arisen and the ways in which these 
influence the case study partnerships. I particularly focus on the established 
previous networks of collaboration and their implications for the building of 
the new partnerships.    
 
3.4 Culture: social capital and political culture  
Finally, since I talk about norms embedded in institutions, I am profoundly 
interested in the value system of the Greek society and its particular enactment 
at the local level. And since I study political institutions, I use some aspects of 
VRFLDOFDSLWDOWRH[SODLQVSHFLILFSDUWQHUV¶EHKDYLRXUDQGDOVRVRPHDVSHFWVRI
political culture that are not addressed adequately by the social capital 
framework. The need to address both concepts in explaining collective action 
LQSROLWLFDOLQVWLWXWLRQVLVSURSRVHGE\:RRG¶VUHVHDUFKRQUHOLJLRXV
organisations. Wood (1997) distinguishes between two faces of culture related 
to politics, the first one is characterised by socLDOQHWZRUNV¶WUXVWDQG
reciprocity, which consist the main elements for the development and 
sustainability of collective action. The second one is composed of beliefs, 
values and assumptions that enable the political stabilisation and mobilisation 
of the emerging collective action.  
 
Culture impacts upon institutions in two ways: first, directly on agency values 
DQGSUHIHUHQFHV$FFRUGLQJWR2VWRUPFXOWXUHGHILQHGDV³WKHYDOXHV
VKDUHGZLWKLQDFRPPXQLW\´DIIHFWVWKH³PHQWDOPRGHOV´WKDWWKHSDUticipants 
in a collective action share between them. Second, indirectly, culture shapes 
rules. According to March and Olsen (1989), institutions are the vehicles of the 
H[LVWLQJV\VWHPWKDWGHILQHWKH³DSSURSULDWH´EHKDYLRXUIRUWKHLQGLYLGXDOV,Q
both cases, agency and rules are carriers of local histories, identities, values, 
and obligations that bring in the institutional processes.  
 
As shown in the following figure (5), the level of social capital and type of 
political culture are selected as key variables from the broad range of cultural 
components because of  the way in which both influence the collaborative 
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activity of a partnership and its democratic operation (Putman, 1993). Political 
institutions in turn affect and shape wider culture elements.  
 
 
 
 
                                     
 
 
 
Figure 5: Relation of culture to political institutions   
 
3.4.1 Relationship of culture with rules  
Before analysing these features, I have firstly to clarify the relation of rules 
with cultural norms. In normative institutionalism, it is difficult to distinguish 
between informal rules and cultural norms. If rules are shared understandings 
comprising, among others, norms and values, and culture is a shared value 
system embedded in individuals, how can the researcher discern whether it is 
the informal rule or the culture that affects agent behaviour? This task gets 
more difficult since following rules repetitively could spread to other 
institutions and finally become a cultural norm.  
 
In this research, I argue that culture is an independent variable that shapes the 
rules-in-use. Informal rules are not identical with cultural norms. Culture 
stands as an explanatory variable, as the economy and institutional 
configuration do too.  
 
The way that informal rules operationalise the general values and norms of 
culture in the specific context of the institution could permit an analytical 
distinction between culture and informal rules. Informal rules provide a link 
between the general values of the community and the specific values developed 
inside the institution in order to be established and sustained. For instance, if 
the culture of a community is characterised by distrust and corruption, an 
LQIRUPDOUXOHLQVLGHDQLQVWLWXWLRQFRXOGDOORZIRUXQSXQLVKHGSDUWQHUV¶
Level of 
Social 
Capital  
Type of 
political 
culture  
Political 
institutions: Rules 
and agency  
 
 
 
Cu
ltu
re
 
 
Feedback 
49 
 
cheating and free riders behaviours. So, the values guiding informal rules 
embody the shared values of the society as well as the shared values produced 
by the actors in the specific institution in order to respond to its own 
LQVWLWXWLRQDODQGRUJDQLVDWLRQDOQHHGVDQGWRDFWRUV¶LQWHQWLRQV7KHDXWRQRP\
RIUXOHVE\WKHFXOWXUDOQRUPVLVDOVRUHVXPHGLQ0DUFKDQG2OVHQ¶V
DUJXPHQWWKDW³LQVWLWXWLRQal autonomy is necessary to establish that political 
LQVWLWXWLRQVDUHPRUHWKDQWKHVLPSOHPLUURUVRIVRFLDOIRUFHV´ 
 
3.4.2 Features of social capital and political culture  
3ROLWLFDOFXOWXUHUHIHUV³WRWKHVSHFLILFDOO\SROLWLFDORULHQWDWLRQV± attitudes 
towards the political system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the role 
RIWKHVHOILQWKHV\VWHP´$OPRQGDQG9HUED6RFLDOFDSLWDOUHIHUV
WRWKRVH³IHDWXUHVRIVRFLDOOLIHRUJDQLVDWLRQVXFKDVWUXVWQRUPVDQGQHWZRUNV
that can imprRYHWKHHIILFLHQF\RIVRFLHW\E\IDFLOLWDWLQJFRRUGLQDWHGDFWLRQV´
(Putman, 1993:167). So, social capital is a particular type of resource available 
to individuals or organisations that facilitates the achievement of collective 
action (Maloney et al, 2000:802).  
 
Social capital and political culture can be regarded as both a policy resource 
and a policy outcome. In the first case, they are analysed as an input to policy 
making preventing or making political collective action. In the second case, 
policy making influences the stock of social capital, -preserve, augment or 
redistribute it - (Lowndes and Pratchett, 2008) as well as the type of political 
culture. In my study, I mainly regard both concepts as a policy input and to a 
lesser extent, I also raise somHTXHVWLRQVDERXWWKHSDUWQHUVKLSV¶UROHLQWKHLU
development. 
 
The relation of political culture to social capital resides mainly in the 
dependence of political attitudes and practices on other social norms and 
networks. Social capital theory could explain political behaviour and values 
since the attitude of the citizen towards his/her social and interpersonal 
environment and relational networks influence his/her political life (Almond 
and Verba, 1989; Bockmeyer, 2000: 2419). More specifically, the concepts of 
trust (towards the political system as well as to social actors like business and 
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community) and the civic engagement (turnout, political action, conception of 
citizenship) that  are further down analysed are the linking elements of social 
capital and political culture.  
 
7UXVWLVGHILQHGE\³DVHWRIH[SHFWDWLRQVKHOGE\RQHSDUW\WKDWDQRWKHUSDUW\
RUSDUWLHVZLOOEHKDYHLQDQDSSURSULDWHPDQQHUZLWKUHJDUGWRDVSHFLILFLVVXH´
(Farrell and Knight, 2003:541). Trust is a fundamental aspect of institutional 
HVWDEOLVKPHQWDQGGHYHORSPHQW0DUFKDQG2OVHQXQGHUOLQHWKDW³WKH
network of rules and rule bounded relations are sustained by trust, a confidence 
WKDWDSSURSULDWHEHKDYLRXUFDQEHH[SHFWHGPRVWRIWKHWLPH´%DVHGRQWKH
belief that the involved actors will behave as expected, the individual could 
manage the daily interactions with the other individuals inside the institution 
and formulate its intentions and goals about future behaviour. Consequently, 
the absence of trust is accompanied by the expectation of dishonest and 
uncooperative behaviour (Bockmeyer, 2000: 2421).  
 
Stone distinguishes 3 types of trust: the particularised trust, the generalised 
trust and the civic trust (Stone 2001: 25-30). The particularised or family trust 
refers to established relations and social networks (family, neighbourhood). 
7KHJHQHUDOLVHGWUXVWZKLFKLVFDSWXUHGLQ3XWPDQV¶ account, derives 
IURPWKHDFWRU¶VH[SHULHQFHLQWKHLUVRFLDOQHWZRUNVDQGUHIHUVWRWKRVHZLWK
whom the actor does not have previous experience. The civic trust, which is 
directly related to political culture, refers to basic trust in the formal institutions 
of governance regarding fairness of rules, official procedures, and allocation of 
resources etc. In my study of partnerships, I focus on the last two types for two 
reasons. First, partnership promotes the process of bridging and linking social 
capital. Representatives from different groups with different geographical 
positions characterised by hierarchical relations develop relaWLRQVWU\LQJWR³JHW
DKHDG´6HFRQGVLQFHSDUWQHUVKLSVLQYROYHSROLWLFDODFWRUVDQGLPSOHPHQW
public policies, it is a political institution. So, I am interested also in the civic 
trust that actors have towards the concrete institution in which they are 
involved.  
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A second common aspect of social capital and political culture is civic 
engagement, i.e. individual and collective actions designed to identify and 
address issues of public concern. In social capital literature, networks are 
distinguished between formal and informal (Putman, 1993). Informal 
networking refers to relations between family, friends, relatives and neighbours 
while formal networking refers to social relations in the social and political 
space. In the formal networks developed in political space, the common ground 
between social capital and political culture can be found in terms of civic 
engagement.  
 
Besides the above common features of social capital and political culture, there 
are some other components of social capital and political culture, which are 
important in order to better understand collective action. Regarding political 
culture, I focus on some aspects of political competence and partisanship since 
it is important as Almond and Verba (1989) note to understand the content and 
TXDOLW\RIWKHFLWL]HQV¶IHHOLQJVDERXWWKHLUDELOLW\WRSDUWLFLSDWHLQWKHSROLWLFDO
system.  
 
Regarding social capital, I focus on social networking and the norms of 
reciprocity. In particular, political participation in combination with social 
participation illustrates the existence or the non-existence of a collaborative 
and participative culture. Moreover, the norms of reciprocity refer to the 
TXDOLW\RIFROOHFWLYHDFWLRQ6WRQHGHILQHVUHFLSURFLW\DV³WKHH[FKDQJHZLWKLQD
social relationship whereb\³JRRGVDQGVHUYLFHV´JLYHQE\RQHSDUW\DUHUHSDLG
WRWKDWSDUW\E\WKHSDUW\ZKRUHFHLYHGWKHRULJLQDO³JRRGVDQGVHUYLFHV´
(Stone, 2001:30). So, reciprocity in collective action refers to the assurance that 
the obligations of the exchange will be kept by all of the participants.   
 
3.4.3 Social capital and political culture in local partnership  
In relation to WKHUROHRIVRFLDOFDSLWDODVSDUWQHUVKLSV¶LQSXWLWLVDUJXHGWKDW
the established norms of reciprocity, mutual trust, collective and civil 
engagement -essential elements of civic ness- constitute the base for successful 
partnerships (Schmitter, 2002). By contrast, low level social capital which 
comprises traditions of individualistic behaviours seeking the satisfaction of its 
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interests, low level of collective actions and civic organisations restrain the 
HIIHFWLYHQHVVRIDSDUWQHUVKLS3DUDVNHYRSRXORV0RUHRYHU³YLUWXRXV´
attributes of political culture like limited participation in public space and no 
trust to political institutions may KDYHQHJDWLYHHIIHFWVRQSDUWQHUVKLSV¶
operations. Not only do they prevent collaborative action in practice but they 
also create misconceptions about the expected behaviours of partners 
(Paraskevopoulos, 2001). 
 
Furthermore, another important assumption is that changes in political culture 
and in political system do not always follow the same speed and direction 
(Almond and Verba, 1989). It could be congruence or incongruence between 
the political system and political culture. Grounding that to institutions, this 
evidence is important to the partnerships of my case study where the 
institutional context is changing rapidly by the introduction of new institutions 
VXFKDVSDUWQHUVKLSVIURP³DERYH´WKH(8ZKLOHWKHSROLWLFDOFXOWXUHLV
remaining stable. In tKLVFDVH³SHRSOHOLYHDQGWKLQNLQYHU\GLIIHUHQWZD\V
and some of these are radically inconsistent with the requirements of formal 
RUJDQLVDWLRQV´%DQILHOG6RWKHSUH-existing political culture and the 
ideas prevailing in the society could not support the logic of appropriate 
behaviour of the new institutional rules. This process is getting more 
aggravating keeping in mind that elements of cultural infrastructure are not 
³RQO\WLPHFRQVXPLQJWRFRQVROLGDWHEXWHTXDOO\WLPHFRQVXPLQJWRDEROLVK´
(Offe, 1996:218). 
 
0RUHRYHUWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRI³LPSRVHG´SDUWQHUVKLSVIURPWKHFHQWUDO
government or the European Union can destroy pre-existing social networks if 
they are not building around knowledge of local context. They can also 
negatively affect the level and type of social capital available to partners 
(Ostrom, 2000). For instance, the development of collaborative projects where 
local authorities distribute resources to civil organisations by a hierarchical 
way could create dependent citizens rather than active citizens that have the 
FDSDFLW\WRJHQHUDWHFDSLWDO$V2VWURPQRWHVVRFLDOFDSLWDO³GRHVQRWUHSUHVHQW
KRZHYHUDTXLFNIL[WKDWFDQEHFUHDWHGE\H[WHUQDORUWRSGRZQSURFHVVHV´
(Ostrom, 2000:202). 
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Regarding social capital as partnership output, I start with the assumption that 
VRFLDOFDSLWDO³LQFUHDVHVZLWKXVHDQGGLPLQLVKZLWKGLVXVH´3XWPDQ, 
$VDUHVXOW³VWRFNVRIVRFLDOFDSLWDOWHQGWREHVHOI-reinforcing and 
FXPXODWLYH´3XWPDQ(YHQLISDUWQHUVKLSVDUHWLPH-limited, they 
OHDYH³WUDFHV´RU³LVODQGV´RIVRFLDOFDSLWDOWKDWFRXOGEHUHDFWLYDWHGLQWKH
future (Lowndes and Pratchett, 2008). Partnerships could reinforce social 
capital through the bridging and linking process. Bridging social capital refers 
to social networks that bring people together who are unlike each other while 
linking brings together people from different power positions, who are not on 
an equal footing (Putman and Goss, 2002). 
 
Conclusion  
7KLVFKDSWHUGHPRQVWUDWHGWKDWDQLQVWLWXWLRQFRPSULVHVWKHUXOHVDQGDJHQWV¶
behaviour related to these rules. Or, the institutions of my case study consist of 
WKHIRUPDOLQIRUPDOUXOHVWKDWJXLGHWKHWZRSDUWQHUVKLSV¶RSHUDWLRQIURPWKH
stage of initiation until the stage of implementation. In terms of agency, they 
FRPSULVHSDUWQHUVKLSV¶PHPEHUVDQGSDUWLFXODUO\³LQVWLWXWLRQDOHQWUHSUHQHXUV´
DQGHVWDEOLVKHGORFDOOHDGHUVDVZHOODVVWDWHH[HFXWLYHVDQGSDUWQHUVKLSV¶
beneficiaries.  
 
As shown in the following figure (6), which illustrates the research protocol of 
my study, in terms of rules, besides the formal arrangements that structure the 
partnerships relations, I also identify informal rules and their configuration 
with the formal rules, in other words, the rules-in-XVH)ROORZLQJ/DXWK¶V
(2000) typology, I am looking at the distinct ways that formal and informal 
UXOHVLQWHUDFWDQGSDUWQHUV¶HQDFWPHQWRIWKHVHUXOHV,DOVRIRFXVRQWKHLPSDFW
of rules-in-use on the partnership processes leading or not to institutional 
change.  
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Figure 6: Research protocol  
 
In this process, the main question addressed is to what extent and in which way 
LQGLYLGXDOV¶DFWLRQVDUHVKDSHGE\WKHUXOHVDQGKRZWKHUXOHVDUHHQDFWHGE\
LQGLYLGXDOV¶DFWLRQ,QGRLQJWKDWWKHLGHQWLILFDWLRQRISRZHUUHODWLRQVWKH
PDSSLQJRIDJHQWV¶purpose and goals as well as the potential for institutional 
change are the main subjects of my analysis.     
 
Finally, I examine the specific contextual factors that influence the 
SDUWQHUVKLSV¶LQVWLWXWLRQVXQGHUVWXG\DQGWKHLPSDFWRIFROOHFWLYHDFWLRQon 
social capital stock and institutional configuration in its turn. The importance 
here lies in the degree of influence, or the extent to which the contextual 
factors get embedded on rules and agency preferences and the extent to which 
the institutions of the primary research call for their autonomy vis-a-vis these 
factors.  
 
In conclusion, this chapter has mapped the main theoretical concepts that 
structure my theoretical framework and guide my research questions. In the 
next chapter these are going to be presented in detail related and grounded in 
the theoretical field of urban politics and their approach on local partnerships.    
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Chapter 2: Neo institutional approaches to 
understanding local partnership  
Introduction  
In the previous chapter, I have outlined the main features that constitute the NI 
theory and I have identified key concepts that set the theoretical framework for 
the explanation of my empirical observations. However, what is missing from 
WKLVSURFHVVLVWKH³VFDOLQJ´RIWKHWKHRU\WRWKH local level on the one hand, and 
its grounding to the concrete and empirical level of partnerships on the other. 
In this way, it will become possible to formulate more precise and targeted 
research questions that will guide the research methodology presented in the 
following chapter.  
 
Thus, I will first present the existing development of urban politics theories and 
their contribution to the study of local governance and particularly to 
partnerships. My aim will be to illustrate their possible relation to NI theory 
and to pick up useful concepts, empirical observations and propositions that 
will help me to ground the general NI concepts to local partnerships. 
Additionally, I will try to identify in these theories possible conceptual and 
empirical limitations and the way that the NI approach could offer new insights 
in the study of partnerships.  
 
From the vast pool of urban theories and approaches, I focus on three theories: 
1. regime theory, 2. theories of urban governance and 3. urban leadership 
theories. On the one side, regime theory and theories of urban governance offer 
me a lot of empirical observations about the development and operation of 
coalitions at the local level and their vertical interactions with other levels of 
governance. Moreover, urban leadership theories contribute to the better 
understanding of agency inside partnerships.  
 
Second, I will present the existing literature that has used a NI approach for the 
analysis of urban policies with special focus on local partnerships and question 
and/or verify their empirical evidence with my own field analysis. Finally, 
since the partnerships in the current study have been initiated by the EU, I will 
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be also interested in Europeanisation theories. Although Europeanisation is not 
an urban theory per se, since it does not entirely focus on urban phenomena 
analysis but on multi-level governance, its uses of NI insights helps me to 
understand the top down and bottom up institutional configurations of local 
partnerships.   
 
The task of this chapter is complex because if in neo institutionalism (as shown 
in the previous chapter) various theoretical approaches are used to explain 
institutions, the landscape of urban theories is much more complicated. Urban 
theories are characterised by theoretical diversity (Davies and Imbroscio, 
2009:1-4). On the one hand, there are theories like Marxism, which explains all 
urban politics through the general theory of capital accumulation and, on the 
other hand, there are theories that examine a concrete phenomenon of urban 
politics like urban leadership or urban democracy (Judge et al, 1995; Davies 
DQG,PEURVFLR7KHUHDUHWKHRULHVOLNHXUEDQUHJLPHVRIZKLFK³HDFK
proposition is grounded in broader social traditions, but at the same time hinges 
on conditions pertaiQLQJWRWKHXUEDQVFDOH´'DYLHVDQG,PEURVFLR
and theories like urban elitist or pluralist theories that explain urban politics 
through particular axioms of how a society works. Despite the difficulties, this 
theoretical diversity poses a challenge for a NI researcher in terms of 
identifying shared concerns with other theories of urban policies and of 
thinking further about how the NI theory could shed light on new aspects of the 
local partnerships phenomenon. 
 
In this chapter, following NI assumptions, I will look into several features of 
local partnerships. One is the partnership development and evolution along a 
QXPEHURIH[SODQDWRU\IDFWRUVVXFKDVIRUPDODQGLQIRUPDOUXOHVDQGDFWRUV¶
practices. Central also to my understanding of partnerships is the nature of 
SRZHUUHODWLRQVDQGOHDGHUV¶EHKDYLRXU7KHFRQWH[WXDOIDFWRUVWKDWLQIOXHQFH
the collaboration effort inside partnership such as the unique local and national 
FLUFXPVWDQFHVDUHDOVRLPSRUWDQW)LQDOO\WKHSDUWQHUVKLSV¶FROODERUDWLYH
outcomes such as the institutional changes in civil society, local government 
and intergovernmental relations are also discussed.  
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Section 1: Theories of urban politics and their approaches to 
local partnership  
In European countries, the changes in central local relations and the growing 
influence of local partnerships and networking in local governance identified in 
the last decades have given rise to theoretical approaches of urban politics 
which try to investigate the collaborative activity and the power relations 
developed horizontally and vertically guiding the governance processes. These 
approaches seek to explain why collaboration happens, what form it takes and 
why, which factors affect the capacity and practices of collaboration (Sullivan 
and Skelcher, 2002:35-36) and how it could transform the policy-making.  
 
Different theories of urban policies like that of regime theory, urban Marxism 
and urban governance are interested in these developments. These theories do 
not provide a comprehensive and integrated framework for the collaboration 
development itself but as 6XOOLYDQDQG6NHOFKHUXQGHUOLQH³WKH\WHQG
WRRIIHULQVLJKWVLQWRSDUWLFXODUDVSHFWVRIFROODERUDWLRQ´GHSHQGLQJRQWKHLU
predominant epistemological claims and assumptions. What is useful for my 
research is that these theories specify their observations at the local scale and in 
this way they offer a concrete and empirically grounded insight of the 
collaborative activity.  
 
8QWLOWKHODWH¶VORFDOSDUWQHUVKLSVKDYHQRWSUHRFFXSLHGXUEDQSROLWLFV
theories since, at that time, partnerships were not so much expanded as a tool 
of policy-making as they are in our days. The existing at that time elitist, 
pluralist and Marxist approaches had analysed the way that a city is governed. 
Looking for behavioural and structural explanatory factors respectively, these 
theories had rejected the dominant explanation of the institutional theory i.e. 
the formal arrangements of the elected local government (Lowndes, 2009).  
 
In particular, elitist and pluralist theories, dominant in the research agenda of 
North APHULFDIRFXVHGPDLQO\RQWKHQRWLRQRISRZHU³LWVJHQHVLVLWV
DFTXLVLWLRQLWVIRUPVDQGLWVXVHV´'DYLHVDQG,PEURVFLRDQG
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analysed the way that a city is governed. Pluralist theory5, with Dahl (1961) 
being the principle representative, argued that power is fragmented and 
GLVSHUVHGZKLOHHOLWLVWVLQVSLUHGIURP+XQWHUV¶VWXG\RI$WODQWD
supported that there is a small group of economically and societal powerful 
agents that determine policy outcomes. If a researcher applied a pluralist 
approach for the study of local partnership, they would focus on the diverse 
interest groups seeking influence in the partnerships, the sharing power among 
partners and the consensual decision-making. For pluralists, partnerships would 
appear as something neutral that does not favour the interests of any particular 
group; the study of the observable changes during the decision -making process 
is sufficient for the definition of who governs inside the partnerships. By 
contrast, in elitist accounts, power in partnerships would be concentrated in a 
small number of elite individuals, mainly corporate partners, who could 
exercise change via their available resources during the stage of agenda setting.  
 
Apart from their strong normative accounts about power distribution, another 
SUREOHPRIERWKWKHRULHVLVWKDWWKH\IRFXVH[FOXVLYHO\RQDJHQW¶VDFWXDO
behaviour and their observable interests in participation. In this way, they 
ignore to examine the general structural context in which the partnerships are 
operated aQGWKHKLGGHQIDFHRISRZHUDVGHILQHGLQ/XNHV¶DSSURDFKRI
power. Finally, both theories would treat partnerships as fixed in time with a 
prescribed agenda and outcomes, which do not change despite the interaction 
among partners and the gradual development of the partnership. Although there 
is not a lot of research that has applied pluralist and elitist theories for the study 
of partnerships6, these theories have influenced subsequent theories like urban 
regime and growth machines that study networks and partnerships respectively.   
 
In Europe, in the same period, the theoretical conceptualisation of urban 
political analysis was, unlike in North America, profoundly based on Marxist 
theories. The Marxist contribution in urban theories is the reorientation of the 
discussion from the LQGLYLGXDOVDQGJURXSV¶EHKDYLRXUIRUWKHIRUPXODWLRQRI
                                                 
5
 To the extent that there are lot variants of pluralism, this is a general and simplified core idea 
of the original pluralist theory (Judge, 1995).  
6An indicative research using an elitist approach could be found in the study of global public 
private health partnerships (Buse and Harmer, 2004). 
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agenda setting and decision-making to the larger socio-economic context in 
which urban development evolves (Judge et al, 1995). Castells, Miliband and 
later on Harvey and Sauders analysed urban political institutions as part of the 
state apparatus and they argued that urban politics play the same protecting role 
of capital accumulation and social order maintenance as the state. So, they are 
interested in how the local state works in the interests of capital (Pickvance, 
1995). Although Marxist theories have placed urban politics in the larger 
economic context and they have tried to explain the interconnections between 
social and economic changes and the effects and outcomes for localities 
(Pickvance, 1995; Geddes, 2009), they have ignored the autonomy of political 
processes in general and of local politics in particular. Regarding local 
partnerships, a deterministic version of Marxist approach would reduce power 
conflict to class struggle between capital and labour undermining other 
interests like community or gender interests, and it would more generally-not 
locally- explain the role of the partnership development in the capitalistic 
accumulation process.  
 
Although the contribution of the urban Marxism in the debate of power 
relations at the local level is deprived of local and political specified analysis 
towards more abstract economic categories like capital accumulation, class 
struggle and labour reproduction, it is correct about the big influence of 
macroeconomic changes on local politics and the fact that the local community 
have the least control over these changes. Influenced by the classical urban 
Marxism, I devote a section in chapter 4 to the larger national economic 
changes that have impacted upon the local community under study and have 
LQIOXHQFHGWKHSDUWQHUV¶PRWLYDWLRQVUHJDUGLQJFROODERUDWLYHDFWLYLW\ 
 
,QWKHPLG¶VWKHUHKDVEHHQDSUROLIHUDWLRQRIDSSURDFKHVDLPLQJDW
analysing new trends in urban governance such as the rearticulating of the 
state- local relationships, the growing influence of policy networks and public 
private partnerships in local governance, the Europeanisation of public policies 
and the introduction of New Public Management (NPM) in (local) 
administration (John, 2001:6-14). These theories have offered valuable insights 
in the study of partnerships because they have focused explicitly either on the 
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collaboration of actors from the private, public and civil society sectors, mainly 
in partnerships and networks processes, or on the context from which these 
processes have emerged.  
 
In particular, in North America, the pluralist/elitist debate has been renewed by 
the theory of growth machines7 and regime theory (Judge, 1995). Both 
approachHVHQULFKWKHGLVFXVVLRQRIFRPPXQLW\SRZHUE\IRFXVLQJ³RQWKH
broad field of urban development and not just on what affects local government 
decision-PDNLQJLQWKLVILHOG´+DUGLQJ,QWKLVZD\WKH\GHYHORSD
V\VWHPDWLFDFFRXQWRI³DSROLWLFDO HFRQRP\RISODFH´HPSKDVLVLQJWKHLPSDFW
of economic development interests on urban governance but remaining away 
from previous work on urban Marxist theories which stress collective 
FRQVXPSWLRQ0DF/HDGDQG*RRGZLQ$V6WRQHDUJXHV³WKe 
capacity to build, modify, or reinforce governing arrangements requires 
resources and skills that are not widely available. Inequalities in that capacity 
DUHVXEVWDQWLDOV\VWHPLFDQGSHUVLVWHQW´ 
 
Regime theory which came to prominence with Clarence StoQH¶VVWXG\RI
Atlanta city in 1989 appears to avoid a simplistic Marxist economic 
reductionism of urban political analysis, while at the same time managing to 
focus  on urban economic development and the conflict between favoured and 
disfavoured groups as the growth machines do (Mossberger and Stoker, 2001; 
Davies, 2001:17-43). Studying the informal coalitions between local economic 
interests and political leaders, regime theory offers much more scrutiny in the 
latter, since it is supported that their relationships with the private sector evolve 
on mutual dependence. As Stone (2005:326) underlines about these coalitions 
³6WLOOWKHQDWXUHRIORFDOSROLWLFDODQGFLYLFDUUDQJHPHQWVFDUULHVJUHDWZHLJKW´
                                                 
7
 Growth machines theory developed by Logan and Molotch (1987) is based on the assumption 
that there is a group of elites who because of the nature of their business are tied with the city 
and consequently their goal is the local economic growth. However, they cannot achieve their 
goals alone and for this reason they create coalitions, the local growth machines, which 
members profit directly from the development process and by which they create a positive 
business climate for investment (Harding, 1995). Growth machines theory does not receive 
much attention by the European scientific community because it focuses explicitly on groups 
of small property owners and consequently it appears to have strong empirical limitations to 
settings outside U.S. For this reason, I do not apply any of its analytical concepts and evidence 
in my research.   
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Consequently, local political processes and economic structures both matter 
and it is the understanding of the structuring process by the local actors that 
regime theory focuses on (Davies, 2001:33-37).  
 
It is also supported by this theory that the power in a city is not given, but it is 
produced by the negotiation of different groups coming together in order to 
secure the governability of the city. It comes to that by its distinctive approach 
of the notion of power as social production. The political power of urban 
UHJLPHVLVFRQFHLYHGDVWKH³SRZHUWR´RUWKHcapacity to act, rather than 
³SRZHURYHU´RWKHUVRUVRFLDOFRQWURODVSOXUDOLVWVDQGHOLWLVWVKDGXQWLOQRZ
FRQVLGHUHGLW,Q6WRQH¶VZRUGVSROLWLFDOSRZHULVDERXW³WKH
SURGXFWLRQUDWKHUWKDQWKHGLVWULEXWLRQRIEHQHILWV´WKHUHVXOWRIFROODERUation 
³WRZDUGVHIIHFWLYHIRUPVRISUREOHPVROYLQJ´6WRQH 
 
Mossberger and Stoker (2001) argue that since the concept of regime theory 
has originally been formulated in North America, its transfer to the European 
context, where local government does not depend heavily on local taxes and 
the private capital but on national grants, must be made with caution. So when 
I use the insights of the regime theory, I carefully select these concepts and 
empirical evidence that could realistically be applied to the European context.  
 
Along with urban regime developments, there is also the emergence of 
governance theories mainly in the European continent. These theories study 
³SURFHVVDQGDFWRUVRXWVLGHWKHQDUURZUHDOPRIJRYHUQPHQW´.MDHU
a QHWZRUNHGIRUPRISROLWLFV7KH\DUJXHWKDWWKHUHLVD³JURZLQJDZDUHQHVV
that governments are not the only crucial actors in addressing major societal 
LVVXHV´.RRLPDQWKHUHDUHQHZPRGHVRIJRYHUQPHQW- society 
interactions, which involve not state solutions to collective action problems 
(John, 2001). Networks (Rhodes, 1997), participatory or deliberative 
governance (Gbikpi and Grote, 2002), metagovernance (Jessop, 2002) and 
collaborative governance (Ansell and Gash, 2007) are some of the alternative 
JRYHUQLQJVW\OHVWRWKHH[LVWLQJKLHUDUFKLHVDQGPDUNHWVZKLFK³GRQRWUHVWRQ
recourse to the authority and sanctions of JRYHUQPHQW´EXWRQ³VWHHULQJDQG
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FRRUGLQDWLRQ´6WRNHUDPRQJUHVRXUFHV¶GHSHQGHQWDFWRUVIURPWKH
private, civil and public sector.  
 
In particular, urban governance theories study state decentralisation, multi-
level governance and the rise of networks and partnerships in local politics. 
They focus on the distinction between urban government consisted by the 
political infrastructures governing local authorities and urban governance 
which refers to the process of coordinating and steering by various groups from 
urban society towards collectively defined goals (Pierre, 2005).  
 
Urban regimes and urban governance theories have a lot of common theoretical 
considerations since both theories examine governing coalitions and networks 
of actors outside the official realm of urban government for the pursuit of 
common goals. From the point of view of urban governance, urban regimes are 
considered to be one model of urban governance in terms of configuration of 
actors and objectives (Stone, 2005).  
 
In the rest of this section, I will identify the key themes from urban regime and 
urban governance theories that relate to my research. These themes facilitate 
the grounding of my partnerships NI study locally. Additionally, I question 
some dominant normative assumptions of these theories regarding the 
democratic performance and governability achievements of the collaborative 
activity avoiding in this way one-sided and rigid approaches to the partnership 
study.   
1.1 Key themes  
1.1.1. Learning 
In governance processes, ³OHDUQLQJVHHPVWREHDIHDWXUHRIFKDQJH´%DFKH
2008:12). Governance theories support that collaborative activity could 
generate VRFLDOFDSLWDODQGPXWXDODFFRPPRGDWLRQE\UHVKDSLQJSDUWQHUV¶
YDOXHVDQGQRUPV$FWXDOO\WKLVSURFHVVUHIHUVWRDSURFHVVRI³WKLFNOHDUQLQJ´8 
                                                 
8
 Radaelli (2003) makes a distinction between thin and thick learning. In the first case, the 
actors only readjust their familiar strategies and goals in order to challenge contextual changes. 
In thick learning they additionally change their primary values and norms in which they 
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(Radaelli, 2003:52) where actors not only just rearticulate their familiar 
strategies in order to challenge contextual changes but they also reshape their 
primary preferences and goals (Radaelli, 2003: 27-56).  
 
In particular, Schmitter (2002: 53) underlines WKDW³WKH³FRGHZRUGV´RI
JRYHUQDQFHWHQGWREH³WUXVWDQGPXWXDODFFRPPRGDWLRQ´%\FROODERUDWLRQ
partners OHDUQDERXWHDFKRWKHU¶VDWWLWXGHVWKH\GHYHORSDVKDUHGXQGHUVWDQGLQJ
of what they could collectively achieve and they gradually develop a 
recognition and commitment to the governance process (Schmitter 2002; 
Ansell and Gash, 2007). Additionally, the negotiations derived from the 
collaboration serve to generate higher levels of trust among those who 
participate and allow them to develop a sense of regularity, since partners 
LQWHUDFWRYHUDORQJWLPHDQGWKH\NQRZHDFKRWKHU¶VLQWHQWLRQV.RRLPDQ
2002). Trust is also built on the basis of risk sharing. As the responsibilities are 
diffused among partners, so are the failures. Consequently, negotiation and 
trust in others for the solution of common problems minimise this risk 
(Murray, 2005).  
 
7KH³VPDOOZLQV´FRQFHSWGLVFXVVHGE\9DQJHQDQG+X[PDQLVD
representative process of collaborative learning that feed back the collaborative 
activity (Ansell and Gash, 2007). The authors refer to these small wins as 
intermediary outcomes of the partnership process that could encourage the trust 
building and commitment among partners further because they convince them 
about the achievability of the partnership goals. From a different theoretical 
antecedent, that of planning theory of urban settings, the research arrives to the 
same empirical evidence about the power of learning. Gonzalez and Healay 
DUJXHWKDWFRQVHFXWLYH³HSLVRGHV´RIXUEDQJRYHUQDQFHZKHQQHZ
innovative institutions like partnerships and networks are introduced, induce 
³FUDFNV´LQWKHH[Lsting institutional structures. They do that by penetrating 
ORFDODFWRUV¶FRJQLWLYHIUDPHVRIUHIHUHQFHWKURXJKWKHSURFHVVRIOHDUQLQJDQG
they progressively transform governance discourse practices. As the authors 
DUJXH³WKURXJKLQYROYHPHQWLQVXFKHSLVodes, people learn the discourses, 
                                                                                                                                 
challenge their environment. Although this concept was developed for the study of 
Europeanisation, it could also enrich other conceptual contexts like such as of this study. 
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practices and values embedded in established governance processes. They may 
DOVRVHHNWRFKDOOHQJHDQGFKDQJHWKHP´*RQ]DOH]DQG+HDOD\ 
 
These developments are part of a gradual learning process during which the 
different organisations of the society (state-market-civil society) rearticulate 
their positions and arrive to a mutual understanding of their relationship. This 
learning process is based on a big number of benefits derived directly from the 
collaborDWLRQDFWLYLW\³H[SHULHQFHJDLQHGVNLOOVGHYHORSHGQHWZRUNV
FDWDO\VHGNQRZOHGJHWUDQVIHUUHG´&URSSHU 
 
1.1.2 5HVRXUFHVDQGDFWRUV¶PRWLYDWLRQV 
The problem-solving capacity of the collaboration in governance sheds light on 
the issue of the relative interdependent resources, able to support the 
collaborative activity. And when I talk about resources, I do not only refer to 
the material ones. I also identify the resources that are related with knowledge 
like expertise and skills, with relationships, like informal contacts and 
organisational connections and with personal aims, like the commitment shown 
by the participants (Stone, 7DONLQJDERXWSDUWQHUV¶UHVRXUFHVLQ
urban regimes, Stoker (1995:60) stresses the role of particularly two kinds of 
resources: first, the possession of strategic knowledge of social transactions 
and a capacity to act on that knowledge and second, the control of resources 
that make one an attractive coalition partner. 
 
The resource dependency concept is also related with the purposes and 
LQWHQWLRQVRIEHLQJPHPEHULQDSDUWQHUVKLS$V6WRNHUDUJXHV³UHFRJQLVLQJWKH
power dependence in collective action means accepting intentions do not 
DOZD\VPDWFKRXWFRPHV´6WRNHU8:22). When participants decide to 
participate, they cannot have complete control over the partnership outcome 
since it is an interactive process during which the members have to deal with 
different behaviours, sometimes with unintended effects. Therefore, Stone 
(2005) affirms that urban regimes analysis treats the relationships among 
partners as contingent.  
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$GGLWLRQDOO\WRWKHXQH[SHFWHGDQGXQFHUWDLQRXWFRPHVLQUHODWLRQWRPHPEHUV¶
PRWLYDWLRQVWKHSULPDU\SDUWQHUV¶LQWHQWLRQVIRUSDUWLFLSDWLRQFRXOGEe related 
ZLWKWKHFRQFHSWRI³VPDOORSSRUWXQLWLHV´7KLVFRQFHSWLVYHU\XVHIXO
HPSLULFDOO\'HILQLQJ³VPDOORSSRUWXQLWLHV´6WRQHDUJXHVWKDW
³PRVWSHRSOHPRVWRIWKHWLPHDUHJXLGHGQRWE\DJUDQGYLVLRQRIKRZWKH
world might be reformed, bXWE\WKHSXUVXLWRISDUWLFXODURSSRUWXQLWLHV´SODFLQJ
HPSKDVLVRQVPDOOSXUSRVHVWKDWJXLGHDJHQW¶VEHKDYLRXU6WRQHDOVRFRQWLQXHV
E\VD\LQJWKDW³WKHNH\SRLQWEHKLQGWKHVPDOORSSRUWXQLWLHVSKHQRPHQRQLV
that motives are more complex than selective matHULDOLQFHQWLYHV´SD\LQJ
attention to others motivational powers than the material ones. Although 
financial incentives are critical to motivational power, others like the 
opportunity to participate in informal policy networks or more altruistic ones, 
as for example the support of local disadvantage groups could play their role. 
  
1.1.3 Agency/Structure relationship  
Regime theory recognises that it is in the capacity of the agent to use or not its 
resources offered by the urban context in its own way in order to participate in 
collaborative efforts. So, regimes are not treated as external structures imposed 
on local actors, however, their operation depends on the capacity of local actors 
to mediate the collaborative rules (Stone, 1989, 2005). This evidence is also 
VXSSRUWHGHPSLULFDOO\E\'DYLHVZKREDVHGRQ6WRQH¶VDUJXPHQWIRXQG
that common structural pressures lead each locality to different partnership 
practices which means that agency action plays a significant role (Giddens 
(1984) affirms this in his structuration theory too). Agency has a central role in 
UHJLPHWKHRU\WKLVLVHPSLULFDOO\HYLGHQWLQWKHUHFRJQLWLRQRIOHDGHUV¶
behaviour in solving problems of coordination and in forging the collaborative 
spirit among partners (see also section 3).  
 
1.1.4 Ideas  
7KHUHJLPHWKHRU\¶VHPSLULFDOREVHUYDWLRQDERXWWKH³SXUSRVHSRZHURID
FRDOLWLRQ´LVDYHU\XVHIXOLQVLJKWIRUP\UHVHDUFK%DVHGRQFHDJDLQRQWKH
VRFLDOSURGXFWLRQPRGHORISRZHU6WRQHVWUHVVHGWKH³SRZHUWR´RILGHDVDQG
how these ideas, when arHFRQFUHWLVHGLQDUHJLPH¶VSXUSRVHFRXOGDWWUDFW
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GLVSDUDWHDFWRUVDQGLQWHJUDWHWKHLUGLIIHUHQWDLPV,Q6WRQH¶VRZQZRUGV
³SXUSRVHLVDSRWHQWLDOVRXUFHRI³SRZHUWR´6WRQH 
However, it is further interesting to understand how these ideas of 
collaboration are formed. In some cases, they do not emerge from a collective 
understanding of the resource independence displayed by the community for 
the achievement of a common goal but they are mandated by the upper 
political context, like the state and/or the EU. In this case, the perceptions of 
UHVRXUFHGHSHQGHQF\DQGWKHFROODERUDWLRQUHDOPDUHVKDSHG³E\WKHVKDGRZRI
WKHVWDWH´$QVHOODQG*DVKZLWKUHJXODWLYHIUDPHZRUNVDQGILQDQFLDO
motives which do not leave space for alternatives other than collaboration 
policy solutions. In this case, the purpose and the ideas that support them 
EHFRPHDVRXUFHRI³SRZHURYHU´ 
In the following table, I outline key concepts of each theory of urban politics 
(object of analysis, power, agency /structure relationship) and its contribution 
to the NI analysis on local partnerships.  
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Table 6: Key concepts of urban theories and their contribution to the institutional analytical framework of this study 
Theories of Urban 
politics  Object of analysis  Power  
Agency/ Structure 
relationship  Contribution to my research  
Pluralist theory  Formal decision-making  Power control (who has the power) $FWRUV¶EHKDYLRXU    - 
Elitist theory  
 
Agenda setting and formal 
decision-making  
Power control (who has the 
power)  $FWRUV¶EHKDYLRXU 
Informal rules: The 
significance of agenda setting 
in partnership decision-
making  
Marxist theory  Capital accumulation and 
maintenance  
Power over (power as 
conflict) 
$FWRUV¶EHKDYLRXULV
structurally determined  
Institutions and context: The 
impact of socio-economic 
VWUXFWXUHVRQSDUWQHUV¶
behaviour  
Urban governance  
Partnerships and networks 
(outside the formal urban 
government)  
Power to(coordination and 
steering ) 
Central role to actors and to 
their interaction  
(processes)  
$JHQF\DQGUXOHV¶
interpretation: Learning 
processes by generation of 
trust and commitment. 
Resource dependency  
Urban regime Governing coalitions of 
resourceful groups  
Power to (power as social 
production)  
&HQWUDOUROHWRDFWRUV¶
behaviour. Recognition of 
structural limitations 
HFRQRP\LGHRORJ\« 
Agency and institutional 
change: Capacity to act 
OHDGHUV$FWRUV¶PRWLYDWLRQV
(small opportunities)  
Informal rules: the purposive 
role of ideas 
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&ULWLFDODQDO\VLVRIWKHSDUWQHUVKLS¶VFDSDFLW\ 
Two points are under reconsideration here: the assumption by urban 
governance theories that a partnership is a primary efficient tool of social 
coordination and that a partnership consists of a democratic tool of policy-
making.  
 
 1.2.1. Is there partnership efficiency?  
Urban regime and urban governance theories reveal the conditions and effects 
of blending complementary resources to archive common goals. According to 
them, there are a number of perceived benefits by the collaboration, there are 
³FROODERUDWLYHDGYDQWDJHV´LQFOXGLQJSRROLQJRIH[SHUWLVHDQGUHVRXUFHVEHWWHU
coordination, community involvement and efficiency (Huxman, 1996). Behind 
WKLV³RSWLPLVWLF´FRQFHSWLRQRIFROODERUDWLRQOLHVDGLIIHUHQWSHUFHSWLRQRIZKDW
is power (as already discussed above). These theories stand for generative 
power relations among partners rather than the authoritative ones supported by 
neo Marxist theories in terms of power struggle over resources or the 
elitist/pluralist of power control. These power relations are developed around 
common efforts and commitment to collaboration for the production of 
effective outcomes.  
 
+RZHYHUGXHWRWKHLU³SRVLWLYH´VWDQGvis-a-vis power and collaboration, both 
theories focus extensively on problem solution and coordination avoiding to 
mention governance failures. In any way, the prevailing public discourse about 
SDUWQHUVKLSVDQGPRUHJHQHUDODERXWJRYHUQDQFHLVLQIRUPHGE\DQ³LGHDO´RI
cooperative and consensual behaviour9. According to Jessop (2002), although 
governance has considerable advantages compared to the other two modes of 
social coordination, market and hierarchy, it could also lead to failures where 
³QRLVH´DQG³WDONLQJVKRS´ZHDNHQWKHFRRUGLQDWLQJFDSDFLW\RIJRYHUQDQFH
For this reason, Jessop proposes the concept of metagovernance as a useful 
form for helping academics and policy makers to overcome both market, state 
and governance failure. Metagovernance suggests that there are many ways to 
                                                 
9
 In 1990, EU and ,QWHUQDWLRQDO2UJDQLVDWLRQVOLNH2(&'¶SROLFLHVSURPRWHGORFDOSDUWQHUVKLS
arrangements as a new policy tool, which will enhance the economic and social regeneration at 
the local level. Local partnership specifically appeared to be an essential feature of good 
JRYHUQDQFH¶VRUWKRGR[\.  
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respond to governance changes, so the selection of the appropriate mode of 
coordination is a question contextually specified and problem related.  
 
6WDUWLQJIURPWKLVFULWLFDOSHUVSHFWLYHRIJRYHUQDQFHDV³SDQDFHD´WRVRFLDO
coordination problems, one significant analytical proposition emerged for the 
SDUWQHUVKLSV¶VWXG\SDUWQHrships could generate collaborative advantage but 
they could also produce conflict and undermine the governability capacity 
(Davies, 2004). Kjaer (2009) refers to the findings of Morgan, Rees and 
Garmise (1999) in their study of the regional public-private partnership in 
South Wales in order to demonstrate that the collaborative arrangements do not 
always succeed in all cities; there are cases when they fail. In particular, in 
South Wales, the partnership was implemented by a hierarchical top down 
fashion with the involvement of selective partners. As a result, mistrust 
emerged among the involved partners and existing vertical networks were 
reinforced (Kjaer, 2009). Another example of a critical apprehension of the 
SDUWQHUVKLSV¶FROODERUDWLYHEHQHILWVLVWKDt of the urban regeneration partnership 
LQ6RXWK,WDO\9LFDUL¶V(2001) findings suggest that this partnership not only 
IDLOVWRDGGUHVVWKHPDLQSUREOHPVRI1DSOHV¶FLW\EXWLWDOVRDJJUDYDWHV
existing traditional relations of power among a closed circle of economic and 
political elites.  
 
)ROORZLQJ-HVVRS¶VDUJXPHQW, I adopt a critical and realistic analysis of the 
SDUWQHUVKLSV¶JRYHUQLQJFDSDFLWLHVVLQFH,GRQRWWDNHIRUJUDQWHGWKH
coordinative and problem solving advantages of governance. Regarding power 
relationships more specifically, I use the two different types of power (power 
to and power over) in order to identify the possible interactive process and the 
boundaries/overlaps between antagonistic relationships and power 
dependencies among the partners.  
 
1.2.2. Do the partnerships have democratic values?  
0DWKXUDQG6NHOFKHUDUJXHWKDWJRYHUQDQFHFRXOGFUHDWHµQHZ
spaces for democratic activity through which the public and other stakeholders 
FDQVKDSHDQGGHWHUPLQHSXEOLFSROLF\SURJUDPPHLPSOHPHQWDWLRQ´RXWVLGHWKH
formal representative democratic institutions of majority voting. In this way, 
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governance opens the door to a different process of decision-making which is 
less constrained and formal than the traditional one of the representative 
democracy offering more flexible arenas of communication with participants 
being able to voice their concerns and ideas, to argue and negotiate (Wolf, 
2002). For instance, the role of managers rather than elected politicians in the 
front line of communication with citizens and the use of innovative managerial 
DWWLWXGHDIIHFWFLWL]HQV¶SHUFHSWLRQRIDFFHVVLELOLW\DQGUHVSRQVLYHQHVVRISXEOLF
administration (Mathur and Skelcher, 2002). Evidence from research suggests 
WKDWWKH³SXEOLFYDOXHPDQDJHPHQW´SULQFLSOHVJRYHUQLQJDPDQDJHU¶V
EHKDYLRXUHQKDQFHFLWL]HQV¶participation. In contrast, traditional bureaucratic 
SUDFWLFHVGLVFRXUDJHFLWL]HQV¶HQJDJHPHQW/RZQGHVet al, 2006). 
 
However, legitimation and accountability problems of new governance forms 
such as partnerships, networks and coalitions are extensively discussed by 
critical theories (Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002: 150). But before I advance to the 
DQDO\VLVRIJRYHUQDQFH¶³GHPRFUDWLFGHILFLW´LWLVXVHIXOIRUWKHXQGHUVWDQGLQJ
of governance legitimation and related problems to mention the distinction put 
forward by Scharpf (2000) about the three modes of legitimation. By 
legitimation, I refer to the acceptance and support of the political decisions by 
the social environment of the political system. Acceptance, trust, support and 
political justifiability are terms that describe political legitimation (Haus and 
Heinelt, 2005). Scharpf (2000 quoted in Haus et al, 2005)) identifies three 
interrelated forms of legitimation: a. LQSXWOHJLWLPDWLRQJHWWLQJRQH¶VYRLFH
KHDUGDQGRQH¶VYRWHFRXQWHGE\PHans of citizens participation b. output 
legitimation: capacity of problem solving and well informed decisions leading 
to effective outcomes c. throughput legitimation: transparency of institutions 
and processes. Scharpf claims that each one is not sufficient on its own; 
instead, there should be a balance between them in order to secure a democratic 
quality of the public policy.  
 
&RPLQJEDFNWRSDUWQHUVKLSV¶GHPRFUDWLFGHILFLW6WRNHUQRWHVWKDW
³*RYHUQDQFHUHFRJQLVHVWKHFDSDFLW\WRJHWWKLQJVGRQH´JLYLQJHPShasis on 
the effectiveness of the governance coordination and on managerial practices. 
What matters more than the traditional forms and norms that ensure 
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legitimation is the delivery of public policy outcomes (Skelcher et al, 2005). So 
governance has been ³FRQFHQWUDWHGSULPDU\RUHYHQH[FOXVLYHO\RQLQFUHDVLQJ
the effectiveness of self regulation´Wolf, 2002:40) i.e. on the provision of 
output-oriented legitimation. But what happened with the input and throughput 
legitimation? Jessop (2002) analysing governance failure notes the problems of 
accountability and biased power structures, while Geddes (2000) analyses the 
SURFHVVHVRIH[FOXVLRQLQFLWL]HQV¶SDUWLFLSDWLRQLQGHSWK 
 
Regarding the problem of accountability, partnerships are required to account 
for their actions in the public arena and they have to establish the tools with 
which they assure accountability to the public. These tools are the electoral 
mandate, access to information and transparency (Sullivan and Skelcher, 
2002). However, partnership bodies suffer democratically from the lack of 
electorate arrangements. Although elected politicians or their appointed 
executive managers may be members of the partnership, political decisions are 
made by members who are not subject to electoral mandate. Since partnership 
institutions demand the adoption of new managerial tools and values, which are 
led by the private sector, knowledge becomes increasingly specialised and 
distributed. This process weakens the authority of elected members towards 
private sectors experts and chief executives (Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998). 
Consequently, managerialism facilitates discretion by public administrators in 
managing partnership relationship and policy implementation undermining the 
legitimacy and accountability of the partnership (Ansell and Gash, 2007).    
 
In their research on governing collaboration in Finnish and Norwegian local 
governments, Haveri et al (2009) found that network governance is in the 
hands of officials and experts rather than politicians. Politicians usually lack 
the skills and time to steer a collaborative activity and as a result they appoint 
executives to run a partnership due to their advanced management knowledge 
and skills. Based on the work of Howard and Sweeting (2004) on the 
legitimation of the council-manager executives in local government, significant 
insights can be drawn about the legitimation of executives in partnerships. In 
particular, executives have a low level of input legitimation. They have an 
indirect legitimation, through the delegation of power by elected politicians. 
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However, executives have the advantage to be free from political constraints 
like political parties and voters and so they are more independent to make 
decisions and run the partnerships.  
 
Moreover, partnerships have to define in detail who is accountable for what 
(political decision, financial management, implementation). However, in 
collaborative processes of joint up action and co-funding such as partnerships, 
the responsibilities and obligations of each partner are diffused and citizens do 
not understand who is accountable for what. So the lack of transparency creates 
a problem of democratic control over political processes and accountability to 
elected politicians (Murray, 2005).  
 
Regarding the biased power structures, governance theory fails to focus on 
issues of power, conflict and interests inherent in the production of networks 
(Kjaer, 2009). Regime theory, on the other hand, recognises that actors possess 
unequal resources, but LWLVFRQFHUQHGPRUHZLWKWKHORFDODFWRUV¶DFWLYLWLHVDQG
in the way that they generate the capacity to act rather than the structural 
limitations of influence on decision-making. However, partnerships and 
networks are not neutral; in many cases their institutional form is selective in 
terms of involving citizens (Jessop, 2002; Geddes, 2000). In this research, I 
recognise that there are considerable power imbalances between partners to the 
extent that some significant partners may not even participate effectively.  
 
In particular, there are questions about the capacity of partnerships to bring 
together all the key actors involved in the policy designed and delivered by the 
partnership. In many cases, partnership decision-making is dominated by 
corporatist forms. Within these forms, established powerful groups make the 
decision excluding traditionally weak groups (Lowndes and Sullivan, 2004). 
Furthermore, there is empirical evidence that the partnership budgets are not 
IRUPXODWHGE\WKHSDUWQHUV¶VKDUHGREMHctives but are guided by the priorities of 
the coordinative partners (Murray, 2005:161-162). In the question of which 
socio-HFRQRPLFLQWHUHVWVDUHLQYROYHGLQSDUWQHUVKLSV*HGGHV¶research 
on urban partnerships in EU shows the dominant role of the public sector (local 
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authorities and other public agencies), the formal rather than substantive role of 
private sector and the limited participation of trade unions.  
 
Moreover, the selective nature of citizens participation is due not only to 
unequal power structures among partners but also to the same logic of 
governance with  participation justified in terms of its contribution to goal 
DFFRPSOLVKPHQW³WRDFFHSWDQFHRIGHFLVLRQVRr to the implementation of 
WKHVH´ (Wolf, 2002: 40). Governance has to produce results. Consequently, in 
most cases, partnerships and networks involve those that are related to the 
relevant policies, and those who control resources for the problem solving. 
This process prevails over the ideal of the representative democracy in which 
everyone has the right to participate at least by voting.  
 
But even if full inclusion is formally secured by the partnership, it is not 
automatically assumed that it will be realised. The quality and capacity of 
community participation is questionable (Lowndes and Sullivan, 2004). 
$FFRUGLQJWR*HGGHV³E\QRPHDQVDOOSDUWQHUVKLSVRIIHUGLUHFW
representation to local community interests; and the effectiveness of 
FRPPXQLW\LQYROYHPHQWLQORFDOSDUWQHUVKLSVLVDWEHVWH[WUHPHO\YDULDEOH´
Very often community involvement in partnerships actually means the 
participation of big players of local associations failing to incorporate small, 
more informally organised vulnerable groups (Geddes, 2000; Lowndes and 
Wilson, 2003). Additionally, community partners usually lack the appropriate 
resources to respond to the partnership bureaucratic processes and influence 
RWKHUSDUWQHUV¶YLHZV,QSDUWLFXODUWKHSHUVLVWHQFHRIHIIHFWLYHSDUWQHUVKLS
management by indicators and targets has been criticised to have a negative 
LPSDFWRQSDUWQHUV¶LQWHJUDWLRQEHFDXVHLWSUHYHQWVWKHPIURPEHLQJHQJDJHGLQ
collaboration since they do not have either the organisational capacity or the 
willingness to participate (Murray, 2005). Moreover, the lack of solidarity in 
community interests and of organisational resources could prevent the equal 
participation in the partnership board (Geddes, 2000).  
 
In conclusion, in partnership processes, there is not a balanced account of input 
and output legitimation with input legitimation lagging behind in terms of 
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equal opportunities for citizens to participate in decision-making. It is this 
democratic deficit by electorate mandate that requires capacity building 
policies that secure community participation. Capacity building is related to the 
development of appropriate skills and resources for citizens and organisations 
to participate in partnerships. According to Sullivan and Skelcher (2002:171-
172), community capacity is determined by a number of factors related to the 
individual such as skills and confidence and structural such as the local social 
capital and the culture of the participant organisations. The extent to which 
these inadequacies are effectively addressed depends a lot on the capacity of 
the statutory members of the partnership. 
 
Based on the above analysis, I apply in my research the Scharpf (2000) 
typology of legitimation (input, throughput and output legitimation) by 
discussing the role of executives, the level of local citizens inclusion and the 
purpose that serves the community involvement i.e. ideal democratic rights 
YHUVXVIXQFWLRQDOJRDODFKLHYHPHQWQHHGV)XUWKHUPRUH,LGHQWLI\SDUWQHUV¶
practices that strengthen/prevent input and throughput legitimation and the 
extent to which the collaboration processes increase local social capital and 
consolidate local autonomy.  
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Section 2: A review of the neo institutional literature on local 
partnership      
Regime theory comprises in its synthesis elements from political economy, 
pluralism and institutionalism (Mossberger and Stoker, 2001). And it is 
because of this familiarity with institutionalism that urban regimes could offer 
useful insights on the study of local partnerships as institutions. The focus of 
regime theory on informal coordination among institutions, internal dynamics 
of coalition building, fragmentation of power and the synthesis of structure and 
agency (Mossberger and Stoker, 2001: 813 ) shares a lot of common elements 
in the way that NI theory and the normative neo institutionalism, in particular, 
approacKWKHREMHFWRIWKHLUDQDO\VLV)RULQVWDQFH6WRQH¶VDSSURDFKRI
small opportunities and gradual change has a lot in common with the 
incremental institutional change supported by normative neo institutionalism. It 
is argued that small wins in collaborative capacity can support habits of 
reciprocity and trust and lead to the penetration of partnerships in other areas of 
local politics and create new relations of interdependence.  
 
Despite the kinship between urban regime theory and institutional theory, 
regime theory remains much localised by neglecting national and international 
economic and political institutions (Davies, 2001: 33). It emphasises the study 
RISROLWLFDOSURFHVVHVDQGDJHQW¶VEHKDYLRXUE\RYHUVLPSOLI\LQJWKHHFRQRPLF
ideological, and political institutional configuration within which the regime 
processes are embedded. Additionally, the governance theory fails to recognise 
the role of institutions and their normative character, the values, norms and 
ideas that are embedded with (Kjaer, 2009:137) As Pierre notes, urban 
governance should include in its analytical model the extent to which 
horizontal and vertical institutions make a difference in the governance 
SURFHVVHV3LHUUH³3ROLWLFDOLQVWLWXWLRQVFDQSOD\DJUHDWPDQ\
dLIIHUHQWUROHVLQJRYHUQDQFH´3LHUUH,QGHHG6WRNHU
underlines that government can play different roles in governance, from being 
the coordinator to being just a partner.  
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,WLVRQO\UHFHQWO\LQWKH¶VWKDWXUEDQSROLWLFVWKHRULVWV turn their attention to 
the ways in which the theories of new institutionalism could illuminate the 
study of urban politics. Their reserve towards the new institutionalism theory 
GHULYHVIURPWKHKLVWRULFDOHYROXWLRQRIWKHGLVFLSOLQHRI³XUEDQSROLWLFV´itself 
which has been constructed in opposition to the traditional version of 
institutional theory (Lowndes 2001; Pierre, 2011:15-17). According to 
Lowndes (2009), the theoretical turn of interest corresponds to major 
substantial changes in urban politics, which make NI approach particularly 
appropriate for their study. These changes are inherent in the partnership 
development itself since partnerships are considered as an organisational 
manifestation of governance among others. In the rest of the section, I 
introduce the key themes around which a NI approach of local partnerships has 
developed.   
 
2.1 Formal and informal rules  
In the last three decades, mainly in North-West Europe, there has been a 
proliferation of new institutional rules that govern local politics due to the 
fragmentation of the elected urban government and the simultaneous 
development of informal policy networks and partnerships. Many of these rules 
are not controlled by the official local government rules (Rhodes 1997; 
Lowndes 2001, 2005) but by informal constraints developed in these 
collaborative spaces. Many NI researchers have identified empirical evidence 
RIWKHLQIRUPDOUXOHV¶SRZHULQORFDOSDUWQHUVKLSV 
 
In their study of urban regeneration partnerships, Lowndes (2001) and 
Lowndes and Skelcher (1998) find evidence of the power of informal relations 
constituting partnerships. Lowndes (2001: 1963) argues WKDW³WKHVXVWDLQDELOLW\
of interagency relationships over time depended upon the underlying presence 
of network-VW\OHUXOHVDQGUHODWLRQVKLSV´,QWHUPVRIFLWL]HQV¶SDUWLFLSDWLRQ
Klausen et al (2005: 200) analysing the community involvement in urban 
partnerships in different countries, mention the distance between formal rules 
DQGDFWXDOSDUWLFLSDWLRQ9HULI\LQJ*HGGHV¶FRQFOXVLRQVWKH\UHSRUWWKDW
although full inclusion is DUHTXLUHPHQWRISDUWQHUVKLSVRQO\³DKDQGIXORI
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residents actually taNHSODFHVR³IXOOLQFOXVLRQ´UHODWHGRQO\WRWKHRSSRUWXQLW\
to SDUWLFLSDWH´ 
 
In other cases where all the partners are in equal decision-making positions, 
actually the decision-making processes are uneven tending to favour more 
organised interests than less organised ones. Indeed, Mathur and Skelcher 
(2007) evaluating the democratic performance of network governance, mention 
that the evaluation of the quality of democracy has to include the informal 
practices of the actors as they are influenced by the contextual norms and 
YDOXHV³+RZWKHFROODERUDWLRQDFWXDOO\ZRUNVLVDPDWWHURI pragmatics arising 
IURPGD\WRGD\SUDFWLFHV´0DWKXUDQG6NHOFKHUDQGUHIOHFWVWKH
meanings that actors give to what is democracy. The importance of rules-in-use 
has also been demonstrated in the study of Lowndes et al (2006) on the level of 
FLWL]HQV¶SDUWLFLSDWLRQLQHLJKW%ULWLVKORFDODXWKRULWLHV,WLVDUJXHGWKDW
although formal structures were similar in these local authorities, the way that 
these structures were operationalised in the daily practices of political and 
administrative personnel as well as civic organisations impact upon the 
FLWL]HQV¶ZLOOLQJQHVVWRSDUWLFLSDWH 
 
So, a NI perspective does not treat partnerships as organisations characterised 
by prescribed formal regulations and principles but as institutional 
arrangements in which formal and informal rules embedded by the socio-
HFRQRPLFUHDOLW\LQWHUDFWZLWKDJHQFLHV¶LQFHQWLYHVDQGSUDFWLFHV 
 
2.2 From staticness  to process  
As mentioned above in the discussion about metagovernance, governance is 
not simply a next stage of government. There is greater variety of governance 
modes in urban politics. In a governance arrangement, market, hierarchy and 
networks modes could co-exist and in some cases mix with each other. 
*RYHUQDQFHLVUDWKHUDQ³LQVWLWXWHGSURFHVV´GXULQJZKLFKROGand new, formal 
and informal, top down and bottom up hierarchy and networking coexist 
(Lowndes, 2009). So, the NI approach can identify the interactions between 
WKHPDQGWKHZD\WKDWWKH³SOD\HUV´DJHQF\DQGLQVWLWXWLRQVSOD\WKH³JDPH´
of politics.  
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In the same aforementioned study of Lowndes and Skelcher (1998), this 
procedural character within partnerships was highlighted. The authors analyse 
partnerships not as a stagnant and static organisations but as processes 
involving stages of development. In particular, they distinguish stages in their 
development and they pay attention to interactions among them. The authors 
argue that partnerships are organisations shaped not only by a networking style 
of governance but also by the hierarchy and market form of social 
coordination.  
 
Following Lowndes and Skelcher argument, Davies (2004: 582) also find that 
regeneration partnerships comprise old (hierarchical) and new (network) styles 
of governability, while Whitehead (2007) in his study of the organisational 
structure and working practices of urban partnerships find that governmental 
hierarchies and local neo corporatism continue to embody urban partnerships in 
day to day working. So, when researchers study a partnership development, 
they have to adopt a rather conceptual openness for analysing the potential 
political mix of social coordination that appears in the particular partnership 
development.  
 
2.3 Institutional interdependence and ideas   
Additionally, in the last three decades, European integration and stateV¶QHZ
political and managerial strategies have supported multi-level governance 
horizontally and vertically, which involved different geographical levels and 
different actors in policy-making. In this context, the institutional 
infrastructures became more complex and interdependent (Ansell, 2006). 
Europeanisation theories, particularly those of new institutionalism (mainly 
historical and sociological institutionalism) and network analysis, which as 
%DFKHFRPPHQWVDUH³LQVWLWXWLRQDOLVWE\QDWXUH´%DFKH08:12), have 
enriched the NI approach of local partnerships by analysing institutional 
configurations.  
 
Some theories from the Europeanisation literature (Bache and Marshall, 2004; 
Marshall, 2002;  Cowles et al, 2001)  focus on the impact of the European 
integration on domestic structures, like social capital, institutional 
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configurations, local traditions and conventions of civic engagement  and the 
ZD\VWKDWWKHVH³PHGLDWLQJGRPHVWLFIDFWRUV´DIIHFWDQGUHVKDSH(8SROLWLFV
%\VD\LQJ³WKHLPSDFWRI(XURSHDQLQWHJUDWLRQ´WKH\UHIHUWRDVHWRISURFHVVHV
through which the EU political, social and economic dynamics, i.e. formal and 
LQIRUPDOQRUPVUXOHV¶UHJXODWLRQVDQGSUDFWLFHVEHFRPHSDUWRIWKHORJLFRI
domestic discourses, identities, political structures and public policies 
(Radaelli, 2000). The exact patterns of interactions are not specified as part of 
the definition but are instead kept as free parameters to be examined 
empirically in each member state (Cowles et al, 2001). Since I deal with 
Community Initiatives (CIs) programmes, these theories have a great analytical 
utility for my research because they provide me with concepts and evidence on 
the way that EU sets the rules and how the state and the local government 
adapt/mediate these rules. In this way, I can understand the multi-level 
institutional configuration in which the partnerships of this study have evolved.   
 
Bache (2000) argues that variations exist not only to domestic politics but also 
to the pressures coming from the EU level. During the process of 
Europeanisation, three factors are important: 1. the ways of policy transfer, 2. 
the content of policy transfer and 3. the agent that transfers the ideas and 
practices from EU to a member state. Regarding the ways of transfer, he 
distinguishes between voluntary and coercive transfer. In the first case, policy 
makers freely choose to adopt policies or practices from EU while in the 
second case, EU forces the member states to adopt a particular policy or 
practice opposed by key state and society actors. In relation to content, it is 
suggested that complex policies or practices may be more difficult to transfer 
than simple ones. This is related to the fact that each policy environment is 
different and anything transferred could meet resistance. Additionally, complex 
policies and practices need more stock of resources (political, bureaucratic, and 
financial), which is not always available to the recipient country. Finally, in 
&,V¶SURJUDPPHVWKH(&LVWKHPRVWLPSRUWDQWagent of policy transfer. EC 
has the legitimacy to organise, support and control policy transfer and it is 
responsible for the development of learning mechanisms, which will support 
changes.  
80 
 
5HJDUGLQJGRPHVWLFIDFWRUVWKHFRQFHSWRI³QRUPHQWUHSUHQHXUV´%RU]HODQG
Risse, 2000) has attracted my attention because it could be related to the 
national and local technocrats of the partnerships under study who promoted 
collaborative activity. The norm entrepreneurs mobilise at the domestic level 
and persuade others to redefine their interests and identities according to the 
EU policies under transfer. Two types of entrepreneurs could be distinguished: 
a. the epistemic community, which is usually a network of actors legitimated to 
provide scientific knowledge and ideas (e.g. national technocrats) and b. the 
advocacy or principled issue networks (e.g. environmentalists).  
 
Evaluation studies of the partnership principle of Structural Funds demonstrate 
that there are considerable variations in effective partnership operation across 
member states caused by the pre-existing territorial distribution of power and 
the degree of prior experience in partnerships (Keller et al, 1999). These 
findings verify the research questions of the NI approaches about the 
influential role of institutional legacies and institutional configuration in a 
political institution:  
 
a. Prior experience of partnership operation in EU.  
In the cases of member states that had little experience on cooperative modes 
of policy-making, EU regulation had often initiated the operation of 
partnership forms. However, in these countries like Greece, local partnerships 
adjusted to EU imposed programmes and priorities without being fully 
equipped with skills and capacities to enter such collaborations (Geddes, 2000). 
For member states which had more experience of partnerships, EU regulation 
was seen to reformulate the partnership along more innovatory lines. This 
argument is directly related to the institutional legacies argument of NI 
theorists.  
 
NI case study research has demonstrated that prehistory of conflicts and 
XQVXFFHVVIXOHIIRUWVRIFROODERUDWLRQ³FUHDWHVDYLFLRXVF\FOHRIVXVSLFLRQ
GLVWUXVWDQGVWHUHRW\SLQJ´$QVHOODQG*DVK$FFRUGLQJWRWKHVH
authors, although high conflict is not necessarily a prohibit of collaboration, 
especially when there is a high interdependence of resources, previous 
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antagonism among partners creates low trust and low trust in its turn creates 
low commitment and strategies of manipulation and miscommunication. The 
research evidence by Andersen and Pierre (2010) about the influence of 
previous collaborations on the existing ones due to geographical proximity and 
shared history verifies this argument.  Analysing inter-municipal cooperation, 
they argue that the involved municipalities were HQWUDSSHG³LQDQHWZRUNRI
WHUULWRULDOO\HPEHGGHGH[FKDQJHV´ZKLFKPDGHLWH[WUHPHO\GLIILFXOWWRHVFDSH
DQGPRYHDXWRQRPRXVO\DQGLVRODWHGIURPRWKHUV¶DFWLRQV7KLVQHWZRUNZDV
based not only on interdependence on territorial defined resources but also on 
common values, memories and identities. 
 
b. Decentralisation of public administration.  
The territorial and functional division of powers and resources plays a 
VLJQLILFDQWUROHIRUWKHSDUWQHUVKLSV¶VXFFHVVIXODGDSWDWLRQ)RUH[DPSOHLQ
centralised states, the structure of intergovernmental relations is expected to be 
dominated by vertical networks in which local government depends on higher 
levels of government for resources. Vertical structures are usually 
hierarchically and bureaucratically organised bringing together actors in 
unequal power relations and inter-dependence. This process also leaves little 
space for horizontal cooperation at the local level with representation of local 
economic and social actors and it discourages the built up of social trust 
(Paraskevopoulos, 2001).  
 
This last point is very important. State but also government of all geographical 
scales are significant factors of examination in local partnerships. Unlike 
5KRGHV¶QHZJRYHUQDQFHDV³JRYHUQLQJZLWKRXWJRYHUQPHQW´-HVVRS
DUJXHVWKDW³JRYHUQPHQWVRQYDULRXVVFDOHVDUHEHFRPLQJPRUH
involved in organising the self organisation of partnerships, networks and 
JRYHUQDQFHUHJLPHV´7KHQDWLRQDODQGORFDOJRYHUQPHQWVSURYLGHUXOHV
information and knowledge, resolve disputes between different interests and 
provide strategic directions (MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999: 522). In his 
research on urban regeneration partnerships in U.K., Davies (2004) found 
evidence that there have been cases when central government funding 
stimulated action and collaborative efforts in the local level but the procedures 
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and conditions of this funding have also worked against the local autonomy 
because the state continued being in control by manipulating the partnership 
institutions.  
 
'HUN]HQ¶VVWXG\RIUXUDOSDUWQHUVKLSVLQWKH1HWKHUODQGVDQG:DOHVILQG
that the level of consultation and participation in decision-making in each 
country was highly dependent on the national policy context, which determined 
in each case who was allowed to participate as a partner at the local level. In 
the Netherlands, the narrow national policy of rural development directed 
urban partnerships to excluding newly emergent groups. However the level of 
decision-making was high due to the established cooperative culture. By 
FRQWUDVWLQ:DOHVWKH³MRLQHGXS´LGHRORJ\OHGWRJUHDWHULQFOXVLRQRf local 
groups but there was a stronger power dependency during decision-making due 
to the traditional role of public sector in local governance. 
  
Finally, NI theories on local partnerships have identified one more institutional 
interdependency of local partnerships, that of ideas. The ideational factors and 
their contained rationalities infuse the values and practices of partners. There 
DUHPDQ\1,VWXGLHVWKDWH[SODLQSDUWQHUV¶SUDFWLFHVWKURXJKWKHZD\WKDWWKH\
have embedded dominant political and administrative discourses about 
collaborative activity (Davies, 2001, 2004). In particular, Davies (2004) 
identifies the penetration of partnership ideology in the politico-administrative 
culture of local authorities and community and how it generates a habit of 
partnership, i.e. an ideological commitment to collaboration, which results 
more and more in partnership activity. The same evidence is derived from the 
study of Andersen and Pierre (2010) on inter-local co-operations in Norway. 
According to them, one main motivation for the municipalities to join 
collaborative efforts is the reaffirmation that partnership is a good thing and 
therefore they have to respond positively to the strong expectation from the 
state to promote collaboration.  
 
Following the path RI³GLVFXUVLYHLQVWLWXWLRQDOLVP´6NHOFKHU6PLWKDQG
Mathur (2005) go deeper in the analysis of this dominant discourse by 
identifying three contesting in some cases patterns of framing the partnership 
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concept in the politico administrative discussion: 1. managerial 2. 
consociational and 3. participatory. The managerial discourse gives more 
GLVFUHWLRQRQPDQDJHULDODFWLRQDQGWKHSXEOLF¶VSDUWLFLSDWLRQLVLQWHJUDWHGLQ
terms of potential in facilitating outcomes. In this context, the desire is to 
secure a stable operating environment in the detriment of participation and 
accountability. The second discourse supports negotiation and agreement over 
conflicts and antagonisms in an elite decision-making structure. This collective 
agreement is facilitated by the technification of solutions and their treatment by 
professionals and experts that reduce the values of different ideologies and 
conflicts and consequently de-politicised the decision-making. Additionally, 
the shaping of the agenda by group leaders in private accommodates the 
common agreement. The third discourse implies that all the community has 
equal opportunities and power for working together for a better future. In the 
latter, an emphasis is given to the inclusiveness of the partnerships and the 
transparency in procedures.  
 
The authors argue that the partnership governance is dominated by the 
managerial discourse and it moderates its democratic deficit by elements of 
FRQVRFLDWLRQDOLVPDQGSDUWLFLSDWRU\GLVFRXUVHV$VWKH\XQGHUOLQH³SDUWQHUVKLSV
are limited through the dominating managerial principles of entrepreneurial 
pragmatism and practices of performance (Skelcher et al, 2005: 20).  
 
In conclusion, I focus on the role of EU in partnerships. I treat EU, among 
other variables, as an independent variable of the larger institutional context 
and I try to investigate in which way it impacts on the partnership process so as 
changes would not have occurred without this influential factor. In particular, I 
look at the particular features of the CI programmes (i.e. (clear/unclear rules, 
simple/complex rules, role of the EC as agent of policy transfer) and the 
domestic institutional factors that enable/prevent the partnership operation. 
Moreover, I take into account the state and its changing relationships with 
lower levels. I also study the established horizontal institutional configuration 
of local government with other local institutions like local interest informal 
networks and civil society organisations. Finally, I look for prevailing 
meanings of collaboration in formal and informal rules that guide the 
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partnerships and the way that this discourse(s) has/have shaped the interaction 
EHWZHHQUXOHVDQGSDUWQHUV¶DFWLRQV 
 
 2.4 Institutional dynamics  
The NI study of local partnerships enhances the discussion about the dynamics 
of local institutional changes. How and when does the change occur and can 
RQHILQDOO\WDONDERXWDQDFWXDOFKDQJHRULVLWWKHUHKDELOLWDWLRQ³RIWKH
IDPLOLDU´WKDWOHDGVWRVDPHRXWFRPHV"/RZQGHVSUHFLVHO\QRWHVWKDW
³LQDSHULRGRIIUHQHWLFDFWLYLW\GLUHFWHGDW³PRGHUQLVLQJ´RU³UHLQYHQWLQJ´
urban governance, neo-institutionalists are able to distinguish between 
RUJDQLVDWLRQDODQGLQVWLWXWLRQDOFKDQJH´,QWKHODWWHUWKHJRDOLVQRWMXVWWR
highlight formal structural changes but the actual rules as they are shaped by 
the existing norms and values of the context. 
 
The dynamic character of partnerships as institutions that lead to change and/or 
to the reproduction of the old practices and cultures due to specific spatial and 
historic (local) governance context is evident in a number of studies that use 
institutional insights to their analysis. In her research on the degree of British 
XUEDQJRYHUQDQFHFKDQJHVVLQFHWKH¶V/RZQGHVE\SDVVLQJWKH
contrasting conceptLRQVRIFKDQJHDQGLQHUWLDUHIOHFWV³DERXWWKHFRH[LVWHQFH
DQGLQWHUDFWLRQVRIIRUFHIRUFRQWLQXLW\DQGFKDQJH´7KXVVKHUHYHDOVWKH
incremental processes of change by identifying various strategies that seek to 
respond to the changing environment and pURWHFWSDUWQHUV¶LQWHUHVWV+DVWLQJV
(1999) in his study of the potential transformative power of partnerships 
wonders whether transformation does really take place during partnership 
SURFHVVHVDQGWRZKDWH[WHQWWKHSDUWQHUV¶LQLWLDOREMHFWLYHVDQGYDOXHV do 
actually change.  
 
Consequently, which rules of the past and present matter more during 
partnership process is an empirical question which can not be answered 
theoretically once and for all but it must be tested each time in the special 
circumstances in which a partnership is developed. For instance, the low 
institutional innovation of partnerships due to the embodiment of traditional 
institutional cultures is mentioned in the study of Vazquez et al (2009) on the 
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urban regeneration partnerships in Portugal. The authors argue that these 
partnerships did not finally induce changes in the governance of urban spaces. 
By contrast, they preserved the characteristics of the dominant administrative 
culture and they failed to express the restructuring processes of 
intergovernmental relations. However, they underline that although remaining 
limited, learning processes from experience in other contexts has produced 
some soft changes in the local governance processes.  
 
Davies (2004:582) argues that the proliferation of partnerships are not 
JHQHUDWHG³VWURQJLQVWLWXWLRQVEDVHGRQLQIRUPDOPRGHVRIFRQVWUDLQWV´EHWZHHQ
SDUWQHUVEXWWKH\DUHGRPLQDWHGE\WKHSHUVLVWHQFH³RISXEOLFVHFWRU-style 
RUJDQLVDWLRQVVWUXFWXUHGKLHUDUFKLFDOO\´VHFXULQJLQWKLVZD\WKHSDWKdependent 
course of policy-making. Haveri et al (2009) also find that network governance 
is still based on traditional mechanisms of steering. However, the development 
of informational structures and the new role of managers could be a challenge 
for new governance practices. The way that the past dependencies could also 
become opportunities for change has been demonstrated in the study of the 
Mexican urban governance by Guarneros-Meza (2009). She argues that a 
number of institutional legacies like corporatiVP³KDYHEHFRPHERWK
opportunities that prompt changes and obstacles that hinder reforms for 
EHFRPLQJSDUWRIWKHVWDWXVTXR´Guarneros-Meza, 2009:11) 
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Section 3: The leadership role in partnership  
In this section, I am looking at the leadership role in partnership processes. 
This research task offers me the opportunity to enrich theoretically my 
knowledge about the role of agency in institutions and the way it enacts the 
rules of the game. Although, throughout the research emphasis is given on the 
agency by addressing questions of motivations, resources and actual behaviour, 
,IRFXVH[FOXVLYHO\RQOHDGHUV¶DFWLRQVEHFDXVHWKHLUVWUDWHJLFEHKDYLRXU
demonstrates more clearly the way that the agency could sustain, change 
and/redirect the formal and informal rules of an institution. In most cases, rules 
are developed and changed by powerful actors without denying that the 
everyday interpretation of rules could also lead to gradual changes (as shown in 
the first chapter).  
 
,QGHHGWKHLGHQWLILFDWLRQRIGLYHUVHDJHQWV¶VWUDWHJLFEHKDYLRXULVIDFLOLWDWHGE\
the partnership working itself. Multi-SDUWQHUV¶FROODERUDWLRQVZLWKWKH
involvement of multi-levels of government generate a sharing leadership, 
which is not identical to one person leading, traditionally the political leader, 
but it is dispersed among various leaders from different origins and different 
geographical levels. In this way, my focus is not restricted to one person only, 
but to a small group, which enhances a better understanding of agent strategic 
behaviour in partnership.  To map leadership in local partnerships, this section 
is divided in two parts: The first part outlines leadership definition and its main 
features in general, while the second part includes a discussion about 
leadership in local partnerships.  
 
In this analysis, beyond political science approaches, I draw from concepts of 
public management theories too, in order to expand my knowledge on leaders 
in political institutions. Although from a different intellectual tradition and 
normative in its principles, public management theory has developed models of 
leadership behaviour in depth. Hambeton (2005) argue that a multi-disciplinary 
approach is essential, if we want to understand leadership within local 
partnerships.  
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3.1 Understating leadership  
Leadership literature suggests that to one or to the other extent both leaders and 
context matters (Hambleton, 2005). This literature reproduces the existing 
discussion about agent/structure relationship in leadership in a more explicit 
way. (see chapter 1, section 2). As a result, leadership refers to the 
LQVWLWXWLRQDOLVDWLRQRIOHDGHUV¶UROHDVZHOODVWKHSHUVRQDOHQDFWPHQWRIWKDW
UROH$V-XGGDUJXHV³XUEDQOHDGHUVKDYHWKHDELOLW\WRPDNH
choices, but within the parameters imposed both by local political 
DUUDQJHPHQWVDQGE\H[WHUQDOIRUFHV´ 
 
Referring exclusively to political leadership, Elgie (1995) demonstrates the 
interrelation between context and behaviour in the following figure. 
   
 
 
Figure 7: The interactive approach to political leadership by Elgie (1995: 8) 
 
$GDSWLQJ(OJLH¶VILJXUHLQP\FDVHVWXG\SDUWQHUVKLSOHDGHUVKLSLVGHILQHGE\
the skills and the personal disposition of the leaders to act, as well as by the 
institutional design of the partnerships, which encourage particular leadership 
styles and practices.  
 
3.1.1 Leadership definition   
In relation to leadership definition, Leach and Wilson (2000: 11) argue that the 
PDLQHVVHQFHRIOHDGHUVKLS³LVWKHDELOLW\WRLQVSLUHRUSHUVXDGHRWKHUVWRIROORZ
a course of action when there is at least some initial UHVLVWDQFHWRIROORZLQJ´
This definition suggests that leadership is a purposeful activity, it operates 
interactively with a body of followers and it is a form of power production 
Leadership 
Environment 
Leadership 
Behaviour 
 
Political 
Leadership  
88 
 
(Stone, 1995: 97). Regarding the latter feature, Burns (1978) draws a very 
helpful distinction between transactional and transformational leadership. In 
the first case, the leader gives a much stronger role to followers, in that leader 
and followers engage in mutually dependent exchanges (symbolic, economic, 
etc).   
 
Transformational leaders are viewed primarily in terms of their ability to 
transform their organisation and the initial patterns of transactions with their 
followers. Burns argues that leaders are more about transforming institutions 
rather than motivating followers to follow. It is the former approach that 
DWWUDFWVP\UHVHDUFKLQWHUHVWVLQFHLWLVUHODWHGWRWKHDJHQW¶VLQGLUHFWSRZHUWR
shape institutional change as discussed already in chapter one. In particular, the 
transactional leader of an institution seeks to optimise outcomes within the 
³UXOHVRIWKHJDPH´ZKLOHDWUDQVIRUPDWLRQDOOHDGHUVHHNVWRFKDQJHWKH³UXOHV
RIWKHJDPH´LHWKHLQVWLWXWLRQDOGHVLJQLQRUGHUWRH[SDQGKRUL]RQV
according to their own vision.  
 
 3.1.2 Identification of leaders  
Speaking from a neo institutional theory, identifying leaders and their tasks in a 
partnership is a process which is not only derived from the constitutional or 
legally established rules of power distribution, but also from the informal rules 
that strengthen the ability of some individuals to exercise power in decision-
making. In particular, the focus should not only be on the legal powers of the 
leadership office holder but also on norms and conventions that define who is 
WKHUHDOOHDGHUDQGWKHLU³DSSURSULDWHEHKDYLRXU´&RQVHTXHQWO\LWLVLPSRUWDQW
WRORRNIRUWKHIRUPDOLQIRUPDOUXOHV¶FRQILJXUDWLRQWKDWVKDSHVWKHOHDGHUVKLS
role in a political institution (Leach and Lowndes, 2007). For instance, some 
political cultures accept more authoritarian leadership than others and this 
difference may have implications on who becomes a successful leader and the 
way that they exercise their leadership tasks.  
 
So, if leadership position and behaviour are mediated by formal and informal 
institutional rules, leaders could be identified in two ways: by their position 
and by their reputation. In the first case, leaders may be identified by the 
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formal position that they hold. In the second case, leaders are identified by 
RWKHUVZKRWKLQNWKDWWKHIRUPHUGHPRQVWUDWHDOHDGHU¶VEehaviour (Purdue, 
2001). This suggests among others that leaders could officially have a 
OHDGHUVKLSSRVLWLRQEXWLWGHSHQGVRQWKHLUGHVLUHWRH[HUFLVHOHDGHU¶WDVNV
(Stone, 1995). 
 
In order to classify the leadership environment and behaviour, the leadership 
literature uses the terms leadership type and style. By leadership type, one 
refers to the way the position of leaders is institutionalised in a political 
organisation; by leadership style, one refers to the enactment of leadership 
roles by those actors who are formally or informally holders of a leadership 
position.  
 
3.2 Leadership in local partnership 
At a conceptual level, three sets of institutions that have the capacity to 
exercise leadership role in collaborative arrangements can be distinguished: 1. 
local government itself, 2. the business sector and 3. the network of civic 
organisations (Stone, 1989 quoted in Hambleton, 2005). Within government, 
there are two sets of players: elected politicians and executives. Elected local 
politicians are seen as the main leadership figures in local partnerships due to 
their electorate mandate and the traditional involvement of local government to 
the delivery of local services. Especially in multi-level partnerships in which 
EU and central government are involved, leadership roles could also be 
attributed to higher levels of governance; to EU officers and to central state 
executives.  
 
Moreover, the potential leaders that come from these sectors could hold a 
formal position (chairman) or have the reputation of a leader among 
partnership members. Finally, one has to keep in mind that leaders could be 
different in different stages of the partnership development. For example, in the 
partnership initiation, central state organisations could have a leading role, 
while in the partnership establishment the leadership role could be in the 
PD\RU¶VKDQGV 
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In the rest of this section, I analyse the political and executive leadership by 
illustrating some of their distinct features and recent changes. While I 
acknowledge other categories of local leadership like community leadership 
and business leadership in local partnerships, I do not discuss them because 
they have not emerged in my case study.   
 
In an institutional sense, political OHDGHUVDUHWKRVHWKDW³KROGDSRVLWLRQat the 
WRSRIWKHFLW\¶VDGPLQLVWUDWLRQRUSROLWLFDOERGLHV´DQGDUH³SXEOLFO\YLVLEOHLQ
ZKDWWKH\GRDQGSROLWLFDOO\DFFRXQWDEOHIRUWKHLUDFWLRQV´+DXVDQG+HLQHOW, 
2005: 27). Consequently, political position in local authority and public 
accountability distinguish local political leaders from other leaders who can be 
very influential in partnerships (such as officers, leaders of interests groups, 
community leaders etc.).  
 
In the last decades, there have been some significant shifts in urban politics that 
have reshaped the context in which local political leadership takes place (John, 
2001). The political leadership in local partnership could not have been viewed 
independently from these changes. More or less, the leaders in local 
partnerships constitute part of local policy and they encompass with smaller or 
bigger differentiations the power relations and the existing political and social 
institutional rules that define the leadership in the locality. Finally, although 
these changes are not so obvious in the Greek reality, the CIs partnerships 
under study initiate and strengthen practices towards these new directions.  
Two main developments in urban politics, those of urban governance and new 
management practices and tools (see also section 1) have had profound 
implications for the exercise of local leadership. Regarding the first one, the 
complex environment of urban governance has led to the following changes on 
local leadership:  
 
First, there has been an increased dependence of political leadership on the 
external environment. This has created a need for a more collaborative and 
inclusive leadership style (Hambleton, 2002; John, 2001). From a hierarchical 
model of the city boss determining policy and imposing to bureaucrats, leaders 
have to move to more outward and facilitative styles (Hambleton 2005; 
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0XUUD\³/HDGHUVKLSLQFROODERUDWLYHDUUDQJHPHQWVGLIIHUVIURP
leadership within single organisations given the need to develop an integrative 
FDSDFLW\´0XUUD\7KHNH\GLVWLQFWLRQKHUHOLHVEHWZHHQWKH
WUDGLWLRQDOH[HUFLVHRISRZHUWRDFWDXWKRULWDWLYHO\³SRZHURYHU´DQGWKH
GHVLUHWRDFWWKURXJKHPSRZHUPHQW³SRZHUWR´RIIROORZHUV,QWKHODWWHU
³SRZHUis not about the direct exercise of detailed influence or control over 
decision-making, but rather it is about giving direction and then mobilising the 
UHVRXUFHVQHFHVVDU\WRHQVXUHWKDWWKHYLVLRQLVIXOILOOHG´*DLQVet al , 2009: 
93). Williams and SulliYDQDQDO\VHWKHIDFLOLWDWRU¶VUROHHYHQIXUWKHUE\
HPSKDVLVLQJWKHOHDGHUV¶FDSDFLW\WRFUHDWHVXVWDLQSURFHVVHVRIFROODERUDWLYH
learning.      
 
At a normative level, this new leadership style in partnerships could be seen in   
the following practices:  a. discover and listen the different views of the 
partners, b. empower the neglected voices, particularly those derived from the 
community sector because there is evidence of their marginalisation from 
partnership interests, c. have a vision and commitment and finally d. create 
opportunities for others to exercise power (Hambleton, 2005). 
 
Second, the organisational fragmentation within local authorities and the 
emergence of diverse objectives, often competitive, create an increasing need 
for strong central direction. In fact, political leaders need to create a strong pro-
active strategic agenda that oversees the extended fragmentation of non-elected 
organisations and improve the quality and speed of decision-making (Leach 
and Percy-Smith, 2001). The development and endorsement of a strategic 
GLUHFWLRQUHTXLUHVJHQXLQHVNLOOVRIPDQDJHPHQWEH\RQGµJRYHUQLQJ¶LQD
traditional way), including setting standards, strategic aims and performance 
evaluation. 
 
However, in this new institutional framework, leaders can have contradictory 
roles, on the one hand generating collaboration, inclusiveness and consensus, 
while on the other hand, exercising strategic policy by a powerful manipulation 
of the diverse interests (Hambletton, 2005). As Vangen and Huxman (2003: 
QRWHWKHUHLVD³QHHGWRGHOLYHURQWKLQJVDVZHOODVJHWWLQJWRJHWKHU´ 
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Finally, there is a pattern of dispersed leadership. In this new environment of 
ORFDOSROLW\³SRZHULVIUDJPHQWHGDQGWKLVPHDQVWKDWOHDGHUVKLSLVDSURFHVV
of connecting thHIUDJPHQWV´+DPEOHWRQ'LIIHUHQWJURXSVRIORFDO
society like elected politicians, community representatives, business leaders 
and appointed executives could be found to have a leadership role in 
collaboration and leaders have to coordinate all these different social positions 
and behaviours.     
 
The second development, the introduction of new public management tools in 
local administration, has led to the reinforcement of chief executives that break 
the traditional distinction between policy formulation and policy 
implementation. This leads to a more shared leadership with the mayor, the 
council and the chief executives making the political decisions collaboratively. 
As it has already been discussed (see also section 1), the chief executive has 
EHFRPH³DG\QDPLFH[HFXWLYHOHDGHUZKRLVFDSDEOHRIZRUNLQJFORVHO\ZLWK
HOHFWHGPHPEHUVDQGEURNHULQJFRPPXQLW\LQWHUHVWV´+DPEOHWRQ
While the political leaders move towards a more innovative entrepreneurial and 
managerial role, the chief executives extend their role beyond their traditional 
task of serving the administration towards a more political task of working 
closely and influencing elected bodies and the community.  
 
Cross-national research on local government chief executives has drawn a 
distinction between two styles of executive leadership. There are the classical 
and the political bureaucrats (Klausen and Magnier, 1998). At the one end of 
WKHVSHFWUXPSROLWLFDOEXUHDXFUDWVDUHPRUHFRQFHUQHGZLWK³GRLQJWKHULJKW
WKLQJ´7KHLUpractices include the formulation of ideas, offering political 
advice to mayors, influencing the decision-making for efficient solutions and 
EHLQJDZDUHRIWKHFLWL]HQV¶YLHZV$WWKHRWKHUHQGFODVVLFDOEXUHDXFUDWVDUH
PRUHFRQFHUQHGZLWK³GRLQJWKLQJV ULJKW´VXFKDVWKHHYHU\GD\PDQDJHPHQW
and the provision of technical advice to mayors.  
 
Transplanting the political bureaucrat features in a partnership operation, chief 
executives can play a decisive role in leading partnership by adopting the 
following practices: a. providing strategic advice to politicians about the 
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operation and the future of the partnership, b. managing processes relating to 
decisions like conflict resolution and establishing confidence (Haveri et al, 
2009), c. making decisions on behalf of political leaders especially in the day 
to day partnership activities and finally d. communicating and influencing 
other organisations, especially the local community.  
 
Moving outside the local level, this type of executive leadership can be 
exercised by higher levels of government. For example, in EU funded projects, 
state administrators can play a decisive leadership role in helping set the 
agenda and facilitate the EU rules to be adapted to the domestic environment 
(see more on section 2).  
 
As aforementioned about the three types of legitimation (section 1), the 
H[HFXWLYH¶VOHDGHUVKLSOHJLWLPDF\LVTXHVWLRQDEOH+RZHYHUZLWKUHJDUGVWR
throughput and output legitimation specifically, things get better.  Executives 
in partnership may appear in the local media frequently and are thus viewed by 
the citizens as the key decision makers. They do that not only because they 
lead the partnership, but also because they usually are the contact persons of 
beneficiaries regarding partnership actions. In relation to output legitimation, 
executives have the capacity to produce efficient outcomes due to their 
professional skills and impartiality. It is in the output legitimation that their 
power to lead the partnership lies mainly.   
 
Finally, we could identify two important institutional factors that determine 
leadership scope: the level of partnership institutionalisation and the conditions 
under which it has emerged (Sweeting et al, 2004). Regarding the former, in 
cases when partnerships have previously been rare or non-existent, as in the 
Greek case, the promotion of working together and the coordination of partners 
are the main tasks for leaders. 
 
5HJDUGLQJWKHODWWHU6ZHHWLQJ¶Vet al (2004) typology about the categorisation 
RIWKHOHYHORIOHDGHUV¶LQVWLWXtional dependence on partnerships could usefully 
be applied to my case study. If the partnership greatly depends on the 
LQVWLWXWLRQDOUXOHVE\ZKLFKOHDGHUVRSHUDWHWKHOHDGHUV¶VW\OHFDQDFFRXQWIRU
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less. In cases in which the partnership is more autonomous from its 
FRQVWLWXWLRQDOFRQWH[WVOHDGHUV¶EHKDYLRXUFould play a more important role. 
This is directly related to the discussion developed in the first chapter regarding 
the revisable character of rules; hence the degree of freedom it allows for 
partners to act independently. Sweeting et al, (ibid) typology distinguishes four 
models of leadership:  
1. Designed and focused leadership: formal partnership rules clearly 
identify and recognise a leadership position by providing a high 
responsibility to the person occupying this position. The influence of 
personal style is very strong in the partnership and among the followers.  
2. Pivotal and integrative leadershipWKHOHDGHU¶VVW\OHFRXQWVIRUOHVV
because how the partnership is working depends on the external policy 
environment and on complicated and bureaucratic arrangements. Leaders 
struggle to achieve consensus in a situation of multi-organisational 
bargaining.  
3. Invisible, implicit, fragmented: There is a vacuum in leadership due to 
the complexity of partnership regarding confusion on direction, shifting 
membership and extensive delegation of responsibilities.  
4. Formative and emergent leadership: Leadership is driven by the 
exigencies of implementation rather than strategic direction. Leaders get on 
with the job building networks and trust and forging the relationship with 
followers for the delivery of action. Consequently, in this case, leadership 
PHDQV³PDNLQJWKLQJVKDSSHQ´Sweeting et al, ibid: 361). 
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Conclusions  
This chapter outlined the main theories of urban politics and it attempted to 
link these with the NI approach. It identified four key issues- learning, ideas, 
UHVRXUFHVDQGDFWRUV¶PRWLYDWLRns, structure/agency relationship- as a terrain of 
conceptual exchange between the NI approach and urban regime/urban 
governance theories.  Based on neo Marxist theories of urban politics, it 
FULWLFDOO\DQDO\VHGWZR³FROODERUDWLYHDGYDQWDJHV´RIORFDOSDUWnerships, those 
of efficiency and democracy further. 
 
Moreover, it reviewed the existing literature on NI local partnership studies and 
it drew from their empirical observations in order to scale the broader research 
questions of NI theory locally. It identified four features of local partnerships 
that have added up to my research design: informal rules, processes, 
institutional interdependence and dynamics of institutional change.  
 
Finally, in the last section, the role of leaders in collaborative spaces was 
GLVFXVVHG,WZDVDUJXHGWKDWERWKFRQWH[WDQGDJHQW¶VEHKDYLRXUVKDSH
leadership scope. Moreover, it outlined recent trends in local politics and their 
implications in the changing role of local political and executive leadership 
generally in policy-making and particularly in partnerships. It provided further 
evidence from empirical research on what constitutes an effective leader in 
local partnerships in terms of their personal traits and of the particular 
institutional context.      
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Chapter 3: Research methodology  
This chapter will outline the methodological design of my research. It will 
present the epistemological approach in which my research is embedded, the 
discussion of the research strategy that has been employed and finally the 
research methods that have been selected for the pursuit of my research goals. 
It will also consider the difficulties, the challenges and the limitations of my 
research design.  
 
Section 1: Ontological and epistemological approach  
The first step in the methodology design is the clarification of the ontological 
DQGHSLVWHPRORJLFDOSRVLWLRQRIWKHUHVHDUFKVLQFHWKLVSRVLWLRQVKDSHV³what 
we study as social scientists, how we study it and what we think we can claim 
DVUHVXOWRIWKDWVWXG\´ (Furlong and Marsh, 2010: 189). In particular, 
ontological questions focus on the nature of reality and epistemological 
questions on how we can learn about this reality; they are related with theories 
of knowledge.   
 
1.1 The main debate  
Although there are various ontological and epistemological approaches, in 
some cases their boundaries are blurred and contested. However, we could 
distinguish two common traditional schools of thought regarding the 
understanding of social reality. One is variously labelled as positivistic, natural 
based science or even simple scientific; the other as interpretive or 
ethnographic, among several other labels (Robson, 1993: 18-20). These two 
schools have different starting points for their research, which lead to different 
methods of data collection and analysis. For positivism, social reality is 
external and objective and, for that reason, the purposes of social science are 
simply to stick to what we can observe and measure objective facts.  
 
The starting point of positivist social research is the hypothetico-deductive 
approach. According to this, the researcher formulates a hypothesis, a testable 
proposition about a relationship between two or more events, which has been 
deduced by the researcher from theory; they then operationalise the hypothesis 
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in order to proceed to the testing of this hypothesis in reality. In the last step, 
the researcher infers the implications of findings for the specific theory. 
Consequently, for the positivistic approach, theory is regarded as the starting 
point.   
 
On the other hand, interpretivism requires the social scientist to grasp the 
subjective meaning of reality. It proposes that there are many interpretations of 
reality based on the specific meaning that each subject attributes to their acts 
and to the acts of others. So, for the interpretative approach, the 
LQWHUFRQQHFWLRQVEHWZHHQHYHQWVHPHUJHIURPWKHSDUWLFLSDQWV¶YLHZV
themselves. Additionally, scientists cannot avoid affecting those phenomena 
they study, because they operate within the social construction in which these 
events emerge. Indeed, there is a double interpretation going on: the researcher 
provides an interpretation of others interpretations. As a result, open-ended 
research design and qualitative techniques of data collection have been 
developed to understand how people interpret their world. The major 
difference with the positivistic approach is that theories and concepts tend to 
arise from the research. They come after data collection rather than before 
(Bryman, 2008: 13-21; Furlong and Marsh, 2010).   
 
Although these two research traditions constitute a long-term battlefield in 
philosophy of sciences and in social sciences, it has often been noted (very 
accurately from my point of view) that many of the differences between the 
two traditions are in the minds of philosophers and theorists rather than in the 
practices of researchers (Robson, 1993: 18-20). It is actually a 
PLVXQGHUVWDQGLQJ³WRLPDJLQHWKDWWKHRU\LVDOWRJHWKHUDEVWUDFWZKLOHHPSLULFDO
knowledge LVVRPHKRZSHUIHFWO\FRUUHFW´*DOKRXQ2QWKHRQH
hand, social science theories depend on at least some information about how 
WKHVRFLHW\ZRUNVDQGRQWKHRWKHUKDQGWKH³HPSLULFDOVRFLDOVFLHQFHV´UHO\
on concepts that are necessary to constitute facts and give explanations.  
 
However, in any case, this does not mean that it is possible to find a synthesis 
of all based on agreements over the fundamental issues or to totally avoid the 
questions of ontology and epistemology in our research. As Furlong and March 
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DUJXH³RQWRORJLFDODQGHSLVWHPRORJLFDOSRVLWLRQVDUHEHWWHUYLHZHG
DVDVNLQQRWDVZHDWHU´WKDWFRXOGEHFKDQJHGIURPRQHUHVHDUFKWRWKHRWKHU 
     
1.2 Research approach  
Although my approach to reality belongs broadly speaking to the positivistic 
side, it is far away from its traditional, even naive, approach of simple 
summation of tested propositions that lead to empirical generalisations. 
Instead, I am sympathetic to a more realistic position of positivism, that of 
critiFDOUHDOLVPGHYHORSHGLQWKHPLGRI¶VE\WKH)UDQNIXUW6FKRROZKLFK
criticised the scientific empiricism of positivism and it has been significantly 
influenced by the interpretative discussion. According to them, the external 
world exists but in relative independence of the specific interpretations that 
offers the agents. As such, this position acknowledges the utility of both 
quantitative and qualitative data. Both types of data help to identify and 
understood the external reality as well as the social construction of the reality.  
 
Additionally, this strand pays attention to research consistency and the power 
of logical expression in the selected methods and data analysis (Outhwaite, 
1996; Burnham, 2008: 9-$V3RSSHUFKDUDFWHULVWLFDOO\KDVSXWLW³The old 
scientific ideal of episteme-of absolutely certain demonstrable knowledge-has 
SURYHGWREHDQLGRO>«@2QO\LQRXUVXEMHFWLYHH[SHULHQFHVRIFRQYLFWLRQLQ
RXUVXEMHFWLYHIDLWKFDQZHEH³DEVROXWHO\FHUWDLQ´3RSSHU 
 
In pragmatic terms, the critical realism leads me to adopt a reflective attitude to 
reality, which means that as a researcher I have to take a critical stance to the 
empirical facts and be aware of the hermeneutic tradition in order to discover 
new areas of the field that could enrich or revise theory. Thus, I avoid the risk 
WRLPSRVHSUHGHILQHGFRQFHSWVLQWKHILHOGKHQFHPLVVLQJWKHµLQGXFWLYH
JURXQGLQJ¶WKDWLVQHHGHG0LOHVDQG+XEHUPDQ$OWKRXJK,
formulated some theoretical propositions at the beginning of the research, some 
of them have been changed during the data collection due to differences from 
P\LQLWLDOWKHRUHWLFDODVVXPSWLRQVSDUWQHUV¶LQWHUSUHWDWLRQVDQGSHUFHSWLRQVRI
the reality. As a result, my theoretically derived propositions have been 
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enULFKHGE\WKHLQWHJUDWLRQRISDUWLFXODUUHVSRQGHQWV¶YDOXHVLGHDVDQGQRUPV
about the reality.    
 
Furthermore, since it is difficult to know reality with certainty, my goal is to 
understand as much as I can with the appropriate methods. So, my concern 
during the research design has been to be able to justify logically the 
conclusions of my research whatever approach I have used. A way to do this is 
the selection of multiple methods, which would secure better understanding of 
what happened in reality (see below on triangulation). In this case, what is 
important is to have a deep understanding of the different sorts of knowledge 
that I obtained using different research methods and to relate the strengths and 
weakness of these methods with the purpose of my research. As Bryman 
XQGHUOLQHVDERXWWKHPXOWLSOHPHWKRGV³WKHUHLVQRSRLQWFROOHFWLQJ
PRUHGDWDVLPSO\RQWKHEDVLVWKDW³PRUHLVEHWWHU´EXWUDWKHUDVLQWKHFDVHRI
single method to conduct a research which is carefully designed and 
completeG´ 
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Section 2: Case study research strategy 
Local partnership institutional dynamics is a complex social phenomenon 
involving many contextual variables, which require carefully designed research 
in order to draw well founded conclusions. Although there are many different 
strategies that could be used to approach this task, like surveys, ethnography, 
etc., I select the case study approach because it is the most appropriate for my 
research purpose.  
 
The use of case studies has become widespread in social research, especially in 
small-scale research (Burnham et al, 2008: 63). A case study is defined in 
various ways; so a standard definition does not exist. However, according to 
Yin (2003: 13) a technical definition could begin with the scope of the case 
stuG\$FDVHVWXG\³LVDQHPSLULFDOLQTXLU\WKDWLQYHVWLJDWHVDFRQWHPSRUDU\
phenomenon within its real- OLIHFRQWH[W´DQGIRUWKHVHUHDVRQVFRQWH[WXDO
conditions can be captured in greater detail by the researcher. Nevertheless, the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not always distinguishable in 
a real life context and for that reason case study relies on a technical distinction 
of the situation by the researcher.  
 
The advantages of the case study approach comprise mainly the focus on in-
depth analysis of a complex social phenomenon and the use of multiple 
methods in order to capture the complexity of the reality under research (Yin 
2003: 15 ; Denscombe 2003: 38).    
 
A case study design is considered by Yin (2003: 1) to be appropriate for 
research when three factors are present:  
x When we have to study a contemporary phenomenon in its natural 
setting  
x :KHQWKHUHVHDUFKDVNV³KRZ´DQG³ZK\´TXHVWLRQVVRDVWRH[SODLQ
the nature and complexity of the processes taking place  
x When the researcher has little control over the events and no 
experiment or manipulation could be used.    
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Taking into consideration the above factors, I argue that the case study is an 
appropriate strategy for my research for the following reasons: First, the study 
of local partnership dynamics in Greece is undeveloped both theoretically and 
empirically. Since previous research is limited, I need a research strategy that 
has the potential to discover new issues going in detail and in depth in the field. 
Second, as noted above, the case study strategy is considered as most suitable 
in research that studies relationships and processes because its integrative 
approach offers the opportunity to understand the complexities of a given 
situation (Yin, 2003: 3-18; Denscombe, 2003:30- 39).  
 
In my research hypothesis, both interactions and processes are questioned. In 
particular, I study the interactions between formal/informal rules and partners 
during partnership development and I am looking for explanations from within 
the context. Finally, another reason for the selection of case study partnerships 
is timing. When I started the PhD, both partnerships were operating, so with 
the selection of this strategy I was able to study partnership development in 
³UHDOWLPH´ 
 
Comparing a case study strategy with alternative strategies that I could apply to 
my research, a survey appears to be the closest contender. A survey enables the 
researcher to obtain the largest possible data at one point in time. Quantitative 
analytical techniques are then used to draw interferences from the data 
(Denscombe, 2003: 6-29). I consider that the case study works better than the 
survey in my research because it offers via an in depth and detailed 
investigation data for a complex situation like that of partnerships since they 
comprise processes, relationships and inter dependencies developed over time. 
Instead, surveys are likely to lack much of detail or depth and ignore 
complexities and operational links between parts of a reality. They are mostly 
focused on outcomes at a specific point in time providing generalisations about 
frequencies. Thus, if I wanted to study the satisfaction of partners and 
beneficiaries from their involvement in partnerships, I could rely on a survey 
strategy; but since my focus is on partnership dynamics, a case study appears to 
be an advantageous strategy for this situation. 
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A case study strategy is vulnerable to criticism for many reasons but two are 
very significant. The first is related to its incapacity to be generalised to 
populations. There is scepticism among social researchers as to the ways that 
insights from a research into a unique case could be representative. The second 
regards its unsystematic approach to research design. It is accused of lacking 
the degree of rigor expected of social science research, focusing more on 
interpretative and descriptive accounts (Yin 2003: 10-11; Bryman, 2008:  
52-58).  
 
Regarding the first criticism, it has to be clarified that case studies could lead to 
generalisations but in a more restricted way than surveys. In surveys, the 
analysis of data collected from a representative sample can lead to a 
generalisHGLQWHUIHUHQFHIRUWKHSRSXODWLRQ,QGHHGVXFK³VWDWLVWLFDO
JHQHUDOLVDWLRQ´IROORZLQJthe warning by Yin (2003:32) is not appropriate for 
WKHFDVHVWXG\³$IDWDOIORZLQGRLQJFDVHVWXGLHVLVWRWKLQNRIVWDWLVWLFDO
generalisation as the method of geneUDOLVLQJWKHUHVXOWVRIWKHFDVHVWXG\´ 
 
However, there are opportunities for limited generalisation, if one considers 
some specific conditions that occurred for this case study; this is more related 
with a process of transferability rather than generalisability. If generalisation 
has to do with quantitative findings that are measurable and testable, 
WUDQVIHUDELOLW\LVDPRUH³LQWXLWLYHSURFHVV´ZKHUHE\WKHUHVHDUFKHUGHGXFHV
how the findings may be applicable to other situations (Denscombe, 2010: 181-
18%U\PDQ$V'HQVFRPEHSRLQWVRXW³DOWKRXJKHDFK
case is in some respects unique, it is also a single example of a broader class of 
WKLQJV´)RULQVWDQFHWKHVWXG\RIORFDOSDUWQHUVKLSVLQ+HUDNOLRQFRXOGEH
viewed as an example of the Greek local partnerships initiated by European 
programmes. Following that reasoning, the degree to which a case study 
example shares same features with others of its type is a condition of 
generalisation. For instance, if local partnerships in Heraklion are typical in 
terms of their institutional organisation and socio-economic background, with 
other partnerships in Crete, then the findings of the particular example could be 
carefully generalised to them.  This presupposes that the researcher provides to 
the reader a thorough description of the situation with sufficient details of the 
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complexity of the reality, so as to offer to the reader the possibility to make 
comparisons and transfer the findings to other situations.    
 
In brief, the observed similarities and differences in two or more situations can 
substantially support the logic of comparison facilitating in this way the 
understanding of the diversity and order of political life (Burnham et al, 2008: 
80-83). But for doing that, one has to be explicit about the case selection and 
description so that the extent of the comparability with other cases can be 
assessed by the reader (Burnham et al: 87).   
 
Apart from the generalisation that depends on contextual similarities, there is 
another type of genHUDOLVDWLRQWKDWRI³DQDO\WLFJHQHUDOLVDWLRQ´7KHODWWHU
SURYLGHVJHQHUDOLVDWLRQVWRWKHRUHWLFDOSURSRVLWLRQV³LQZKLFKDSUHYLRXVO\
developed theory is used as a template with which to compare the empirical 
UHVXOWVRIWKHFDVHVWXG\´<LQ,QWhis context, a case study appears to 
be a suitable strategy for testing and generating theory. In the case of theory 
testing, the findings of the case study are interacting with the research 
hypothesis; the researcher seeks to validate the theory and to see which 
approaches and concepts work properly in different contexts. In the case of 
generating theory, the researcher tries to build new ideas and concepts in order 
to make sense of the reality.    
 
In relation to the second criticism, regarding the provisLRQRI³VRIWGDWD´GXHWR
the lack of quantitative data and statistical procedures, it looks more like a 
prejudice derived from the proponents of positivist philosophy rather than an 
inherent disadvantage of the case study approach. These criticisms usually 
SURSRVHWKDWTXDOLWDWLYHILQGLQJVUHO\RQWKHUHVHDUFKHUV¶XQV\VWHPDWLFYLHZ
about what is significant and the lack of transparency in the research design 
(Bryman, 2008: 391-393). However, if case study research, as in all other 
research strategies, uses a concrete research design comprising a robust logic in 
all stages of its realisation, it can respond to the prerequisites of good quality 
research, that of validity and reliability.  
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2.1 Embedded single case study   
One key feature required in the development of the research design is the 
definition of the case study; this has direct implications for the transferability 
issue too. This question concerns the number of case studies and the units of 
analysis that will be covered in each case study (Yin, 2003:39-55). Regarding 
the number of cases included in the research, this could be selected between 
single and multiple case studies. In relation to units, the case study could be 
embedded or holistic. For embedded, it could be identified smaller sub units of 
analysis looking for a more extensive analysis of some variables; for holistic, 
the phenomenon is examined as a whole.  
 
According to Yin (2003: ibid), the appropriateness of single or multiple case 
studies depends on a number of circumstances. Generally speaking, a single 
case study could be used to test a well-formed theory or where there is no 
previous theory and the study is explanatory. It is also preferred when one has 
to deal with unique or extreme case studies or when the case represents a 
typical one. Multiple case studies are preferable when one wants to modify or 
extend theory through cross-case analysis.  
 
A dilemma that I faced during the case study design regards the selection of a 
single or two case studies. According to the literature, multiple case designs 
appear to be stronger (Bryman, 2008: 52-58; Yin 2003: 54) since the 
replication logic could support the comparative aspect of the research. Despite 
this, my choice was to go for a single case study for two reasons. First, there is 
a large number of variables in my research, including contextual variables, 
SDUWQHUVKLSV¶IRUPDODQGLQIRUPDOUXOHVDQGDJHQF\¶VUROH$OOWKHVHYDULDEOHV
are interconnected and their interaction in some cases is not linear (as in the 
case of trust building and shared understanding) as they developed continuous 
and dynamic relations throughout the partnership process.  
 
The second reason is related to the issue of the theoretical level of analysis. 
Since in this research, I use meso level theoretical frameworks and concepts, 
such as neo institutional theory, path dependency and social capital theories, 
these variables produce much variation in each case under study.  
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In summary, if I had selected two cases studies, first, I would not have either 
the resources or the time required (Yin, 2003: 47) for an in depth examination 
in order to highlight all these variables and their interactions. Second, since 
understanding the interaction between formal/informal rules and the ways that 
the actors interpret them is already a complex endeavour, the systematic 
analysis of two cases would reveal also another complexity, that of different 
external conditions which have a significant role in a multi-case design. The 
external conditions could produce significant heterogeneity in both cases, so 
their rigorous analysis would alter my main research purpose, which is to study 
WKHUHODWLRQRIUXOHVDQGDJHQF\&RQVHTXHQWO\IROORZLQJ2VWURP¶VSURSRVLWLRQ
WKDW³WKHUHLVQRWRQHRSWLPDOPDSWKDWFDQEHXsed for all purposes; each level 
RIGHWDLOLVXVHIXOIRUGLIIHUHQWSXUSRVHV´2VWURPWKHVLQJOHFDVH
study responds better to my research purpose and the practical limitations of 
doctoral study (Denscombe, 2003: 38).  
 
My case study consists of the EU CI partnerships programmes EQUAL II and 
LEADER+, which are coordinated by the Local Development Agency of 
Heraklion (DAH) in Crete. The selection of this case study combined a number 
of features that could support potential transferability to other partnerships in 
*UHHFHDQGWKHRU\WHVWLQJ0\FDVHVWXG\UHSUHVHQWVDQ³H[WUHPHLQVWDQFH´LQ
FRPSDULVRQ ZLWK D ³W\SLFDO´ RQH ,I D W\SLFDO RQH UHIHUV WR D FDVH ZKLFK LV
³VLPLODULQFUXFLDOUHVSHFWVZLWKRWKHUV´'HQVFRPEH<LQ-
41), the extreme case had some particularities that made it distinguish from the 
others. I have selected my case study because of its outstanding character, 
which refers to the fact that both partnerships were very successful in terms of 
their partnership development and outcomes. According to the national 
evaluation reports on all LEADER+ and EQUAL II initiatives of Greece, the 
DAH was ranked second after the Local Development Agency of Thessaloniki 
in terms of funding absorption (Final evaluation report of EQUAL II, 2008; 
Mid-term evaluation report of LEADER+, 2005).  
 
This is not an ordinary phenomenon since in Greece, there are very few local 
partnerships that are working well and provide the expected results (Getimis 
and Grigoriadou, 2004; Grigoriadou and Marava, 2006; Getimis and 
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Georgadas, 2003). According to my research purpose, I aim to study the 
influence of some particular factors like institutional legacies and the role of 
leaders in partnership development and implementation. So, this extreme case 
gave me the opportunity to research in a more detailed way the role of these 
factors, which, in a typical case, would lose their influential power among 
other factors that prevent the partnership development.  
 
Regarding transferability, in an extreme case, generalisation is more difficult 
than in a typical case since there are not so many similarities with the ones of 
same category (Denscombe 2010:186-190). However, transferability is 
possible for three reasons: First, although my case is unique, it still provides 
data for local partnerships in Greece. The factors that are revealed in my 
extreme case already exist and are relevant for the others (Denscombe 2010: 
ibid). Even if they exist in other cases in a way that they bring opposite effects, 
(i.e. unsuccessful partnership outcomes or moderate outcomes), their disclosure 
in my case notifies their significance in ordinary case studies too. For instance, 
a finding from my case study illustrates the significance of the local leader in 
facilitating the partnership process. This means that in other cases, researchers 
and practitioners should be aware of the leadership role in partnership 
development whether its effects are negative or even if totally absent. 
 
Second, like my case, most local partnerships in Greece are initiated by 
H[WHUQDOERGLHVPDLQO\WKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ¶V6WUXFWXUDO)XQGVDQGWKH&,VDQG
they are institutionally organised according to the rules of these funds. Finally, 
my case study, as all the other local partnerships, share the same national 
institutional legacies which support the development of particular informal 
institutional rules defining local partnership dynamics, as  for instance lack of 
trust among partners and the public sector prevalence in partnership 
composition.  
 
It is worth mentioning that the selection of the specific case in Crete was also 
based on a more pragmatic reason regarding the feasibility of the research in 
terms of access to data and cooperation from the participants as well as my 
familiarity with the Cretan culture. I studied for 4 years in Crete and got my 
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degree in sociology from the University of Crete. During those years, I 
developed friendships and family relationships with locals, which allowed me 
WREXLOGD³ORFDO´LGHQWLW\7KLVIDFLOLWDWHGP\DFFHVVWRWKHILHOGHYen from my 
ILUVWPHHWLQJVZLWKWKH³JDWHNHHSHUV´)RUWKHP,ZDVQRWWKH³IRUHLJQHU´3K'
candidate from Athens but almost one of them since I had studied in Crete, I 
have been a godmother to a Cretan child and I knew two families with a good 
social and professional status.  
 
Under these circumstances, I rapidly developed relations of trust and good will 
with the members of the DAH and the other partners. Another feature that 
supported my access not only at the local level but also in the involved 
ministries and EU offices was my professional status. Being a permanent civil 
servant in the Ministry of Interiors Affairs was an important advantage because 
,ZDVVRPHRQHZKRLVSDUWRIWKH³civil servant´FRPPXQLW\ZKRNQRZVIURP
inside about key events and sharHVWKHVDPH³ODQJXDJH´$GGLWLRQDOO\VLQFH
the Ministry of Interior Affairs is responsible for all the issues related to local 
government, mayors further enhanced my access to the field since they value 
having a contact in this ministry in terms of their future access to information.     
 
Despite these privileges, the access to the field was a constant concern 
throughout the phase of data collection. On the one hand, in Greece, trust is not 
easily developed due to specificities of our culture and on the other hand, 
research in social sciences is underdeveloped and people are not familiar with 
interviews and other research methods. Fortunately, the executives of the Local 
Development Agencies (LDAs) were familiar with questionnaires and 
interviews due to its participation in a large number of European programmes 
that required internal and external evaluations.  
 
Additionally, I am based in Athens I had to travel to Crete. This alongside the 
fact that partners and beneficiaries were dispersed all over Crete has added 
significantly to the cost for carrying out the research (it has actually exceeded 
the original budget). It also had an impact on the planned research timeline. 
There were times that I have to drive over 400 km in one day on bad country 
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roads to conduct one interview or to extend my stay in the island for one more 
day in order to meet a partner late in the afternoon. But even when things do 
not go according to plan, one can find a positive aspect in the adversity of 
situations.  Driving for hours on country roads surrounded by olive groves and 
vineyards and isolated small villages or spending an evening walking in 
Arhanes, a big village where the DAH has its offices, offered me the 
opportunity to take  the time to feel and observe the lifestyle. For example, I 
have grown to understand better the isolation of women in the mountainous 
villages, grasp what a rural way of living really means and how important local 
identity is for local people.  
Since I have selected a single case study, the next step is the selection between 
holistic and embedded case study. I have selected an embedded case study for 
analysis because I would like to increase the sensitivity of my investigation in 
order to counterbalance the disadvantages of the selection of the single case 
study. In my case, there are two units of analysis, the LEADER+ and EQUAL 
II partnerships. These programmes have some similarities and some 
differences.  
 
Both partnerships are funded by the EC and they follow common principles of 
institutional organisation of partnerships and policy delivery. However, there 
are differences in regards to partnership membership, the relation with the 
beneficiaries and the policy sector of intervention. Due to their similarities, 
these units of analysis have revealed a duplication logic since I have identified 
in these units the reproduction of constant interactions among the main 
variables of my study. Additionally, due to their differences, each unit has 
KLJKOLJKWHGGLIIHUHQWDVSHFWVRIWKHVDPHSKHQRPHQRQLQWHUPVRIYDULDEOHV¶
weight and types of interaction, which have enriched my knowledge of the case 
study.  
 
So, my analysis of the two units did not aim for a systematic comparison 
between them (although some obvious conclusions have been made), but rather 
it aimed to uncover complementary or repetitive interactions in order to have a 
stronger and deeper understanding of the case as a whole. Anyway, when 
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studying embedded case studies, one should bear in mind the statement of Yin 
DERXWWKHGDQJHURIORVLQJIRFXVRQWKHKROLVWLFQDWXUHRIWKHFDVH³+RZHYHULI
WRRPXFKDWWHQWLRQLVJLYHQWRWKHVHVXEXQLWV>«@WKHFDVHVWXG\LWVHOIZLOOKDYH
shifted its orientation and changeGLWVQDWXUH´<LQ 
 
I would also like to point out that the units of analysis have been changed 
during the data collection. At the beginning, I have decided to study only the 
EQUAL II project and I defined as units of analysis the four geographical areas 
where the programme had been implemented. However, after discussions with 
the partners of EQUAL II, I realised that it would be more fruitful to study 
EQUAL II as a whole and to study another programme implemented in 
Heaklion prefecture, that of LEADER+. This helped me to better reveal the 
partnership dynamics on both programmes.  
 
I also undertook four mini cases as a complementary research practice in order 
WRXQGHUVWDQGWKHUHODWLRQRIWKHSDUWQHUVKLS¶VLQVWLWXWLRQZLWKWKHEHQHILFLDULHV
Each mini case is a story telling, a narrative about the partnership history of a 
beneficiary, starting from how they came into contact with the programme up 
to the implementation of their programme actions. The mini cases comprise 
two beneficiaries of the E48$/,,SURMHFWWKHZRPHQ¶VFRRSHUDWLYHVRI
Zakros and Krousaniotisa as well as two from LEADER+, the owner of the 
tourism accommodation in Katalagari village and the winery cluster of 
Heraklion Prefecture. This practice allowed me to study for a short time the 
sequences of the events in my case and highlight the way that one group of 
individuals experienced the reality of partnerships. In this way, new issues for 
further analysis had been arose; I then brought these in the main case study.   
 
2.2. Challenges in establishing the case study scope 
A difficulty of the case study identification is the creation of boundaries 
between the context where the phenomenon is evolved and the phenomenon 
itself (Yin, 2003: 39-55; Denscombe, 2003: 38). In my case, the main problem 
refers to the spatial characterisation of both partnerships as urban or rural and 
what could be the consequences of this choice for my research proposition. 
First of all, this difficulty arose from the lack of a universally accepted 
110 
 
definition of what is rural. According to Pizzoli and Gong (2001), there is no 
universally approach as to how to classify the urban and rural. On one hand, 
WKHUHLVWKH2(&'VLPSOHDSSURDFKLQZKLFKD³UXUDODUHD´LVGHILQHGPHUHO\
on the population density (below 150 inhabitants per square kilometre), and on 
the other hand, there has been a rich literature on what other variables should 
be considered and included for the urban-rural typology.  
The lack of a unified definition is derived from the contemporary 
transformation of rural areas at global level, due to new forms of economic 
organisation, technological change and globalisation. Rural areas could no 
longer be synonymous with agriculture since employment and income in these 
areas now results from a diversified economy including services, activities and 
manufacturing. This process has been facilitated by the improvement of 
infrastructure, providing new transport routes and better accessibility, as well 
as of new forms of communication (e.g. the information technologies) and 
ways of living. Furthermore, the interdependence of rural and urban has been 
increased by a continued and varied exchange of resources at the economic and 
cultural level that has blurred their boundaries (Boscacci, 1999). Finally, there 
is also a globalisation effect where we as society now interact with rural and 
urban space in different ways, blurring traditional boundaries and transgressing 
different levels of scale (Scott et al, 2007). So there is not a clear distinction 
between rural and urban, but rather a continuum between the two with many 
shades of grey.  
 
In Greece, rural space is experiencing a significant transformation too. During 
the last four decades, the traditional urban ±rural dichotomy had given its place 
to complex spatial configurations, which are in a process of continuous change. 
For instance, rural development no longer depends solely on the agricultural 
sector but also on a large variety of economic activities, mainly the service 
sector and tourism. Additionally, there is an increased exchange of rural ±urban 
relationships related to location of activities, urbanisation and economies of 
scale (Illiopoulou et al, 2006).  
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Going back to CIs, LEADER+ has a purely geographical scale approach; it has 
to be implemented in mountainous and disadvantaged areas with a strong 
socio- economic gap. EQUAL II does not specifically address the geographical 
location of its activities. What is important is the identity of the beneficiaries 
and the policy sector. However, EQUAL II of my case study gave a 
JHRJUDSKLFDO FKDUDFWHU WR LWV SURMHFW EH UHILQLQJ WKH EHQHILFLDULHV¶ FDWHJRU\
IURP ZRPHQ¶V XQHPSOR\PHQW WR PRUH VSHFLILFDOO\ XQGHUHPSOR\HG ORZ
income women and farmers living in mountainous areas. So, both projects are 
addressed to remote non-DFFHVVLEOH UXUDO DUHDV ,QGHHG ERWK SURJUDPPHV¶
operation not only covers similar areas but also in some cases their 
geographical intervention overlaps.  
 
However, two questions arise. First, how rural are these areas of intervention? 
In many cases, these rural areas are parts of local authorities, which according 
to the Hellenic Statistical Authority (ELSTAT)10 are characterised as urban. 
For instance, the municipalities of Arkalochori, Archanes, Moiron and 
Heraklion belong to this case. Additionally, some rural municipalities like 
Gorgolaini, Gaziou and Temenus are located near the urban centre of 
Heraklion (Appendix C, map of Heraklion prefecture) which means that the 
exchange of resources is increasingly blurring their limits. Although the 
agricultural activity remains the main resource of income, employment in 
tourism sector and the related activities such retail and handcraft activities 
increase continuously (Illiopoulou et al, 2006, see also next chapter on local 
socio-economic context).  
 
6HFRQGGRHVWKHDUHDRI LQWHUYHQWLRQRU WKHORFDWLRQRISDUWQHUV¶RUJDQLVDWLRQ
characterise the geographical feature of the partnership? Since the area of 
intervention does not fit to the rural-urban dichotomy, I directed my question 
WRZDUGV WKHJHRJUDSKLFDO ORFDWLRQRI WKHSDUWQHUV¶RUJDQLVDWLRQEXW , KDG WKH
same results. In EQUAL II partnership, a lot of partners are based in cities, 
such as research and training centres, which are located in Heraklion city. In 
                                                 
10
 The Hellenic Statistical Authority of Greece employs demographic criteria for the statistical 
definition of rural areas. According to it, in Greece, rural areas are the municipalities in which 
the largest settlements have less than 2.000 habitants, while in urban areas the largest 
population centre has 2.000 or more inhabitants. 
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LEADER+, some mayors come from urban municipalities. The DAH is also 
located in Archanes which is a big village located near the urban centre of 
Heraklion. As far as the beneficiaries are concerned, in the case of LEADER+ 
project, some of them realise the undertaken activities in their village of origin 
while they live in Heraklion, as happened in the mini cases of tourism 
accommodation in Katalagari village and the winery cluster.        
 
Worth all the ambiguities, my decision was to define these partnerships as 
³ORFDO´KHQFHGHHPSKDVLVLQJWKHGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQUXUDODQGXUEDQVLQFHWKLV
distinction is no longer clear and it does not affect directly the process of 
partnership. In this way, I keep the issue of scale as a significant component of 
the partnership development since there is a localisation effect in terms of 
policies adopted, partners involved and areas of intervention. But I do not 
resort to simple reductionism of the complexity of the particular local area.  
 
The complexity of the research subject which involves a large number of 
variables is related to another problem of defining my case study. The lack of 
long experience in research, especially in small-scale research, as well as the 
explanatory character of the case study, led me to the selection of a large 
number of variables which, after the advice of my supervisors and of the 
national external evaluators of the CIs, were reduced; however, that did not 
completely resolve the problem. In some cases, I chose not to analyse further a 
variable, for instance an informal rule at the national level, because evidence 
showed to me that it was not so important. In another case, I got so much lost 
LQYDULDEOHV¶FRPELQDWLRQZKHQIRULQVWDQFH,DQDO\VHGWKHLQWHUDFWLRQVof 
formal and informal rules inside the national Monitoring Authorities (M.As) of 
the CIs that I finally got confused about the purpose of this analysis. However, 
this limitation could be counterbalanced with the fact that the problem of many 
variables is DJHQHUDOSUREOHP³UHFRJQLVHGE\RWKHUVFKRODUVDVRQHRIWKH
perplexing problems haunting systematic empirical testing of social science 
WKHRULHV´2VWURP 
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2.3 Pilot study 
A good research strategy requires careful planning and a pilot study is a crucial 
component of this task. A pilot study is a small scale preliminary study 
conducted before the main research in order to evaluate and improve the design 
of the research and especially the research instruments (Burhman et al, 2008: 
48-49). Although in PhD research the time framing and the limited budget 
leave no room for a full pilot of large scale, parts of the design needed to be pre 
tested (Denscombe, 2003; Robson, 1993:164-165).  
 
In my research design, I conducted a short pilot case study where I tested my 
main propositions and the methodological instruments of my research. My 
pilot case study was an EQUAL I partnership programme named 
³.('$9526´,VHOHFWHGWKLVFDVHIRUWZRUHDVRQV)LUVWLWZDVDVLPLODU
programme to that of my case and also I had access to the data because of my 
cooperation with the project coordinator in a previous research programme. 
This programme has been implemented in the urban area of Volos and in the 
rural area of Livadi. Responsible for the project coordination was the local 
branch of EETAA (Hellenic Agency of Local Development and Local 
Government), which is situated in the capital of the region, Larissa.  
 
I travelled to Larissa and conducted two interviews on the same day (15th of 
November 2007). The first one was with the director of the partnership board 
and the second one with the project coordinator of a sub project implemented 
in Volos. Meanwhile, the interviewees gave me selected secondary material 
related to the project like evaluation reports and publications. The interviews 
were recorded and they then were transcribed and finally analysed.   
 
The findings from the pilot case study led me to the revision of the research 
design regarding the main questions of the interviews and the proposed 
methods. On the first point, during the pilot, I came to realise the need for a 
more elaborate interview structure in terms of more specific questions that 
could investigate in depth and in a more detailed way the research issues. The 
limitation of my first approach was asking rather general questions and, for this 
reason, I received unclear and vague responses. The general questions were 
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also accompanied by poorly defined concepts and as a result I could not 
retrieve the relevant information from the interviewees. Furthermore, it became 
clear that the issue of Europeanisation could not be addressed at the local 
partners, because the interviewees stated that neither they nor other partnership 
members had a direct relation with the EU. Consequently, an additional 
interview schedule was developed with a new set of questions regarding 
Europeanisation. This new interview schedule was used with selected officers 
in Brussels.  
 
Finally, the issues of intergovernmental relations and the role of the national 
government in EU led me to a third interview schedule targeting selected 
H[HFXWLYHVRIWKHPLQLVWULHV¶0$VORFDWHGLQ$WKHQV7KHGHYHORSPHQWRID
different interviews schedule added value to my research strategy because they 
gave me the opportunity to explore the multi-level context in which my case 
study operated.  
 
In relation to the proposed methods, I realised that the interview was too long, 
more than one and a half hour and both the interviewee and I were very tired at 
the end. Consequently, I produced a shorter version of the interview schedule 
and I came to the decision that I have to use another method in order to gather 
information for those variables no longer covered by the interview. The 
excluded variables were related to the context in which the partnerships are 
developed, especially the level of social capital and the type of political culture. 
To consider these variables, I decided that it would be better to make a short 
questionnaire and distribute it to all the partners of both partnerships. In this 
way, I would, on the one hand, save time by not conducting very long 
interviews, and on the other hand, I would be able to adhere to a more careful 
and strict definition and measurement of the contextual factors avoiding 
misunderstanding at the time of data elaboration. Finally, issues concerning the 
local political environment and the partnership organisation could be addressed 
more specifically only with the coordinators of the CIs partnerships through an 
additional interview focusing exclusively on these issues.  
115 
 
Section 3: Research Methods  
In this research, I have tried to avoid what may be characterised as 
methodological monism, i.e. the practice of using just one research method. 
Instead, I have used a triangulation approach. Triangulation, increasingly 
applied by social sciences, comprises the use of more than one method of 
collecting data for the study of the same phenomenon. There are two main 
benefits from this technique. On the one hand, it allows the research to address 
more issues for investigation improving the quality of the research since its 
method has its own assumptions about the nature of the social world and offers 
different kinds of data. On the other hand, it allows for the corroboration of the 
data produced by different methods improving in this way the validity of the 
research. In this way, the confidence in the findings deriving from a study 
using multiple methods is enhanced by the use of more than one way of 
measuring the propositions (Bryman, 2008:603-624; Denscombe, 2003:       
131-34).   
 
The use of mixed methods also distinguishes my research from the long 
³TXDOLWDWLYH- TXDQWLWDWLYHGHEDWH´DERXWUHVHDUFKPHWKRGVVXVWDLQHGE\WKH
interpretative ethnographers and positivist scientists respectively. I think that 
for a new researcher like me, who acknowledges the recent critical evaluation 
of this dichotomy and the move towards a convergence of epistemologies and 
combination of methods (as in critical realism), this debate appears 
anachronistic (Tashakkori and Tedllie, 1998).  
 
Additionally, like critical realism does, the recent literature on social sciences 
methodology proposes that the selection of the method cannot be made in 
abstract but has to be related to the particular research problem and object of 
analysis (Alvesson and Skoldberg, 2000: 4; Robson, 1993: 2-16). Finally, a 
case study as a research strategy has greater potential to use multiple data 
collection methods than other research strategies like experiments or surveys, 
further supporting my preference for multiple methods. Although there is a 
tendency to associate case studies with qualitative research, this association is 
not appropriate since this strategy can also give space to the generation of 
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quantitative data (Bryman, 2008: 52-57). So, observation, interviews, 
questionnaires, but also documentation are methods encouraged by this 
strategy (Yin, 2003: 97).     
 
My research design employed four direct data collection methods: semi 
structured interviews, a small questionnaire, storytelling and direct observation. 
Additionally, I undertook a review of national and EU evaluations reports and 
of official documentation pertaining to each partnership. The research was 
conducted between December 2007 and January 2009. During this period, I 
visited the field 7 times and I stayed there 2-3 days each time. Due to family 
responsibilities, I was not able to stay in the field for longer, for instance 2-3  
months; instead, I visited the field sporadically for a short time conducting as 
many interviews as I could each time. Though the data collection has been 
completed sufficiently, direct observation was limited and the focus of the 
research was more on interviews, losing in this way additional information 
about what people are actually doing in these partnerships. My approach did 
have advantages, however, allowing for reflection between field visits, and the 
ongoing iteration or theory development and data collection.  
       
3.1 Interviews 
Since there were many different types of actors involved in the partnerships of 
my study such as partners, local leaders, national government and Brussels 
officers, I decided to design three different semi-structured schedules 
(Appendix A) addressed to these different categories of interviewees. In this 
way, I managed to ask relevant questions to each category, which allowed to 
me to gather precise and detailed data for the multi-level character of 
partnerships. For the selection of leaders, I identified them by their institutional 
position and by reputation as it was stated by partners (see also chapter 2, 
section 3.1.2). In total, I conducted 34 interviews (see Appendix A which 
comprises the date of the interview, the job title of each interviewee and their  
role in the partnership).  
 
Specifically, I have conducted 16 semi-structured interviews with the partners 
of both partnerships¶ERDUGV, which constitute the main core of my case study. 
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From the 19 partners in both programmes, only 3 were not interviewed because 
they had a busy professional schedule and they could not manage to find a time 
for the interview. I also conducted 5 additional interviews with members of the 
DAH board and administration since DAH had been the coordinator of both 
projects and the information gathered from those members was valuable for 
understanding the actual partnership dynamics and the context in which 
partnerships are developed.      
 
I believe that the number of interviews was quite satisfactory since at the end 
of the data collection, I was gathering the same information from the 
interviews, which of course enabled me to verify the data. However, there are 
two limitations RIWKHLQWHUYLHZHHV¶VDPSOH. One is the lack of interviews with 
new mayors or mayors of opposition in order to better understand the balance 
RISRZHULQORFDOSROLWLFVDQGWKHZD\WKLVUHIOHFWVRQWKHSDUWQHUVKLSV¶DJHQGD
setting and decision-making. The second one is the lack of interviews with the 
excluded partners who could provide valid information about the democratic 
processes of partnership design.   
 
Finally, I conducted 6 interviews with executives from the MCs in two 
ministries: the Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of Agriculture; 2 interviews 
with the national external evaluators of the CIs and 1 interview with the 
coordinator of another EQUAL II programme in Athens. I also conducted 4 
interviews with officers in Brussels who have been involved in both CIs 
implementation and evaluation. These interviewees offered me information on 
the intergovernmental relations, the EU perception of CIs implementation in 
Greece and a comparative perspective of how these initiatives work in other 
countries and in Greece. All the interviews and the questionnaires were 
conducted between March 2008 and January 2009. 
 
Most interviews have been conducted in an environment of trust and good will 
and the responses seem to be sufficient, full and open, which is very 
satisfactory considering the difficulties of the Greek case. Only in some 
questions, which referred to the sensitive issues of clientelism and 
political/partisan informal networks did some interviewees give typical 
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DQVZHUVWDLORUHGWRDQ³LGHDO´UHDOLW\LQRQHFDVHWKHLQWHUYLHZHHIHOW
defensive to such a point that they mentioned exclusively the legal framework 
governing the operation of the programme.  
 
When each interviewee agreed to participate in the research, an interview time 
and place was set. That was usually in the morning, in their workplace, 
although there were two interviews conducted in central cafes of Heraklion 
city. The interviews had an ordered list of issues and they were conducted one 
WRRQH,QWHUYLHZOHQJWKUDQJHGIURPPLQXWHVWRDQGòKRXUV$IWHUWKH
completion of the interviews, additional questions were asked for clarification; 
some were on statements made in previous interviews. At the beginning of 
each interview, participants were asked their permission to tape record the 
interview. From the 34 interviews, only 7 have not been audio- recorded 
because the interviewees did not feel comfortable with the audio ± recorder and 
they denied its use. In these cases, notes were taken during the interview.  
 
After the end of each interview, I wrote field notes with my thoughts and my 
impressions about what was said or not said, about events occurring in the 
course of the interview and the physical context of the interview. These notes 
were used as a complement to the tape recording interview.        
 
Additionally, I encountered some difficulties. One is pragmatic and related to 
the time available for the interviewees. Especially in the case of mayors, it was 
difficult to find time for an interview and during interviews there were many 
interruptions because of phone calls and people coming into the office. 
Furthermore, as mentioned above, on sensitive issues, especially connected to 
issues of power, party politics and clientelism, the interviewees were very 
reluctant to answer and resorted to formal standard answers. One difficulty in 
the intervieweeV¶ VHOHFWLRQ ZDV WKH GLVWLQFWLRQ EHWZHHQ WKH SDUWQHUV DQG WKH
beneficiaries. In both programs, some beneficiaries were also members of the 
partnership board. In these cases, I chose to deal with these beneficiaries as 
partners and to use the storytelling method to other beneficiaries which were 
not members of the board. Finally, the Greek national external evaluators and 
the officers in Brussels seem to have extreme and absolute negative or positive 
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views and perceptions of the Greek CIs partnerships. In the latter two cases, I 
RYHUFDPH WKH GLIILFXOW\ RI FROODWLQJ ³VXEMHFWLYH´ GDWD DV IDU DV WKDW ZDV
possible, through the use of data from observation and secondary analysis of 
evaluation reports, as well as comparing them with similar studies of the field.       
 
3.2. Storytelling  
Furthermore, I decided to get closer to the beneficiaries using a more narrative 
approach of data collection. I thought that this would be a more appropriate 
method for respondents like women farmers who might encounter problems in 
responding to a formal structured interview in terms of confidence and 
convenience. Instead, I approached them in a more informal way and asked 
them to tell me their story of participation in these projects. I conducted 4 
interviews with the beneficiaries of both partnerships, two from each, and I 
collected data essentially on the openness of the partnership and the nature of 
community involvement (Appendix C, photos of tourism accommodation in 
KatalagariZLQHU\FOXVWHUDQGZRPHQ¶VFRRSHUDWLYHV of Zakros and 
Krousaniotissa). The selection of these respondents was made on a very 
realistic basis and for that reason the beneficiaries are not considered as a 
typical example of this category, especially those of LEADER+ project. They 
were selected because of their willingness to participate in the research, which 
was related to their commitment to these programmes from the beginning. 
 
The conversations were unstructured starting with the general theme of their 
involvement in the project and followed by discussing their personal 
experiences and feelings about the project activity. The respondents felt free to 
tell the story of how they got involved in this project, talk about the difficulties 
and the opportunities that they encountered, and the possible solutions to 
problems. Allowing the respondents to tell in their own words what they have 
done, and what they thought about all these issues, provided a chance for me to 
understand in a temporal sequence (like a movie) all the project stages and 
think about the partnerships from a different angle, in a less complicated and 
more pragmatic way. Hence, the narrativeVDFNQRZOHGJH³WKHLPSRUWDQFHRI
WLPHDQGWKHFRQQHFWLRQRIHYHQWVLQDPHDQIXOOWRWDOLW\´$OYHVVRQDQG
Skoldberg, 2000: 92-93). The discussions were conducted in a very informal 
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and friendly environment drinking coffee and testing local products and they 
ZHUHXVXDOO\FRQFOXGHGZLWKDZDONDURXQGWKHEHQHILFLDULHV¶LQYHVWPHQWV
WRXULVPDFFRPRGDWLRQFRRSHUDWLYHV¶LQIUDVWUXFWXUHV 
 
3.3 Questionnaire 
The questionnaire (Appendix B) is composed of 12 closed questions asking the 
opinion of the partnershipV¶PHPEHUVDQGRIVHOHFWHGEHQHILFLDULHVDERXWVRFLDO
FDSLWDODQGSROLWLFDOFXOWXUH0RVWRIWKHTXHVWLRQVDUHEDVHGRQ6WRQH¶V
research on social capital and PLUS research (Participation, Leadership and 
Urban Sustainability, 2001) on urban leadership and community involvement. 
7KHFORVHGTXHVWLRQVLQFOXGHGWZRRSWLRQVOLNH³\HVQR´RUPRUHRSWLRQVOLNH
five scale options (Likert scale11) regarding the degree of agreement or 
disagreement on an issue. Some of the closed questions were followed by an 
opHQRQHFOHDUO\PDUNHGDV³RWKHU´)RUWKHVHRSHQTXHVWLRQVDSRVWFRGLQJ
procedure was undertaken during data analysis.  
 
I distributed 26 questionnaires to all the interviewed local partners and 
beneficiaries and I received back 23, which is a good response rate. The 
questionnaire was given out at the end of the interview and, depending on the 
time they had available, the respondents completed the questionnaire right 
away or sent it by e-mail to me at a later point. When they completed the 
questionnaire directly, interesting questions and comments arose which I 
recorded in my field notebook.     
 
There are a lot of limitations to this method. First, after the data collection, I 
realised that some questions might have been missed or should have been 
reframed while some others could have been more analytical. Question 2 
(Appendix B) could have been removed since there are not that many social 
organisations cooperating with the private sector. It is a good question for other 
national contexts like the UK but not for Greece. Question 6 and 10 regarding 
WKHFLWL]HQV¶SDUWLFLSDWLRQLQSROLWLFVFRXOGKDYHEHHQFRQVROLGDWHGLQWRRQH
                                                 
11
 It is used for the investigation of attitudes in survey research and it is a technique for 
conduction such an investigation. It is essentially a multi indicator measure of a set of attitudes 
relating to particular area indicating the level of agreement going from strongly agree to 
strongly disagree (Bryman, 2008: 146).  
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question while question 10 needed to be reframed. If I could have rebuilt the 
questionnaire, I would have added new questions regarding the attitude to 
cooperation in general and the interaction of professional networks with 
networks of friends and family, and I would have been more analytical in 
questions about the leadership behaviour.  
 
Second, the population the questionnaire was administered to has been small 
enough so that it has not allowed for making statistical generalisations or 
correlations between questions or between them and demographic 
characteristics of respondents like sex, occupation and  location (although these 
questions had been included in the questionnaire). It would have been better to 
extend this questionnaire to a larger population, like all the beneficiaries of 
both projects, but this would have required more time and money.  
 
,QWHUYLHZV¶TXHVWLRQVDQGWKHTXHVWLRQQDLUHDUHDWWDFKHGDV$SSHQGLFHVDVZHOO
DVDOLVWRILQWHUYLHZHHVVKRZLQJGDWHVDQGWKHLQWHUYLHZHHV¶SURIHVVLRQDO
statXVDQGWKHTXHVWLRQQDLUH¶VUHVSRQVHV 
  
3.4 Observation 
My main data was derived from the interviews and to a lesser extent from 
systematic direct observation. Observation was a supplementary method that 
complemented the interview method and it occurred during my field visits for 
FRQGXFWLQJLQWHUYLHZV)RULQVWDQFH,ZLOOQHYHUIRUJHWP\YLVLWWRDPD\RU¶V
office. I remembered that his secretary announced my arrival to the mayor over 
the phone and then I went through a security door that opened remotely from 
WKHVHFUHWDU\¶VRIILFHWRDYHU\ELJURRPZKHUHWKHPD\RUZDVVLWWLQJLQDELJ
chair! This made quite an impression to me. Another example has been my 
observation on the importance attached by the DAH to the LEADER+ project 
as compared with EQUAL II regarding the location of their office. LEADER+ 
office was located in the DAH building, while EQUAL II office was located 
500 metres away from the DAH offices in a rented space which was closed 
after the end of the programme.  
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Although I did not spend enough time in the field for a systematic observation, 
observation was always an inherent and continuous action in my research that 
captured in a non-selective way what happened in there. For this reason, I kept 
long field notes where I wrote in an unsystematic way everything that had a 
SDUWLFXODUVLJQLILFDQFHIRUP\UHVHDUFKIURPSK\VLFDOVHWWLQJVWRDFWRUV¶
activities and feelings. For instance, one day I observed that many stores had 
VLJQVRIWKHRZQHU¶VVXUQDPHVZKLFKZHUHWKHVDPHZLWKWKRVHRIWKH
executives working in DAH. So I kept notes about the degree of closeness 
between members of a small local society and the potential familial links 
between them.    
 
The absence of direct observation of formal meetings in both projects made it 
more difficult to gather additional information especially on the issues of 
power relations and networks. I could not undertake a direct observation in 
EQUAL II project because the project was concluding and the formal meetings 
with all the partners had been completed. In LEADER+ project, I had been 
invited to participate to one meeting but this never took place. I think that in 
reality I did not have access to these meetings.  I did not push this issue further 
because I did not want to lose the goodwill, cooperation and acceptance by the 
'$+¶VH[HFXWLYHV5HJDUGLQJWKHPHHWLQJRIWKH'$+&RXQFLOWKHUHZDVQRW
any one during the period of my data collection.  
 
3.5 Documentation  
Besides the interviews, the questionnaire and the storytelling, I have also used 
documentary analysis as a complement to the above methods. The material 
comprised the European, national and local evaluation reports of projects, their 
official proposals, all the publications by the coordinating agency on paper and 
on their web site page, the presidential decrees that guide these projects, all the 
available letters and informative material addressed to beneficiaries and 
partners and finally the official statistics for the region of Crete. Unfortunately, 
my material does not include newspaper articles, which are considered as a 
valuable source of information, if used in a credible way. I did not use this type 
of source because the newspapers in Heraklion were not archived electronically 
and consequently, the manual research of relevant articles would have taken 
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WRRPXFKWLPH$GGLWLRQDOO\,GLGQRWDQDO\VHWKHSDUWQHUV¶PHHWLQJVPLQXWHV
because the minutes were not detailed but they were kept in a form of 
headlines, which did not provide any useful information.     
 
Generally, the use of documentation can be considerably helpful for 
identification of new data for further analysis by other methods or for cross 
validation of collected data (Robson, 1993: 272-285). However, when we use 
documentation, special care must be paid to the fact that we are dealing with 
something that has been produced for some other purpose and not for the 
VSHFLILFDLPVRIRXUUHVHDUFK,QWKLVZD\³GRFXPHQWVDUHVLJQLILFDQWIRUZKDW
WKH\ZHUHVXSSRVHGWRDFFRPSOLVKDQGZKRWKH\DUHZULWWHQIRU´%U\PDQ
2008: 527) and they should not be viewed as simple representations of the 
reality.  
 
This was particularly evident in the case of the national and EU evaluation 
reports. The EU evaluation reports have treated the data for evaluation with 
sensitivity due to their political will to avoid revealing problems in some 
countries. On the other hand, in the national and local evaluation reports, the 
focus has mainly been on the depiction of positive outcomes since the inflow 
of European money depends on these evaluations. Having all this in mind, I 
used the data from evaluation reports very carefully and I made an effort to 
UHDG³EHWZHHQWKHOLQHV´LQRUGHUWRXQGHUVWDQGLPSRUWDQWPHDQLQJVWKDWZHUH
just mentioned or remained hidden in their official analysis.   
 
Regarding the statistical data of my case study, I used them essentially for the 
description of the socio-HFRQRPLFFRQWH[WRIWKHSURMHFWV¶DUHDLQWHUYHQWLRQ
(see next chapter). The main source of primary statistical data comes from the 
Hellenic Statistical Authority (ELSTAT). This organisation is the Greek 
official institution for the provision of statistical data. All data provided by 
ELSTAT have been elaborated by the author.  
 
Additionally, the available information from the two studies of Regional 
Operational Programme of Crete (2000-2006 & 2007-2013) and the local 
evaluation report of LEADER+ was added to the above statistics. These studies 
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had also elaborated data from ELSTAT as well as from EUROSTAT. Since I 
have used these data as additional information to the interviews, my rationale 
was to firstly use all the available data from the above studies and then move 
on with my own data processing issues not covered by those studies.   
 
As far as the availability of data is concerned, the lack of data or the 
interruption of constant flow of data for a particular year has been problematic. 
This caused to me several difficulties. First of all, I spent a lot of time 
undertaking primary research, gathering all the data needed to explore a 
SDUWLFXODUDUJXPHQW)RULQVWDQFHLQWKHFDVHRIPD\RUV¶LGHQWLILFDWLRQDQG
party affiliation during the last five electoral periods (from 1990 to 2006), the 
Ministry of Interior Affairs keeps an electronic record for only the last two 
electoral periods. So, I called personally all the 26 municipalities of the 
Heraklion prefecture in order to have an integrated image of all the electoral 
periods.  
 
Second, there has not been continuity in the provision of data; this resulted in 
analysing data that has not been recent and comparable (meeting the conditions 
for data comparability has been an issue throughout this process). For instance, 
ELSTAT stopped PHDVXULQJWKHSUHIHFWXUH¶V*URVV'RPHVWLF3URGXFW*'3
in 1996. So, when I discuss the issue of region wealth and the prefectural 
economic disparities in the region, the data I referred to for the prefectures was 
that of 1996 whereas the data I referred to for the Cretan region was that of 
2006. It is apparent that in the case of prefecture, the data available was quite 
old as opposed to more recent data for the case of the region. Furthermore, the 
last general census of ELSTAT was in 2001 and the one before that was in 
1991 which is by far very old. So, when I compared these two censuses, my 
conclusions about the socio- economic features of the case study area were not 
accurate, particularly if one takes into account the rapidly changing rural 
societies.  
 
Finally, in some cases, I wanted to explore further a research proposition as 
interviews have provided evidence for this but it was impossible due to lack of 
data bases. For instance, it was impossible to find the number of rural 
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cooperatives in each prefecture of Crete. This data would have been available 
from an annual report on the cooperative management of the Agricultural Bank 
of Greece; however, this report, which had been the only valid source for the 
UXUDOFRRSHUDWLYHV¶GHYHORSPHQWVLQ*UHHFH0DUDvegias, 1999), stopped being 
produced in 1991. Another example is that of the World Values Survey 
(Values Surveys Databank, 1999-2004). There have been 5 surveys in total12 
and Greece has participated only in the 1999 survey; as a result there are no 
recent comparative data available.   
                                                 
12
 The World Value Survey had conducted five wave surveys: 1981, 1990, 1995/1998, 
1999/2000, 2005/ 2008. 
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Section 4: Data analysis   
Data analysis is a process of transforming the collected raw data to findings 
that answer research questions (Yin, 2003:109). There are different strategies 
for the analysis of qualitative and quantitative data; however, what is important 
is that both strategies should meet the validity principle. The data collected in 
my case study is primarily qualitative and it has been derived from interviews, 
direct observation and documentation. Only a small part of the data is 
quantitative and has been derived from questionnaires. Unlike the quantitative 
data, the qualitative data does not a prescriptive formula for doing analysis and 
their techniques are less developed. There are few researchers like Yin (2003) 
and Miles and Huberman (1994) who have given to qualitative data analysis a 
realm of rigorous analysis like the one developed in the quantitative data 
(Robson, 1993: 370 - 407).      
 
According to Miles and Huberman (1994: 5-11), what the researcher does in 
the analysis of qualitative data, is to break down the collected data into units 
identified as important to the research questions and then to reconstruct the 
data recognising relations, processes, types, etc. The aim of this process is to 
outline the general research assumptions in a comprehensive and integrated 
way. The authors recognise in this process three steps: data reduction, data 
display, and drawing conclusions with verification. 
Data reduction refers to the process of selecting, and thus simplifying, the data 
that appears in transcriptions, field notes and documentation. Data display 
refers to ways of displaying the data, which include matrices, graphs, and 
charts illustrating the patterns and findings from the data. Conclusion drawing 
and verification refer to a process of developing an initial thought about 
patterns and explanations stemming from the findings.  
However, this technique of data managing, which has been applied in this 
research is not sufficient on its own, if it is not accompanied by a systematic 
VWUDWHJ\RIGDWDDQDO\VLV¶FRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQ$QGWKLVV\VWHPDWLFVWUDWHJ\LV
dependent on the epistemological approach of the research. Yin (2003:111-
115) presents two strategies for general use: one is to rely on the theoretical 
127 
 
propositions of the study, and then to analyse the evidence based on those 
propositions. The other is to develop a case description, which would be a 
framework for organising the case study. The latter one could be related to the 
QDUUDWLYHFDVHVWXGLHV¶GHVFULSWLRQRIJURXQGHGWKHRU\DQGSKHQRPHQRORJ\
since the theoretical framework does not strictly guide the research process. 
Since Yin adheres to the positivist site of epistemology, he is hesitant to adopt 
this strategy because according to him, it does not provide guidance about the 
selection of data under study.  
 
Following the epistemological approach of this research, I adopt the first 
strategy which analytical orientation basically relies upon theoretical 
propositions, but I also acknowledge two principles from the interpretive 
epistemological approach: analysis should be cyclical and reflexive (Bryman, 
2008: 541-%\WKDW,PHDQWKDW³ZRUGV´WKHFRPPRQIRUPRITXDOLWative 
GDWDDUHULFKZLWKGLIIHUHQWPHDQLQJVDERXWWKH³UHDO´ZRUGRXWWKHUHLQ
FRPSDULVRQZLWKWKH³FOHDU´DQGDEVWUDFWQXPEHUVRIWKH³REMHFWLYH´UHDOLW\
Consequently, the researcher actively participates during the analysis process 
and approaches it in a cyclical manner, rather than as a finished task of the 
accomplished data collection.  
 
This is why Miles and Huberman (1994:55-68) refer to the qualitative data 
analysis as a continuous and interactive enterprise between the initial 
processing of the data in codes and the identified relations of patterns during 
the formulation of findings. According to them, data collection and the coding 
process could create new ideas that could change in their turn the final 
assumptions by the addition or variation of one initial proposition. This task 
becomes even more difficult because the researcher is likely to deal with a 
large volume of data in a non-standard format due to the verbal or textual 
nature of qualitative data. Consequently, this part of the methodology process 
appears to be the most difficult but also the most challenging for the production 
of high quality findings. 
 
So, in my data analysis, although I started the data collection with a well 
developed theoretical framework with clear propositions, I remained open 
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minded during the development of the research, alert to emerging themes that 
would redirect my initial theoretical presumptions.  
 
In particular, I have started the data analysis during data collection by 
providing to my supervisors reports of some preliminary thoughts about 
explanations and new findings that altered the direction of the main theoretical 
issues of my research. For instance, my priority was to examine only the 
partnership leaders but the research evidence shifted my attention to other 
actors too such as local and national institutional entrepreneurs. Additionally, I 
was keen to study three stages in partnership development. However, during 
interviews I realised that, the distinction is not so relevant for the Greek reality 
since in the first stage i.e. that of partnership initiation, there is almost no 
cooperation because it is the project coordinator who does everything. Another 
example is that of the social capital variable. At the beginning, in the 
formulation of my hypothesis, I paid attention to the variable of the existing 
cooperative culture, while during the interviews a new influential factor 
emerged, that of political stability.   
 
Furthermore, during the coding process, the identification of codes and the 
relationships between them was also a reflexive procedure during which codes 
have been changed since new issues appeared to be more important than others 
and the codes had to be re-shaped in a new way. For instance, some of the 
codes referring to intergovernmental relations were transferred to a new 
category that of the informal UXOH³IHDURIUHVSRQVLELOLW\´During the 
interviews and observation, I understood that this rule is a more general one 
and it is not only characterising the intergovernmental relations, but rather all 
the relations between institutions. Or, in some cases, as the analysis progressed, 
I gave a new, different from the original, interpretation of the same extract of 
GDWDOLNHLQVRPHPD\RUV¶LQWHUYLHZVUHJDUGLQJUHODWLRQVZLWKFLWL]HQV,Q
particular, at the beginning, they were coded as clientelistic relations and later 
on, as I started understanding what happened in the field, as dense 
interpersonal relations resulting from the small size of the community.  
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Consequently, from the moment I started the data collection until the writing of 
the final research conclusions, it was as if the research was clay taking different 
shapes due to new perspectives and new theoretical concepts emerging from 
the data analysis which led to its reshaping.  
There are many analytical techniques such as pattern matching, time series 
analysis, logic models, etc, which propose different modes of connecting the 
data with the research propositions. At the core of this technique is a 
comparative logic. In this research, I use the pattern matching logic where 
several pieces of case study data are linked with the theoretical propositions of 
the research. In particular, pattern matching aims to link two patterns; one is a 
theoretical pattern and the other is an empirical one. Depending on the extent 
that the patterns match, one can conclude that the theory that predicted the 
same observed pattern receives support. In the case of mismatch, there are 
alternative or rival explanations. The identification of correlation between 
³WKHRU\´DQG³SUDFWLFH´UHTXLUHVSUHFLVLRQLQWKHDUWLFXODWLRQRIHPSLULFDOGDWD
For this reason, I believe that Miles and Huberman¶VDQDO\WLFDO
technique is very useful. Because of their insistence in the systematic 
standardisation of data reduction and display, it is an alternative to the tradition 
of long narratives, which allows pattern matching to be rigorous and safeguard 
the validity of the research.  
If one adopts the Miles and Huberman technique, the first step is data 
reduction. In my process of data analysis, I fully transcribed all the interviews, 
typed all the field notes and saved them on my PC. All the interviews were 
collated in A4 format with wide margins in order to code them and add notes 
next to the relevant ideas and events. I also made a list of all the material that I 
have collected (raw data, documentation, photos, etc) so as to have an 
overview of all the material.  
 
When I prepared all these I started coding the material. I first read the text from 
the interviews, the field notes and the documents very carefully and in each 
line or paragraph, I was thinking under which category the data could be 
placed.  Finally, I looked at which further data belonged to this category. This 
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process had two dimensions. I worked inductively to understand what new 
insights the reality offered to me, and then worked deductively to check for 
themes identified as important in my initial research propositions.  
 
The concepts referring to codes were in some cases descriptive as for example 
FLWL]HQV¶SDUWLFLSDWLRQRUORFDOVWDWHUHODWLRQVRUSDUWQHUV¶PRWLYHVEXWLQVRPH
cases they included an argument, as for instance the impact of Europeanisation 
process or unequal power relations between partners. I also made categories of 
codes, as some codes appeared to be systematically associated. For instance, 
the three codes local, intergovernmental and state±European networks are 
placed in the sub category of informal networks which belongs to the category 
of informal rules.   The coding was completed, when additional information 
was no longer constructive in discovering something new for this category.  
 
When I did the coding, I was trying to categorise the data but I was also 
FRQWLQXRXVO\UHIOHFWLQJRQWKHFRGHV¶UHODWLRQVKLSVDQGWKHWUDQVLWLRQIURP
codes to concepts. This is the reason that at that time I kept a small memo with 
new ideas and comments about their relationship. This step was closely related 
to the data display in which I represented interconnections and systematic 
associations in matrices13, flow charts and causal networks in order to give a 
PRUH³UHDGLO\´H[SODQDWLRQRIZKDWKDSSHQHGLQWKHVHSDUWQHUVKLSV7KHVH
³FRPSOHWHGPDWULFHV´ZKLFKHVVHQWLDOO\ZHUHWKHIindings of my research were 
used with comments and quotations from the interviews.  
 
Regarding the selection of the quotations, I made an effort to select those that 
DUHPRVWO\UHSUHVHQWDWLYHRIWKHUHVHDUFKILQGLQJVDQGDOVRKDYH³ODQJXDJH
VWUHQJWK´LQRUder to add vitality to the account. In many cases, the quotations 
represent views and attitudes dominant in the transcribed text and in some 
cases they express the thoughts and feelings of a minority (this is explained 
                                                 
13
 According to Miles and Huberman (2004), there are a lot of data display tools. The most 
important is the matrix usually with a table with a dual categorisation with the rows to 
represent one dimension and the columns the second dimension. In the case of flow charts, a 
study of processes is demonstrated while the causal network is a diagram which includes the 
most important independent and dependent variables in a case study and their relationship.   
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each time in the text). Regardless of what they express, they have been used in 
order to support evidence for a point or an argument in my analysis.  
 
Additionally, in each quotation, I have tried to give some indication of the 
context from which the quotation emerges, through reference to the position of 
the person I am quoting, in order to avoid the de-contextualisation of the 
extract (Bryman, 2008:555). In the final stage, I have revised all my notes and 
the coding process and I have attempted to refine my explanations going up 
and down the matrices and codes trying to give a more integrated and 
consolidated picture of my case study. This process of reflection is related to 
the identification of a set of generalisations that could serve the purpose of the 
case study for theoretical generalisation and transferability to other relevant 
phenomena.       
 
With regards to the quantitative data gathered from the questionnaire, the 
statistical analysis is elementary. Essentially, I did not go beyond descriptive 
statistics, looking for correlations between sets of data, because of the small 
population to which the questionnaire was addressed. In particular, the type of 
data is ordinal which means that I have assigned in each category of the 
response scale a number, which represented a ranked relationship among them. 
For instance, in the five point scale -strongly agree, agree, neutral disagree and 
strongly disagree- I have assigned the numbers 1-5 respectively; in the three 
point scale, the number 1-3 respectively and so on. For each value of the 
category, I identified the population frequency and I presented it in proportion 
(%). For each question, I identified the highest value of the frequency and I 
also discussed the frequency distribution in cases with extreme values or very 
high frequency in one category. In some questions, I also proceeded to 
grouping frequency distributions in order to have more robust findings for one 
issue. I finally presented the frequencies of each question in pie and bar charts 
(Appendix B). For the elaboration of the data and their visual presentation I 
used the Microsoft Office Excel 2007 programme.   
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Section 5: Challenges and limitations  
One important development in qualitative research is the emergence of 
computer software that can assist in the use of qualitative data analysis 
(Bryman, 2008: 565) like Nud.ist, NVivo, Ethnograph, Atlas.ti. They have the 
possibility to store, code, and retrieve the data very fast but they can also 
contribute to the core analysis of data, establishing connection between codes, 
classifications and the formulation of theoretical propositions that fit the data. 
Despite all these possibilities that these software programmes offer, I used the 
traditional approach of dealing with my data by keeping folders of all the 
fieldwork material and coding them manually. I did this for many reasons; first 
and foremost due to high cost and practical reasons. Since my research has 
been on a small scale, I have had a relatively small amount of data, which 
could be managed manually, so it was an opportunity for me to learn without 
the aid of the computer programmes all the processes of data analysis step by 
step and to save money for the set up cost which my budget could not have 
afforded.  
 
Second, although computer analysis of qualitative data has an enormous 
potential in regards of the storage/retrieval capability, there are many 
controversies about the quality of data analysis. The criticism is that they lead 
the researcher towards a mechanistic and superficial processing logic because 
WKH\FDQQRWXQGHUVWDQGWKHSRO\VHP\RIWKHZRUGV¶PHDQLQJVDQGWKHFRQWH[W
in which the events have occurred. So, using computer software always bears 
the danger to distance the researcher from the data and the whole picture of the 
case leaving them to elaborate segments and de-contextualised data. In this 
ZD\WKHVHWRROVFRXOG³NLOORIIWKHLQWXLWLYHDUWRIDQDO\VLVLQTXDOLWDWLYH
UHVHDUFK´VXEstituting the intellectual process that the researcher engages in 
with a procedural mechanical data management (Denscombe, 2003:276). 
Additionally, the easiness with which the coded text could be quantified raises 
concerns about the colonisation of reliability and validity criteria of 
quantitative research (Bryman, 2008: 567)  
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Another issue encountered during the analysis of the data is that of language. 
Firstly, writing in a foreign language generally adds an extra difficulty to the 
writing process, making it more complex than it already is and it affects the 
quality of the produced text. Research in this subject had demonstrated this 
difficulty (Bergh et al, 2006). For instance, it has occurred  to me many times 
to sum up a thought in one sentence in Greek, while in English I express that 
thought in more than one sentences.  Another example would be having a well 
articulated argument in Greek, but when writing this in English, it appears to 
be poor in meaning.  
 
Second, since Greek is the mother tongue for the interviewees and me the 
translation of my thoughts and the quotations from the interviews deprived the 
case study analysis from the vitality and the semantic of the language which 
are very important elements of a qualitative study. This is a problem generally 
referred to as the translation. In particular, the word equivalence across two 
languages is not only restricted to idioms and to syntax but also to the 
experience and concepts attached to words (Sechrest, 1972). For instance the 
WHUP³V\QFKRULDQRV´ZKLFKPHDQVSHRSOHIURPWKHVDPHYLOODJHUHIHUVQRWRQO\
to people with the same origin but also to a commitment to a social group 
defined locally. To overcome this problem, I asked the assistance of a 
colleague who is bilingual so as to translate together those quotations which 
meaning was difficult to capture in the English language. Despite the effort to 
do my best, it is possible that something has been missed during the translation 
process. 
 
On the other hand, the fact that I reviewed English literature, offered me the 
opportunity to keep a distance from the Greek reality and to be more 
³REMHFWLYH´DQGDQDO\WLFDOLQWKHGDWDDQDO\VLVSURFHGXUH&DSWXULQJWKHUHDOLW\
through concepts developed in other countries made me more reflective about 
the deep meaning of these concepts and their adaptability to the Greek reality. 
A simple example is that of the partnership concept, which signifies the co-
operation of public, private and civil society organisations. However, the 
meaning attached to private sector in the English language and the Greek 
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language is quite different due to the different historical development of this 
sector in both countries.  
 
So, although writing a PhD in a foreign language is difficult and time 
consuming because of translation problems, it is a worthwhile challenge due to 
the opportunities provided for reflecting on the different cultural contexts in 
which words have been developed.      
  
5.1 Ethical issues 
Ethical issues in this research were minimal since the object of the analysis is 
not a special case involving sensitive issues and/or vulnerable groups that 
could potentially cause inconvenience to the participants. The study involved 
only adults who had verbally agreed to participate in the research. Prior to 
commencing the fieldwork, the University Research Committee granted me 
ethical approval in order to conduct the research.  
 
)XUWKHUPRUHWKHLQWHUYLHZHHV¶DQRQ\PLW\KDVEHHQDGKHUHGWRRQO\WKHLU
professional role has been stated. In fact, in some sensitive themes, like 
criticisms by senior members of staff or informal practices of power exercise, 
the stated role is generic so that it cannot be linked to specific persons. 
Additionally, the interviewees were explicitly told that would not be identified 
in the research report and all information would be treated as confidential.  
Finally, clear and honest explanations about the research aims and procedures 
as well as my professional identity have been made to all participants via a 
letter sent to them.      
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Conclusion  
In this chapter, I presented a detailed account of the research philosophy, 
strategy and methodology according to which I have conducted this research. 
Finally, throughout the analysis of the research design, I identified its 
challenges and limitations. 
 
This research has adopted the critical realism stance, which acknowledges a 
refle[LYHDSSURDFKWRUHDOLW\DQGWKHUHVHDUFKHU¶VDFWLYHSDUWLFLSDWLRQLQGDWD
interpretation. Due to the complexity of the partnership processes and the 
limited previous research in the Greek context, I have selected an embedded 
case study strategy in which the in-depth research can provide a comprehensive 
picture of all the variables. 
 
Regarding research methods, I have applied a triangulation approach by using 
different methods like interviews, questionnaires, storytelling, observation and 
documentation. Data analysis, following the adopted epistemological approach 
of this research recognised alongside the critical realism approach, the cyclical 
and reflexive procedure of data analysis.  
 
Based on the theoretical framework and the research design, the following 
chapters will discuss the research findings.   
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Chapter 4: Analysis of case study and context 
Introduction 
This chapter has two aims: First, to provide a description of the case study 
offering technical details about where and what happened and who was 
involved. Second, to identify and analyse main features of the national and 
local environment in which the partnerships under study had been developed. 
This analysis will allow the reader to understand comprehensively the specific 
national and local background of the case study. It will also provide a firm 
basis upon which to explain the configuration of formal/informal rules and 
SDUWQHUV¶EHKDYLRXUZLWKLQSDUWQHUVKLSV 
 
Section 1: The case study partnerships 
In this section, I briefly outline the main characteristics of CIs EQUAL and 
LEADER. Additionally, I provide a description of the local EQUAL II and 
LEADER+ programmes of my primary research by presenting some of their 
basic features like budget, timescales, activities and area of intervention.   
  
 1.1 EQUAL and LEADER Community Initiatives in general  
The CIs (such as EQUAL, LEADER, URBAN...) were introduced by reforms 
of the Structural Funds regulations (CSFs) in 1988 and are governed by the 
CSF 1260/99 principles (EC, 1260/99). Their distinctive characteristic is that 
they provide the E.C. with discretion to act independently from central 
governments, directing structural assistance on specific policy areas that it 
regards as essential for the promotion of economic and social cohesion. 
Furthermore, the EC has employed the CIs as flexible mechanisms that allow 
experimentation with innovative measures and actions that substantially 
diverge from those incorporated into mainstream policy programmes such as 
WKH&6)¶V.RXWDODNLV 
 
Finally, the most profound innovation is that CIs promote the application of EC 
policies at the rural and urban level (Hoodge, 1996: 38). In the spirit of that, 
CIs contribute to decentralisation by empowering the local communities and 
fostering horizontal and vertical cooperation.  
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EQUAL II CI is testing new ways of tackling discrimination and inequality 
experienced by those in work and those looking for a job. Two calls for 
proposals for EQUAL projects in the member states had taken place so far, the 
first one in 2001 (EQUAL I or 1st round), the second one in 2004 (EQUAL II 
or 2nd round). It is the EQUAL II, which is under consideration in my study. 
EQUAL II operates in 5 thematic fields: employability, entrepreneurialism, 
adaptability, and equality and asylum seekers. Implementation take place 
through geographical or sector based Development Partnerships (DPs) that 
bring together key actors from the local and national level. In addition to 
partnership, the EQUAL II CI had been guided by the following key principles: 
thematic approach, empowerment, transnationality, innovation, and 
mainstreaming (COM (203) 840 final; www. ec.europa.eu/employment 
social/equal). 
 
LEADER CI aims at integrated rural development. It started in 1991 with 
LEADER I, it continued with LEADER II (1994 ± 1999) and LEADER+ (2000 
± 2006). My case study deals with LEADER+. LEADER has been designed to 
improve the quality of life of the population in rural areas and to attract young 
people into the rural economy. LEADER+ is structured around three actions: a. 
support for integrated territorial development strategies of a pilot nature, b. 
support for cooperation between rural territories, and c. networking. The 
programme aims are attained by the implementation of an integrated 
development strategy for each area of intervention (Local Action Plan) in the 
context of a significant local issue (Priority Theme), which best encapsulates 
the nature of local needs. Its implementation takes place through the 
establishment of Local Action Groups (LAGs) bringing together relevant 
public and private actors at local level. It is guided by the following key 
principles: bottom-up and area based approach, partnership, integrated and 
sustainable pilot development strategies around specific themes, inter-territorial 
and transnational co-operation and networking (2000/C 139/05, 
www.ec.europa.eu/agriculture/rur/leaderplus/index_en.htm) 
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EQUAL II and LEADER+ co-financed activities in all EU member states. 
Responsibility for the implementation of these CIs programmes lies with the 
national authorities of each member state. In each one, monitoring authorities 
(MAs) are responsible for the deVLJQDQGPDQDJHPHQWRIWKH1DWLRQDO&,¶V
programmes, the organisation of the calls for proposals, guidance and support 
to partnerships such as facilitation of national networking, mainstreaming and 
evaluation.  
 
1.2 The case study EQUAL II and LEADER + partnerships  
7KH(48$/,,SURMHFWZDVFDOOHG³,QFXEDWRUIRUWKH'HYHORSPHQWRI6RFLDO
(FRQRP\´DQGLWEHORQJHGWRWKHEntrepreneurship ± Strengthening the Social 
Economy thematic field of the programme. Its intervention area has been the 
whole region of Crete14 (Appendix C, map of Crete). It has been carried out by 
the DP called KRIKOS (Social & Economic Development Partnership of 
Crete) encompassing 13 partners from the whole region of Crete. The project 
coordinator was the Development Agency of Heraklion15(Appendix C, map of 
Heraklion prefecture). The total budget of the project was 1.237.031 euro and it 
was funded by the European Social Fund (75%) and the Greek Ministry of 
Employment and Social Protection (25%) (Development Agency of Heraklion, 
2004; www.anher.gr).  
 The project aimed to further support the existing social enterprises in the 
region and create new ones. The project beneficiaries are the existing social 
                                                 
14
 Crete is the largest island of Greece covering an area of about 8.300 sq.km and it is 
situated in the south part of Greece. The coastline is over 1.000 km long and there are three 
big mountain complexes. Crete has about 600.000 inhabitants, of which over a third live in 
the towns of Heraklion, Chania and Rethymno. The rest of the island is sparsely populated, 
with large tracts of mountainous areas. Crete is a region divided into 4 prefectures: Chania, 
Rethymno, Heraklion and Lasithi. At the time of the research, the regions were de-
concentrated state organisations while the prefectures and municipalities were local 
authorities.  
15The prefecture of Heraklion lies in the central eastern part of Crete. Heraklion city is the 
capital of the prefecture and of the Crete region. At the time of this study, the prefecture 
constituted of 26 municipalities and 194 municipal districts (previous municipal authorities). 
The prefecture landscape is mostly plain and semi- mountainous.  Economically, it is the most 
developed prefecture of Crete and the most densely populated one.  
139 
 
enterprises, the unemployed and women farmers as well as people with 
disabilities. The main actions of the project were:    
1. Operation of one ³Support Structure´ in each prefecture and a ³Centre of Support 
Structures´ in Heraklion prefecture that will assist in the development of social 
economy in Crete and encourage local actors to support social entrepreneurship.  
2. Agreements between local government, private companies and social enterprises 
with the aim to further promote and support corporate social responsibility. 
3. Creation of women¶V cooperatives in Crete- at least two in each prefecture- and of 
training workshops for disabled people. Provision of technical, advisory and 
financial support to these target groups. Creation of clusters. 
4. &UHDWLRQRID³6KRZURRPRI6RFLDO(QWHUSULVHV3URGXFWV´LQDFHQWUDOORFDWLRQLQ
Heraklion Port. 
  
From all theVHDFWLRQVP\UHVHDUFKIRFXVHGPDLQO\RQWKHFUHDWLRQRIZRPHQ¶V
cooperatives in all the four prefectures of Crete and their support by the D.P. 
However, selected data from other actions like the creation of women 
FRRSHUDWLYHV¶FOXVWHUVDQGWKHWUDLQLQJZorkshops for disabled people have also 
been integrated in the research analysis in order to complement my 
understanding about the project. 
 
LEADER+ has been coordinated by the Development Agency of Heraklion 
like EQUAL II. It has been implemented in the rural and disadvantaged areas 
of the prefecture of Heraklion (Appendix C, map of LEADER+ area). The 
LAG consisted of public and private local oganisations operating in the project 
intervention areas. The developmental strategy of the LAG for the area rested 
on two thematic areas: a. sustainable development for the area by the 
rational development of resources and the mobilisation of local population b. 
improvement in the quality of life aiming to develop attractive living 
conditions (Development Agency of Heraklion, 2002; www.anher.gr) 
  
The total budget was 13.274.051 euro of which the national participation was 
2.625.898, 78 euro; the Community participation 5.974.101, 22 euro and the 
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SDUWLFLSDWLRQE\WKHSURMHFW¶VLQYHVWRUV amounted to 4.460.991, 17euro. The 
main actions that got funded were:   
1. The development of agro tourism infrastructures like the construction and 
improvement of accommodation units, handicraft units and traditional 
coffee-shops etc 
2. Networking and clustering of three categories of enterprises: a. in wine 
production b. in agro tourism accommodation c. in handicrafts and 
pottery production. 
3. Protection -enhancement and valorisation of the natural and cultural 
heritage. 
 
From the above actions, I have been more interested in the construction of agro 
tourism accommodation and the winery clusters since there have been high 
cost successful investments. However, I have also collected data from clusters 
of pottery and the housing development of areas with particular cultural 
interest.  
 
0RUHGHWDLOHGLQIRUPDWLRQDQGDQDO\VLVDERXWWKHFDVHVWXG\SDUWQHUVKLSV¶
formation and development will be provided in the next chapter, which deals 
ZLWKSDUWQHUVKLSV¶IRUPDOUXOHV 
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Section 2: National and local context   
As mentioned in the first chapter (section 3), the institutions are not developed 
in a socio-economic and institutional void but are dependent on it and 
interrelated with it. Thus, in this section, I will present key features of the 
Greek political system and the larger local socio-economic and institutional 
context in which partnerships have operated. My attempt will be to understand 
the way that the partnership rules have embedded norms of the larger 
environment. I will also try to explain the community needs for development 
and its readiness to undertake partnership projects.  
 
2.1 Key features of the Greek political system  
There is an extensive body of literature (Featherstone, 2005) that analyses the 
features of Greek politics. In this section, I briefly outline its main aspects. 
Although many developments have occurred recently, especially after the 
economic crisis, I confine the analysis only in the period 1995-2005 because it 
is that period that has actually influenced both partnerships; it is in the 2000s, 
that the CIs under study have been launched and implemented. 
 
The following features are of particular relevance to this discussion:      
2.1.1 State structure and intergovernmental relations 
7KHVWDWHLVDµFRORVVXVZLWKIHHWRIFOD\¶0RX]HOLV6RWLURSRXORV
meaning a huge state with an inefficient administrative structure and highly 
politicised policy making (Spanou 1996; Sotiropoulos 1993). The policy-
making process is marked by DXWKRULW\DURXQG³KHURLFOHDGHUVKLS´W\SLFDOO\
exercised by the prime minister and the ministers (Featherstone, 2005), without 
technocratic legitimation (Lavdas 1997; Ladi 2002). This leads to political 
priorities being strongly dependent on (political) interests within government 
and outside of it.  
 
The highly centralised and hierarchically organised state and the lack of a 
viable system of sub-national governance are generally considered as the main 
characteristics of the Greek intergovernmental relations. As many Greek social 
scientists underline (Ioakimidis, 1998; Verney and Papageorgiou, 1993), the 
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Greek state was the most centralised and interventionist state in the EU of 12 
demonstrating a strong resistance to decentralisation. Consequently, the 
government in Athens determines the allocation of resources and sets the rules 
while sub-national authorities are highly dependent on its authority and favour.  
 
More specifically, the financial dependence of sub-national authorities on 
central state transfers, the functional overlapping of competencies, the 
controlled and centralised planning development, and the role of political 
parties as mediators between the central administration and the municipalities 
are the main features of the Greek intergovernmental relations. They have led 
to the emergence of an administratively weak, highly party-politicised and 
state-dependant local government. Within this framework of hierarchical 
vertical networks, the development of horizontal cooperative actions is difficult 
to achieve (Paraskevopoulos, 2001). 
 
2.1.2 Civil society  
The above features of the Greek state are accompanied by a weak civil society 
depended on the state and the national parties. In the Greek literature, the 
subordination of the civil society to the state and the national parties is often 
perceived as the principal factor for the limited development of NGOs and 
social movements at the national and local level. The existing research on civil 
society organisations emphasises their fragmentation, hierarchical structure, 
small size, financial fragility, lack of links among them and finally lack of a 
concrete plan of action (Lyberaki and Paraskevopoulos, 2002; Christoforou, 
2004).  
 
The gap between the weak civil society and the strong state is filled by the 
emergence of clientelistic relations which function as the main informal 
channels of political integration and participation of the society in the public 
administration and the political system (Mouzelis, 1995). Furthermore, in the 
1980s, the clientelistic networks abandoned their traditional paternalistic 
character and started developing through national parties. In particular, national 
parties use the state and public administration to allocate resources to their 
electorates (Lyritzis, 1993). Additionally, the state society relations are also 
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marked by heavy legalism and over-regulation (Kazakos, 2001). Legalism is so 
extensive that the number of laws exceeds the number of 4.000 in our days.   
 
At the local level, the use of clientelistic networks by local authorities has 
proved to be particularly useful for them. First of all, it has been a precious tool 
for their legitimation and political empowerment vis-a-vis the citizens. 
Furthermore, clientelistic relations between local authorities and the state have 
been a useful tool for the financially weak local authorities as they gain access 
to more resources. Finally, clientelistic relations help the local authorities to 
function as a transmission belt of the local demands to the national level 
(Chlepas, 1994; Christophilopoulou, 1996). In the latter process, mayors 
DFKLHYHWKHVDWLVIDFWLRQRIORFDOQHHGVDQGFLWL]HQV¶UHTXHVWVE\XVLQJWKHLU
contacts with political party deputies. Consequently, the reproduction of 
patronism and clientelistic relations between the state and local authorities, as 
well as between local authorities and local civil society restrict community 
involvement and interest groups¶SDUWLFLSDWLRQLQWKHORFDOSROLWLFDODIIDLUVVLQFH
FLWL]HQV¶GHPDQGVDUHVDWLVILHGE\LQIRUPDOSURFHGXUHV9Hrney, 1994).  
 
2.1.3 Political culture and social capital  
The above features are closely linked to an extremely individualistic political 
culture and a deep-rooted mistrust of the state. In particular, the Greek political 
culture is characterised by a strong politicisation of citizens and an individual-
particularistic conception of politics (Mouzelis, 1997; Demertzis, 1990). The 
FLWL]HQV¶VWURQJLQWHUHVWLQWKHSROLWLFDOOLIHDQGWKHSUHGRPLQDQFHRISROLWLFDO
language in their daily life contradict their low participation in the public space 
and the limited emergence of collective action. This particular form of political 
behaviour is expressed via clientelistic networks (Demertzis, 1994) and 
EHKDYLRXUPRGHOVVXFKDVWKDWRI³IUHHULGHU´7VRXNDODV 
 
According to the World Values Survey of 1999 (Values Surveys Databank, 
1999-2004), in the question asking people to state their agreement on whether 
people stick to their own affairs, in Greece, 19,5% answered that they strongly 
agreed and 3,9% strongly disagreed while for the same question, in UK for 
example, 7% corresponded to strongly agree and 25,9% to strongly disagree. 
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Following the responses to one question in my questionnaire i.e. the one 
regarding the level of reciprocity, the individualist attitude has been adopted by 
more than half of the involved partners (57%) who answered that people are 
always interested in their own affairs (Appendix B, responses). This question 
could also be combined with the question about political competence where 
87% of partners answered that they were interested in local policy making only 
in cases that the policy was directly related to their interests (Appendix B, 
responses).   
 
Low participation and the lack of political trust are also related with the 
existing national stock of social capital. Greece is a country with low stocks of 
social capital in terms of social trust and involvement in social networks 
(Lyberaki and Paraskevopoulos, 2002). The mistrust gets worse due to the 
extensive corruption in government and in private sector. ³*UHHNSHRSOH
cannot be controlled by official papeUVDQGODZV>«@LIWKH\ZDQWWRGR
VRPHWKLQJWKH\ZLOOGRLWHYHQZLWKRXWDSSO\LQJH[LVWLQJUXOHVDQGJXLGHOLQHV¶¶
the LEADER+ coordinator said laughing when asked to comment on the 
corruption of the system. While in UK a simple declaration is sufficient for the 
LEADER investor to verify that he has used the funding in accordance to 
project requirements the investor, in Greece has to start an endless circle of 
bureaucratic procedures in order to submit to the project coordinator the 
certificates that prove how he/she has spent each penny of the funding. It is a 
way for the state to respond to corruption.  
 
The limits of legitimacy seem to be quite diluted; I was struck by the easiness 
with which an interviewee whilst evaluating the course of the programme said: 
³,IWKHLQYHVWRUFUHDWHVVRPHWKLQJJRRGIRUWKHFRPPXQLW\,GRQRWFDUHLIit 
LQIODWHVELOOV´(8 officer). 
 
This section demonstrated that the combination of a centralised and inefficient 
state structure with a weak civil society and a state-dependant local 
government has led to hierarchical clientelistic networks, party-dominated 
political relations, and an individualistic, confrontational and mistrustful 
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culture. These features seem to constitute major constraints for partnership 
formation and community involvement forms. Moreover, when collaboration is 
developed, it is achieved with difficulty and, it is embedded with these features 
that shape its nature.  
 
2.2  The local context  
In this sub section, I will overview the most representing data regarding the 
socio- economic context of my study area. Additionally, I will discuss the local 
institutional legacies, the level of social culture development and the type of 
political culture. I focus only on those institutional legacies and social capital 
features that are distinct in the geographic area where the partnerships have 
been implemented. I argue that even if the national context prevents the 
development and sustainability of collaborative efforts, these partnerships 
succeeded in being accomplished because the local contextual dough 
FRPSULVLQJWKHORFDOVRFLHW\¶QHHGVDQGQRUPVIRUGHYHORSPHQWFRUUHVSRQded 
to a big extent to partnership goals.  
  
2.2.1 Local socio-economic context   
%RWKSDUWQHUVKLSV¶LQWHUYHQWLRQDUHDFRYHUVDELJQXPEHURIVPDOO
underdeveloped local municipalities, which are dispersed in the hinterland of 
Heraklion prefecture. These rural areas are spread around the growth pole of 
the prefecture, which includes the capital of the region, Heraklion, and 
developing cities along the prefecture north seaside part. I argue that the 
economic backwardness of these communities combined with serious 
demographic problems had supported a unified power for adoption by local 
actors of collective activities that would guarantee their future economic 
development.  
 
2.2.1.1. Demographic profile  
6LQFHWKH¶VWKHUHKDVEHHQDELJLPPLJUDQWPRYHPHQWof the agricultural 
population to the nearest big cities16 in Crete. The internal migration led to the 
depopulation of small villages, especially the mountainous ones. Table 7 shows 
                                                 
16
   Additionally, some of the farmers have moved to villages in a plain and to the seaside of 
the island. Due to tourism development, the latest have transformed to small cities. 
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that in five years (1999-2004), there has been a 7, 21% increase of urbanisation 
in Crete; much higher than that of the country as a whole (the corresponding 
rate for the country is 1,68%) causing a decrease of population and dispersion 
of activities in rural areas. 
 
Table 7: % alteration of urbanisation in Greece and in Crete 1999-DXWKRU¶V
elaboration. Source: Regional Operational Programme of Crete and Aegean Islands, 
2007-2013. 
 
In Heraklion prefecture particularly, the concentration of the population in 
bigger urban areas and the severe decrease of its rural areas population is also 
present. The following figure (8) illustrates the changes in population size in all 
the local authorities of the prefecture in the decade from 1991 to 2001. One can 
see the increase of population in the city of Heraklion and in the surrounding 
north seaside local authorities such as Mallion with 43, 23% of population 
growth, Gouvon with 54, 62%, Gaziou with 72, 96% and Hersonisou with 
23,35% respectively.      
  
 Difference between 1999-2004 
 
 
Densely populated 
zones with over  500  
per square meter 
Intermediary zones with  
100 & 499 per square 
meter 
Sparsely populated 
zones below  100 per 
square meter 
GREECE 0,44% 1,23% -1,68% 
CRETE 4,98% 2,23% -7,21% 
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Figure 8: Percentage alteration of size population of the local authorities in the Heraklion prefecture 1991-DXWKRU¶VHODERUDWLRQ6RXUFH(/67$7 
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148 
 
In the rest of the prefecture, which constitute WKHPDLQDUHDRIWKHSDUWQHUVKLSV¶
intervention, the existing picture of depopulation gets worse with the existence 
of many municipal departments (MDs)17 which are small villages with small 
population. In the following table (8), one can see that the MD population is 
dispersed across small and very small MDs.   
 
Year 2001 
Size of 
population in 
MDs 
Number of MDs 
Population 
Number Percentage 
up 500 73 22.832 34% 
501-1000 41 28.391 43% 
1001-2000 12 15.132 23% 
Total 126 66.355 100% 
Table 8: (Agricultural) population in MDs. Source: Mid- term evaluation report of 
LEADER+ for the countryside of Heraklion, 2005 
 
Most of the MDs population (77%) is concentrated in small size MDs of up to 
1.000 inhabitants, while only 23% live in MDs with more than 1.000 to 2.000 
inhabitants. On the other hand, the countryside of Heraklion has some big 
villages such as Archanes, Peza, Arkalochori, Castelli, Thrapsano, Avdou, and 
Gazi. The MDs around these big villages are gradually being abandoned and 
the population is moving to these centres.  
 
Finally, looking closer at the LEADER+ area of intervention again (Appendix 
C, map of LEADER+ area), the depopulation of the area is additionally 
followed by serious demographic problems. In the period 1991-2001, negative 
changes of some key demographic indicators like juvenility, aging and 
economic dependence created a concern for the future growth population and 
regeneration. Based on the mid-term evaluation report of LEADER+ for the 
countryside of Heraklion (2005), the main changes in the area of LEADER+ 
intervention are the following:  
                                                 
17
   The MD has been introduced by the law 2539/97, known as Kapodistrias law, which 
administratively replaced the old autonomous communities following their obligatory 
amalgamation in bigger municipalities.  
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x the aging indicator which calculates the number of persons 64 years old or 
over per hundred persons under age 15 years old increased sharply and 
from 95,76% reached 150%.  
x the indicator of juvenility calculates the number of persons under age 15 
per  hundred persons 64 years old or over. It is considered as positive the 
higher the received value. While in 1991, the indicator for the LEADER+ 
area was characterised relatively satisfactory at a rate of 19, 65%, in 2001 it 
dropped significantly reaching only 14, 67%.  
x the dependency indicator, which reflects the dependence of younger and 
older people on the productive population (15-64 years) fell from 62,53% 
to 58,23%.  
 
2.2.1.2. Economic development  
Until 2000, despite the downgrading of the demographic profile in these areas, 
activities of the primary sector such as the cultivation of agricultural products 
and cattle raising, and some of the third sector activities, mainly the tourism 
development and the state subsidies, had offered sufficient income to farmers. 
Based on the 2001 national census (ELSTAT, 2010) the majority of people in 
the LEADER+  area were still employed in the primary sector (53%) followed 
by the tertiary sector ( 32,65%), mainly in tourism business and finally the 
secondary sector (10,66%).  
 
Nevertheless, the general national economic crisis of the agricultural sector that 
JUDGXDOO\VWDUWHGLQWKHPLG¶VKDGLPSDFWHGRQWKHFDVHVWXG\DUHDLQWKH
beginning of 2000. In the following figure (9), I demonstrate that the decrease 
of the primary sector during the 1991-2001 decade is evident in all local 
authorities of the Heraklion prefecture revealing the crisis in farming. In 
particular, from the 26 municipalities, 13 decreased their primary sector by 
15%, 8 municipalities reached a decrease that ranged from 15% to 30% and 5 
from 30% to nearly 60%.  
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Figure 9: Percentage alteration of primary sector in the municipalities of Heraklion 
prefecture during 1991-DXWKRU¶VHODERUDWLRQ Source: ELSTAT, 2010 
 
Therefore, the need for developmental interventions that would prevent the 
future devastation of these small communities came forward. The president of 
DAH, advocating for the need of implementing local development plans 
through partQHUVKLSVSRLQWHGRXWWKDW³Fifteen years ago, there was no 
significant reason to talk about this because people had an income sufficient 
enough to live in such rural areas. Today, the situation is very difficult for 
farmers and for that reason we have to modernise our ideas and ways of 
LQWHUYHQWLRQ´. 
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Despite the emerging economic crisis by the reduction of the primary sector, 
Crete responded relatively well in relation to the other regions of Greece. Crete 
still remains one of the richest regions in Greece and among its prefectures, 
Heraklion, is the richest one. In the following figure (10) that demonstrates the 
GDP per capita in each Greek region in 2006, one can see that from the 13 
regions of Greece, Crete is the fourth richest region with its GDP per capita 
reaching 16.828 euro.  
. 
 
Figure 10: *'3SHUFDSLWDSHUUHJLRQDXWKRU¶VHODERUDWLRQ6RXUFH(/67$7
2010 
 
While the wealth is mainly concentrated in the north part of the prefecture and 
particularly in the capital of the region, Heraklion, it created multiple economic 
benefits for the hinterland and the south seacoasts of the region, which are less 
developed. Consequently, the degree of economic crisis for the farmers living 
in small villages of Heraklion prefecture is not the same as for example in the 
region of Hepirous, which is one of the poorest regions with GDP per capita 
14.346 euro (see figure 10).  
 
This relative prosperity created an interest for local investments and offered the 
local deputies better access to central government and power to exercise 
pressure for more state subsidies and project subsidies. So, while the economic 
crisis of farmers and the inter-prefectural disparities between north and 
hinterland played a role of rallying around cooperative efforts of development, 
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it was also the wealth of the region that played a facilitative role for supporting 
these cooperative efforts. For that reason, when an executive of EQUAL II 
M.A. ZDVDVNHGWRH[SODLQWKHUHDVRQVIRUWKHSDUWQHUVKLS¶VVXFFHVVLQ
+HUDNOLRQVKHDUJXHGWKDW³,W¶VQRWRQO\WKHJRRGTXDOLW\RI'$+VWDII,WLV
also the area itself, its wealth. For example, the prefecture of Fokida has neither 
previous experience in projects nor the money to invest; it is a poor area´ 
 
2.2.1.3 Geo political position and administrative organisation   
The areas of LEADER+ intervention are not only economically deprived; but 
they are also politically isolated from the centre of decisions, i.e. the ministries 
located in Athens. Due to their small size and their insularity, they do not have 
the same access and political influence to the central government as the big 
local authorities of urban centres. Consequently, their small size, their narrow 
economic development and their geographical distance from the centre 
function as a stimulus for the development of joint efforts by community 
organisations and politicians of these rural communities to solve their problems 
and to promote development by themselves. As an EQUAL II partner and ex-
SUHVLGHQWRI.2,1232/,7,$UHSRUWHG³local authorities in Athens have 
solved many of their problems that are yet unsolved for us. They are located 
close to the centre of decision-making. Here, the challenges are so demanding 
and the tools are so few, that we have to build new ones on our own´.  
 
However, the rural communities are in a more advantageous position regarding 
political access to the central state, in relation to the respective areas in the rest 
of Crete region. This is because Heraklion is the capital of the region and the 
biggest in size city of Crete. For these reasons, all public institutions in the 
region, like for example the regional administration services, are based in 
Heraklion. In addition, the Heraklion prefecture has more local deputies in the 
parliament when compared to other prefectures of the region. As we see in the 
following table (9), the Heraklion prefecture has eight (8) deputies, as many as 
all the other prefectures together.  
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Prefecture of Crete Deputies  
Chania 4 
Rethymno 2 
Heraklion 8 
Lasithi 2 
Table 9: 1XPEHURIORFDOGHSXWLHVSHUSUHIHFWXUHLQ&UHWHDXWKRU¶VHODERUDWLRQ
Source: Official website of the regional administration of Crete.  
 
By having more political power in the government than the other prefectures of 
Crete, the Heraklion prefecture could more effectively support its demands to 
the central state for programme funding.   
 
2.2.1.4 Social organisation  
These small in population rural societies enhance proximity, which supports 
the development of interpersonal relations that could facilitate the circulation 
of information and the development of dense formal and informal relations 
between partners. For instance, people working in the DAH could meet with 
potential project beneficiaries in venues as for example in the market, at local 
festivals, in name-day celebrations and information about the project could be 
exchanged.  
 
Moreover, potential partners could easily meet in public places like in 
informative meetings held by the Regional Council or in the inauguration of a 
public construction. They are likely known to each other not only by their 
institutional position but also by their family and friends. The coordinator of 
the EQUAL II GHVFULELQJWKHSDUWQHUV¶VHOHFWLRQUHSRUWHGWKDW³they are people 
WKDWZHPHHWYHU\RIWHQZHNQRZWKHP´ and the coordinator of LEADER+ 
SRLQWHGRXWDERXWWKHEHQHILFLDULHV³there is no need to come to my office 
because when I go to the market, 200 people stop me and ask me questions´
The ex-president of KOINOPOLITIA who was also an EQUAL II partner 
speaking DERXWWKHGHYHORSPHQWRISDUWQHUVKLSVDGGHG³We know each other in 
this community. This can be both good and bad, but I know who to go to, the 
community is not that big´ 
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Even though the population being small size is defined as a positive factor for 
the partnership development due to the creation of extensive interpersonal 
relations, it can also be an obstacle for the partnership development and the 
sustainability of partnership membership. In regards to the latter, the 
development of a partnership needs a sufficient population size that can 
support its outputs. For example, the operation of a social support office needs 
a sufficient number of beneficiaries in order to realise its policies. For instance, 
in a deserted village of 1.000 habitants, a social service could not function 
properly and the cost-benefit evaluation of the service would be negative.  
 
As a result, in rural areas, like the ones in my study, the initiation of the 
partnership and its development could only be supported by villages with a 
bigger density of population. It is not by chance that Archanes, a large village 
of 5.000 habitants (Appendix C, photo of Archanes) was the place where the 
DAH and other organisations of inter-municipal cooperation (like 
KOINOPOLITIA) were initiated.  
 
One more social feature of these rural areas that certainly influenced the 
initiation of both partnerships is the existence of vulnerable groups such as 
disabled people, unemployed women and young people. Below, I mainly focus 
on data about unemployed women since women¶V cooperatives have been one 
of the main target groups of the EQUAL II partnerships (see section 1 of this 
chapter). 
 
In the Greek province, women are usually trapped in traditional social roles, 
mainly that of parenting and informal support of family income that would not 
allow them to pursuit a career. In cases that they manage to access the labour 
marker, they fail to remain engaged for long due to problems of matching their 
family and professional life.  
 
As regards the employment of women in the whole country, it appears that 
women have lower rates of full employment than men while the employment 
rate is higher in part-time jobs that require limited skills. In particular, when 
both projects started being implemented, in 2006, the female employment rate 
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in EU 27 was 57, 1%, while Greece was one of the countries with the lowest 
female employment rate at 47, 4%. The situation in Crete was even worse, 
since the employment rate for the second trimester of 2007 was 40, 05% for 
women. Furthermore, women appear to remain unemployed longer than men 
)LUVWHYDOXDWLRQUHSRUWRI(48$/,,³,QFXEDWRUIRUWKH'HYHORSPHQWRI6Rcial 
(FRQRP\LQ&UHWH´ 
 
7KHSUREOHPRIZRPHQ¶VXQHPSOR\PHQWLVFRPELQHGZLWKWKHDOPRVW
nonexistent national and local social policies for this category of the 
population. In particular, in Greece, social policy in general is elementary; 
especially at local level. It was just after 2000 that social programmes started to 
run in local authorities by the opening up of funding from the European Social 
Funds (Petmesidou, 2006). However, the main social policy provisions still 
remained limited and centralised. Discussing this with the ex-president of 
.2,1232/,7,$KHVDLGWKDW³Social policies were not enough in Greece and 
they stopped at the regional level; there were no public bodies responsible for 
implementing these at a lower level´&RQVHTXHQWO\³there was a big deficit in 
local authorities´ 
 
Summary  
The following table (10) demonstrates the local socio-economic factors and the 
needs/opportunities that have arisen for supporting collective action. They have 
fertilised an environment for the development of a unified power among 
SDUWQHUV³DSRZHUWR´XVLQJ6WRQH¶VFRQFHSWZKHUHSDUWQHUVGHFLGHWR
commit to collaboration in order to find solutions for their common problems. 
 
More specifically, the partnership goals have responded to local needs for 
development due to economic backwardness, demographic problems and 
political/administrative isolation. Moreover, the partnership operation has 
taken advantage of the opportunities offered by the specific local community 
characteristics like the prefeFWXUH¶VHFRQRPLFSURVSHULW\DQGUHODWLRQVRI
proximity. Although the area of intervention for these partnerships had a lot of 
economic and demographic problems, the fact that the area was part of a rich 
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prefecture offered a double dynamic that not only boosted collective action but 
it also facilitated it.  
 
Facilitating local 
contextual factors Needs Opportunities 
Demographic problems 
Keep young 
people in their 
villages 
 
Economic backwardness 
of rural areas 
Local economic 
development  
Rich and big size of 
prefecture  
Sufficient prosperity for 
capital mobilisation and 
political influence 
Geographical distance 
from the centre of 
decision making 
Self-development  
Vulnerable groups: 
unemployed women 
Integrated 
economic policies  
Small size communities  Proximity 
Table 10: Facilitating local socio-economic factors 
 
2.2.2 Institutional legacies and social capital   
2.2.2.1 Learning from the past: Cohesion policy and previous partnerships  
Since the accession of Greece in EU in 1981 and until the implementation of 
the CIs under study, there were three periods of ESF funding, the 
implementation of Integrated Mediterranean Programmes in the mid-1980s and 
finally various Community Initiatives.  In fact, the whole Greece became 
eligible for Objective 1 structural funding from 1989 to 2006. Afterwards, five 
out of twelve regions ceased to qualify for this type of funding (Getimis & 
Demetropoulou, 2004; Bache et al, 2011) Eventually, this large scale funding 
through the Cohesion Funds and the EU imperatives for convergence led the 
Greek regional policy to concede with the Community Structural Policy and 
the CSF as planning instrument to replace all other forms of development plans 
(Andrikopoulou & Kafkalas, 2004).  
 
However, the incompatibility between the Community Structural Policy 
requirements such as partnership and programming and the peculiarities of the 
Greek polity (section 2.1 of this chapter) created considerable adaptational 
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pressures to Greece just after its accession. In this respect, it was not 
coincidental that the first accession years had been characterised by a negative 
stand and commitment reluctance on the part of the Greek state (Getimis & 
Demetropoulou, 2004). For instance, the planning of the Integrated 
Mediterranean Programmes had been the outcome of the ministerial politicians 
DQGKLJKH[HFXWLYHV¶DFWLRQVLQVWHDGRIUHJLRQDODQGORFDOKRUL]RQWDODQG
vertical networks. In this way, the local needs and demands were ignored 
causing significant difficulties during implementation and resulting in the 
lowest absorbance rate among the beneficiary states (Papageorgiou & Verney, 
1992). 
 
According to Andreou (2006), overall, the impact of cohesion policy in Greece 
regarding multi level governance had almost left untouched the 
intergovernmental relations with regional networks having slowing developed 
and dominated by state actors and with social dialogue having remained 
particularly underdeveloped. However, he points out the set up of task specific 
governing bodies like the local development agencies of my case which even if 
they did not function as policy makers, they still had an impact upon the 
existing management system. In particular, the management of EU policy 
issues requires specialised skills and technocratic knowledge which necessitate 
a shift towards more managerial practices which will secure better monitoring 
and administration of programmes (Getimis & Demetropoulou, 2004). 
Consequently, the most important shift due to cohesion policy referred to the 
RUJDQLVDWLRQDOSDWWHUQVRISROLWLFV³&RKHVLRQSROLF\ZDVVKURXGHGLQD
technocratic mantle and placed almost exclusively in the hands of politically 
FRQWUROOHGH[SHUWV´$QGUHRX 
 
This is related with the process of (social) learning through the long term 
engagement of actors with EU cohesion policy (Bache, 2008; Paraskevopoulos, 
2005).  For instance, Paraskevopoulos (2005) in his investigation of the 
implementation of structural funds in transport infrastructure in Greece since 
WKHPLGVLGHQWLILHGWZRSURFHVVHVRISROLF\OHDUQLQJ³OHDUQLQJIURPSDVW
VXFFHVVHVDQGIDLOXUHV´DQG³OHDUQLQJIURPDEURDG´+RZHYHUWKHODWWHUSROLF\
OHDUQLQJLV³WKLQ´VLQFHLWLVQRWDFFRPSDQLHGE\FKDQJHVLQVRFLDOQRUPVGXHWR
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the specific features of the Greek institutional and policy making structure.  
Andreou (2010) points out that in Greece the principle of policy performance 
with the adoption and diffusion of new management practices in the 
DGPLQLVWUDWLRQLVWKHUHVXOWRID³WKLFN´OHDUQLQJGXULQJWKHLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRI
EU cohesion policy.        
   
In relation to my case, networking and transfer of know-how from previous 
programmes to new ones was mostly a gradual learning process of new 
practices and attitudes between the old and new involved partners leading to 
VRPHH[WHQWWRD³WKLFN´OHDUQLQJLQWHUPVRIDOWHULQJDFWRUV¶SUHIHUHQFHV
regarding partnerships and programming. In fact, even in ERWK(8&,V¶
evaluation reports (EU-wide evaluation of the Community Initiative EQUAL 
2000-2006, 2006; Synthesis of mid-term evaluations of LEADER+ 
programmes, 2005), the implementation of previous projects has been 
identified as an essential factor for the success of new ones.  
 
For instance, areas with previous experience in LEADER have had a 
competitive advantage in accelerating the start of a next LEADER, especially 
ZKHUHDVWURQJFRUHRIKXPDQUHVRXUFHVVWDIIORFDOSROLWLFLDQVYROXQWDU\¶
organisations) who understand the LEADER philosophy, its principles and 
approach already exists. The conclusions of the EU evaluation reports are also 
confirmed in my interview with an EU officer, geographical responsible of 
LEADER+ in Greece³:KHQ,JRWDSSRLQWHGWRWKLVSRVLWLRQZHZHUHDOUHDG\
planning the third period of the programme; therefore any problems that arose 
GXULQJWKHILUVWSHULRGKDGDOUHDG\EHHQRYHUFRPH´. 
 
Regarding my case study, the DAH had already realised a number of projects 
that required the establishment of partnerships (LEADER I & II, EQUAL I, 
INTERREG III, LIFE, etc). The gap between the partners that had the 
experience of previous partnerships and the new ones has been clearly 
presented during the interview with the LEADER+ cRRUGLQDWRU³WKHUHLVDELJ
gap between the new municipalities that enter LEADER+ and the old ones. 
And the gap is big not only among elected representatives but also among 
people, i.e. the investors´. The previous partnerships impact on the partnerships 
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under study in various ways: first, they have formed a sustainable network of 
cooperation between local institutions; second, they have cultivated a 
collaborative culture and a managerial attitude to their partners and, finally, 
they have established adequately trained staff familiar with the financial and 
administrative management of European programmes.  
 
Regarding the creation of a stable network, the ex-president of 
.2,1232/,7,$DUJXHG³ZKDWLVOHIWRIWKHVHSDUWQHUVKLSVDUHWKHHVWDEOLVKHG
contacts resulting from the partners collaboration so, in any future cooperation, 
we have a list of potential SDUWQHUVUHDG\´([-president of KOINOPOLITIA). 
This did not happen overnight. The gradual cooperation of partners in previous 
projects or in the extension of the same programme, (i.e EQUAL I and 
LEADER I, II) for years has led to the creation of stable networks. Partners 
could go back to these networks and mobilise their relationships for building 
new projects. Explaining the selection of EQUAL II partners, the coordinator 
of EQUAL II XQGHUOLQHGWKDW³this was not a sudden, strictly political decision; 
it was the result of many years of cooperation. Indeed, WKUHHTXDUWHUVRI'3¶V
composition was formed by partners who were involved in EQUAL I and 
³,62.5$7,$´SDUWQHUVKLSVZKLFKZHUHFRRUGLQDWHGE\WKH'$+7KHUHIRUH
these partners had already gained knowledge on social policy projects and 
ability to cope with programme obligations and implementation procedures. 
³3artners were aware of the target group needs from previous project 
experience, so we  further developed this knowledge so as to maximise 
collaboraWLRQ´National external evaluator of EQUAL II) .  
 
In relation to the second factor, the acquisition of the collaboration culture and 
managerial skills, the frequent participation of local institutions to partnerships 
have gradually created trust and familiarity to this kind of policy making. 
³)LIWHHQ\HDUVDJRWKHUHZDVDSURJUDPPHFDOOHG³,QQRYDWLYHUHJLRQVLQ
(XURSH´$WWKDWWLPHWKHUHZHUHPDQ\FRQIOLFWVDPRQJSDUWQHUVDVIRU
example, who would be the leader, who would get more money. This did not 
happen in EQUAL II. There was a greater spirit of conciliation, as for example 
RQEXGJHWUHIRUPLQJ´Director of EDAP).  
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So, if at the beginning, partnership is a totally strange way of working, the 
SDUWQHUVJUDGXDOO\XQGHUVWDQGWKHUXOHVRIWKH³JDPH´DQd they feel more 
FRQILGHQWZLWK³SOD\LQJ´LW³(48$/,ZDVDWHVWRISURMHFWPHWKRGRORJ\IRU
us; in EQUAL II, the cooperation RIWKHSDUWQHUVZDVVPRRWKHU´'irector of 
KOINOPOLITIA). Partners learn to listen, to negotiate, to plan and to become 
seriously committed to the obligations towards other partners. They get more 
persistent and consensual on the one hand, and more professional and daring 
RQWKHRWKHUKDQG³,QWKHEHJLQQLQJDOOWKHQHZDFWRUVWKHPD\RUWKHVWDII
and the beneficiaries are reluctant but in a next project, they become more 
FRXUDJHRXVDQGGHPDQGLQJ´(LEADER+ coordinator).  
 
In particular, if I look more systematically at the geographical origin of the 
SHRSOH¶VGHPDQGVIRULQYHVWPHQWLQ/($'(5DERXWRILQYHVWPHQW¶
applications came from municipalities who participated in LEADER II 
(northern part of Heraklion) and only 16% from new municipalities (southern 
part of Heraklion) (Mid-term evaluation report of LEADER+ for the 
countryside of Heraklion, 2005).  Therefore, it is assumed that there is a 
UHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQWKHEHQHILFLDULHV¶PRWLYDWLRQWRSDUWLFLSDWHWR/($'(5
and prior experience in the areas of LEADER II. In areas that local people have 
already experienced LEADER bottom up approach and they know what this 
programme is about, they trust it.  
 
As far as programme management is concerned, the development of qualified 
staff in DAH by its participation in previous programmes is related to the CIs 
preparation and submission to the state in a timely and accurately way as well 
as to their efficient implementation. In particular, in LEADER +, the activation 
of the LAG took place in time. Since the announcement of EU LEADER + 
until the call of interest  by the Greek MA, the LAG information office, already 
established in LEADER II, had started a series of information campaigns to 
local people and completed the project design (Mid-term evaluation report of 
LEADER+ for the countryside of Heraklion, 2005). In EQUAL II too, previous 
experience in EQUAL I helped the DAH to design the whole programme 
timely, along with its activities and to estimate realistically the cost of the 
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SURJUDPPH¶VDFWLYLWLHVFirst evaluation report of (48$/,,³,QFXEDWRUIRUWKH
Development of Social Economy in Crete, 2006).  
 
Previous experience in partnerships is a significant resource for efficient 
project management at the central level too. All the interviewees from both CIs 
and MAs underlined the benefits from the cumulative experience acquired 
from LEADER I and II as well as from EQUAL I. The ex-general secretary of 
LEADER+ MA describing the problems of LEADER organisation at state 
level PHQWLRQHGWKDW³WKHUHZHUHQRWVRPDQ\SUREOHPVLQ/($'(5
(YHU\RQHIURPWKH/'$VWRWKH0$V¶H[HFXWLYHVKDVOHDUQHGKRZWRGRWKHLU
MRE´ZKLOHWKHH[-general secretary of EQUAL II MA commented that ³WKH 
accumulative experience from collaborative projects such as ADAPT and 
EMPLOYMENT helped us to organise the MA well, to implement EQUAL 
following a JRRGPDQDJHPHQWV\VWHP´ 
                 
2.2.2.2 Political stability and strong political leadership  
In the Heraklion prefecture, there is a tradition of strong visionary mayors. The 
dLUHFWRURIWKH'$+VWDWHGZLWKUHOLHIWKDW³$WOHDVWLQ&UHWHDQGHVSHFLDOO\LQ
the prefecture of Heraklion, ma\RUV¶ZRUNDGKHUHVWRTXDOLW\VWDQGDUGVDQG
they have all together understood the way to confront and solve the problems 
of local society. This is very important. They are open- PLQGHG´ 
 
It is no coincidence, that most of the mayors in Heraklion prefecture have more 
than two consecutive tenures. The successive electoral victories of the same 
mayor could be related to efficient and visionary personality who knows well 
the problems of the community and they struggle for their development. The 
following table (11GHPRQVWUDWHVWKHIUHTXHQF\RIPD\RUV¶WHQXUHVDQGHDFK
RQHV¶SDUW\DIILOLDWLRQLQHYHU\ORFDODXWKRULW\RIWKHSUHIHFWXUHGXULQJWKHODVW
electoral periods, starting from 1990 until 2006. As shown in the table, mayors 
do not change frequently; the same mayors have been elected again and again 
in the same communities. In fourteen municipalities from the twenty-six of the 
prefecture, mayors have been elected up to three times consecutively; in the 
case of Arkalochori, Gorgolainis, and N. Kazantzaki the mayors have not 
changed at all. Indeed, some of the mayors with a lot of continuous tenures 
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constitute the main informal network of decision-making inside DAH such as 
the Mayors of Arkalochori, N. Kazantzaki, Archanon and Episkopis, 
(discussed in more detail in chapter 6).  
 
Impressive is also their homogeneity in their party affiliation. With few 
exceptions, all mayors belong to the socialist party PASOK, one of the two 
biggest political parties in Greece. As already discussed, political parties are 
strong in local politics and there are rivalries among them that could block 
ORFDOSROLFLHV)RUWXQDWHO\IRUWKHSDUWQHUVKLSVRIP\FDVHVWXG\WKHPD\RUV¶
same political affiliation had ensured a lesser influence of political parties 
although internal micro conflicts in the same political party do exist at the local 
level and had been reproduced through the existing networks within both 
partnerships (discussed in more detail in chapter 6). Moreover, the almost 
identical political affiliation of the mayors created and still creates a unified 
front to the state for meeting their demands despite having caused collateral 
practices of clientelism and corruption.   
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Electoral Period  
1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 
a/a 
 L.A/ mayor (X1-
X5) per electoral 
period and 
political 
affiliation  
X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 
1. AGIA VARVARA 
X1 
PASOK 
X1 
PASOK 
X3 
INDEPENDENT  
X3 
INDEPENDENT 
X5 
PASOK 
2. ARKALOCHORI X1 PASOK 
X1 
PASOK 
X1 
PASOK 
X1 
PASOK 
X1 
PASOK 
3. ARCHANON X1 PASOK 
X1 
PASOK 
X1 
PASOK 
X1 
PASOK 
X4 
PASOK 
4.  ASTEROUSION X1  PASOK 
X2  
PASOK 
X3  
PASOK 
X4  
PASOK 
X5 
PASOK 
5.  VIANNOU X1 PASOK 
X1 
PASOK 
X1 
PASOK 
X4 
PASOK 
X5 
COLLECTIVE  
6.  GAZIOU X1 PASOK 
X1 
PASOK 
X3 
PASOK 
X3 
PASOK 
X3 
PASOK 
7.  GORGOLAINIS X1 COLLECTIVE 
X1 
COLLECTIVE 
X1 
COLLECTIVE 
X1 
COLLECTIVE 
X1 
COLLECTIVE 
8.  GORTINAS X1  PASOK 
X1  
PASOK 
X3  
PASOK 
X4  
PASOK 
X4  
PASOK 
9.  GOUVON X1  PASOK 
X1  
PASOK 
X3  
PASOK 
X3  
PASOK 
X5  
PASOK 
10.  EPISKOPIS X1 LEFT 
X1 
LEFT 
X1 
LEFT 
X1 
LEFT 
X1 
LEFT 
11.  ZAROU X1  PASOK 
X1  
PASOK 
X1  
PASOK 
X1  
PASOK 
X1  
PASOK 
12.  HRAKLEION X1  PASOK 
X1  
PASOK 
X3  
PASOK 
X3  
PASOK 
X5  
PASOK 
13.  THRAPSANOS X1 PASOK 
X1 
PASOK 
X1 
PASOK 
X4 
PASOK 
X4 
PASOK 
14.  KASTELI X1  PASOK 
X1  
PASOK 
X3  
PASOK 
X4  
PASOK 
X4  
PASOK 
15.  KOFINAS X1 INDEPENDENT  
X1 
INDEPENDENT  
X1 
INDEPENDENT  
X4 
PASOK 
X1 
INDEPENDENT  
16.  KROUSONAS X1 PASOK 
X1 
PASOK 
X3 
PASOK 
X4 
PASOK 
X5 
PASOK 
17.  MALLION X1 PASOK 
X2 
PASOK 
X3 
PASOK 
X4 
COLLECTIVE  
X5  
PASOK 
18.  MIRON X1 PASOK 
X1 
PASOK 
X3 
COLLECTIVE 
X4 
COLLECTIVE 
X3 
COLLECTIVE 
19.  NEA ALIKARNASO 
X1 
PASOK 
X1 
PASOK 
X3 
PASOK 
X4 
PASOK 
X4 
PASOK 
20.  N.  KAZANTZAKI 
X1  
PASOK 
X1  
PASOK 
X1  
PASOK 
X1  
PASOK 
X1  
PASOK 
21.  ROUVA X1  PASOK 
X1  
PASOK 
X3  
PASOK 
X3  
PASOK 
X3  
PASOK 
22.  TEMENOUS X1  PASOK 
X1  
PASOK 
X1  
PASOK 
X1  
PASOK 
X5  
PASOK 
23.  TETRAXORIOU X1  PASOK 
X1  
PASOK 
X3  
PASOK 
X4  
PASOK 
X4  
PASOK 
24.  TILISOU X1  PASOK 
X1  
PASOK 
X3  
PASOK 
X1  
PASOK 
X1  
PASOK 
25.  TIMPAKIOU X1  PASOK 
X1  
PASOK 
X1  
PASOK 
X4 
ȃ; 
X5  
PASOK 
26.  XERSONISOS X1  PASOK 
X1  
PASOK 
X1  
PASOK 
X4  
PASOK 
X4  
PASOK 
Table 11: Mayors and party affiliation in the five (5) last electoral periods of the 
PXQLFLSDOLWLHVRI+HUDNOLRQSUHIHFWXUHDXWKRUV¶HODERUDWLRQ   
 
164 
 
During my visits to the research field, the interviewees have very often 
mentioned two mayors to whom they attributed a very dynamic political profile 
and appeared to respect: Stavros Arnaoutakis and Nikos Kalochristianakis. 
Both of them, the last and the current Mayors of Archanes, played a significant 
role for the development of many policies. They had also created and 
supported an environment of innovation for municipal councillors and 
executives to take initiatives for local development. Describing the activism of 
that period, the ex-SUHVLGHQWRI.2,1232/,7,$XQGHUOLQHGWKDW³HYHU\RQH
LQWHUHVWHGZDVREOLJHGWRIROORZWKDWVWUHDPRIWKRXJKWDQGDFWLRQ´ 
 
Stavros Arnaoutakis, Mayor of Archanes and president of the DAH from 1990 
until 2004, has established the DAH and has been characterised as a visionary 
PDQZKRPDQDJHGWRRYHUFRPHWKHORFDOLVWV¶DWWLWXGHVRIPD\RUVdiscussed in 
more detail below) by establishing values of trust and credibility in his 
relations with other mayors. It is for that reason that in his last tenure, the 
foXUWKRQHKHJRWRIYRWHV³The DAH had an Arnaoutaki who was 
clever, of a higher calibre as compared to the level of the Greek province (EU 
officer´*RLQJHYHQIXUWKHUEDFNLQWKHVWZRPD\RUVRI&UHWHKDYH
been mentioned as veterans of local government not only for Crete but for the 
whole of Greece: George Klados, Mayor of Anogia and Nikos Petrakis, Mayor 
of Sitia. Both had undertaken initiatives very innovative for the local 
authorities at that time. They had supported entrepreneurialism in local 
authorities, inter-municipal cooperation with the development of LDAs and 
sustainable local development policies.   
 
The 30-\HDUKLVWRU\RIVXFFHVVLRQRI³LPSRUWDQW´PD\RUVKDVFRQVROLGDWHGD
political environment that presuSSRVHVIXWXUHPD\RUVRI³TXDOLW\´LQWHUPVRI
political management and entrepreneurialism. Furthermore, the importance 
given by all these mayors in inter municipal cooperation had fostered a culture 
of collaboration vis-a-vis attitudes of localism creating informal networks of 
cooperation like the network of ³old mayors´ in the DAH (discussed in more 
detail in chapter 6)    
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The obligatory merge of small communities into bigger geographical and 
administrative local authorities under the programme Kapodistrias 
(L.2539/1997) has also positively influenced the development of partnerships 
DQGIDFLOLWDWHGPD\RUV¶DFWLYLWLHV7KLVLQVWLWXWLRQDOFKDQJHDWWKHDGPLQLVWUDWLYH
level has created fewer but bigger local government units, which after the first 
shock of unLILFDWLRQFRRSHUDWLRQUHFRUGHGLQORFDODXWKRULWLHVDVD³JRRG´
thing. Additionally, since there were numerically fewer local authorities than 
previously, cooperation among lesser local authorities appeared to be easier in 
terms of political agreements among mayors. 
 
 2.2.2.3 Level of social capital    
As already mentioned above, Greece is characterised by a weak civil society 
with low level of social capital endowments and an individualist political 
culture. However, in the region of Crete, it seems that the social capital is more 
developed, which explains in its turn, the smoother development of 
cooperation. In their study for the level of social capital in each Greek region, 
Jones et al FRQFOXGHGWKDW³WKHDYHUDJHVRFLDOFDSLWDOVFRUHRIWKH
rHJLRQRI&UHWHGLIIHUVLQDVWDWLVWLFDOO\VLJQLILFDQWZD\´IURPWKHDYHUDJHVRFLDO
capital scores of all other regions.  
 
Furthermore, there are some variations of the level of social capital at 
prefectural level with Heraklion prefecture supporting higher levels of trust and 
cooperative culture than the other 3 prefectures of Crete. For instance, in 
EQUAL II, the establishment of cooperatives in the prefecture of Rethymno 
HQFRXQWHUHGPXFKPRUHSUREOHPVUHODWLQJWREHQHILFLDULHV¶EHKDYLRXUDQGWKHLU
difficulty to be mobilised at a professional level than in the prefecture of 
Heraklion. By contrast, the mobilisation of women in the prefecture of 
Heraklion was achieved more smoothly and the problems of their business 
organisation have been solved more easily (in the interview with the EQUAL II 
coordinator). Indeed, from the existing 29 women cooperatives in all Crete, 16 
are operating in the prefecture of Heraklion while the remaining 13 are 
dispersed in the rest of the three regions (Lasithi (3), Chania (5), Rethymno (5) 
(Statistics for social enterprises in Crete, 2005). 
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Nevertheless, this argument must be supported with caution not only due to the 
IDFWWKDW³PHDVXULQJVRFLDOFDSLWDOLs a notoriously difficult exercise´ (Lyberaki 
and Paraskevopoulos, 2002: 2), but also to the problem of data availability both 
contemporarily and across time. Unfortunately, there are only two studies that 
offer some data for the Cretan social capital, of which only one is specialised in 
the Heraklion prefecture18. Additional to these, the 23 questionnaires 
GLVWULEXWHGWRERWKSDUWQHUVKLSV¶SDUWQHUVDQGVRPHRIDFFRXQWVSURYLGHGE\
the interviewees complement the following analysis of the social capital in 
Heraklion. In particular, the analysis comprises social capital features of Crete 
and especially of the Heraklion prefecture that differ to a certain extent from 
those at national level. These features are trust, belonging and collaborative 
culture.    
  
 Trust   
As already has been discussed, trust is not an established value at the national 
level and every time people have to prove that they can be trusted by others as 
well as to be convinced that they can trust others. Revisiting the partnerships 
under consideration, partners and beneficiaries spend energy in developing 
relations of trust not only with each other but also towards the partnership 
institution itself.  
 
However, the starting point of trust building is not as low as in other areas of 
Greece. Based on the questionnaire data and the conclusions of the two 
aforementioned studies, I argue that trust is higher between individuals at the 
same horizontal level and average between individuals and institutions (see 
chapter 1, section 3.4.2). According to the study by Jones et al (2008), the level 
of trust between citizens in the Cretan region reaches the highest score (3, 85 at 
a 10 per cent significance level) of all the Greek regions (civic culture) while 
the trust of citizens towards institutions (generalised trust) had almost the same 
score as in all the other regions (5, 26 at a 10 per cent significance level).    
 
                                                 
18The study of Regional Social Capital in Europe (2005) focuses exclusively in the prefecture 
of Heraklion while the study by Jones N. et al (2008) focuses on variations in Greek regions.   
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In relation to the administered questionnaire, the analysis of responses about 
trust among individuals confirmed that trust is relatively sufficient (57% 
responded that the level of trust is relative) and it gets higher when people 
belong to the same social and professional group19. Furthermore, regarding the 
question about trust towards formal institutions, 48% declared high trust while 
43% relative. Despite the limited data, there is evidence that the Heraklion 
prefecture seems to enjoy higher level of civic trust than the average of Greece 
(and Crete) as a whole.     
 
Belonging                       
For Greek people, family plays a significant role in their life. According to the 
World Survey of 1999 (Values Surveys Databank, 1999-2004), the importance 
of family in Greece is obvious by the fact that 82, 3 % participants when asked 
about family importance replied that they regard it very important; 15,3% 
stated that it is rather important (Values Surveys Databank, 1999-2004). The 
Greek tradition on extended strong familial ties is apparent in Crete too. This 
feature is more intense in rural areas where the crisis of nuclear families (see 
for example single parent families and divorce rates) in urban areas has not 
impacted in the same degree on these small communities where more 
traditional styles of living do exist.  
 
Additionally, there is one more aspect of belonging in the Cretan communities 
WKDWRIVWURQJORFDOLVPGHULYHGIURPWKHFRPPXQLWLHV¶VPDOOVL]HDQGWKH
UHJLRQ¶VKLVWRU\,WLVWKHSRZHURIWKLVVWURQJORFDOLVPWKDWJXLGHGWKHGLUHFWRU
of the DAH to affirm that ³ZKDW ZHGRLWLVRQRXURZQKHUH´,QSDUWLFXODUWKH
habitants of the island define themselves as Cretan in relation to the rest of the 
Greek people; they believe they are different from them and they also are 
proud to have been born in Crete. Additionally, Cretan people are considered to 
be different and particular by the rest of the Greek people.  On the one hand, 
there are some specific positive character traits attributed to Cretans like 
braveness, dignity, and honour, gatekeepers of tradition, creativity and 
                                                 
19
 In particular, in the question regarding the level of reciprocity within the same social and 
professional groups, 83% responded that they help others if necessary 
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hospitality. On the other hand, there are stereotypes of violent character, 
egoism, revolutionary and touchiness (Astrinaki, 2002).  
 
Individuals define themselves by the village where they were born. Each 
YLOODJH³OHJDWHV´DSDUWLFXODUKLVWRU\DQGVRPHEHKDYLRXUDOFKDUDFWHULVWLFVWRLWV
inhabitants and it is the base for the formation of a social and cultural coiling 
WRZDUGVWKHH[WHUQDOZRUOG³,QWKHYLOODJHWKHVROLGDULW\LVEDVHGRQWKH
interpersonal relations and the common cultural similarities. They care about 
each other, as if they are members of their famil\´([-president of 
KOINOPOLITIA). Therefore, the identity of origin is a reference point for a 
Cretan. Even if an individual moves to another place, he/she keeps the relation 
with the place of origin practically but also socially and ideologically. For 
example, people from Sfakia, a mountainous village in the north of the 
+HUDNOLRQSUHIHFWXUHUHJDUGOHVVRIZKHUHWKH\JRWKH\³UHPDLQIHHOFDOO
themselves 6IDNLDQRLDQGWKH\ZLOOEHKDYHOLNH6IDNLDQRL´$VWULQDNL
36). I will never forget how proud the Mayor of Gorgolainos was of his village; 
indeed, a very beautiful village with plenty of vineyards. During our interview, 
he spent ten minutes describinJWKHYLOODJH¶VQDWXUDOEHDXW\DQGKLVWRULFDO
KHULWDJHHQGLQJE\VD\LQJ³,Dm very proud to be the mD\RURIVXFKDYLOODJH´ 
 
The strong ties of family and place of origin create a common identity and 
diffuse an attitude of solidarity in its members against those living outside the 
island. It is like extending the Banfield assumption about the role of the family 
³DQ\RQHZKRVWDQGVRXWVLGHWKHVPDOOFLUFOHRIWKHIDPLO\DUHDWOHDVWSRWHQWLDO
FRPSHWLWRUV¶¶ZLWKRQHPRUHIHDWXUHWKDWRIWKH village. In a 
partnership, this solidarity could be translated as a facilitating factor for 
FRRSHUDWLRQLQWKHSDUWQHUV¶HYHU\GD\FRPPXQLFDWLRQDQGDVDXQLI\LQJSRZHU
of creativity for further partnership development. As commented by the 
president of KrousanioWLVVDZRPHQ¶VFRRSHUDWLYH³)RUWXQDWHO\ORFDOVRFLHWLHV
DUHVPDOODQGHYHU\RQHPDNHVFRQFHVVLRQVDQGFRPSURPLVHV´ 
 
Nevertheless, there are not only advantages attributed to belonging in a place; 
WKHUHDUHSUREOHPVWRR*UDQRYHWWHU¶VDQDO\Vis on the disadvantages of 
strong ties may be more relevant to Crete than any other region. The strong 
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micro- localism of each community creates conditions of conflict with the 
other communities by intervening in the relations of partners and especially in 
PD\RUV¶UHODWLRQVUHJDUGLQJEXGJHWGLVWULEXWLRQ/RFDOLVPLVDIDFWRURI
FRQIOLFW³,Q&UHWHORFDOSDUWQHUVKLSVDUHYHU\GLIILFXOWEHFDXVHWKHUHLVD
ORFDOLVPRIGLIIHUHQWW\SHV´([-president of KOINOPOLITIA). These types 
are related to different geographical levels of belonging; i.e. the place of origin, 
the prefecture where the village of origin belongs to and Crete as a whole.  
 
For example, one partner referring to inter-prefectural competitiveness 
DIILUPHGWKDW³7KHUHDUHVWURQJJHRJUDSKLFDOGLVDJUHements and competitions 
EHWZHHQHDVWDQGZHVW&UHWHZLWKUHJDUGVWRWKHELGGLQJIRUVWDWHVXEVLGLHV´
(Executive of the LDA Sitia) while the Mayor of Arkalochori revealed old 
inter-municipal conflicts in the same prefecture between two local 
development ageQFLHVWKDWKDYHPHUJHGLQWRDQHZRQHWKH'$+³,QWKHµV
there were two local development agencies that competed strongly against each 
other´.   
 
With regards to regional identity, withholding of information and 
competitiveness practices by the DAH during the exchange of good practices 
in meetings of the  national thematic network have been mentioned in the 
interviews with the executives of the EQUAL II 0$³7KH\DUHTXLWHLQWURYHUW
people. Their local identity makes them successful because it unifies them. 
+RZHYHUWKLVLQWURYHUVLRQNHHSVWKHPLVRODWHG´ 
 
Culture of cooperation 
Another feature of social capital that is more developed than in other parts of 
*UHHFHLVWKHFXOWXUHRIFRRSHUDWLRQ,Q-RQHV¶et al study (2008), Crete shares 
the third highest score in the growth of formal networks and the fifth place 
regarding the informal networks. Moreover, the existence of extensive formal 
and informal networks of solidarity has often been mentioned in the interviews. 
Looking closer at these networks, they have been initiated by private and/or 
public organisations and they have focused on the provision of social services 
to disadvantaged groups. However, these institutions mainly promote bonding 
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between families with common characteristics while bridging is less developed 
(see chapter 1, section 3.4.2).   
 
Also at the economic level, there are more agricultural cooperatives in the 
Cretan region in relation to the rest of Greece, which shows that habitants are 
more familiar with cooperative practices. While in 1989, 74, 9% of the 
agricultural population of Greece were members of agricultural co-operatives, 
membership was higher in Crete with 84, 6% respectively (Patronis, 1999). 
Especially in the Heraklion prefecture, one interviewee mentioned that it was 
the Heraklion prefecture that firstly developed an extended number of 
FRRSHUDWLYHVDQGODWHURQDOOWKHRWKHU&UHWDQSUHIHFWXUHVIROORZHG³<RXVKRXOG
know that here in Chania, we do not have so many cooperatives as in 
Heraklion because we have a collaborative problem; there is a difference in 
FXOWXUHLQWHUPVRIFRRSHUDWLRQ´([HFXWLYHRILDA OADYK).  
 
The high associational membership in the prefecture of Heraklion is also 
confirmed by a research on the agricultural development of Crete (Alexiou, 
2000), which claims that the higher percentage of agricultural participation in 
cooperatives has been from the prefecture of Heraklion with 89,9% followed 
by the prefecture of Chania with 88%, Rethymno with 82% and Lasithi with 
75%. In the same study, Heraklion presented also the lowest percentage of 
IDUPHUV¶SDVVLYHSDUWLFLSDWLRQLn the cooperatives with only 22,8% of farmers 
doing very little with the activities of the cooperatives while in Chania the 
corresponding percentage is 57,7%, in Rethymno 34% and in Lasithi 45,2% 
respectively. Consequently, the development of social networks and 
agricultural cooperatives could constitute an evidence of stronger social capital 
in the prefecture.  
 
The collective action is stimulated not only at the social and economic level but 
also at the politico-administrative one. There is an inter-municipal cooperation 
called KOINOPOLITIA, which comprises 42 Cretan local authorities for the 
provision of social municipal services. Interestingly, this inter-municipal 
cooperation has been initiated in Archanes where the DAH was also 
established and it was a key member of EQUAL I and II projects. Since this 
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type of inter-municipal cooperation does not exist in other parts of Greece, it 
could also complement my argument about the existence of a stronger social 
capital in the prefecture of Heraklion.         
 
If bonding is very strong in the region of Crete, bridging and linking have 
started to expand only recently, as a result of EU funded projects. It appears 
that the region and particular the prefecture of Heraklion has entered a phase 
whereby networks between organisations from the civil society sector are 
multiplying and cooperation between organisations from different geographical 
levels has started to develop (Regional Social Capital in Europe, 2005).   
 
Networking is expanded to the whole region of Crete reaching the point where 
³WKHUHDUHVRPHRUJDQLVDWLRQVIURPGLIIHUHQWSUHIHFWXUHVDQGZLWKGLIIHUHQW
legal identities that consider themselves permanently as partners at the level of 
Crete (Executive of NELE). However, there is a disadvantage in networking, 
that of strong density. In the case of the Heraklion prefecture, it appeared that 
there is a reproduction of the same institutions and the same individuals in 
local politics. This is a feature of small communities: engaged individuals and 
individuals available for participating are not that many and the active 
RUJDQLVDWLRQVDUHDIHZ³<RXNQRZKRZUHODWLRQVKLSVDUHKHUHHVSHFLDOO\DW
this level, there are few that are active and interesteG´Consultant of the Port 
Authority). Looking at all the cooperative projects realised by the DAH the last 
decade, the same partners participated in the established partnerships over and 
over again as for example ZEUXIS, KOINOPOLITIA, NELE of Heraklion and 
the LDAs.  
 
This has also been illustrated by the answers provided to the administrated 
questionnaire regarding the degree of overlapping of the same actors in the 
networks. Eighty three per cent answered that the same people are involved in 
the networks and only 17% responded that there is a small overlap.   
 
Finally, it appears that local authorities tend to cooperate more easily with 
social organisations and lesser with private firms and vice versa. Answers 
provided to questions regarding the level of cooperation between local 
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authorities with social organisations and local firms, illustrated a difference in 
WKHOHYHORIORFDODXWKRULWLHV¶FRRSHUDWLRQZLWKWKHVHWZRFDWHJRULHV,ILQWKH
case of private firms, 57% characterised the cooperation with local authorities 
low, in the case of social organisations, the cooperation scores higher, with 43, 
48% of the participants characterising the cooperation strong and 39,13% 
moderate. 
 
Summary  
Regarding institutional legacies, (table 12) I identified: a. the development of 
networks and attitudes of cooperation of the involved partners due to their 
participation in previous rounds of the two CIs and other collaborative projects 
b. the political stability and strong political leadership in the Heraklion 
prefecture. The first institutional legacy has IDFLOLWDWHGWKHSURMHFWV¶
management and implementation. Political stability has established a stable 
channel of communication between mayors, which has reduced the 
confrontations within the partnerships and has created a unified power towards 
the state. Additionally, the strong political leadership by overcoming the 
traditional irrational political practices of party clientelism and corruption - to a 
certain extent- has created an environment of trust towards the partnerships and 
has facilitated the smootKLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIWKHSDUWQHUVKLSV¶IRUPDOUXOHV 
 
Institutional 
legacies Features that impact on partnerships 
Prior networking   Collaborative culture, trust, expertise   
Political stability  Stable network of communication, less confrontations, 
unified power towards the state 
Strong political 
leadership  Modernised and visionary practices of policy making  
Table 12: Institutional legacies and their impact on the partnerships of the case study  
 
Regarding the level of social capital (see next table), it is argued that the higher 
levels of generalised and civic trust and networking have enhanced cooperation 
and trust among partners. 
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Level of social capital Features that impact on partnerships 
Higher generalised and civic 
trust  
Collaborative attitudes and trust between 
partners   
High level of bonding: formal 
and informal networking  
Collaborative attitudes and trust between 
partners 
Strong belonging and dense 
networking  
Diverse localist demands, limited openness 
to new partners    
Low level of bridging and 
linking  
Difficulties in cooperation with different 
groups horizontally and vertically   
Table 13: Level of social capital and its impact on the partnerships of the case study 
 
Elements of strong belonging and dense networking have also created 
collaborative problems by the intervention of diverse localism demands and 
limited openness in different ideas and interests. This had successively an 
impact upon the democratic representation of the community and the equally 
distributed stock of social capital among new members.  
 
Conclusions  
In this chapter, I offered an outline of the case study partnerships for which 
more additional material and analysis will be provided in the next chapter 
regarding formal rules.   
 
Moreover, I have analysed some key contextual factors of the local and 
QDWLRQDOFRQWH[WLQRUGHUWRH[SODLQWKHHPSLULFDOHYLGHQFHDERXWUXOHV¶
FRQILJXUDWLRQDQGSDUWQHUV¶EHKDYLRXUZLWKLQSDUWQHUVKLSV discussed in the 
following chapters. My conclusion is that although EQUAL II and LEADER+ 
SDUWQHUVKLSVZHUH³LPSRVHG´E\(8IXQGLQJRSSRUWXQLWLHVDQGWKHLU
UHTXLUHPHQWVZHUH³QHZDQGVWUDQJH´WRSDUWQHUVWKH\PDQDJHGWRFRPPLWWR
the project principles and build a network of collaboration because there were 
specific local contextual factors, differentiated from the national dominant 
values and practices that have facilitated collaborative activity.  
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Chapter 5: Partnership¶IRUPDOUXOHVDUUDQJHPHQWV 
Introduction 
7KHSXUSRVHRIWKLVFKDSWHULVWRLGHQWLI\WKHSDUWQHUVKLSV¶IRUPDOUXOHVDVWKH\
appeared in official documents (joint ministerial decrees, laws, directives, 
regulations and guidelines) and statements of politicians and chief executives at 
the (8QDWLRQDODQGORFDOOHYHO7KHVHUXOHVKDGSUHVFULEHGWKHSDUWQHUVKLSV¶
operation of the case study. As mentioned in the first chapter, neo-institutional 
analysis is not completed, if it is deprived of the classic institutional study of 
formal rules.  
 
I argue that not only had these formal rules initiated partnership as a new way 
of policy-making in the Heraklion prefecture, but they have also additionally 
impacted on the national and local political coordination by supporting new 
policy tools and VHFWRUVRILQWHUYHQWLRQ$VUHSRUWHGLQDQLQWHUYLHZ³Greece 
has had no experience of collective action in policy-making, so they started 
from scratch´(8officer, geographical responsible of LEADER). I further 
argue that although the main player for the SDUWQHUVKLSV¶IRUPDOUXOHV
formulation was the EU, there was also a variability feature (see chapter 1, 
section 2.1) in these rules that enhanced the possibility for national and local 
coordinators to adapt them to the domestic context.  
 
I have selected five (5) formal rules included in CIs principles and guidelines 
as well as in joint ministerial decrees as adapted by the Greek state. These 
formal rules have been selected because they have been directly related with 
the organisation and implementation of collective action. For each rule, I will 
discuss the way that it has been implemented horizontally by the involved 
partners and vertically as the result of the relationship between EU, the Greek 
state and local partnership coordinators. I will also discuss issues of 
institutional change by identifying the impact of these formal rules on local and 
to a lesser extent on national political organisation and policy-making.  
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First rule: Partnership and openness of decision-making  
1.1. The CIs partnership rule and its vertical adaptation  
According to the partnership principle underlying both initiatives, the private 
sector, the non-governmental organisations and the beneficiaries should gain 
access to partnership policy-making processes building up on their interaction 
with government institutions at all levels of public administration in order to 
UHDOLVHWKH&,¶VSROLF\JRDOV 
 
In LEADER +, the partnership principle had to be realised by the establishment 
of LAG. It was a local partnership that had the task to formulate and implement 
the local development strategy plan, make decisions about the allocation of 
financial resources to investors and coordinate the whole programme. 
According to the LEADER+ guideline, LAG should involve public, civil 
society and private actors. The private and association partners should make up 
at least 50% of the local partnership (Commission Notice 139/05, 2005:7).  
According to EQUAL guideline (COM 840, 2003), the partnership principle 
has to be realised through the establishment of DP. The latter should gather 
several public, semi-public or private organisations, which would be in charge 
of planning and implementing the initiative. In both partnerships, the partners 
had to participate in the decision-making process on an equal footing while one 
of the partners was assigned with the administrative and financial co-
ordination; they are the project coordinator. 
 
In Greece, the partnership as policy tool and the principles of bottom-up 
approach and empowerment that followed partnership implementation (see 
chapter 4, section 1) were something very new for the Greek political and 
socio-HFRQRPLFUHDOLW\³Generally, all the projects that we implement now are 
through partnerships. This was not something that suddenly started happening 
in Greece; partnerships have been derived from EU programmes (Coordinator 
of EQUAL II).The novelty of these programmes applied both to local 
authorities and the state. ³In its first implementation, LEADER was a first time 
experience for both the Ministry which was responsible for the whole project 
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management and the involved local authorities´([HFXWLYHRI/($'(5
MA).  
 
PDUWQHUVKLSZDVD&,V¶JHQHUDOUXOHWKDWDOORZHGURRPIRUPDQRHXYUHIRUHDFK
member state in terms of partnership composition and geographical level of 
implementation. Each member state could adapt this rule tȠ their national 
context.  So, the Greek state added new formal rules in its effort to specify the 
general EU rule on partnership. In this context, more attention must be paid to 
two main interventions made by the Greek state; one was the 
institutionalisation of DP by law and the other one was LAG establishment 
under the coordination of LDAs. 
 
In relation the first one, the Greek state decided to institutionalise the DP of 
EQUAL project with the introduction of a law (L. 2956/2001, article 42), 
which expliciWO\GHVFULEHGWKHSDUWQHUVKLS¶VOHJDOLGHQWLW\LWVPHPEHUV¶
organisational type, responsibilities and entitlements, and the DP 
administrative and management procedures. In this way, on one hand, ³we 
found a way to protect the small partners who offer their experience and on the 
other hand, to create a powerful management system that makes partners to be 
committed avoiding withdrawals´([HFXWLYHRIEQUAL II MA).  
 
The institutionalisation of the DP, through a specific legal form, was 
differentiated from DP establishment practices in other member states. In 
Ireland or in UK for instance, the DPs were informal. One possible explanation 
is that in these countries the partnership principle was already an established 
practice of local policy-making. On the contrDU\LQ*UHHFHZKHUH³it was the 
first time that the project enhanced cooperation among agencies who hardly 
had any relation previously´(8 officer, evaluator of EQUAL), the fear of 
resistance by domestic institutions with established norms and practices (see 
next chapter) obliged the Greek state to make this decision. Discussing further 
WKLVLVVXHZLWKWKH(8HYDOXDWRURI(48$/LWZDVUHSRUWHG³In Greece, 
politicians feel more confident and do things in a more secure way when they 
make laws. I think that in the case of EQUAL, this was good because it secured 
the sustainability of this effort´&RQVHTXHQWO\WKH*UHHNVWDWHWULHGWRSURWHFW
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the sustainability of the partnership from potential breaking off due to its 
innovative character for the Greek policy-making20.   
 
If in the EQUAL II case, the state showed a commitment to substantial 
partnership development, in the LEADER+ case, it was more unwilling to 
change the established old way of LEADER implementation. In particular, in 
LEADER I and II, the LDAs played the role of LAGs managing the whole 
SURMHFW7KLVZDVSRVVLEOHEHFDXVH/($'(5¶VUHTXLUHPHQWUHJDUGLQJWKHUDWLR
of involved public and private shareholders at that time was a minimum of 
70% public agencies and 30% private agencies which corresponded well to the 
shared capital of LDAs. However, in LEADER +, the EC changed the ratio of 
public and private agencies with a minimum of 50% private and 50% public 
DJHQFLHV7KH/'$¶VVKDUHKROGHUVFRPSRVLWLRQFRXOGQRORQJHUUHVSRQGWR
this ration since the /'$¶VVKDUHGFDSLWDOZDVDQGVWLOOLVPDLQO\SXEOLFLH
local authorities. For managing this new situation in order  to keep the LDAs as 
WKHPDLQSURYLGHUVRI/($'(5WKH*UHHNVWDWHIRXQGDQ³DFUREDWLF´
solution: the LDA with its shareholders do not formally appear on the LAG 
board but they control it´National external evaluator of LEADER+). The 
LDA still identified as LAG continued to develop and implement a local 
LEADER + project in its area of intervention.  
 
The management of all issues relating to programme planning and 
implementation was realised by a body set up under the LAG as a special 
Management Committee of LEADER + (MC), which composition met the 
50% public -50% private ratio. The MC was also called "decision-making level 
RI/$*´&RPPRQMinisterial Decision, 518/350/12-02-2002). The LAG 
board transferred responsibility for managing and implementing the local 
                                                 
20
   Interestingly, the institutionalisation of the DP was recognised as best practice by EC 
examining the DP as a policy model (EQUAL Guide for Development Partnerships, 2005). 
However, this practice was negatively evaluated by the program coordinator due to the lack of 
flexibility for the involvement of different partners and beneficiaries in different levels of 
SURJUDPGHYHORSPHQW³They restricted the partnership and they made it difficult to function 
>@LWLVD³WUDSSHGSURJUDPPH´ZLWKUXOHVWKDWWKH0LQLVWU\VHWV´(Equal II coordinator). This 
argument is in accordance with the EU evaluation report of EQUAL 2000-2006 (2006:203),   
ZKLFKPHQWLRQHGWKDW³the EQUAL experience of partnership has also demonstrated the 
relevance of planning and combining different levels of involvement for different partners over 
time, rather than requiring continuous commitment´ 
178 
 
programme to this body. In the legal documentation, the relationship of these 
two bodies was not specifically defined. LAG and MC were not clearly 
distinguished in terms of their role in the design of the Local Action Plan, 
which was the most strategic part of the programme. As I argue more 
analytically in the next chapter, it seems that the fear of the state to trust the 
private sector with such a big budget for local development led to the 
LQVWLWXWLRQDOLVDWLRQRID³IDOVH´DQG³SHFXOLDU´FRRSHUDWLRQZKHUHWKHSXEOLF
sector remained the key actor.   
 
Apart from the European and national formal rules, there were also those at 
local level. These rules were not new and different from the existing European 
and national ones, but they were supported explicitly by the programme 
coordinators in order to limit LQIRUPDOUXOHV¶SRZHUDQGWKHrealisation of 
DJHQWV¶ specific goals (see next chapter). These are: 1. transparency and 
publicity, 2. unchangeable rules and 3. clear distinction of roles. 
 
In relation to the first one, the establishment and utilisation of transparent 
criteria in the selection of funded projects and in the decision-making processes 
were a permanent concern for programmes coordinators in the fear of losing 
FUHGLELOLW\DQGWUXVWIXOQHVVWRSDUWQHUV³For us, it was important to have 
transparency in all actions we took and for that reason, we created an additional 
LQWHUQDOUHJXODWLRQIRUWKHSURJUDPPHLPSOHPHQWDWLRQ´ (EQUAL II 
coordinator). Particularly in the LEADER+ case, more emphasis was given to 
the formulation of clear selection criteria for investments under funding. These 
criteria have also been published in information booklets and on the DAH 
ZHEVLWH³$OOSDUWQHUVDQGLQYHVWRUVKDYHWKHERRNOHWZLWKWKHFULWHULDthat have 
been approved by the board [...]. The criteria are as objective as SRVVLEOH´
(LEADER+ coordinator).  
 
Moreover, in both CIs, publicity was an important issue by providing 
information and availability of data to the public for all partnership processes. 
³(YHU\RQHwhether they got a lot or little funding continues to support the 
SDUWQHUVKLS¶VGHFLVLRQVEHFDXVHWKH\XQGHUVWDQGWKDWHYHU\RQHLVLQYROYHGLQDOO
179 
 
the processes openly; the publicity of the programmes has been available to all, 
every citizen was aware of everything´0XQLFLSDOFRXQFLOORURI$UFKDQHV 
 
The principle of transparency was combined with the principle of 
XQFKDQJHDEOHUXOHV³We inform them from the beginning that the criteria are 
not just typical, each criterion has its direct implications on selecting 
LQYHVWPHQWV´LEADER+ coordinator). Since the criteria had been established 
and decisions were made about investments, no further changes could be done 
even if there were pressures exercised by political parties affiliations, 
LQWHUSHUVRQDOUHODWLRQVRUODUJHUIDPLO\WLHV³If we (DAH) backed down and we 
did a favour to a mayor or we integrated him to a programme informally, there 
would have been consequences; they would accuse us of getting black money 
[...] WKHDJHQF\¶VSROLF\LVQRWWRJLYHLQWRVXFKSUHVVXUHV´ (LEADER+  
coordinator).  
 
)LQDOO\WKHIRUPDWLRQRIFOHDUUXOHVUHJDUGLQJSDUWQHUV¶UROHDQGSDUWQHUVKLS
operation was one of the project coordinators and the DAH political 
PDQDJHPHQWSULRULWLHV³The issue is to clearly know the meanings and rules of 
the game and this has been the case for the '$+´(Mayor of Arkalochori); 
³WKHUHDUHFOHDUREMHFWLYHVDQGDJUHHGSULQFLSOHV´ (Municipal Councillor of 
Archanes). Many partners also confirmed the relationship between clarity of 
WKHSDUWQHUV¶UROHDQGWKHSDUWQHUVKLS¶VVPRRWKRSHUDWLRQ³We all have good 
relations because every partner has a distinct role; the DAH has been clear on 
WKLV´ (Executive of LDA AKOM).  
 
1.2 EQUAL II and LEADER+ partnership principles at the horizontal level 
1.2.1 Decision making, management structure and partQHUV¶GHVFULSWLRQ 
In LEADER+, DAH as all other LDAs that could not respond to the EC 
prerequisite for a representation of 50% by private interests and 50% by public 
interests in LAG, has also established a MC. The MC composition was 
designed to ensure representation at 50% by socio-economic actors. So, finally, 
both DAH and MC were involved in the programme decision-making and 
management. 
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The involved bodies in the LEADER+ partnership regarding decision-making 
are presented in the following figure (11).  
   
 
 
 
                                                                                                   
 
  
                
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: The LEADER+ partnership structure of decision-making   
 
As shown in the figure and discussed above, it is the DAH that made all the 
decisions while the MC kept a more formal role by approving those decisions. 
7HFKQLFDODQGDGPLQLVWUDWLYHVWDIIVXFKDVWKH³&RPPLWWHHIRULQYHVWRUV¶
VHOHFWLRQ´VXSSRUWHGERWKERGLes. In the next part of this section, I provide a 
short description for each partner in terms of their legal status, membership and 
field of activity. I start with DAH for which only I give a detailed description 
of how it has been administrated because it was one of the key actors and the 
project coordinator of both partnerships.  
 
The Local Development Agency of Heraklion (DAH) is as all the LDAs, a 
limited liability company that aims to develop the prefecture of Heraklion. It 
supports the development policies of local authorities, it makes use of available 
national and European funds and it implements programmes for the 
development of the broader area. The company employs 56 people and it is 
organised in 5 departments, each one specialised in a policy such as tourism, 
Public sector 
(Local Authorities 
and the Local Union 
of L.As.)  
Private sector 
(Cooperatives and 
Industrial Park) 
Management Committee 
(MC) 
Administration Board of 
DAH 
Management 
Team 
Decision -
making 
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rural development and social cohesion. It was established in 198921 by the 
Municipality of Archanes and three small neighbourhood communities22 and it 
gradually expanded including all the municipalities in the Heraklion prefecture 
as well as cooperatives and banks. In particular, all the 24 local authorities of 
the Heraklion prefecture23 and the Local Union of Local Affairs hold the 80% 
of the shareholders.  Twenty per cent of shareholders belong to 8 cooperatives, 
which are mainly agricultural cooperatives with the exception of the 
Cooperative Bank of Crete and the Traders and Craftsmen Association of 
Arkalochori.  
 
As we see in the following figure (12) which demonstrates the decision- 
making structure of the DAH, the shareholders have an annual general meeting 
and they decide on main policy directions. The translation of these directions to 
concrete policy actions and the everyday administration of the DAH is realised 
by the administration board, which comprises eleven members. These members 
are elected by the shareholders for a mandate of four years. The administration 
board comprises of 8 mayors -2 of them are the president and the vice president 
of the board- 2 municipal councillors and 1 representative from an agricultural 
cooperative.  
  
                                                 
21
 It is no coincidence that the year of DAH establishment is the year that partnership became a 
requirement for all EU programmes. One main reason for the development of DAH as well as 
for the most of LDAs was the management of CSF programs.   
22
 These communities are Kato Archanes, Vassilies, and Skalani. Since the implementation of 
the Kapodistrias programme which provides for the compulsory amalgamation of 
communities, these have been joined with the municipality of Archanes.  
23
 After the recent amalgamation of L.As in 2010, the number of L.As in the Heraklion 
prefecture has been decreased. However, the data provided here concern the period that both 
partnerships had operated.   
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Figure 12: The DAH decision-making structure  
 
It was the DAH administration board, which after consultation with the 
shareholders, had decided the composition of the MC.   
 
The Management Committee (MC) is now composed by the Local Union of 
Local Authorities representing all the municipalities of the Heraklion 
SUHIHFWXUHDJULFXOWXUDOFRRSHUDWLYHV³3(=$´DQG³.DWR$VLWHV´WKH
Industrial Park of Arkalochori, and the municipalities of N. Kazantzakis and 
Archanes. In the following table, the organisational type of partners and their 
names are presented.  
  
Annual Shareholders General Meeting 
24 local authorities of 
Heraklion Prefecture 
8 
cooperatives 
Local Union 
of Local 
Authorities 
Administration Board  
2 municipal 
councilors 
8 mayors 1 agricultural 
cooperative 
President 
Vice President 
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Type of Partner  
     Name of Partner   
Network of L.A   
 
Local Union of Local Authorities of the 
Heraklion prefecture  
Local Authority  Municipality of N. Kazantzakis 
Municipality of Archanes  
 
Cooperatives Agricultural cooperative of PEZA 
Agricultural cooperative  of Kato Asites  
 
Private Company   Industrial Park of Arkalochori 
Table 14: Type and name of the MC partners 
 
The Local Union of the Heraklion local authorities is a union of all the 
municipalities in the Heraklion prefecture for the coordination and facilitation 
of their (political) activities. It is an organisation with administrative and 
scientific staff for providing continuous information and technical support to 
local authorities as well as of proposing and assisting the central state with 
issues regarding local policies.  
 
The agricultural cooperative of PEZA is located in the municipality of N. 
Kazantzakis in Heraklion and it produces wine and olive oil. It is an old 
FRRSHUDWLYHZKLFKKDVEHHQHVWDEOLVKHGLQ)DUPHUV¶SDUWLFLSDWLRQLVYHU\
high with the shareholder farmers amounting to 45 and the activity being 
profitable. It is administered by a five-member committee elected by the 
general assembly of the participating farmers. The agricultural cooperative of 
Kato Asiton is located in the municipality of Kato Asites and its activity is 
considerably smaller. Finally, the industrial park of Arkalochori is a relatively 
new institution that started its operation in 2005. This is a limited liability 
company, but its management comprises public and private agencies such as 
the municipality of Arkalochori and the Arkalochori Association of Traders 
and Craftsmen. 
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In relation to the decision-making and management structure of the EQUAL II 
partnership, which is demonstrated in the following figure (figure 13), there 
were three bodies: the Management Board, the Coordinator and the 
Administrator. The coordinator was the partner responsible for the day to day 
running of the project and supporting the board with technical and 
administrative reports for facilitating its decision-making. They were the link 
person with the relevant ministry and responsible for responding to all the 
bureaucratic prerequisites derived from the Greek state and EU. The 
DGPLQLVWUDWRUZDVUHVSRQVLEOHIRUWKHSDUWQHUVKLS¶VILQDQFLDOPDQDJHPHQWDQG
they were accountable to the relevant ministry.  
 
The management board was made up of one representative from each partner 
and it had three important functions in partnership operation: the approval of 
WKHSDUWQHUVKLS¶VPDLQJRDOVWKHLULPSOHPHQWDWLRQand auditing. Since the main 
discussions for the finalisation of the policy activities and budget distribution 
had already been made in the stage of partnership initiation (see next chapter, 
section 1.1) WKHJRDOV¶DSSURYDOZDVPRUHRUOHVVDIRUPDOSURFHGXUH
GHPRQVWUDWLQJWKHSDUWQHUV¶GHILQLWLYHHQJDJHPHQWLQWKHSDUWQHUVKLS 
 
The most significant competency of the board was to provide decision-making 
IRUDFWLRQV¶LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ7KHVHGHFLVLRQVUHJDUGHGDQXPEHURILVVXHVD
money redistribution so that in case a partner could not manage to complete 
their activity, another one could take over; b. the type of target groups that 
would be selected for the implementation of partnership goals; c. the range of 
SDUWQHUV¶LQWHUYHQWLRQLQWKHLPSOHPHQWHGDFWLRQVDQGILQDOO\GWKHZD\VRI
SDUWQHUV¶FRRSHUDWLRQIRUDFKLHYLQJDFRQFUHWHSDUWQHUVKLSSROLF\$PRQJ the 
competencies of the management board was to elect the president of the board 
and the administrator. 
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Figure 13: The EQUAL II partnership structure of management and decision-making  
 
Commenting on the membership of the EQUAL II partnership board, I will 
briefly describe each partner as already done in LEADER+. At the beginning 
14 partners participated and they later decreased to 13 because one partner, a 
municipal enterprise could not cope with the implementation of the action 
taken due to the lack of specialised staff. As it is demonstrated in the following 
table (15) presenting the organisational type and name of each partner, there 
were five LDAs, three prefectural agencies, two networks specialised in social 
policy, one research body, one vocational training centre and one public 
organisation.   
  
Semi-public 
bodies (Local 
Development 
Agencies, Port 
Authority, 
Network of local 
 
Public bodies 
(Prefectures) 
Voluntary 
sector 
(Network of 
voluntary 
organisations) 
Private sector 
(Training and 
research 
centers) 
EQUAL Partnership Board: 
Decision- making body  
Coordinator: 
Administrative 
management  
Administrator: Financial 
management   
Technical Staff 
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  Type of partner  
        Name of partner   
Networks of L.A &  
NGOs of Crete  
Agency of Social Policy of Crete L.A:  
³.2,1232/,7,$´ 
Pancretian network of social organisations:   
³=(<;,6´ 
Local Development Agencies  Development Agency of Heraklion  
Development Agency of West Crete 
³2$'<.´ 
Development Agency of Mountainous 
Milopotamou-0DOHYL]LRX³$.20-M 
3VLORULWLV´ 
Development Agency of Lasithi  
'HYHORSPHQW$JHQF\RI6LWLD³2$6´ 
Prefecture:  Committees of 
Adult Education (NELE) 
NELE of Heraklion 
NELE of Chania 
NELE of Rethymno 
 
 
Research body  Science and Development Park of Crete 
(EDAP ETEK-K) 
Vocational Training Centre 
(KEK) 
.(.³'HYHORSPHQWRI&UHWH´ 
 
Wider public sector  Port Authority of Heraklion (OLI) 
Table 15: Type and name of partners of the EQUAL II partnership board  
 
The social policy network of Cretan Local Authorities (KOINOPOLITIA) is a 
non-profit organisation operating throughout the Crete region. 
KOINOPOLITIA is an inter-municipal consortium of Cretan municipalities for 
the coordination, planning and implementation of social policy of the 
municipality- partner. Members of the network are 44 municipalities and their 
legal representatives are municipal councillors and mayors. It is divided in 4 
prefectural branches based on the geographical and administrative division of 
municipality - partner. 
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The ZEUXIS network is a non-governmental organisation in which 31 social 
organisations from all Crete participate. These organisations represent people 
with disabilities such as the Centre for Special Children Zoodochos Pigi which 
is one of the main founders of this network. The main goals of the network are 
raising awareness and mobilising the Cretan society and NGOs for achieving 
the social integration of vulnerable groups through cooperative actions and 
sharing of information.  
 
From the five LDAs that have participated in the partnership, 4 are activated in 
the prefectures of Chania, Rethymno, Lasithi and Heraklion respectively and 1 
in the county of Sitia, which belongs to the Lasithi prefecture (Appendix C, 
map of Crete). Because Sitia is isolated from the administrative centre of the 
prefecture due to remoteness and bad road networks, the participation of its 
LDA had facilitated access to vulnerable groups. The purpose of all these 
LDAs is the realisation of development interventions in their areas through the 
use of national and EU resources. As in the case of DAH, the share capital 
comprises in its largest percentage local authorities, while other shareholders 
are Chambers of Commerce, cooperatives, the Local Union of Local 
Authorities, the Pan-Cretan Cooperative Bank, NGOs, etc. 
 
The Prefectural Committee on Adult Education (NELE) is a prefectural service 
and it aims at providing training to all ages. The content of education focuses 
on literacy issues and completing basic education, social and cultural 
awareness, vocational training and it is addressed to both general population 
and vulnerable groups.  
 
The Science and Development Park of Crete (EDAP) located in Heraklion is a 
limited liability company that supports the business development of 
approximately 45 companies and develops various projects in order to promote 
regional innovation and entrepreneurial activity. 
 
The vocational training cHQWUH³'HYHORSPHQWRI&UHWH´KDVEHHQIRXQGHGE\
seven LDAs, which geographically cover the largest part of Crete.  It is 
certified as a training centre of regional range; apart from training, it is active 
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in other fields too, such as studies, workshops and provision of support services 
to local authorities. Finally, the Port of Heraklion is also a limited liability 
company of public interest. It applies a flexible management and it is 
considered as a driver force of growth in the Cretan region.  
  
 1.2.2 3DUWQHUV¶UHVRXUFHVDFWLYLWLHVDQGPRWLYHV 
As discussed in the second chapter, one main advantage underlying partnership 
narratives in urban governance theories and policy guidelines is the sharing of 
scarce resources and the synergy of different key stakeholders in a particular 
SROLF\ILHOG,DUJXHWKDWLQERWKSDUWQHUVKLSVWKHLQWHUGHSHQGHQFHRISDUWQHUV¶
resources and common motives have supported coordination and sustained 
FRRSHUDWLRQDPRQJSDUWQHUV³In these programmes, we understood that the 
partner, who works with you, needs you as much as you need him´0XQLFLSDO
councillor of Archanes).  
 
All partners demonstrated expertise and experience in subject areas they have 
been involved in and worked together complementarily. This is evident when 
SUHVHQWLQJDVWKHIROORZLQJWDEOHGRHVWKHVWURQJFRUUHODWLRQRISDUWQHUV¶
resources with the activities in which they have been involved. The paUWQHUV¶
resources responded to material, political, geographical, scientific, and field 
access which responded to partnership needs. These types of resources confirm 
6WRNHU¶s argument (chapter 1, section 1.1.2) about the significance of 
strategic knowledge (expertise, organisational connections, contacts) besides 
that of material resources in cooperation. Indeed, in my case, it seems that the 
strategic knowledge was more significant than the material resources for two 
reasons: first, the material resources were already provided by EU funding; 
VHFRQGVLQFHFROODERUDWLRQKDVEHHQ³LPSRVHG´IURPDERYHLWUHTXLUHGPRUH
strategic effort and skills from partners for its implementation.
 
 
 
,QWHUPVRISDUWQHUV¶PRWLYHV6WRQH¶V argument, based to a large extent 
RQQRUPDWLYHLQVWLWXWLRQDOLVPSXWWLQJHPSKDVLVRQ³FXOWXUDO´SDUWQHUV¶
EHKDYLRXULVDOVRFRQILUPHG7KHPRWLYHVRISDUWQHUV¶SDUWLFLSDWLRQLQFOXGHG
material gains (mainly financial ones) but also altruistic ones such as the 
support of local diVDGYDQWDJHGSHRSOH$OVRWKH\LQFOXGHG³DSSURSULDWH´
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motives such as remaining integrated in the local community by their 
participation in new institutions like that of partnerships. Finally, as Stone 
(ibid) also mentions about the size of motives they were not always big like the 
development of local social policy but also small motives like the opportunity 
to participate in a network or the improvement of their learning on cooperation 
and management.   
 
In the following table, I present the resources, motivations and activities of 
each partner of both EQUAL II and LEADER+ CIs.  
 
 Partners  Resources  Motivation  &,V¶DFWLYLWLHV 
EQ
U
A
L 
II
 
 
Five Local 
Development 
Agencies  
Good knowledge 
and expertise in 
their geographical 
area  
Financial gains, 
opportunity to further 
sustain their aims 
regarding  regional 
development and  
social policy  
Establishment of Social 
Economy Support Offices 
and creation of three 
ZRPHQ¶VFRRSHUDWLYHVLQ
each prefecture. 
Participation in 
transnational thematic 
network  
Three NELE  
Experience in 
education and 
training, established 
networks in their 
geographical area   
Recognition of their 
work and gain of trust 
by other local 
organisations and 
local society  
Setting up social 
HQWHUSULVHVZRPHQ¶V
cooperatives)  
EDAP 
Expertise in 
entrepreneurialism  
Learning new areas 
of entrepreneurialism, 
that of social 
economy  
Studies, creation of 
clusters  
Port Authority Property  
Support and 
promotion of the 
FRPSDQ\¶VVRFLDO
responsibility profile  
Exposition hall 
ZEYXIS  
Field access: 
network of 
information, good 
knowledge of target 
groups  
Financial gains, 
support local 
disadvantaged people  
Promotion of the social 
responsibility to big 
companies of Crete and 
creation of disabled 
SHRSOH¶VFOXVWHUV 
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Vocational and 
Training Centre  
Experience in 
education and 
training  
Financial gains 
Training of the target 
groups  
KOINOPOLITIA  
Network of 
information to local 
authorities, 
expertise in social 
policy  
Financial gains, 
support and develop 
social policies in L.A    
Responsible for the 
creation of contracts 
between local authorities 
and social enterprises. 
Creation of the Social 
Economy Support Centre 
in Crete. Responsible for 
the Social Economy 
Support Office in 
Heraklion prefecture.    
LE
A
D
ER
+
 
Local Union of 
Local Authorities  
Experience in 
project 
management and 
issues regarding 
local government  
Securing all local 
DXWKRULWLHV¶LQWHUHVWV
in the area  
Approval of the local 
strategic plan, selection of  
project investors 
Municipalities of 
Archanes and N. 
Kazantzakis 
Expertise from their 
position in the 
DAH board for 
years 
Political and 
organisational  
cohesiveness between 
DAH and MC 
Approval of the local 
strategic plan, selection of 
project investors  
2 Agricultural 
Unions and 1 
Industrial Park  
Knowledge of 
IDUPHUV¶H[SHULHQFH
and needs of small 
businesses  
Financial gains, 
representation of 
different 
geographical areas of 
LEADER+  
Approval of the local 
strategic plan, selection of 
project investors  
Table 16: 3DUWQHUV¶UHVRXUFHVPRWLYDWLRQVDQGDFWLYLWLHVRIERWK&,V 
 
In the EQUAL II case, which activities spread in the whole region of Crete, the 
geographical distribution of partners throughout the region was essential. There 
was a need to integrate one key actor from each prefecture. Furthermore, this 
key actor should cover in its geographical area of responsibility, rural 
municipalities that experienced greater social exclusion.  
 
Therefore, one LDA was selected from each prefecture because of its acquired 
knowledge and established role in the support of local development processes. 
The selected LDAs have been also activated in mountainous and remote areas 
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of the prefecture, particularly through the development of rural development 
programmes for the countryside (LEADER+23$;« 
 
These LDAs became responsible for the local offices that supported 
entrepreneurship (Support Offices) by creating social enterprises and have also 
participated in international cooperation. Explaining the reasons for the 
SDUWQHUV¶VHOHFWLRQWKHFRRUGLQDWRURIEQUAL II PHQWLRQHG³We would like to 
represent all of Crete, our project was regional. Consequently, each LDA has to 
secure its prefecture; namely, the Development of Heraklion is responsible for 
the prefecture of Heraklion, AKOM Psiloritis is responsible for the areas of 
Milopotamos, Malevisi and Mountainous Rethymno, OADYK activates in 
Chania and the Development Agency of Lasithi is responsible for the area of 
Lasithi (EQUAL II coordinator). Finally, in the prefecture of Lasithi, the Sitia 
Development Organisation participated too because the organisation had a 
deep knowledge and understanding of the local particularities and needs of the 
Sitia county. However, the Development Organisation of Sitia did not 
undertake activities on its own; but rather in close cooperation with the 
Development Agency of Lasithi. 
 
The three NELE, specialised in programmes combating social exclusion, 
focused on services related to the provision of technical support and financial 
assistance to beneficiaries. Furthermore, their geographic scope (each NELE 
was responsible for one prefecture) facilitated coordinated actions in 
collaboration with the relevant LDAs. In cooperation with them, NELE were 
UHVSRQVLEOHIRUWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRIVRFLDOHQWHUSULVHV³The DAH collaborated 
with us for one and simple reason. We have staff whose activities are 
associated with a deep knowledge of the local territory, of local particularities, 
of local people and they are credible and interested in their work¶¶([HFXWLYH 
of NELE).  
 
The Research Centre (EDAP) had experience in actions concerning the 
technical and administrative business support, as well as in studies regarding 
innovation, regional development and quality management systems.  EDAP 
offered knowledge and expertise in social economy issues and undertook 
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relevant studies contributing to FOXVWHUV¶HVWDEOLVKPHQW7KHGirector of EDAP 
ZDVYHU\FOHDUDERXWKLVFRQWULEXWLRQWRSDUWQHUVKLS³%HFDXVHRIRXUH[SHUWLVH
in entrepreneurialism, ZHFRQWULEXWHGWRWKHWHFKQLFDOSDUWVRIWKHSURSRVDO´ 
(Director of EDAP). 
 
The non-governmental association for disabled people (ZEUXIS) and the inter- 
municipal association (KOINOPOLITIA) shared their information network. 
ZEUXIS has a database of 300 organisations and they daily inform more than 
60 organisations, mainly NGOV³Our main role was to disseminate the 
partnership project results and communicate its activities to other interested 
SDUWLHV´ (Director of ZEUXIS). KOINOPOLITIA has access to every local 
authority of the Heraklion prefecture through its established information and 
communication network. Additionally, both offered their expertise in social 
policies since these networks have been activated in this sector before and thus, 
WKH\FRXOGHDVLO\GHWHFWORFDOGLVDGYDQWDJHGSHRSOH¶VQHHGVDVIRUH[DPSOH
disabled people or long term unemployed women. As the EQUAL II national 
external HYDOXDWRUUHSRUWHG³Although the NGO had no management skills, 
they knew the target groups and their problems well and they cared a lot about 
the programme´ 
 
In this context, KOINOPOLITIA undertook the establishment of the Social 
Economy Support Centre in Crete, which had coordinated among other actions 
the actions of the four prefectural Social Economy Support Offices in the 
Cretan region. KOINOPOLITIA has also been responsible for the Social 
Economy Support Office in the prefecture of Heraklion and the contracts 
between social and private enterprises. ZEUXIS undertook the promotion of 
the corporate social responsibility principle in large companies in Crete and the 
creation of protected manufacturing workshop clusters for disabled people. 
 
7KH9RFDWLRQDO7UDLQLQJ&HQWUHZDVUHVSRQVLEOHIRUWUDLQLQJWKHSURMHFW¶V
EHQHILFLDULHVDQGH[LVWLQJVRFLDOHQWHUSULVHV¶HPSOR\HHVZKLOHWKH3RUW
Authority of Heraklion has offered a place for the creation of an exposition hall 
for selling social enterprises products.  
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In the case of LEADER+, the balanced geographical distribution of partners in 
the Heraklion prefecture as well as the administrative coherence of DAH and 
0&ZHUHWKHPDLQFULWHULDIRUWKHSDUWQHUV¶VHOHFWLRQ,QSDUWLFXODr, the Local 
Union of Local Authorities (TEDK) was chosen because it represented all the 
municipalities in the Heraklion prefecture and had previous experience in local 
government projects. The municipalities of Archanes and N. Kazantzakis were 
selected for purely administrative reasons, that of better coordination between 
DAH and MC. The chairman of the DAH Board was the mayor of N. 
Kazantzakis, while the municipality of Archanes has been a founding member 
RI'$+³We did not want to have different representatives in DAH and MC 
because we wanted to ensure a proper functioning of the MC´LEADER+ 
coordinator). The cooperative of PEZA is a union with a dynamic development 
that represents a significant number of farmers. The Industrial Park of 
Arkalochori represents a different professional category that of small and 
medium enterprises. Finally, the agricultural cooperative Kato Asites 
represents farmers from the west Heraklion area.  
 
All partners involved in both partnerships have demonstrated a good will to 
work together for a variety of reasons. The first motive was financial. 
Especially for small partners like NGOs and cooperatives as well as for LDAs, 
the financial support is very important because their existence depends on 
SURMHFWVSDUWLFLSDWLRQWKH\³RXJKW´WRSDUWLFLSDWHLQHDFKDYDLODEOHSURMHFWHYHQ
if this project did not respond directly to their needs, in order to maintain their 
financial sustainability.  
 
Interestingly, during the interviews, the partners avoided to refer to financial 
gains. Only in one case, the financial gains appeared to be the first reason for 
SDUWLFLSDWLRQ³we joined the MC of LEADER+ in order to have access to 
programme funds´3UHVLGHQWRIWKH,QGXVWULDO3DUNRI$UNDORFKRUL+RZHYHU
it remained an important motivation since, as I will present in the next chapter, 
the budget reallocation was one of the most conflictual issues in partnership 
decision-making process. The scarce financial resources were and still remain 
ORFDODXWKRULWLHV¶PDLQSUREOHP,QDVKRUWDQGVLPSOe way, the EU 
geographical responsible of EQUAL highlighted the apparent financial motive 
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in Greek partnerships ³We did not have institutions of cooperation, but in order 
to get money, we convinced ourselves to establish collaborations and then we 
carried on with them ...´. Although the importance of budgeting is well known, 
why did the partners avoid mentioning it? Perhaps it was too evident or it 
appeared to be a very detriment reason for partnership participation; so the 
partners avoided referring to it.  
 
Nevertheless, financial gains were not the only motivation. As Huxman (1996) 
underlines regarding collaborative advantages, another motivation is the self-
interest of the organisation, i.e. the fact that an organisation may achieve its 
targets, that cannot be achieved in any other way, through collaboration. 
Although cooperation was imposed from above, the partners recognised that 
the collaboration was necessary for getting funds and implementing their goals 
efficiently. They recognised that they have to rely on other partners for the 
SDUWQHUVKLSWRPRYHIRUZDUGWRVXVWDLQHG³FROODERUDWLYHDGYDQWDJHV´ ³:H
have decided to work all together because in this way, we join our forces and 
ZHKDYHEHWWHUUHVXOWV´(EQUAL II coordinator). For instance, for 
KOINOPOLITIA and ZEUXIS the main goal has been social policy 
promotion; yet resources have been scarce for these two organisations. 
EQUAL II project has provided them with money and policy tools to further 
develop their goal.  
 
Not only are motivations rational, they are also altruistic. Especially for the 
public or semi public institutions, the programme offered the opportunity to 
implement social policy activities; a sector that is not well developed in Greece 
DQGLQSDUWLFXODUDWWKHORFDOOHYHO³As a LDA, we are interested in the 
integrative development of Chania. We have implemented a number of 
programmes like LEADER and INTERREG. However, the EQUAL II project 
has a special value for the area because it focused exclusively on social policy 
which had been neglected´([HFXWLYHRI/'$ OADYK). For the Port 
Authority, this large semi public organisation, the aim was the development of 
LWVVRFLDOUHVSRQVLELOLW\SROLF\³The Port Authority wanted to help because it 
owned a building which it offered to cooperatives to use. It was a social offer´
(Consultant of the Port Authority). 
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The motivation of public institutions was purely ethical. For them, participating 
LQWKLVSURJUDPPHVHHPHGWREHDUHZDUGIRUWKHLUFUHGLEOHZRUN³It was self 
evident that we are good, consistent and reliable partners, thus able to respond 
to the project specifications. Because what we need in these projects are 
consistency, continuity, efficiency, a relation of trust.´Executive of NELE).  
 
All partners claimed that this partnership responded to the interests and goals 
of their organisation and their participation was something that happened 
QDWXUDOO\,VD\³QDWXUDOO\´EHFDXVHLQWKHLQWHUYLHZVZKHQWKHUHDVRQVRIWKHLU
participation were discussed, partners usually paused as if the answer to the 
question was obvious. Rethinking this first reaction, it seems that for them it 
ZDV³DSSURSULDWH´WRSDUWLFLSDWHLQWKHVHSDUWQHUVKLSV$OOWKHVHSDUWQHUVKDYH
previously cooperated in the first round of the EQUAL project or in other 
projects and they have created a stable network of cooperation (chapter 4, 
section 2.2.2). So, their participation appeared to be deterministic. This 
explains the reflection of the Director of LDA Lasithi when I asked him the 
reasons of its participation in EQUAL II proMHFW³The Development Agency of 
Lasithi participated in the first round of EQUAL, in OPAX, in LEADER. For 
more than 15 years, we have been collaborating with the Development Agency 
of Heraklion and we have been bidding for funding for the whole of Crete. 
TKDW¶VWKHUHDVRQ´ 
 
1.2 3. Changing Attitudes     
The participation in partnerships has taught partners new ways of behaving and 
dealing with each other. In my question to a partner about what he has gained 
from the cooperation, he said excitedly that "It's nice to be able to create, not 
stay in your small community, being able to open up and do things that you 
would otherwise not have the opportunity to do on your RZQ´ (Consultant of 
the Port Authority).  
 
The key in this process was the gradual development of a new paradigm of 
policy-PDNLQJWKDWRISDUWQHUVKLS³The most important benefit was that we 
learned to collaborate, listen, work, be more engaged´Executive of LDA  
Sitia). Partnership and collaboration, in more generic terms, have created a 
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morHFRQVHQVXDOWKLQNLQJDQGSHUFHLYLQJRIWKHRWKHUSDUWQHU³Although we 
had substantial experience in programmes, EQUAL II was by far the most 
FROOHJLDORQH,OHDUQHGWRDFFHSWRWKHUV¶RSLQLRQ,OHDUQHGWRHPSDWKLVHZLWK
others and understand their reasoning for not meeting deadlines´([HFXWLYHRI
LDA AKOM). Additionally, the dense relationships gradually embedded in 
partners day-to-day behaviour had created a basis for commitment that led to 
the sustainability of the established networks of cooperation.  
 
An example oIHPHUJLQJFRQVHQVXVDPRQJWKH³GLIIHUHQWODQJXDJHV´ of 
partners is that between cooperatives and mayors in LEADER+ MC. In the 
FDVHRIFRRSHUDWLYHVWKHUHSUHVHQWDWLYHVXVHGD³XQLRQODQJXDJH´DQGWKHLU
DGKHUHQFHWRRUJDQLVDWLRQDODQGDGPLQLVWUDWLYHSULQFLSOHVZDVOLPLWHG³I 
usually participated in union meetings when we defended the position of our 
union, while our role in LEADER has been entrepreneurial; so we have had to 
adopt to a new methodology and ways of working´&RRSHUDWLYHRI3(=$ In 
the case of mayors, they supported a vision for the whole community and they 
believed that the cooperatives wanted only to promote their own sector of 
DFWLYLW\³their perception on cooperation is quite tight because they only look 
after their own interests´0Dyor of Gorgolaini). However, the mayors were 
positively disposed towards cooperatives because they believed in their social 
dynamic ³ZHDUHVHQVLWLYHDQGWROHUDQW>WRZDUGVFRRSHUDWLYHV@,Q/($'(5
partnership, there are problems of understanding each other but we do not 
allow issues to escalate; we have been patient with them´0XQLFLSDO
councillor of Archanes).  
 
Another e[DPSOHRIDWWLWXGHV¶FKDQJHIRUWKHEHVWRISDUWQHUVKLSSURFHVVHVDQG
outcomes was the case between EDAP and DAH in the EQUAL II project. As 
a research centre and manager of the Science and Development Park of Crete, 
its position towards the development of enterprises followed the private sector 
principles. Nevertheless, its pure technocratic approaches changed by its 
contact with women¶VFRRSHUDWLYHV,WKDVEHHQXQGHUVWRRG that the social 
economy sector  could not follow the private sector rules to the leWWHU³we 
realised that farmer women are not entrepreneurs and that disabled people got 
used to being supported by the state, so we changed our goals and we set 
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limited business criteria´Director of EDAP). DAH by its contact with the 
research centre started to support more entrepreneurial and sustainable 
solutions rather than solutions that would not be viable but would be socially 
aware. For that reason, it changed its primary decision to create two separate 
clusters, one for women¶V cooperatives and one for disabled people and it 
decided after consultation with the research centre to unify them in order to be 
profitable. So in the end, there is a convergence of these two ³RSSRVLWH´
attitudes. As the EDAP GLUHFWRUUHSRUWHG³In the meetings, there were 
different views; we have more technocratic ones, the DAH more social. 
However, the DAH left room for everyone so as to arrive at a mutually 
acceptable solution´.   
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Second rule: Local community involvement and empowerment   
)DLWKIXOWRWKHFRQFHSWRI³SDUWQHUVKLSLGHDO´DERXWFRPPXQLW\LQYROYHPHQW
the partnerships of my case study also required the involvement of local people 
in decision-making in order to adjust the policy interventions to the needs of 
the target groups. In LEADER+, this principle was expressed in the feature of 
bottom-XSDSSURDFKZKLFKPHDQVWKDW³local actors participate in decision-
making about the strategy and in selecting the priorities to be pursued in their 
ORFDODUHD´ (www.elard.eu). Local actors included the population at large, i.e. 
economic and social interest groups and representatives of public and private 
institutions.  
 
The EU evaluation on LEADER+ (Synthesis of mid-term evaluations of 
LEADER+ programmes, 2005) underlines that especially for vulnerable 
groups, the path transition from the idea of the investment to the investment 
project was often too complicated. Consequently, the local strategy of LAG has 
to address this challenge by the utilisation of information and participatory 
tools that made LEADER+ known to the wider public and offered the 
possibility for actual involvement.  
 
In EQUAL II, the key principle was empowerment. The empowerment referred 
WRSURJUDPPHV¶EHQHILFLDULHVDVZHOODVWR'3¶VSDUWQHUV,QWKHFDVHRI 
beneficiaries, it was a process of mobilising resources and developing skills 
with a view to prepare the beneficiaries to actively plan their own future. In the 
case of partners, the empowerment encouraged a balanced share of power and 
participation among all DP partners (COM (2003)840).  
 
Capacity building was an essential component of both bottom-up approach and 
empowerment principles. Capacity building was addressed both to individuals 
and the community by setting up structures that could sustain collective actions 
and local development after the initial intervention of programmes. In turn, the 
expected empowerment at the local level could lead to power changes in the 
community as well as in the relations of local authorities with the state.  In 
EQUAL II, the EU-wide evaluation of CI EQUAL (2006) points out that the 
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ZHLJKWRIHPSRZHUPHQWZDVFRQFHQWUDWHGRQ'3WHFKQLFDOVWDII³This has 
sometimes required conscious efforts, for example on the part of lead partners, 
WRH[SODLQ³WUDQVODWH´) the terminology of the programme, perceived as highly 
complex, to their partners´(8- wide evaluation of CI EQUAL, 2006: 342)24. 
So, the work done by the coordinating partner was identified as crucial to help 
local people to gain the capacity to develop their own projects and to become 
project promoters. As shown below, the DAH as partner coordinator had also a 
FHQWUDOUROHLQSDUWQHUVDQGEHQHILFLDULHV¶HPSRZHUPHQW 
 
In the following two sub sections, I briefly present the informative and 
participative practices of both projects and I further discuss practices that had 
empowered local actors as well as local authorities vis-a-vis the state.  
 
2.1 Communication and empowerment of local community: local citizens, 
beneficiaries and partners  
The informative and participative practices in both projects were implemented 
in two phases: the first referred to the initiation of the programme and included 
newsletters to municipalities and local organisations for the CIs purposes and 
actions in general. A website for each initiative had also been built and 
meetings with potential beneficiaries had been realised. The second phase 
UHIHUUHGWRSURJUDPPHV¶DFWLRQVLPSOHPHQWDWLRQDQGLWKDVLQFOXGHGWKH
dissemination of activities in media (press releases and radio broadcasts), 
participation in exhibitions, brochures as well as workshops and meetings with 
beneficiaries. 
 
                                                 
24
  Regarding the European experience, there are some interesting practices on the ways that 
capacity building is achieved. Regarding LEADER, in Netherlands (East) for example, some 
LAGs made use of local networking to reach new potential beneficiaries and publicised 
information on what LEADER was doing in the area. In Wallonia, most LAGs have 
implemented information tools such as folders or meetings informing local population about 
the opportunities offered by the programme. In Trento, Umbria and Lombardia, the LAG 
realised a communication plan and undertook a lot of informative and participative activities 
(Synthesis of mid-term evaluations of LEADER+ programmes, 2005). In the case of EQUAL, 
LQ6SDLQIRULQVWDQFHVPDOOµJUDVV-URRW¶SDUWQHUVDQGSDUWQHUVUHSUHVHQWLQJ beneficiaries argued 
that through the participative decision-making processes which were set up, they had been put 
on an equal footing with public administration, something which would not have happened 
outside EQUAL. In Denmark, the most important empowerment of the project participants 
took place at the psychological level in the form of increased self-esteem and self-confidence, 
whereas action-oriented and political empowerment is more limited (EU-wide evaluation of the  
C.I. EQUAL, 2006) . 
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EQUAL II  
The following table presents the EQUAL II publicity25 actions. There were a 
lot of publications (articles, brochures) as well as meetings with target groups.  
 
1. Building two Websites 
2. Designing and printing 4 brochures  
3. Preparation of 1 publication regarding the Corporate Social Responsibility 
principles for the private enterprises in Crete  
4. Publishing articles in 10 local newspapers in the 4 prefectures of Crete 
informing about the operation of Social economy Support Offices  
5. Organisation of 2 information events in selected local authorities and 
distribution of questionnaire to target groups  
6. Organisation of 1 workshop in a Social Economy Support Centre 
7. Participation in 3 exhibitions 
8. Meeting with more than 30 groups of unemployed people (mainly women) 
who have expressed interest in establishing a social enterprise 
9. Broadcasts in Lasithi and Heraklion cities  
10. Promotion of information letters to municipalities and local organisations  
11. Press Release 
Table 17: Publicity actions of EQUAL II 
 
From all the above actions, I focus on those that had been beyond the uni-
dimensional approach of communication, i.e. information, and adopted a more 
participatory process involving local population and beneficiaries. In particular, 
these are:  
1. A working group under the operation of a Social Economy Support Centre 
with the aim to promote a bottom-up approach to local needs regarding 
social economy. In its initiation, the group organisers sent an information 
letter to local authorities, employment agencies and social enterprises 
asking for their participation. There were also contacts with the presidents 
                                                 
25
   The information and publicity plan took into account and followed the instructions and 
directions on information and publicity of the CSF 2000 ± 2006 guide by the Greek Ministry of 
Economy and Finance (2002). This included the Commission Regulation No 1159/2000 
regarding information and publicity activities that should be carried out by member tates on 
Structural Funds. 
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of women's cooperatives for activating their participation too. The group 
held workshops with representatives of women's cooperatives and people 
with disabilities during which they expressed their views on actions, and 
generally the difficulties and problems, which could be addressed through 
EQUAL II. 
2. Open information meetings in municipalities in order to identify target 
JURXSV¶QHHGVDQGWRH[SORUHWKHORFDOSRSXODWLRQ¶VLQWHUHVWLQHVWDEOLVKLQJ
social enterprises. 
3.  Meetings with many groups of unemployed women who expressed an 
interest in establishing a social enterprise; the meetings were more than 20 
in the whole of Crete.  
4. Field researFKFRQGXFWHGE\'$+XVLQJDVXUYH\WRUHFRUGFRRSHUDWLYHV¶
problems and to determine actual needs (e.g. need for networking, finding 
VDOHV¶FKDQQHOVHQVXULQJTXDOLW\RIWKHLUSURGXFWV 
 
Apart from publicity actions to local people and potential beneficiaries, the 
DAH had also responded to the second facet of empowerment, that of partners. 
In relation to public institutions, the DAH support was mainly accommodative 
and advisory for overcoming huge delays in decision-making by these 
institutions. These delays derived from their heavy bureaucracy as well as the 
OLPLWHGLQGHSHQGHQFHRIWKHH[HFXWLYHIURPSROLWLFLDQV¶GHFLVLRQV,Q1(/(IRU
instance, the final decision about its activities in the partnership depended on 
the prefect approval; so the partnership representative of NELE had to wait the 
prefect signature for each decision.  
 
Moreover, in the case of public institutions that entered collaboration schemes 
for the first time, the main role of the DAH was to encourage them to stay in 
the partnership and to support them technically as much as possible. This was 
for instance the case of NELE Chanion ³1(/(&KDQLRQLVDQLQVWLWXWLRQZLWK
which we cooperated for the first time. It needs help; Sometimes Manolis from 
NELE Chanion called me and I told him what we had already said many times 
but I said to myself, it is worth the try, it is important to invest on what we are 
FDOOLQJSDUWQHUVKLSHGXFDWLRQ´Coordinator of EQUAL II).   
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,QUHODWLRQWR1*2V¶SDUWQHUVLQVRPHFDVHVOLNHLQ=(8;,6DQG
KOINOPOLITIA, even their initiation and organisation had emanated from 
DAH efforts. Consequently, beside the concern of their financial survival, the 
DAH also felt responsible for the smooth operation of these organisations and 
the preservation of a collaborative spirit among partners too. The feeling of 
responsibility was expressed in the following statement of the EQUAL II 
cRRUGLQDWRU³The creation of ZEUXIS was a big achievement for us because 
the partners did not communicate at all at the beginning; even now there are 
prREOHPVLQWKHLUUHODWLRQVEXWZHWU\WRVRUWWKHPRXW´. 
 
The support of local vulnerable groups like unemployed women by EQUAL II 
social policies had led to the empowerment of these groups by (re) entering 
them to the economic and political local space. ThHZRPHQ¶VFRRSHUDWLYHV
offered the opportunity to women farmers to go out of their homes and make 
something of their own, to manage their own future and to show to the younger 
generation, theiUFKLOGUHQRWKHUZRPHQUROHV³All of these ladies who made 
cookies created a revolution at home; it is true that in the beginning, they 
³VSRLOHGWKHIDPLO\VRXS´EXWZKHQFKLOGUHQVDZWKHLUPRWKHUOLNHWKLVWKH\JRW
very excited´(8RIILFHU+HDGRI8QLW).  
 
Finally, local authorities rearticulated their role in local society; the programme 
PDGHWKHPPRUHUHVSRQVLEOHDQGVXIILFLHQWLQVHFXULQJVRFLDOFRKHVLRQ³The 
municipalities have no social service and the mayors are not interested in social 
policy. With EQUAL II, they understood the importance of social services and 
ZLWKWKHLUKHOSWKHFRRSHUDWLYHVZHUHVHWXS´ (Executive of LDA Lasithi). 
 
LEADER+ 
In LEADER + project, publicity and distribution of information was a 
continuous process. After the proclamation of LEADER + by the Ministry of 
Agriculture, DAH held an LQIRUPDWLRQFDPSDLJQZLWKWKHVORJDQ³/HW
VSODQ
WRJHWKHU´:LWKLQWZRZHHNVLWRUJDQLVHGILYHLQIRUPDWLRQFDPSDLJQVLQ
municipalities in the Heraklion region, which involved around 250 people. Its 
aim was to motivate local population to participate in the Local Action Plan 
formulation. Furthermore, before signing the contract with the ministry, LAG 
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organised two information events for local authorities of the LEADER+ area 
involving 47 people. The meetings aimed at informing mayors, municipal 
councillors and civil servants about the local programme in order for them to 
support the dissemination of information.  
 
After signing the contract and even before the publication of the local 
programme proclamation, LAG initiated information events to target groups 
and local study offices in order to have timely information about the 
preparation of investment projects. During 2 months, 17 meetings in different 
local authorities were organised and around 700 people participated.  
 
From all the above communicative practices, significant for promoting bottom-
XSDSSURDFKZHUHWKHILYHLQIRUPDWLYHPHHWLQJVHQWLWOHG³*RDOVVWUDWHJy, and 
programme of local LEADER +. Exploring the needs of the Heraklion 
KLQWHUODQGDUHD´,QWKHVHPHHWLQJVUHSUHVHQWDWLYHVRIORFDODXWKRULWLHs, 
cooperatives, associations and any interested parties were invited. The 
LQIRUPDWLRQPHHWLQJV¶VFKHGXOHZDVSXEOLVKHGLQORFDOQHZVSDSHUVDQGZLWK
the help of local authorities, it was displayed in public places. In these 
meetings, a questionnaire was dLVWULEXWHGLQRUGHUWRUHFRUGWKHLQYHVWRUV¶
interest for the local programme and the readiness of project investors.  
 
Moreover, LAG has consulted specific target groups who represented sectors 
of local production in order to have a clear picture of the aUHD¶VHFRQRPLF
features. The consultation was realised with the:  
x Agricultural cooperatives (involving 19 people) 
x Entrepreneurs of pottery (involving 16 people) 
x Owners of ecotourism enterprises (involving 17 people)  
x Wine producers (involving 11 people)  
 
 
LAG also realised meetings and consultations with stakeholders from the MA 
of Regional Development Programmes, with officers from the regional 
department of environment, the Heraklion prefecture and other public bodies in 
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RUGHUWRILQDOLVHWKHSURJUDPPH¶V strategic objectives and avoid overlapping 
with their own policy design. 
 
5HJDUGLQJWKHVXSSRUWWRLQYHVWRUV/$*FRQVLGHUHGWKDWWKHSURJUDPPH¶V
quality and effectiveness had to rely on good cooperation with the investors, 
was in constant contact and communication with them (meetings, one to one 
and telephone contacts, guides of implementation). Furthermore, LAG has 
addressed all relevant regional public services (Department of Environment, 
Department of Forestry, Department of Industry, Department of Health, etc.) 
disseminating to them the list of investors and their investment and requesting 
their cooperation to accelerate approval and authorisation procedures. In this 
ZD\LWKDGVSHHGXSDQGJHQHUDOO\IDFLOLWDWHGWKHLQYHVWPHQWSURMHFWV¶
implementation.  
 
Finally, during the whole programme, there were consultations with the main 
regional stakeholders (6), building of one website, publications in newspapers 
(24), radio presentations and press conferences (2), publication of reports, 
posters and participation in events of other public organisations. 
 
So, empowerment and capacity building seemed to be quite important features 
in both initiatives. Talking about the quality of cooperation, the coordinator of 
EQUAL II XQGHUOLQHGWKDW³our goal is the empowerment of those partners who 
need help´,QFRQWUDU\WRRWKHUFRXQWULHVDVIRUH[DPSOH8.6KXFNVPLWK, 
ZKHUH³most of the LAG have prioritised job creation and tangible 
outputs over capacity building and few have looked beyond the community of 
place to seek to build the capacity of excluded individuals´WKH'$+KDV
invested on capacity-building.  
 
However, I argue that the main concern of this effort was more towards the 
GLUHFWLRQRIHIILFLHQF\UDWKHUWKDQWKHORFDOFRPPXQLW\¶VGHPRFUDWLVDWLRQ7Ke 
EQUAL II FRRUGLQDWRUVWUDLJKWIRUZDUGO\VWDWHG³The DAH could not stand 
alone and realise programmes, if it did not empower the institutions working 
ZLWKWKHP¶. Especially, in EQUAL II, what was at stake was to make 
organisationally self-sufficient public institutions and NGOs for being 
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operational partners in DAH programmes. However, even from this 
perspective, NGOs, getting more autonomous from the public sector and 
stronger in their organisation, had reinforced their position in the local political 
arena. Or, as Mathur and Skelcher argue (2007), they acquire their autonomy 
through the back door. 
 
For instance, by its participation in the EQUAL II partnership, ZEUXIS came 
in contact with other categories of vulnerable groups such as that of disabled 
people, unemployed women, and other stakeholders, both public and private. 
By this, it broadened the understanding of its scope of intervention and 
developing of new networks for possible future cooperation. This process 
could create appropriate conditions for WKHLQVWLWXWLRQ¶VIXWXUHDXWRQRP\E\
gradually strengthening it. "The network came into contact with women's 
cooperatives and with new organisations and consequently, it widened its 
KRUL]RQVDQGSURVSHFWV´ 'LUHFWRURI=(8;,67KHZD\WKDWWKH1*2V¶JHW
empowered by their participation in partnerships constitutes quite an 
interesting question that can be studied further by a new research focusing 
exclusively in this issue.  
 
Empowerment was not the only concern of the DHA. The sustainability of the 
established organisations of civil society was another one. For example, in the 
case of women cooperatives, the EQUAL II coordinator expressed her anxiety 
for the future of these cooperatives and she mentioned that the DAH would 
make an effort to support them aftHUWKHHQGRIWKHSURJUDPPH³We do not 
want to leave them in the future. We will try to help them to prepare bids for 
new technical infrastructure and human resources. We have invested on them; 
we do not want to leave them, mainly because we do not want these women to 
be disappointed´.2,1232/,7,$¶VGLUHFWRUDOVRUHIHUUHGWRWKHIHHOLQJRI
UHVSRQVLELOLW\WRZDUGVWKHFRRSHUDWLYHV¶VXVWDLQDELOLW\³In EQUAL I, we have 
already established cooperatives and there was a commitment from our part to 
the members foUWKHLUFRQWLQXDWLRQ´. Discussing its relation with investors, the 
LEADER+ FRRUGLQDWRUDIILUPHGWKDW³our rationale is not just to implement a 
programme; after the end we try to have continuity with the investors whom 
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we have funded, we do not quit, we keep in contact with them in order to 
inform them about new programmes´ 
 
7KHFRQFHUQIRUWKHEHQHILFLDULHV¶IXWXUHLVQRWDFRPPRQDWWLWXGHLQRWKHU
member states. The results of the EU- ZLGHHYDOXDWLRQRI(48$/DERXW'3V¶
interest for the accomplished programme activities are striking if one compares 
it with the Cretan case. In particular, 40% of the DPs do not register whether 
participants complete the project and/or whether they have benefited from the 
project and 60% of the DPs have no information as to what happens with the 
participants after they have completed the project (EU-wide evaluation of the 
C.I. EQUAL, 2006). 
 
2.2 Empowerment of local authorities  
5HJDUGLQJORFDODXWKRULWLHV¶HPSRZHUPHQWvis-a-vis state, this is achieved in 
both ways: the empowerment gained directly by state through a number of 
additional targeted actions and by their participation in these partnerships. In 
regards to the empowerment by state, in the EQUAL II project, the following 
DFWLRQVKDGIDFLOLWDWHGDQGVXSSRUWHGWKH'3V¶ZRUNDWKHODZIRU
the establishment, composition and operation of DPs through specific legal 
form; b. the creation of a common database with all members sWDWH'3V¶SURILOH
and scope for facilitating the transnational partner search for networking; c. the 
drafting of guides, for example the Guide of Transnational Networking; d. the 
organisation of meetings with all DPs for the preparation of actions II and III of 
the initiative.  
 
Under LEADER, the delegation of both the financial management and the 
implementation of the Local Action Plan in LDAs was another step by the state 
WRZDUGVGHFHQWUDOLVDWLRQ³The state did not just hand over the planning 
management to the LDA as it has been done in other countries, but also the 
project management; it was a very courageous decision for that time (National 
external evaluation of LEADER+).  
 
Finally, the scientific staffing of MAs with specialised and experienced in 
European programmes personnel and the ongoing technical support of the MAs 
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WR'3VDQG/$*VZHUHLQGLFDWLRQVRIWKHVWDWH¶VZLOOLQJQHVVWRVWUHQJWKHQWKH 
SDUWQHUVKLSV¶GHYHORSPHQWDt the local level. The high quality of staff was also 
mentioned by an EU officer, who had a more integrated idea of what happened 
WRRWKHUPHPEHUVWDWHV¶0$V³The MA in Greece has highly qualified staff, 
much more than those of other countries MAs like U.K´ 
 
5HJDUGLQJORFDODXWKRULWLHV¶HPSRZHUPHQWE\SDUWLFLSDWLRQ&,VPDQDJHPHQW
offered the opportunity to local politicians and DAH chief executives to 
influence the decision makers in the relevant ministries -WKH0$V¶JHQHUDO
secretary and chief executives - UHJDUGLQJWKHSURJUDPPH¶VSODQQLQJDQG
LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ³In LEADER II, the ministry sent us the draft ministerial 
decision concerning the programme to express our opinions because we would 
work with it every day; there was consultation for the first time ever´
(LEADER+ coordinator). 
 
Additionally, in EQUAL II, the national thematic groups prepared and 
discussed with the Ministry of Labour the revision of the National Action Plan 
for Employment and Vocational Training introducing the social economy 
policy as a new area of intervention. The inclusion of policy proposals based 
on EQUAL II results in national programmes and laws was a driving force for 
local empowerment. As the municipal councillor of Archanes said proudly 
³The DAH has been strengthened at higher levels; government bodies show 
FRQILGHQFHWRLWDQGWDONDERXWLW´.  
 
Furthermore, both projects offered the opportunity to LDAs to expand their 
activities and to develop a net of experts that could support more development 
HIIRUWVLQWKHDUHD³$IWHr LEADER, there are LDAs in some local authorities, 
mainly those that are isolated, which are the biggest employers of scientific 
personnel´National external evaluator of LEADER+$OOWKH/'$V¶SDUWQHUV
in EQUAL II also underlined their empowerment regarding the increase of 
human resources and the development of new sectors of intervention, i.e. social 
SROLF\³The programme improved the capacity of the LDA and gave it relevant 
experience in social policy´([HFXWLYHRI/'$ AKOM). The increase of 
qualified staff could provide another sound basis for the improvement of rural 
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FRPPXQLWLHV¶RUJDQLVDWLRQDOFDSDFLW\EHFDXVHLWRIIHUVWRWKHPWKHQHFHVVDU\
human resources to identify programmes and pursue their own development 
needs. Because of that, the DAH presLGHQWVWDWHG³Whe fact that the LDAs have 
the ability to know and support local development is inextricably linked to the 
LQFUHDVHGUROHRIORFDODXWKRULWLHV´. Furthermore, the LDAs, as support bodies 
of local development, strengthened their role in the community as they came 
closer to people and carried out successful programmes ³7KHDAH has won 
SHRSOH¶VWUXVW´0XQLFLSDOFouncillor of Archanes).  
 
Finally, the LEADER+ project and in some degree the EQUAL II project have 
led the municipalities of the case  study to start inter- municipal cooperation 
which in turn led to their empowerment since it could support a unified self-
governing force for micro-regional development. In general, there is evidence 
that LAG setting up and the requirement to present a commonly agreed Local 
Action Plan have mobilised potentials in the area which otherwise would have 
not even been activated (Mid- term evaluation report of LEADER+, 2005). In 
many cases, the LDAs, which are mainly an inter-municipal cooperation for 
local development have been created or further developed as the result of the 
LEADER project implementation needs. In particular, rural areas often have 
only a limited stock of resources which do not enable them to solve certain 
problems or take advantage of some of their potential just on their own. In 
contrast, by inter-municipal cooperation the local communities put their 
strength together and thus local authorities can overcome the constraints and 
attain sufficient potential for development achieving desired results otherwise 
inaccessible.  
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Third rule: Networking  
Both CIs gave particular importance in networking by establishing thematic 
networks including a few DPs and LAGs respectively and other stakeholder 
institutions at national and European level. Their aim was to discus solutions 
around specific issues, strengthen cooperation and transfer best practices into 
policy and practice (http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/equal). Indeed, the 
active participation of the partnerships in these networks was mandatory by 
both CIS.  
 
EQUAL II  
EQUAL II¶VVSHFLILFDLPRIQHWZRUNLQJZDVWRLGHQWLI\DQGYDOLGDWHRXWFRPHV
and good practices with a view to disseminate and mainstream them 
(http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/equal). According to the EQUAL II 
national evaluation in Greece, the networking had met these goals. The 
national thematic networks have played an important role to ensure the transfer 
of know-how between participants and the development of common policy 
SURSRVDOV7KHWUDQVQDWLRQDOQHWZRUNVKDGVWLPXODWHGLQWHUHVWIRURWKHUV¶
SUDFWLFHVDQGIRUGLUHFWLQVSLUDWLRQIRURQH¶VRZQSUDFWLFHVFinal evaluation 
report of EQUAL II, 2008)³In the thematic networks, different partners with 
expertise in the same subject sat together for the first time: people with 
knowledge of the field, people with scientific background, and just simple 
SHRSOHWKH\GLVFXVVHGDQGWKH\FRRSHUDWHG>«@,WZDVDVLJQLILFDQWOHDUQLQJ
process´(Executive of EQUAL II M.A).  
 
As shown in the following table (18), the DP had participated in one national 
and one transnational network.   
Name of network Geographical level Activities 
Social Economy  National (10 DPs) Transfer of knowledge  Policy proposals   
S.E.N.D  
Transnational (5DPs 
from Greece, Poland, 
Italy) 
Transfer of knowledge  
Best practices  
Table 18: EQUAL II networking  
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Specifically, it has SDUWLFLSDWHGLQWKHQDWLRQDOWKHPDWLFQHWZRUN³6RFLDO
(FRQRP\´7KLVZDVFRRUGLQDWHGE\EQUAL II MA and ten national DPs, 
ZKLFKLPSOHPHQWHGVLPLODUSURMHFWVLQPHDVXUH³6WUHQJWKHQLQJWKH6RFLDO
(FRQRP\´7KLVWKHPDWLFQHWZRUNZDVLQWHUHVWHGLQWUDQVIerring its experience 
and best practices, both to other organisations active in the field of social 
economy for adopting and incorporating new practices and policies (horizontal 
mainstreaming 26) and to key national actors responsible for employment and 
social integration policies (vertical mainstreaming).  
 
This network created a guide for both business owners and potential 
entrepreneurs for the establishment and operation of social enterprises. Also, 
the network obtained specific policy proposals, which although they were not 
adopted on the whole by national policy; they constituted an important step in 
formulating a new national policy on employment and social inclusion. For that 
UHDVRQ³WKHPHPEHUVZHUHHQJDJHGDQGEHOLHYHGLQWKDWEHFDXVHWKH\FRXOG
change something in social economy, they felt this network could make things 
KDSSHQ´ (Executive of the EQUAL II M.A).   
 
)XUWKHUPRUHWKH'3KDVDOVRSDUWLFLSDWHGLQ³6(1'´WKHWUDQVQDWLRQDO
network for social economy policies. This transnational cooperation aimed to 
develop a joint strategy to support and strengthen social economy at 
LQWHUQDWLRQDOOHYHO,QSDUWLFXODUWKHQHWZRUN¶VPDLQREMHFWLYHZDVWRLPSURYH
local practices through the exchange of international models, experience and 
visions. In the context of this network, three workshops for the establishment 
and coordination of working groups, a transnational learning experience in 
Portugal and a conference in Brussels (European Parliament) had been held. 
Finally, in the context of this transnational cooperation, three manuals 
KDQGERRNVZHUHSURGXFHGLQFOXGLQJWKHZRUNLQJJURXSV¶RXWFRPHV 
 
                                                 
26
 One key principle in EQUAL is mainstreaming which means the process of incorporation of 
best practices and lessons learned to policy and practices. Mainstreaming can be horizontal and 
vertical. In the vertical mainstreaming the transfer and integration of learned lessons is realised 
at the politico administrative level while in the horizontal level to similar organisations 
(http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/equal).  
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In this transnational network, the partners of the Cretan DP had the opportunity 
to learn about developments in the field of social economy at European level; 
they were informed by more experienced partners, mostly from Italy, on social 
entrepreneurship and social economy and developed a dialogue with people 
working in the same field and shared common concerns.  
 
 ³7KHUHDUHDORWRIWKLQJVWKDWZHGRQRWNQRZLQ*UHHFHUHJDUGLQJVRFLDO
economy and partnerships; there are a lot of things that we can get from other 
FRXQWULHV´EQUAL II coordinator), while the executive of LDA Lasithi added 
³:HOHDUQHGQHZZD\VRIZRUNLQJZHJRWQHZLGHDVDQGQRZZHZRUNLQD
PRUHRUJDQLVHGZD\´ 
 
LEADER+  
LEADER+¶PDLQDLPRIQHWZRUNLQJZDVWRVWLPXODWHDQGDFKLHYHFRRSHUDWion 
between territories as well as to provide information and draw lessons 
concerning territorial rural development 
(http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/rur/leaderplus).  
 
The LAG of my case was involved in two networks as illustrated in the 
following table (19) 
Name of network Geographical level Activities 
Cooperation of insular 
areas for the development 
of rural tourism  
National (11 LAGs) 
Promotion of thematic 
tourism activities    
Creation of cluster    
Transnational 
FRRSHUDWLRQ³3ODQIRU
the commercialisation of 
local products and rural 
WRXULVP´ 
Transnational (14 
LAGs) 
Exchange of knowledge  
Promotion of rural 
tourism  
Table 19: LEADER + networking  
 
7KH³&RRSHUation of insular DUHDVIRUWKHGHYHORSPHQWRIUXUDOWRXULVP´
involved 11 national LAGs. More specifically, this inter-territorial cooperation 
was originally seen as a partnership between the four LAGs from Crete for 
joint promotion of rural tourism. However, after contacts with the MA and 
other LAGs, they decided that even better results could be achieved through 
cooperation among all the islands. This network aimed at promoting thematic 
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tourism and created a single cluster of agro-tourism that would coordinate and 
promote all the others, i.e. a cluster of clusters.  
 
7KH³7UDQVQDWLRQDOFRRSHUDWLRQSlan for the commercialisation of local 
SURGXFWVDQGUXUDOWRXULVP´LQYROYHG/$*s from 9 countries (Greece, Italy, 
Spain, Portugal, France, Sweden, Bulgaria, Romania and Cyprus). This 
transnational project was a continuation of the cooperation that had been 
established under LEADER II and  resulted in multiple benefits for LAG; for 
instance on the basis of this cooperation, it has profited from involvement in 
other projects such as ³Culture 2000´ and ³Socrates´ (Mid-term evaluation 
report of LEADER+ for the countryside of Heraklion, 2005).  
 
LAG was very active in these networks since it was the coordinator of both the 
national interregional cooperation and the national group of the transnational 
cooperation. It is important to note that the events and meetings facilitated by 
the above networks have fostered personal exchanges of experience, which 
eventually led to mutual learning and transfer of concepts and policies. 
Discussing the advantages from networking, the LEADER+ coordinator noted 
WKDW³We took people from here and we went to Italy, to Spain and they had the 
opportunity to see, to talk to other investors´ 
 
This learning was not only attained incrementally, since partners and 
beneficiaries developed skills and knowledge through appropriate experience 
DQGWUDLQLQJ,WKDVDOVREHHQDFTXLUHGE\DPRUH³TXDOLWDWLYH´OHDUQLQJZKHQD
network member would change their attitude after having an experience, which 
had brought them in contact with others having the same values. This could 
happen for instance through a visit to a place where the partner or the 
beneficiaries look at something they always wanted to realise or find a group 
with common values and purposes with whom they feel they can cooperate 
(EU synthesis of mid-term evaluations of LEADER+ programmes, 2005). In 
the same evaluation report, it has been emphasised that the transfer and 
adoption of methods for the transnational networks was closely linked with 
spontaneous exchange of experience that was not always planned in advance.  
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MoreoverWKHGLVFRYHU\RI³IHHOLQJSDUWRIDJURXS´RIhaving a common 
identity and a commitment to a goal, was quite a significant factor further 
supporting this kind of learning. This common identity is also mentioned in 
official documents as the ³LEADER spirit´ (Synthesis of mid-term evaluations 
of LEADER+ programmes, 2005) or as the ³EQUAL community´ (EU-wide 
ILQDOHYDOXDWLRQRIWKH&,(48$/,,³Local authorities and local 
SHRSOHIHHOWKHSURJUDPPHDV³WKHLUV´DQGLWLVWKHRQO\SURJUDPPHWKDWLVVR
IDPLOLDUDQGNQRZQ>«@ERWKSHRSOHDQGSDUWQHUVFRQVLGHU the programme as 
of their own´LEADER+ coordinator). This idea of being part of a group was 
SRWHQWLDOO\DVRXUFHRI³SRZHUWR´IRUSDUWQHUV¶DJJUHJDWLRQDQGFRPPLWPHQWWR
the partnership as Stone argues about the purposive idea of regimes (chapter 2, 
section 1.1.).  
 
Following RadaelOL¶VFRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQRIOHDUQLQJFKDSWHUVHFWLRQ
1.1.)WKHOHDUQLQJSURFHVVE\H[SHULHQFHFRXOGOHDGWR³WKLFNOHDUQLQJ´GXULQJ
ZKLFKSDUWQHUV¶YDOXHVDQGQRUPVFKDQJHJUDGXDOO\DOVRLPSDFWLQJRQWKHLU
preferences. In my interview with the EQUAL II coordinator, with regards to 
WKHVRFLDOHFRQRP\VHFWRULWHPHUJHGWKDW³Some practices and values from 
other countries helped a lot and some of our partners adopted and implemented 
these paradigms integrated in the GreeNFRQWH[W¶¶7KHW\SHRIOHDUQLQJWKDW
institutional borrowing could introduce and the extent to which local actors are 
receptive to new ideas and policy paradigms constitute quite an interesting 
study for future research.  
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Fourth rule: Management: programming, monitoring and 
evaluation 
Another CIs rule was the effective management, which involves programming, 
monitoring and evaluation (Council Regulation 1260/1999). These rules, 
almost unknown until recently to Greek national and local policy-making, led 
to significant changes in the way partners have to operate in partnerships and 
politicians and executives have to understand their role as decision makers.  
 
In Greece, the policies at both national and local level are often fragmented, 
without ex ante assessment of needs. ³Social programmes in Greece do not 
have a long-term orientation, i.e. to improve the existing situation. They mainly 
cover current operating needs, gaps in the budget or they are looking for last 
PLQXWHIXQGLQJ´ (EU geographical responsible of EQUAL). EU stimulus of 
programming, monitoring and evaluating a policy had obliged central and local 
administration to a shift from a bureaucratic and fragmentary policy-making 
towards a more managerial style of governance. The statement of the President 
of the Central Union of Local Authorities in LEADER Monitoring Committee 
in 2003 captured in a very adequate way the impact of EU programmes on the 
ORFDODGPLQLVWUDWLRQV\VWHP³, am very satisfied regardless of whether the 
project activities have been realised or not, because with EU programmes we 
learn to manage´LQWKHLQWHUYLHZZLWKWKHnational external evaluator of 
LEADER+).  
 
In reality, it was through the EU programmes regulations and principles that 
the knowledge of how to manage and monitor one policy had been transferred. 
EU programmes have also introduced a rational and effective organisational 
culture to local actors. Talking about the development of experience stock in 
EU programme management, the LEADER+  national external evaluator 
UHSRUWHG³LEADER has had a positive effect; of what kind? Local authorities 
have become aware of management. Or, if these programmes did not exist, 
local authorities in small agriculture areas would not even know what a 
European programme is, what processes are, what the effort to have an 
integrated approach of development means. In any way, it was probably at least 
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an exercise for the mayors and the local actors in general to understand that 
programming is not a simple catalogue of actions´ 
 
Regarding EQUAL II for instance, evaluation was carried out in three levels: 
one evaluation at European level, one at national and one at the local level, in 
the DP itself. The evaluation results from each DP had to be presented to the 
national MA which in its turn prepared the national evaluation of all DPs. 
Based on these national reports, the EC carried out the evaluation of the 
programme in total. During the evaluation process, the DP provided data to 
evaluators, it was judged at national level according to specific criteria and the 
results were compared with all the DP at the European level and were 
published. In this context, the regulation framework of evaluation enforced 
mayors and all the involved partners to change. This was to get away from 
traditional practices of policy-making and rethink policy in terms of good 
JRYHUQDQFHDVGHILQHGLQWKH6WUXFWXUDO)XQGV¶JXLGHOLQHVQDPHO\WRXVH
managerial principles applied by specialised staff in partnership operations as 
much as possible.  
 
The n+2 rule 27 is another example. Independently of the criticism  that this 
UXOHKDVUHFHLYHGE\QDWLRQDODQG(8HYDOXDWRUVWKH(8UXOH³Q´REOLJHG
partners and national administration to learn programming in a fast and flexible 
way in order to comply to new time limits of EU funding. For instance, in 
LEADER +, from the time of signing the contract with the Ministry of 
Agriculture (March 2003) until the first proclamation (May 2003) for 
investment projects, the time was so little (about two months) for the funding 
application to be submitted to EU, that consequently the LAG had expedited all 
SURFHVVHV'LVFXVVLQJ'$+¶VUHVSRQVHWRWKLVUXOHWKe general secretary of the 
DAH board and mayor of Gorgolaini VDLGWKDW³We have learnt to adapt to 
VSHFLILFSURJUDPPH¶VUXOHV1RZ,DGKHUHWRWKHVHUXOHV´ 
 
                                                 
27
 According to the Article 31.2 of the European Regulation 1260/1999, ³7KH&RPPLVVLRQ
shall automatically decommit any part of a commitment which has not been settled by the 
payment on account or for which it has not received an acceptable payment application, as 
GHILQHGLQ$UWLFOHE\WKHHQGRIWKHVHFRQG\HDUIROORZLQJWKH\HDURIFRPPLWPHQW´
This rule has been applied on 31.12.2002 for the first time. 
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A last example refers to the spread of the integrated development principle 
following programming. As noted by the EU geographical responsible of 
LEADER for Greece ³What we are trying as EU is to achieve synergy and 
avoid overlapping programmes´3URJUDPPLQJWKURXJKLQWHJUDWHG
development has transmitted the idea of complementarities between actors in 
local development to partners. Accordingly, local actors have learnt to operate 
in a strategic vision considering as quite important the integration of single 
LQWHUYHQWLRQWRWKHZKROHGHYHORSPHQWSODQRIWKHLUORFDOLW\³Our philosophy is 
not to treat each programme individually, as something temporary. Our key 
strategy is the development of the prefecture and we adapt each programme to 
this strategy´LEADER+ coordinator).    
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Fifth rule: New policy goals  
CIs did not only bring new policy tools and practices in the Greek political 
organisation and management like partnership, empowerment, bottom- up 
approach, management and evaluation but they have also introduced new 
policy goals like social economy and integrated rural development. Discussing 
more generally about the new policies that Structural Funds introduced to 
Greece and the limited scope of Greek policies with the LEADER+ national 
H[WHUQDOHYDOXDWRUKHUHIHUUHGWRWKHIROORZLQJH[DPSOH³The Structural Funds 
offered resources for policies like digital convergence and human resources. I 
would not ever think that the Greek state would give money on its own for 
these policies´ 
 
Reviewing EQUAL II funding themes, most of the involved LDAs in EQUAL 
II had undertaken social policies for the first time because by then there was a 
JDSLQWKHLUORFDOSURYLVLRQ³)URPEQUAL II we have gained experience in 
social issues that we have not had previously; we came closer to people´
(Executive of LDA OADYK,). Once given the opportunity to implement such 
policies, the development was exceptionally fast. In the EU evaluation of 
EQUAL, particular emphasis was given to the evolution of DPs in Greece 
UHJDUGLQJQHZSROLF\WKHPHV¶LPSOHPHQWDWLRQIURPWKHILUVWWRWKHVHFond 
programme round. The difference between EQUAL I and EQUAL II in theme 
reallocation of funding was one of the highest in member states reaching +60% 
(EU-wide evaluation of the C.I. EQUAL II, 2006). This indicates the 
continuous adoption of new policies by the Greek state and the local 
FRPPXQLW\¶VQHHGIRUVocial policy. As seen in table 20 below, which 
compares the difference between EQUAL I and II regarding the number of 
'3¶VLQHDFKWKHPHIXQGVZHUHUH-allocated to theme 1.2 (combating racism) 
from themes 1.1 (facilitating access and return to labour market) and 3.1 
(adaptability). DPs were also selected in theme 4.1 (reconciling family and 
professional life) while none had been selected under this theme in EQUAL I. 
Theme 2.2 (social economy) also received additional financial support.  
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Consequently, while in the first round the DPs have been formed mostly to 
address the employability and lifelong learning priorities, in other words the 
traditional social policy provisions, in the second round, the emphasis was 
placed in social economy, addressing also adaptability and reconciliation of 
family and professional life issues. Finally, new horizontal priorities were 
defined e.g. concerning people with disabilities, victims of human trafficking 
and the Roma community. 
  
   THEMES 1
st
 
round 
% 
total  
2nd 
round 
% 
total Difference 
1.1Employability-reintegration to labour 
marker  11 27,5% 15 23,5% - 4  
1.2Employability-Combating racism  3 7,5% 6 9,3% + 1,8  
2.1Entrepreneuriaship - business creation 6 15% 9 14,1% - 0,9  
2.2Entrepreneuriaship-social economy 5 12,5% 10 15,7% +5,2  
3.1Adaptability-lifelong learning  5 12,5% 6 9,3% - 3,2  
3.2Adaptability-adaptation to change and 
NIT 5 12,5% 8 12,5% 0 
4.1Equal opportunities- Reconciliation of 
family and professional life 0 0% 5 7,8% + 7,8  
4.2Reducing gender gap and 
desegregation 4 10% 3 4,7% - 5,3  
5.1 Adaptability -Asylum seekers  1 2,5% 2 3,1% + 0,6  
Total  40 100% 64 100%  
Table 20: Comparison of DPs percentages per theme in EQUAL I & II in Greece. 
Source: Final evaluation report of EQUAL II, 2008  
 
In the case of rural development, agricultural development policies 
traditionally had a sectoral character dealing essentially with agricultural 
SURGXFWLRQDQGVXSSRUW³When we say rural development policies in Greece, 
ZHPHDQDFWLRQVIRUIDUPHUVRQO\WKDWWKLVLVPRQH\WRSD\RQO\WRWKHP´ (EU 
officer, Head of Unit). This approach to rural development is still identified 
SULPDULO\E\WKHQDWLRQDOSROLF\RIVXEVLGLHV¶SURYLVLRQWRIDUPHUV so as to 
enhance their income (Gousios, 1999; Avdelidis et al, 1981). This is a 
parochial concept of rural development which serves, in short term, both the 
farmers who manage to retain their incomes stable and the state which through 
VXEVLGLHV¶UHJXODWLRQFRQWUROWKHFRXQWU\VLGH³it is a smart way to keep the 
IDUPHUVLQKRVWDJH´ (EU officer, Head of Unit). However, in the long term, this 
particular model of rural development does not create a dynamic development; 
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as a result the rural areas are gradually driven to desolation and to strong 
GHSHQGHQFHRQWKHVWDWH³This is a problematic approach inherent in the 
administration by the Greek Ministry of Agriculture; they have never 
understood other dimensions of rural development´(EU officer, Head of Unit). 
 
On contrary, the LEADER+ project looked for a multi-sectorial management 
of private investments in rural areas, which enhanced entrepreneurial attitudes 
and developed expertise among farmers, politicians and executives at local and 
national level. In particular, Action 1 in LEADER+ promoted projects that 
supported integrated rural development strategies of a pilot nature setting up 4 
priority themes: 1. the use of new know-how and technologies to make the 
products and services of rural areas more competitive, 2. the improvement of 
life quality, 3. adding value to local products, in particular by facilitating 
access to markets for small production units, 4. making the best use of natural 
and cultural resources (Commission Notice, 2000/C 139/05).  
 
Therefore, ³when LEADER started, in 1990, it was rather innovative for the 
Greek reality since it had promoted and supported rural development´
(Executive of the LEADER+ M.A), which as already mentioned for the Greek 
context had a totally different meaning. Under LEADER+, the traditional 
approach of subsidies for farmers had been replaced by aid to small businesses 
LQFUDIWLQJDQGE\LQIUDVWUXFWXUH¶VPRGHUQLVDWLRQZKLOHSUHVHUYLQJWKH
environment so as to hold the rural population within an integrated rural 
developmeQW7KLVOHGWRDJUDGXDOGHYHORSPHQWRIDSURYLQFLDO³PLGGOHFODVV´
by mostly young businessmen followed by a relatively independent 
HQGRJHQRXVUHJLRQDOGHYHORSPHQW7KLVHYROXWLRQKDGFUHDWHGQHZJURXSV¶
interests, which have rearticulated their relation with local government in terms 
of more rational and less partisan exchanges.  
 
In addition, at the ministry level, on the one hand, the minister had to reduce 
WKHFRQWURORYHUUXUDOGHYHORSPHQW³to understand that agriculture is not his 
fief" (National external evaluator of LEADER+) and on the other hand, to 
relocate the programming and monitoring of the agricultural policy from the 
agronomists (for years the dominant professional category in the ministry) to 
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managers. According to people that know LEADER ZHOO³This profession (of 
agronomists) is too technical for the emerging needs of the new programmes 
for rural development´(EU officer, Head of Unit). This is the reason why the 
ex -general secretary of LEADER+ who had been an engineer and project 
manager in major national projects complained about the reaction of 
agronomists when he took over the management of the LEADER + project: 
³When I was appointed as general secretary, my main problem was the 
reaction of the agronomists to my way of working´([- general secretary of 
LEADER+). 
 
Having in mind that in Greece, social policy is underdeveloped (Venieris, 
2003) and rural development is directly related with land cultivation (Gousios, 
1999), the introduction of new policy goals had disturbed the established state 
and local community practices in terms of social and rural development 
provision. Unfortunately, as shown in the next chapter, the introduction of 
these goals is not accompanied by innovation; a key principle in both projects. 
On the contrary, innovation has been translated by the Greek polity in quite an 
elementary way because even the basic CIs theme features were very new for 
the Greek reality. In the interview with the EQUAL II coordinator, an example 
was referred to that demonstrates the novelty of these policies for the Greek 
FRQWH[W³The Italians are far ahead of what is social economy. While we were 
trying to understand what social economy is, they talked about systems of 
certification and innovation in social enterprises´.  
 
  
221 
 
Conclusions  
If my analysis remained in the identification of formal rules and their impact 
on local policy-making and intergovernmental relations, I could argue that 
these initiatives have introduced new policy tools, practices and goals: from 
partnership and networking to management and integrated policies. And it 
would have been  expected that all these new rules had empowered local civil 
society, rationalised policy-making, changed the intergovernmental relations 
and finally kicked off a process of learning in local and national actors which 
as Bache (2008) argues could in their turn lead to changes in politics. However, 
as it is shown in the next chapter about informal rules, things have not 
happened like this; the changes that occurred had a considerable variation from 
the expected ones. 
 
However, formal rules had an impact and changes occurred not only to the 
RUJDQLVDWLRQDOOHYHOEXWDOVRWKHLQVWLWXWLRQDORQH³WRDFWXDOUXOHVRIEHKDYLRXU´
(Lowndes, 2009: 97). Formal EU rules mattered, especially in the Cretan local 
context where economic, demographic, institutional and cultural conditions 
offered specific opportunities and expressed needs directly related to formal 
UXOHV¶DLPV$GGLWLRQDOO\WKHJHQHUDOVFDUFHUHVRXUFHVRIDOOORFDODXWKRULWLHV
combined with the EU programmes funding opportunities made the adjustment 
QHFHVVDU\3DUWQHUV¶PRWLYHVDQGWKHLUUHVRXUFHV¶LQWHUGHSHQGHQFHUHIOHFWHG
also local needs for new governance practices and policy goals. Or, although 
&,V¶SROLF\DQGLQVWLWXWLRQDOPLVILWKDVEHHQKuge, the specific local context 
DSSHDUHGWREHIDYRXUDEOHIRUFKDQJHVLQWURGXFHGE\WKH&,V¶IRUPDOUXOHV 
 
The main changes, which resulted from EQUAL II and LEADER+ formal 
requirements, have been the proliferation of new local actors and the 
strengthening of their involvement in decision making regarding local 
economic and social policy-making. There were organisations representing 
vulnerable target groups that were initiated by both CIs programmes like the 
case of cooperatives and NGOs, which were further empowered. Additionally, 
there was a proliferation of semi public institutions like LDAs and 
KOINOPOLITIA, which were based upon inter- municipal cooperation 
combining public and private criteria in their operation. Finally, both 
222 
 
partnerships gave rise to stable (informal) policy networks at which for the first 
time, new and various actors sat at the same table in a given territory.  
 
A second change is related to learning processes. The diverse experience and 
exchanges of know-how among partners and their participation in national and 
transnational networking have also directly contributed to boosting learning 
DQGGHYHORSLQJSDUWQHUV¶FRPSHWHQFLHVIRUFROODERUDWLRQ3DUWQHUVJUDGXDOO\
honed the ability to cooperate and identify small wins from collaborative 
actions. Learning combined with higher levels of trust and mutual 
accommodation due to partnership negotiation and regularity created a sense of 
commitment to partnerships for the partners and facilitated their participation 
to new ones. So, partnerships gradually had been established as practice of 
governing.  
CLWL]HQV¶SDUWLFLSDWLRQLQWKHLEADER+ strategic plan and the empowerment 
of vulnerable groups in the EQUAL II project reinforced democratic practices 
in local policy-making in three ways: a. by the identification and integration of 
social vulnerable groups in political space, b. by ensuring public participation 
through publicity and consultation meetings, and c. by opening the local 
hierarchical decision-making to arenas of communication so that many more 
could have a voice. In this way, acceptance and support by the local 
FRPPXQLW\RULQRWKHUZRUGVSDUWQHUVKLSV¶OHJLWLPDWLRQZDVREWDLQHGZKLOH
social capital was further reinforced by its use. Additionally, new policy 
interventions altered the established relations of local government with local 
actors towards more technocratic and consensus-seeking solutions rather than 
established hierarchical and partisan practices. 
 
Additionally, the CIs formal rules helped to build up local competence in terms 
of self-RUJDQLVLQJORFDOGHYHORSPHQWIURPQHHGV¶DVVHVVPHQWWRLQWHJUDWHG
implementation, fostering the capacity of local authorities to support diverse 
actions for the benefit of their area. Moreover, through networking, local 
authorities bypassed central hierarchies and became known to national and 
international partners as an autonomous identity. The state had also 
decentralised competencies to local authorities for the first time. Consequently, 
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local authorities got stronger vis-a-vis state and gained the ability to structure 
themselves for different purposes and in different ways. Finally, the demand 
for managerial tools adoption in partnerships also rationalised local policy-
making by creating a managerial and organisational culture for the involved 
partners. In this way, the political style has changed from fragmented and 
bureaucratic attached to party clientelism practices to a more technocratic and 
integrated one. 
 
7KHIROORZLQJFKDSWHUZLOOUHYHDOWKHLQIRUPDOUXOHVWKDWJXLGHDJHQWV¶
behaviour and the way that these contradict, enable or substitute the formal 
ones.  
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Chapter 6: Partnership in practice: the interaction of 
formal and informal rules   
Introduction 
Having conducted the research in the field, I have come to realise the huge 
difference that exists between the partnership organisation that the formal rules 
ZRXOGOLNHLGHDOO\WRGHYHORSDQGWKH³UHDO´SDUWQHUVKLSLQRSHUDWLRQ6RLQWKLV
chapter, I identify those informal rules that had actually guided the partnership 
development. Following /DXWK¶V (2000) typology (chapter 1, section 1.2), I 
also explore the nature of their relation with the formal ones. 
 
It is argued that since these programmes have introduced the collaborative 
forms of policy-making on local communities for the first time, there were 
problems in their operation and implementation (chapter 2, section 2.3). In 
particular, collective action did not emanate directly from local needs for 
SUREOHPV¶VROXWLRQEXWIURPDERYHWKH(8IRUVHFXULQJ(XURSHDQDQG
governmental grants. In this case, as Cowles, Green and Risse (2001) have 
already affirmed, the domestic structural and institutional resistance is higher 
than expected offering to informal rules a much more significant role in 
SDUWQHUVKLSV¶UHJXODWLRQ 
 
When interviewed, an EU officer FRPPHQWHGWKDW³WKHJUHDWHIIRUWZKLFKKDV
been made regarding LEADER+ implementation is the overcoming of the 
dominant Greek attitude. Because, it is different to plan something that 
previously did not exist at all. Everything is innovative and partners have to 
disrupt the existing establishment. In such cases of discontinuity between old 
DQGQHZSUDFWLFHVROGDQGQHZ³ERWKFRH[LVW´DVStreeck and Thelen (2005) 
argues about the process of institutional change and it has been a challenge for 
the current research to identify their power relations and chart the level of 
institutional change.   
 
In the next section, I present 6 informal rules, their relationship with the 
respective formal ones and their influence on partnership operation in terms of 
collective action. Additionally, following +HOPNHDQG/HYLWVN\¶V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argument about the sources of informal institutional change (chapter 1, section 
1.2), I discuss some potential changes in the formal- informal rules relationship 
and I outline evidence of institutional change on local policy-making. Finally, I 
devote a small section to the comparison of LEADER+ and EQUAL II in order 
to further reveal the significance of institutional legacies and political norms in 
the shaping of informal rules. 
      
First rule: Partnership internal dynamics: the domination of a 
centralised and mayoral local government   
Although the diversity of interests and the equity of partners were supposedly 
UHFRJQLVHGE\SDUWQHUVKLSV¶IRUPDOUXOHVWKHUHDOLW\ZDVGLIIHUHQW,IRQH
carefully looked at both partnerships decision-making process and the internal 
every day practices of their operation, one would identify political processes 
that had generated limited interest representation, unequal power relations and 
low involvement of local people. In my interview with the EQUAL II national 
evaluator who had a comprehensive view of the project throughout Greece, it 
was reported thDW³In fact, there are 2-3 main partners and the coordinator who 
PDNHGHFLVLRQVDQGPRYHWKHSDUWQHUVKLSIRUZDUG´.  
 
In the partnerships under study, I argue that the partners who set the agenda, 
make decisions and manage partnerships were also few and they were 
exclusively semi and/or public agencies. These were the DAH at the local level 
and the relevant ministry with its MA at the state level. For understanding the 
powerful role of these two players, I present in figure 14, the different locus of 
power among all the actors involved in EQUAL II and LEADER+ 
development and implementation and I further explain their power relations.  
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Figure 14: Loci of power in EQUAL II and LEADER+ development and 
LPSOHPHQWDWLRQDXWKRU¶VHODERUDWLRQ 
 
In particular, the power is dispersed in all the geographical levels. In each 
geographical level, one can identify horizontal and vertical power relations. 
The main institutions where power was exercised were EU, the Greek state and 
local partnerships. Furthermore, in each stage of partnership development, 
these three institutions had different weight in power balance.   
 
Starting from the horizontal level, the agencies that entered power relations in 
each partnership were different. In EQUAL II, there were the 12 agencies that 
were formal partners of EQUAL II DP. In LEADER+, there are the 6 agencies 
of MC and the DAH Council itself which represent a partnership of 40 
members, mainly local authorities. Additionally, the beneficiaries of both 
projects; the cooperatives of women and disabled people as well as the private 
investors entered the power interplay.  
 
At vertical level and particular at state level, there were two main loci of 
power, the ministries (the Ministry of Labour for EQUAL II and the Ministry 
of Agriculture Development for LEADER+) and the respective MAs, which 
were part of the ministries. Finally, at the EU level, research does not analyse 
in depth the power relations between EU and the Greek state. For the current 
study, EU was the starting point that set the regulatory framework for the 
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implementation of the two CIs defining in this way the framework of action 
and the range of powers that could be exercised by the state and local partners.   
 
Below, I first discuss the horizontal power relations inside partnerships and 
examine more critically their internal representational and management 
dynamics.  I then analyse the power relations of local partnerships with the 
beneficiaries and the state.  
 
1.1 Partnership initiation  
,QUHODWLRQWRERWKSDUWQHUVKLSV¶LQLWLDWLRQLWZDVWKH'$+WKDWKDGSOD\HGWKH
main role in defining the budget distribution and in selecting the partners. 
³'XULQJWKHQHJRWLDWLRQVZLWK'$+WKHUHZDVDQRULJLQDOSODQZLWKGHIDFWR
standards so that only VPDOOFKDQJHVFRXOGEHPDGH´ (Executive of NELE ).  
 
The central role played by DAH in partnership planning has also been reported 
in the EQUAL II local evaluation report. According to this, DAH, or in other 
words its ORFDODXWKRULWLHV¶VKDUHKROGHUVwere emerging as a player with the 
most effective and the highest participation in project plan formulation. Almost 
about two thirds of the EQUAL II involved partners i.e. 62, 5% assessed as 
³TXLWHKLJK´WKHSDUWLFLSDWLRQRIORFDOJRYHUQPHQWLQWKHSDUWQHUVKLS design 
phase, while the degree of participation of social and economic partners was 
HYDOXDWHGDV³DYHUDJH´E\WKHUHPDLQLQJSHUFHQWDJHThe contribution of 
private enterprises appeared to be limited (First evaluation report of EQUAL II 
³Incubator for the Development of Social Economy in Crete, 2006).  
 
In LEADER+, the attendance of local authorities was stronger than that in 
EQUAL II and partnership planning was exclusively in the hands of local 
DXWKRULWLHVZKRPDGHNH\FKRLFHVRQFULWHULDIRULQYHVWRUV¶Hligibility, areas of 
LQWHUYHQWLRQDQGSDUWQHUV¶VHOHFWLRQLQWHUYLHZZLWKWKHLEADER+ 
coordinator).  
 
As a result, in both programmes, the main decisions for budget distribution, 
areas of intervention and type of project actions had already been defined by 
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the DAH, while the other partners made small scale adjustments. In other 
member states, like in the EQUAL II of Northern Ireland, a majority of DPs 
had involved partners representing the target groups or NGOs working with 
these groups in partnership initiation. According to the Northern Ireland 
HYDOXDWRU¶s survey to DP partners, 41% of the respondents supported that the 
target groups be centrally involved in all discussions in designing and steering 
the project (EU-wide evaluation of the C.I. EQUAL II, 2006).  
  
1.2 Partnership development  
EQUAL II  
As far as partnership development is concerned, if one carefully examines once 
again the formal composition of EQUAL II DP (see figure 13 and table 15),  it 
is obvious that the EQUAL II partnership was dominated more by local 
DXWKRULWLHV¶RUJDQLVDWLRQVDQGOHVVHUE\ORFDOVRFLHW\RUJDQLVDWLRQVDQGSULYDWH
sector businesses. Actually, the number of institutions that were controlled by 
local authorities was ten out of a total of thirteen. Only the research centre 
EDAP, the NGO ZEUXIS and the Port Authority of Heraklion are agencies 
WKDWRSHUDWHLQGHSHQGHQWO\IURPORFDODXWKRULWLHV¶FRQWURO 
 
The supremacy of local authorities inside the EQUAL II partnership was also 
confirmed by the local evaluation report. Assessing the actual degree of each 
SDUWQHU¶VLQYROYHPHQWE\RWKHUSDUWQHUVLW is presumed that the category of 
partners that appeared to play a more active role is local government, with 75% 
of respondents believing that the involvement of local authorities in developing 
DQGLPSOHPHQWLQJWKHSDUWQHUVKLSZDV³TXLWHKLJK´5HJDUGLQJSULYDWH
HQWHUSULVHV¶UROHRISDUWQHUVDVVHVVHGDV³DYHUDJH´WKHLUFRQWULEXWLRQWR
the project. The remaining partners, namely national public institutions, 
research and training centres and NGOs, were estimated by the partners to have 
SDUWLFLSDWHGLQSDUWQHUVKLSSURFHGXUHVDWDQ³DYHUDJH´OHYHOWRR(First 
evaluation report of (48$/,,³Incubator for the Development of Social 
Economy in Crete, 2006).   
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Moreover, the budget allocation per partner is also another piece of evidence 
IRUWKHORFDODXWKRULWLHV¶SULPDF\LQ'3$VVKRZQLQWKHILJXUH15, the 
majority of the budget programme (19.85%) was allocated to DAH. In a way, 
this was expected because DAH undertook a number of supplementary actions 
as project coordinator such as technical support and local evaluation. However, 
this percentage remained by far the highest all the others. In the second rank, 
KOINOPOLITIA which is an inter-municipal cooperation managed 10, 97% of 
the total budget followed by the Science & Technology Park (EDAP) which 
was allocated 9, 18% of the total budget. The remaining partners managed a 
EXGJHWUDWHRIEHWZHHQDQGVRIXQGV¶DOlocation to other partners had 
no particular differences.   
 
Figure 15: Budget allocation per partner in EQUAL II. Source: First evaluation report 
RI(48$/,,³Incubator for the Development of Social Economy in Crete, 2006  
 
The concentration of power by local authorities was also evident in the day-to-
day operation of the EQUAL II partnership. Looking back at figure 13 
illustrating the management and decision-making structure, the partnership 
coordinator and administrator was the DAH while the president of the 
partnership board is the director of DAH. As project coordinator, it was 
certainly expected that the DAH would have high degree of authority; 
KRZHYHUWKHRFFXSDWLRQRIDOOPDQDJHULDOSRVLWLRQVRYHUFDPHIRUPDOUXOHV¶
prerequisites.  
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Additionally, the DAH power seemed to be reasonable and legitimised by all 
SDUWQHUV³7KHFRRUGLQDWLQJRUJDQLVDWLRQKDVWREHWKHPRVWGRPLQDQWSDUWQHU
because it establishes the contacts with the ministry; it is responsible for 
networking, manages and controls all the procedures (Director of 
KOINOPOLITIA). And it is designated to do all these without the involvement 
of anyone else. The DAH power has been legitimised to the extent that the 
partners allowed the coordinator to exercise even coercLRQSRZHU³0DQ\
WLPHVWKHGLUHFWRURIWKH'$+WKUHDWHQHGXV>«@KHWROGXVWKDWXQOHVVZHJRW
results, he would get us out of programme and that he would replace us with 
another organisation (Executive of LDA). 
 
The norm that local politics is the absolute competency of local authorities - 
registered for years in local community values - is also verified by the answers 
in the questionnaire regarding political engagement. Thirty five per cent of 
SDUWQHUV³VWURQJO\DJUHHG´DQG³UHODWLYHO\DJUHHG´RQWKH statement that 
³ORFDODXWKRULW\KDVWRDUWLFXODWHWKHSROLWLFDODJHQGDRQLWVRZQDQGPDNHWKH
GHFLVLRQVZLWKRXWWKHLUDFWLYHSROLWLFDOHQJDJHPHQW´0RUHRYHULWLVQRWRQO\
this value that is embedded in local community. What is also embedded is the 
institutional legacy of a strong mayoral system that makes mayors resist the 
idea of sharing the gained power over years with other local actors out of fear 
of losing the traditional patronage relation with the community. 
 
Another characteristic of the EQUAL II SDUWQHUVKLS¶VFRPSRVLWLRQZDVWKH
legal identity of partners; from the 13 partners, 9 were private agencies of 
public interest i.e. semi-public agencies28.  These semi-public organisations 
challenge the classical distinction of the three sectors (public-private-social) 
because they have an intermediate role between private and public sector. In 
the Greek socio-economic context, where the public sector is heavily 
bureaucratised and politicised on the one hand and the private sector does not 
feel confident to cooperate with public bodies on the other, these semi ±public 
                                                 
28
 That means that they are non profit organisations achieving public interest objectives but the 
principles and values of their organisation and management are led by private sector. In 
particular, they have to serve as modern organisations having emancipated from bureaucratic 
and political obstacles of the public sector and maintain accountability and public interest goals 
at the same time. 
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organisations could easily overcome the ankylosis of the public sector and 
operate with cost oriented rules in the policy arena.  
 
Additionally, their legal status makes them eligible for partnership projects 
with both the private and public identity. Their profile fits with any type of 
SDUWQHUV¶ project prerequisite. However, there are questions about the 
legitimation and public accountability of these organisations. Their 
participation in local partnerships weakens the presupposed democratic 
attributes of collaborative actions.  Consequently, it is not only the issue of 
power concentration by local authorities and the under representation of other 
local actors but also the legal identity of the institutions by which local 
authorities have been represented.  
 
My argument about unequal representation of interests and control of decision-
making by the public sector has been further confirmed by the EQUAL II 
QDWLRQDOHYDOXDWLRQUHSRUWUHJDUGLQJWKHFRRUGLQDWRU¶VOHJDOIRUPRIDOOEQUAL 
II DPs in Greece. It has been concluded that the Cretan case did not differ from 
the other national DPs in which the public sector still remained dominant.  As 
shown in the following table (21), the first three categories, public, wider 
public agencies and local authorities comprise together the highest number of 
DP coordinators at 45%. They have been followed by the private sector at 
32%. However, it is worth noting that the private sector was largely 
represented (31, 3E\DEXVLQHVV¶VSHFLDOFDWHJRU\WKDWRIvocational and 
training centres which organisational goals are shared between social and 
economic orientations. 
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Type of Coordinator EQUAL II DPs Number Percentage 
Public 4 6.3% 
Wider public bodies 8 12.5% 
Local authorities  17 26.6% 
NGO 5 7.8% 
Labour and employers  organisations  9 14.1% 
Private sector  21 32.8% 
Total  64 100.0% 
Table 21: Legal status of all coordinator DPs of EQUAL II in Greece. Source:  Final 
evaluation report of EQUAL II (2008) 
 
Moreover, if I compare the Greek coordinators legal status with the relevant 
EU average of all DPs, the Greek variation becomes obvious. At the EU level, 
30% of DPs have been led by nongovernmental organisations and only 6% by 
semi-public organisations like the DAH. Furthermore, the legal status of 
partnership members was mainly shared into three types: 28% of 
nongovernmental organisations, 32% of public organisations and 27% of 
private organisations. Only 4% are semi-public organisations and 1% 
cooperatives (COM (2003) 840: 3). For instance, in Finland, 28% DP partners 
have been drawn from enterprises and trade unions; in Flemish Belgium, 30% 
'3SDUWQHUVKDYHEHHQUHSUHVHQWDWLYHVRIVRFLDOSDUWQHUVHPSOR\HHV¶
organisations, trade unions), in Spain and Great Britain, more than 30% DP 
partners have been organisations providing support and guidance for 
disadvantaged groups (EU-wide evaluation of the C.I. EQUAL II, 2006). 
 
+RZHYHUDOWKRXJKSDUWQHUV¶HTXDOSURSRUWLRQDl representation was secured in 
RWKHUFRXQWULHVWKLVGRHVQRWKDYHWREHFRQIXVHGZLWKSDUWQHUV¶HTXDO
involvement. In the EU- wide evaluation of EQUAL II (2006: 129), it has been 
UHSRUWHGWKDW³WKHPRVWLPSRUWDQWGLIILFXOW\LVQRWRQO\WKHZHDNUHSUHVHQWation 
of FHUWDLQSDUWQHUVEXWDOVRWKH³unequal involvement´ of partners´. But what 
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LV³VXIILFLHQWSDUWLFLSDWLRQ´DQG³KRZPXFKXQHTXDO´WKHSRZHUEHWZHHQ
partners is could not be easily compared so as to conclude that my case study 
when compared to the U.SDUDGLJPLVFKDUDFWHULVHGE\SDUWQHUV¶XQHTXDO
involYHPHQW7KHDVVHVVPHQWRIZKDW³VXIILFLHQWSDUWLFLSDWLRQ´ means depends 
each time on national contexts. For example, the Danish evaluators in EQUAL 
II project assessed the share of private companies (14% of partners) as too low, 
whereas the relevant European average is 11.8% (EU- wide evaluation of 
EQUAL II, 2006).  
 
Bearing that in mind, the difference between Greece and other countries is 
remarkable in the way that it understands the participation of non-public actors 
in these initiatives. This demonstrates by far how the established norms of civic 
engagement and political competence of the Greek context have been 
reproduced informally in partnership rules.   
 
LEADER+ 
In the LEADER+ partnership too, the situation was not different. This was also 
expressed by a LEADER+ MA executive commenting on all LEADER 
SDUWQHUVKLSVLQ*UHHFHWKDW³QRWKLQJZDVFKDQJHGLWLVHVVHQWLDOO\WKH/'$
DGPLQLVWUDWLRQFRUHDQGVWDNHKROGHUVWKDWKDGGHFLGHGIRUWKHSURMHFW´
Particularly in LEADER+ MC (see figure 11 and table 14), there also a pure 
representation of private enterprises did not exist. Instead, there were 
cooperatives which identity is particular as in the case of semi-public 
organisations in the EQUAL II project, because their aims comprise a 
particular combination of trade unions demands, private interests and social 
aspirations.  
 
Additionally, due to long term state intervention in the regulation of agriculture 
cooperatives and politicisation of their internal affairs, the cooperatives in 
Greece are strongly dependent on the state and political local and national party 
conflicts (Papageorgiou and Kaldis, 1999). Therefore, this type of interest 
representation from private sector had allowed for the local authorities to have 
DJUHDWUROHLQWKHSDUWQHUVKLSV¶VWUDWHJLFRULHQWDWLRQ 
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,I,FRPSDUHWKH&UHWDQ0&¶VFRPSRVLWLRQZLWKRWKHUFRXQWULHV¶/$*VOLNHIRU
instance Finland, where LAGs were composed according to the tri-partition 
principle (one third local residents, one third public administration and one 
third local business) (Kull, 2009: 10), the difference seems striking.      
 
Furthermore, when the identities of the local authorities that participated in MC 
have been thoroughly explored, I reached the conclusion that once again DAH 
has a strong presence in decision-making. All representatives were elected 
politicians: two were mayors and one was a municipal councillor, president of 
municipal council. The two mayors have a position of power in DAH. One was 
the president and the other was the general secretary of the DAH board. The 
municipal councillor was from Archanes, the village where DAH has its offices 
and has started its operation.  
 
Alongside mHPEHUV¶UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ, the real control on decision-making was 
located in the DAH board from the beginning of the MC establishment. As 
revealed in the previous chapter (section 1.1) the MC should be a decision 
ERG\WKDWVHWVXSWKHVWUDWHJLFSODQIRUGHYHORSPHQWDQGUDWLILHVWKHLQYHVWRUV¶
projects. However, through an informal agreement among the DAH partners, 
all MC decisions have to be approved by the DAH board. So, MC seemed to be 
MXVWDIRUPDOERG\³:HKDYHDFWXDOO\PDGHDGHDOWKDWRNZHKDYHVHWXSWKH
MC because the programme requires to do that but all the main decisions 
relating to the programme strategy have to be approved informally by the DAH 
ERDUG>«@ LQUHDOLW\LWLVWKHERDUGWKDWPDNHVGHFLVLRQV´LEADER+ 
coordinator).  
 
The main programme decisions such as areas of intervention and investments 
IRUIXQGLQJZHUHGHWHUPLQHGE\'$+ZKLOHRQO\WKHSURJUDPPH¶V
management was given to MC. Its actual role was the ratification of 
investments already selected by the relevant DAH committees and their follow 
XS%XWHYHQLQWKHVHPDQDJHULDODFWLYLWLHV0&¶V role had been weakened. The 
management team, which was exclusively composed by DAH staff, had a great 
influence on the MC due to its expertise in advisory capacity related to 
problem solving. Furthermore, since the MC office had been located at the 
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DAH buLOGLQJWKHUHZDVDOVRDQLGHQWLILFDWLRQRIWKH0&¶VZRUNLQJSODFHZLWK
that of DAH, which symbolically had further empowered the position of the 
latter.  
 
Accordingly, in the end of the day, DAH had the final say in both partnerships. 
Even if all partners were formally equal, it was DAH that had decided on areas 
RILQWHUYHQWLRQSDUWQHUV¶VHOHFWLRQDQGEXGJHWDOORFDWLRQ$QGILQDOO\DQGPRVW
significantly, it was DAH that had interpreted the formal rules such as what 
was meant by cLWL]HQV¶SDUWLFLSDWLRQEottom- up development and innovative 
solutions. However, DAH did not wish to be seen as the dominant partner: 
³>«@IURPWKHPLQLVWU\WKH\WROGXVWKDWVRPHDJHQFLHVDUHDOZD\VGRPLQDQW
in our partnership, this is our constant worry, and we do not want to leave any 
RQHIHHOXQIDLUO\GHDOWZLWK´EQUAL II coordinator). 
 
1.3 DAH board and informal networking  
0\DUJXPHQWDERXWORFDODXWKRULWLHV¶SUHGRPLQDQFHLVIXUWKHUVXSSRUWHGZKHQ
the stakeholders and the management structure of DAH are examined in detail. 
/RRNLQJDJDLQDWLWVVWDNHKROGHUV¶SHUFHQWDJHVfigure 12), DAH has clearly 
EHHQDORFDODXWKRULW\¶VGRPDLQDQGLWVDGPLQLVWUDWLRQKDVH[FOXVLYHO\EHHQDW
PD\RUV¶KDQGV 
 
$VVHVVLQJLQGHSWKPD\RUV¶SRZHUUHODWLRQVLQWKH'$+ERDUG,KDYH
identified one PD\RUV¶LQIRUPDOQHWZRUNWKDWFRXOGEHFDOOHG³2OG0D\RUV´
This network have sustained an integrated power front vis-a-vis to other 
mayors and influenced the DAH policy directions. In the first chapter (section 
1.2), I have highlighted the significance of networks as an informal rule since 
QHWZRUNLQJ³DIIHFWWKHGLVWULEXWLRQRISRZHUWKHFRQVWUXFWLRQRILQWHUHVWVDQG
LGHQWLWLHVDQGWKHG\QDPLFVRILQWHUDFWLRQ´$QVHOO 
 
Starting from this point, I argue that the interpersonal relations developed in 
this informal network have played a more central role in the DAH decision-
making and therefore in the partnerships under study rather than the relevant 
formalised mechanisms of decision-making established by partnerships as 
requirements by both programmes.  
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This network has mainly been based on a common ideology, which maintained 
a consensus on which policies had to be promoted and how they would be 
implemented. Additionally, it has supported and diffused particular values and 
³ORJLFV´RIEHKDYLRXUamong the DAH council partners. Although it has 
strongly influenced decision-making, it did not challenge delays and blockages 
thus causing serious internal conflicts and disagreements that could have 
DIIHFWHGWKH'$+DQGSDUWQHUVKLSV¶XQLW\DQGVXVWDLQDELlity; its influence has 
been smooth and diffusing.  
 
7KH³2OG0D\RUV´QHWZRUNKDVEHHQFRPSRVHGE\PD\RUVRIWKHSUHIHFWXUH¶V
northern and central parts. These mayors initiated DAH and supported its 
development from its early onset. The network acquired its coherence through 
many years of established communication and collaboration (chapter 4, section 
2.2.2). These mayors have been elected in the same municipalities for many 
constituencies and they have known each other very well. Their long 
discussions and contacts, even in an informal and friendlier level, attributed a 
VWURQJXQLILHGLGHQWLW\WRWKLVJURXS$VWKH'$+SUHVLGHQWPHPEHURI³2OG
0D\RUV´QHWZRUNVWDWHG³7KRVHFRQIOLFWVWKDWKDGWRRFFXUKDYHDOUHDG\
occurred in the past; now, we have found a common way of understanding and 
,WKLQNWKDWWKLVDOOLDQFHUHOLHVRQWKLVIDFWRU´ 
 
Moreover, these mayors had previous experience on projects, which helped 
WKHPWROHDUQTXLFNO\WKHRSHUDWLRQRIWKHQHZSURMHFW¶VUHTXLUHPHQWVDQG
mobilise effectively their local population. ³7KHGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQWKHQHZ
PD\RUVZKRHQWHUWKH/($'(5SURMHFWODWHURQDQGWKHROGRQHVLVJUHDW´ 
(LEADER+ coordinator). I need to clarify that when the LEADER+ 
FRRUGLQDWRUUHIHUUHGWRQHZPD\RUVVKHGLGQ¶WPHDQPD\RUVZKRwere elected 
for the first time even if this may have been the case for some of them; instead 
she talked in terms of their recent membership in DAH.    
 
Their constitutive recruitment in DAH, their long-term acquaintance and their 
experience have created an advantageous position when being compared to 
other mayors-partners of the DAH council. Their power was translated in more 
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money claims for their municipalities and formulation of policy options for the 
DAH future. For instance, in the LEADER + project, I have found that more 
LQYHVWPHQWVKDYHEHHQUHDOLVHGLQ³2OG0D\RUV´¶PXQLFLSDOLWLHV. Based on the 
following table 22 showing the number of private investments in LEADER+ 
E\PXQLFLSDOLW\LWLVLQGLFDWLYHWKDWWKH³ROG´PXQLFLSDOLWLHVVXFKDV$UFKDQHV
N. Kazantzakis and Episkopis had more investments in comparison to other 
municipalities with the extreme case of N. Kazantzakis municipality where 11 
from 46 private investments have been realised. 
 
Municipality 
Number of 
private 
investments 
Municipality 
Number of 
private 
investments 
Arkalochori 1 Kasteliou 5 
Archanon 5 Mallion 1 
Asterousion 2 Moiron 1 
Gaziou 3 N. Kazantzaki 11 
Gouvon 1 Xersonisou 4 
Episkopis 4 Total  46 
Heraklion 5 
  
Thrapsanou 3 
  
Table 22: /RFDWLRQRISULYDWHLQYHVWPHQWVRI/($'(5E\PXQLFLSDOLW\DXWKRU¶V
elaboration.  Source : www.anher.gr  
 
+RZHYHU³2OG0D\RUV´KDGFKDUDFWHULVHGWKHLUDWWLWXGHVWRZDUGVQHZPD\RUV
as more instructive than directional. According to them, they have tried to 
transfer their experience on collaboration and their knowledge of how things 
have to be done to the new gHQHUDWLRQRIPD\RUV³:HWKHROGPD\RUVZH
have the experience but we never told the new mayors that they are stupid they 
know nothing. We are not monopolising the knowledge. However, we have the 
duty to transfer our knowledge to the new mayors for a better cooperation and 
GHYHORSPHQW´PD\RUSDUWQHURIWKH'$+FRXQFLO 
 
:LWKRXWGRXEWLQJWKHJRRGZLOORI³2OG0D\RUV´LWLVHYLGHQWIURPWKHDERYH
quotation only, that the existing hierarchical relations were embedded in a 
FRQWH[WRIDWUDGLWLRQDO³WHDFKer-VWXGHQW´VW\OHZKHUHWKH³ROGJX\V´NQRZZKDW
must be done. Especially when dealing with mayors operating in a context of 
strong localism (chapter 4, section 2.2.2), these unequal relations derived from 
238 
 
unequal knowledge on programme management could easily result in unequal 
SURMHFWV¶IXQGLQJGLVWULEXWLRQLQIDYRXURI³WHDFKHUV´ 
 
This network has been led by few visionary mayors. These mayors have had a 
concrete and strong political vision for the regional development in general and 
for the future of DAH in particular. They have essentially been distinguished 
from the simple observers - DAH council partners who have unconditionally 
followed the DAH developments. A mayor and partner of the DAH council 
UHSRUWHGRQWKDW³7KHUHLVDQLQIRUPDOJURXSWKDWQDYLJDWHVWKHERDW>«@
When there are some common principles among mayors, like the commitment 
to local development, the communication is like a chemical reaction and it 
PRYHVHYHU\WKLQJDKHDG¶¶$QRWKHUPD\RUDGGHG³7KHUHDUHORFDODXWKRULWLHVRI
³WZRVSHHGV´7KHUHDUHWKRVHWKHPD\RUVRIZKLFKSDUWLFLSDWHLQWKHDAH 
council and are actively involved in the procedures and there are just the 
simple partners´. It is argued that these ³ERDWFDSWDLQV´FRQVWLWXWHGWKHFRUHRI
decision-making inside LEADER+ MC and LAG (or DAH) and strongly 
influenced the DP of EQUAL II. 
 
Consequently, despite all the claims of the European Community Initiative 
programmes for openness, diversity, and empowerment of different interests 
inside partnerships, one becomes immediately aware by the numerical 
representation of partners and their power relations as well as by the 
management structure that both partnerships were dominated by few mayors 
implementing their political choices through a semi-public institution i.e. the 
DAH which has been directly controlled by them. In these partnerships, there 
was actually an amalgamation of various interests and motivations but this 
amalgamation refers mainly WRYDULRXVPD\RUV¶LQWHUHVWVDQG'$+H[HFXWLYHV¶
expertise.   
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 Second rule:  Intergovernmental dynamics of partnership: the 
domination of a centralised and highly politicised State  
 
The CIs rules have been translated by the Greek state through the prism of a 
certain number of values and practices, which have been established for many 
\HDUVLQWKHSXEOLFVHUYLFHDQGWKHVWDWH¶VSROLWLFDORUJDQLVDWLRQ7KHVHLQIRUPDO
rules have not led to the empowerment of local government as one would have 
expected looking exclusively at CIV¶ formal rules. Instead, the central state 
through its relative ministries and MAs has remained the most powerful actor 
in the LEADER+ and EQUALII programmes by developing high hierarchical 
relations with local government.   
 
The empowerment and bottom-up approach principles had to be developed not 
only between local partnership and local community but also between central 
administration and local partnership. However, it is argued that the state 
essentially had approached bottom-up principle one-dimensionally as 
managerial decentralisation. In the interview with the ex- general secretary of 
the LEADER+ project, bottom-up approach seemed to be related with a very 
QDLYHDSSURDFK³:HWUHDWWKHLQYHVWRULQDIDYRXUDEOHZD\KLVSD\PHQWPDGH
at the local level, by the LDA, he did not have difficulties as in the case of 
other development projects in which their application is controlled by the 
central mLQLVWU\LQ$WKHQV´6RDFFRUGLQJWRKLPVLQFHWKHSURMHFWEHQHILFLDU\
had negotiated and did business only with the LDAs without personally 
addressing the ministry, the bottom-up approach had been secured. As stated, 
in a humorous way, in the interview with an EU officer ³,QRWKHUZRUGVWKH\
want (state government) to support the bottom-up approach with the condition 
that the bottom will be them and the up will be them again; them being the 
ministry and the M$´ 
 
Essentially, the Greek state has been highly centralised and remained so during 
ERWKSURMHFWV¶LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ³No ministry in Greece wants to lose political 
control; the Minister wants to have them all in his/her hands´ (EU officer). 
That is why the EQUAL II FRRUGLQDWRUSRLQWHGWKDW³:HIRXQGWKDWLIZHZHUH
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based in Athens, it would be easier to run the project because I could go to the 
ministry every day and solve my problems; everything is FRQWUROOHGE\LW´.  
  
2.1 Political power  
State power has been expressed in two levels: politically and bureaucratically. 
In the first level, the state has all on its own made decisions about the following 
issues: the overall budget of CIs and its geographical distribution at regional 
level, the definition of policy priorities and areas of intervention, and finally 
the selection of DPs and LAGs. For instance, in relation to the definition of 
programme policy priorities, in the EQUAL II case, the role of the state in the 
promotion of particular measures was very significant because it changed the 
financial distribution for promoting measures that had been inactive in the first 
round of the initiative.  
 
Another example is the geographical distribution of money to the regions. 
Which region had been eligible for more or less funding depended on 
ministerial decisions. These decisions were influenced by party political games 
since the regions had only been typically consulted. They were also influenced 
E\WHFKQRFUDWLFNQRZOHGJHDWFHQWUDOOHYHOUHJDUGLQJIXQGV¶DEVRUSWLon at the 
earliest possible time (see more for funding absorption below, fifth rule³The 
system here is upside down, they do not make an assessment for identifying 
needs first; they instead distribute money geographically and they then explore 
what actions they can carry ouWZLWKWKLVPRQH\´(8RIILFHU). According to 
PD\RUV¶YLHZVWKHVWDWHGLGQRWWDNHLQWRDFFRXQWWKHORFDOQHHGVRIHDFKDUHD
at all³7here was no room to express our views; this probably was done at a 
higher level, by our local deputiHV´0D\RURI$UNDORFKRUL 
 
In particular, during my interviews with partners, I have identified a strong 
vertical informal political network that influenced state decisions in both 
programmes. This network comprised of mayors of participant municipalities, 
local deputies and the relevant minister. This extended intergovernmental 
QHWZRUNKDGEHHQVWUXFWXUHGDURXQGSROLWLFDODQGSDUWLVDQLQWHUHVWV¶
motivations; political in terms of mayors and deputies re-election needs and 
partisan in terms of favouritism and party clientelism. It was this network that 
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promoted political and partisan pressures and demands instead of real local 
needs that the LEADER+ national external evaluator FULWLFLVHG³)URPP\
experience in all territorial levels, from the upper political level to the lower 
one, no one had the courage to say that this village does not need this 
investment; make the investment in another village that actually has a 
VWUXFWXUDOQHHG>«@7KLVLVXQIRUWXQDWHO\KRZWKHZKROHSROLWLFDOV\VWHPLQ
*UHHFHZRUNV´.  
 
Discussing the selection procedures of DPs by the relevant Ministry, one EU 
officer SUHVHQWHGWKHVLWXDWLRQLQDFOHDUZD\³IRUWKHSHULRG-2006, there 
have been proclamation notices and there has been a big interest but the 
selection of proposals has not been made in the most appropriate way. Political 
SDUWLHV¶LQWHUHVWVZHUHVWURQJO\LQYROYHG´ 
 
The following figure represents graphically the network actors, their influence 
and power relations. I argue that this network is characterised by hierarchical 
relations with the minister having the final say for all key decisions. From my 
own experience when preparing a proposal bid for EQUAL II on behalf of a 
local authority, I remembered that when all propositions had been conformed 
to project prerequisites and evaluated by external evaluators, they then were 
ILOHGLQWKH³PLQLVWHU¶VGUDZHU´6LQFHWKDWDOOKDGEHHQZDLWLQJIRUWKH
moment the minister would look at them and make his/her decision.  
 
7KHPLQLVWHU¶VSUHGRPLQDQFHZDVDOVRUHODWHGWRSURJUDPPHV¶VXSSRUWDQG
progress. Analysing the reasons of the EQUAL II success, an EQUAL II MA 
H[HFXWLYHUHSRUWHGWKDW³7KHSROLWLFDOOHDGHUVKLSLHPLQLVWHUDQGWKH
appointed general secretary) has an important role in the success of the 
programme; success depends on whether they have the political will to support 
or not the programme. Since 2002 when the EQUAL II project was launched, 
WKHJRYHUQPHQWKDVFKDQJHGDQGFKDQJHVRIPLQLVWHUV¶IROORZHGWRR
sometimes they had the will to support the programme and sometimes they did 
QRW´ 
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Figure 16: Vertical political network of decision-making process  
 
Regarding local GHSXWLHV¶UROHRQH(8RIILFHU described in detail their 
pressures in LEADER+³7KHORFDOGHSXWLHVLQWHUYHQHLQWZRZD\VWKHILUVW
one concerns the budget distribution in regions. In the case of LEADER, this 
DFWXDOO\UHJDUGV/$*V¶VHOHFWLRQ>«@7KH\JRWRWKHPLQLVWU\DQGWKH\EHJLQ
H[HUFLVLQJSUHVVXUH,WLVOLNHWKLV´7KHVHFRQGZD\LVWKURXJKWKHHOHFWRUDO
type of the prefecture that they represent: if the prefecture is uninominal, or 
ZKHWKHULWKDVDORWRIGHSXWLHV%\UXQQLQJWKHJRYHUQPHQWZLWKWKHUXOH³,
JLYH&,VPRQH\LQRUGHUWRJDLQLQIOXHQFHRQSUHIHFWXUHV¶YRWHUVHYHQWRWKRVH
ZKRDUHQRWLQVRPXFKQHHG´PRUHDWWHQWLRQLVJLYHQWRXQLQRPLQDO electoral 
prefectures because in this case, the government has a good chance to 
maximise its political DSSHDO$VWKHVDPH(8RIILFHUIXUWKHUVWDWHG³,VLW
possible for a small prefecture to be allocated the same amount of money when 
Heraklion prefecture is more densely populated? Yes it is, because Heraklion 
Decision-making process  
Mayors: pressures through 
local deputies or directly to 
the minister 
Local deputies: intermediary 
role 
 
Minister: makes the final 
decision 
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has a lot of deputies, while a small prefecture could have only one. For the 
JRYHUQPHQWLWLVYHU\LPSRUWDQWWRZLQWKLVSUHIHFWXUHRYHU´ 
 
Mayors either pressurised the local deputies who belong to the same party or 
they went directly to the minister, especially when there was common political 
affiliation. It is not a coincidence that during my field work trying to arrange 
my interview appointments with mayors, their secretaries very often told me 
that they were in Athens for a meeting at the ministry. Being a civil servant in 
the Ministry of Interior Affairs, I have almost every day seHQPD\RUV³FRPH
DQGJR´WRWKHJHQHUDOVHFUHWDU\DQGPLQLVWHU¶VRIILFHVIRUSURPRWLQJWKHLUORFDO
demands. I remember an incident that a mayor described after the end of the 
interview. It was about an informal visit of the LEADER+ MA general 
secretary with his wife who came from this municipality. To welcome them, 
the mayor organised a celebration and he told me in detail how he managed to 
PDNHWKHJHQHUDOVHFUHWDU\¶VZLIHWRGDQFHDQGVLQJ+HHQGHGWKHVWRU\E\
VD\LQJWKDW³ZKLOH,DPDIILOLDWHGWRDQRWKHUSROLWLFDOSDUW\,GLGWKDWIRUWKH
sake of my municLSDOLW\VRWKDWZHFDQDFFHVVWKHJRYHUQPHQWLQWKHIXWXUH´ 
 
So, the clientelistic practices exercised by political parties and government 
UHPDLQHGVWURQJLQDOOWKHVWDJHVRIQDWLRQDO&,V¶SODQQLQJUDQJLQJIURPWKH
simplest decisions to the more complex ones. This was also mentioned by the 
EU geographical responsible of EQUAL: ³In Greece, politics have been 
GLIIXVHGLQWKHORZHUOHYHOLQSDUWQHUVKLSV¶VHOHFWLRQZKLOHLQRWKHUFRXQWULHV
this does not happen, politics remain at  higher levels´.      
 
These pressures led to extremely irrational situations as for example that in 
(48$/¶VILUVWURXQG7KH'3RI'$+KDGREOLJDWRULO\PHUJHGZLWKDQRWKHU
DP, which was more than 1.000 km away from Crete in order to satisfy 
SROLWLFDOSDUWLHV¶GHPDQGV³,WKDGbeen a very big DP and in reality there were 
hardly any contacts. The ministry unified us; as a result the DP was in essence 
a ministry creation. It has QRWEHHQRSHUDWLRQDODWDOO´&oordinator of   
EQUAL II).  
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Therefore, in these decision- making processes, the fundamental principles of 
partnership and bottom-up approach seemed to lose their prestige. Their goal to 
improve vertical and horizontal coherence with multiple tiers of government 
institutional coordination and involvement of local actors had been weakened 
towards this informal vertical network. Even though this network brought up 
demands from the lower level, these demands had been based on political 
SDUWLHV¶ pressures29 and political motives for government re-election. 
 
2.2 Bureaucratic power  
Regarding bureaucratic procedures, there was a complicated, to a certain point 
exhausting, system of management with a lot of institutions involved and an 
extensive number of laws defining planning, management and implementation. 
³The institutional part governing EQUAL II is too bureaucratic i.e. the 
certification of costs, how the payments have to be made, how to do the project 
LQGHWDLO«. I have spoken to Italian and Spanish people who implement 
EQUAL II and there is QRFRPSDULVRQ´(EQUAL II coordinator).  
 
In LEADER+ too, the extensive programme bureaucratisation was evident if 
one looked at the number of involved institutions and institutional documents 
that the partners had to follow in order to conform to the programme 
requirements. DAH as the coordinator had to communicate with the following 
upper level institutions:  
a) Ministry of Agriculture (General Directorate of Land Reclamation Works)  
b) Monitoring  Authority (MA) of LEADER +,  
c) Ministry of Finance (paying authority,  General Accounting Office)  
d)The Monitoring Committee of LEADER + and 
e) EC Monitoring Committees   
                                                 
29
 The influence of political parties by informal channels of communication with the state is 
evident also at the European level. Informal discussions with Greek executives in Brussels had 
confirmed that the internal competitive party games of the Greek governments of the two 
major parties (PASOK and N.D.) had influenced the Greek policy in Brussels. An example 
referred to was a post change for a permanent EU executive of Greek nationality due to their 
disagreement with the political decisions of a newly elected Greek minister who belonged to a 
different political party to the one of the executive. Another example was the political 
resistance of the new at that time government to decisions of the previous government 
regarding national reformation of particular social policies strongly promoted by the EU 
Commissionaire for years. 
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Additionally, the institutional framework governing LEADER + 
implementation comprised of 46 different documents and was divided into 
joint ministerial decision, laws, directives, regulations and guidelines.  
 
This complex system of control was a clear choice of the Greek politico- 
administrative system and was in no way an EC formal requirement. In the 
interview with an EU officerKHZRQGHUHG³:KRKDVHYHQasked to certify that 
the investor has fulfilled his military service? The Commission? Certainly not, 
WKLVLVSXUHO\QDWLRQDO´.        
 
The overregulation has stemmed from two factors: one was operational and it 
was related to corruption and problems of programme sustainability and the 
other was political and it was related to political control exercised by ministers 
and local interests. In regards to the first one, in Greece, especially in the first 
decade of EU inflows i.e. in 1985-1995, there were several cases of 
mismanagement and corruption and long delays in funds absorption (see for 
example the Mediterranean Integrated Programme and LEADER I).  
 
Being responsive to these problems, the Greek government went to the other 
extreme, namely to check everything so as to prevent cases of wasting public 
DQG(8PRQH\³7KHVWDWHKDVFKRVHQWRLPSOHPHQWVWULFWDXGLWVEHFDXVH/'$V
were used to great freedom by interpreting Greek laws LQWKHLURZQZD\´([
general secretary of LEADER+). This of course resulted in extremely 
formalistic controls, which made it harder for investors to invest and led them 
into "illegal" procedures in order to finish the project on time. ³2QWKHRQH
hand, the state pressurised them to complete the projects and on the other hand, 
it exhausted them with audits so that they found their own "ways" to achieve 
WKHLUJRDO´(8RIILFHU).  
 
Moreover, since partnership was not a regular policy practice for local actors, 
WKHIHDURIWKHVWDWHIRUSDUWQHUV¶ZLWKGUDZDOVKDGOHGWRWKHLQVWLWXWLRQDOLVDtion 
RIDOOSDUWQHUVKLSV¶FRQVWLWXHQWSDUWVIRUVHFXULQJLWVVXVWDLQDELOLW\$VRQHRI
the EU evaluators of EQUAL reported:  ³In Greece, there is a greater tendency 
246 
 
to institutionalise all policy processes, perhaps because politicians feel that if 
they do not do that nothing will operate well enough, while in England or 
,UHODQGWKHFRRSHUDWLRQFDQEHEDVHGMXVWRQJRRGSUDFWLFH´.  At the political 
level, the local government, faced with all these state institutions and 
documents, has confirmed state power because it is the latter which had 
regulated all the rules of the game, supposedly always adhering to European 
regulations.  
 
However, the overregulation has not only derived  from the state's attempt to 
control corruption, protect programme completion, and show off its superiority 
but also by the possibility of sharing control and money among more players in 
the state government. In particular, all the plethora of involved institutions and 
legal acts had allowed for CIs control by several ministries, which in turn were 
susceptible to pressures and interventions in programme design by many, often 
disparate, local political interests.  
 
As a result, in this context, the substance of these programmes for innovative 
and integrated local development was essentially lost. ³7KHSUHVHUYDWLRQRID
WLHGIUDPHRIPRQLWRULQJDQGSROLWLFDOFRQWURO>«@GRQRWDGMXVWWRWKH³ERWWRP-
XSDSSURDFKDQGWKHSLORWDSSURDFKRIORFDOGHYHORSPHQW´Mid - term 
evaluation report of LEADER+, 2005).  30  
                                                 
30The highly politicised feature of the Greek state by the ruling government becomes apparent 
if one closely looks at the relation of ministries with the monitoring committees and MAs of 
both CIs. Although CIs horizontal dynamics at state level are not part of my analysis, I provide 
some evidence to further support my argument. The LEADER monitoring committee had 
limited influence, particularly the involved socio-economic actors. The same applied to the 
EQUAL project. According to the EU - wide evaluation of EQUAL (2006), the role of social 
partners in the Greek EQUAL monitoring committee was restricted to the typical role of 
FRQVXOWDWLRQRQO\$OWKRXJKVRFLDORUJDQLVDWLRQV¶SDUWLFLSDWLRQLQWKHIRUPXODWLRQRI
employment policy constituted an improvement when compared with previous formal 
consultation exercises, their role appeared to be less important. However, they have played a 
crucial role in the dissemination of information in their own networks. The fact that the 
monitoring committees did not contribute to the established operation of CIs programmes and 
their task was not finally performed properly has also been confirmed in the literature 
(Ioakimidis, 1996). Talking in general about the cohesion funds, the national external evaluator 
RI/($'(5QRWHGWKDW³LQWKHPRQLWRULQJFRPPLWWHHVWKHHFRQRPLFDQGVRFLDODFWRUVKDYH
limited power and little opportunities to expUHVVWKHLURSLQLRQ´ 
 
Furthermore, the MAs role was also restricted to the operationalisation of the programme 
principles according to the political will of ministers. For instance in the LEADER case, even 
if the MA was trying to promote local integrated development, it had been under pressure by 
the political leadership of the Ministry to maintain the traditional relations between the 
247 
 
The centralisation feature of the Greek state has also been confirmed in both 
the EU programmes evaluations referring to Greece as a member state that 
centrally organised programmes.  Suggestions have been made for the need of 
UHJLRQDOORFDOVWDNHKROGHUV¶JUHDWHULQYROYHPHQWLQDOOWKHVtages of 
SURJUDPPHLPSOHPHQWDWLRQ³1HLWKHUUHJLRQDORIILFHVQRUORFDODXWKRULWLHVDUH
involved in the management and monitoring of the national EQUAL II plan´
(EU-wide evaluation of the CI EQUAL, 2006).  
 
On the contrary, in many member states, decisions for the EQUAL II national 
plan had been made together with the regional and/or local level of 
JRYHUQPHQW)RULQVWDQFHLQ*HUPDQ\/lQGHUDVZHOODVRWKHUORFDODFWRUV
participated in an EQUAL II national monitoring committee and they have 
taken part in tKH'3V¶VHOHFWLRQ,Q)UDQFHDOWKRXJKHPSOR\PHQWSROLF\
strictly speaking, was the responsibility of central government like in Greece, 
EQUAL II national planning has been marked by strong involvement of 
regional partners. In less centralised countries like the United Kingdom and 
Belgium, it was their regional authorities that had produced their own EQUAL 
II planning (EU-wide evaluation of the CI EQUAL, 2006).  
  
                                                                                                                                 
Ministry and the countryside.  Additionally, some of the MA staff have been ex-employees of 
the Ministry which means that they brought with them the relevant attitudes of a civil servant  
³$QGZHVKRXOGQRWIRUJHWWKDWWKH0A is composed by officials from the Ministry who 
FRQWLQXHLPSOHPHQWLQJLQWKHLUZRUNDWWLWXGHVDGRSWHGIURPZKHQZRUNLQJLQWKHJRYHUQPHQW´
(EU officer). Traditionally, the strong bureaucratic system of Greece has given specific 
characteristics to civil servants: conservatism, fear of responsibility, low productivity and 
obedience to politicians. Therefore, those programmes that demand a comprehensive and 
innovative design are not entirely supported by appropriate and independent from short 
political intereVWV¶SXEOLFDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ 
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Third rule: Community engagement: more information than 
participation  
3.1 Community involvement  
As mentioned in the previous chapter, community involvement was a 
significant formal rule in both programmes. In the EQUAL II partnership, the 
community participation was realised by applying the empowerment rule, 
while in LEADER+ by applying the rule of bottom-up approach. However, I 
argue that these rules have actually been restricted to practices of information 
and limited consultation rather than of active local community participation 
because they have embedded in their operation established practices of civil 
society and state apparatus organisation. ³7KHSULQFLSOHRIERWWRP-up approach 
was never realised. It was more about local authorities providing information 
through the local press without feedback from the locaOSRSXODWLRQ´([HFXWLYH
of LEADER+ MA).      
 
In LEADER +, LAG or in other words DAH had functioned more as a body of 
programme implementation and lesser as a body that would empower and 
motivate the local society to plan their vision for sustainable development.  For 
instance, the selection of a priority theme around which all programme action 
would have been built, has not been the result of consultation with local 
SHRSOHLWZDVUDWKHU/$*¶VFKRLFHZKLFKVXEVHTXHQWO\KDVEHFRPHNQRZQWR
the public by project information actions. The priority theme selection was 
mainly based on a study about the socio-economic character of the area 
realised by the DAH at the request of the relevant M.A.  
 
In regards to the Local Action Plan, it was the local authorities of the 
prefecture who designed it. As mentioned in the mid-term evaluation report of 
LEADER+ for the countryside of Heraklion (2005: 83) ³7he forms completed 
by local authorities and other public bodies and the information provided by 
mayors, DAH partners, who know very well the local community, had 
FRQWULEXWHGVLJQLILFDQWO\WRWKHSURJUDPPH¶VGHVLJQ´DQGLWFRQWLQXHVE\
UHSRUWLQJWKDW³LWVKRXOGEHQRWHGWKDW/$*ZRUNORDGLQFRPELQDWLRQZLWK
administrative routine and bureaucratic requirements in some way deprive 
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YDOXDEOHWLPHIURPWKHPDWXUDWLRQRIQHZLGHDVE\FRQVXOWLQJORFDOSHRSOH´ 
So, although there were a few participatory processes (see chapter 5, Second 
ruleWKH\ZHUHWRDJUHDWH[WHQWIRUPDORQHVRSHUDWLQJPDLQO\DV³REOLJDWRU\´
due to the programme requirements, thus allowing the programme design 
exclusively to mayors.  
 
This was not only a Cretan phenomenon. This happened in all the LAGs of 
Greece. If someone looked at the local evaluation reports of each LAG, the 
bottom-up approach was restricted to an extended publicity of the project to 
local institutions and people in the area of intervention (Mid- term evaluation 
report of LEADER+ , 2005). In the interview with the LEADER+ national 
external evaluatorLWZDVPHQWLRQHGWKDW³7KH\WKH LDAs) have to set up 
campaigns informing citizens as this is one of the programme prerequisites but 
DOOWKLVKDVQRWEHHQGHYHORSHGDQ\IXUWKHUWKXVUHPDLQLQJDWDEDVLFOHYHO´DQG
it was added that ³In Greece, the concept of LAG does not essentially exist. 
Without downplaying the LDA as a tool in the hands of local authorities and 
prefectures for local development, the character of LEADER as a pilot, 
innovative and self-development of local communities programme does not 
H[LVW´ 
 
Making an effort to explain the limited participation of local community, the 
institutional legacies of civil society and state are at stake. As already 
mentioned in the section for the Greek political system (chapter 4), the civil 
society is weak and the state is very centralised. Under this situation, there 
were a lot of structural limitations preventing community participation in both 
CIs planning and decision-making. First, a centralised state means that there 
was not a lot of room for new ideas and initiatives derived from the local level. 
,QDQHQYLURQPHQWZKHUHWKHVWDWHKDVJLYHQSROLFLHV¶GLUHFWLRQFRPPXQLW\
involvement has been limited to formal processes of information about pre-
decided sectors of activities.   
 
Additionally, state policy directions were combined with exhausting financial 
controls in both projects. In practice, the LDAs had to respond to a great 
number of regulations and controls, which immediately prohibited the adoption 
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of pilot projects, which by their nature need flexibility and openness. And the 
queVWLRQ³:KLFK/'$ZLOOWDNHWKHUHVSRQVLELOLW\WRLQYHVWLQDQLQLWLDWLYH
ZLWKRXWDQ\GLUHFWUHVXOW´National external evaluator of LEADER+) and risky 
outcomes emerged quite naturally.  
 
Although the sectors of project intervention were selected by the state, they had 
to be adapted by DAH according to local needs. Here, state centralisation fitted 
with local government centralisation, not used to practices of citizen 
consultation. Thus, the elected politicians of the national and local government 
ended up being those who made the choices about the projects rather than the 
community as required by CIs formal regulations.  
 
7KLVQRUPZDVVRGHHSO\HPEHGGHGLQORFDOSDUWQHUV¶DWWLWXGHVWKDWKDGOHGWKH
DAH president, a mayor too, to interpret the rule of bottom-up approach as a 
collective effort by neighbouring local authorities to support a common 
development action plan for the whole Heraklion prefecture. The local plan had 
WREHEDVHGRQPD\RUVDQG/'$VH[SHUWV¶YLHZV³/($'(5KDVWKHORJLFRI
bottom-up approach: the planning from below. So, we respect the 
particularities of each area, we use our experience from the national and 
LQWHUQDWLRQDODUHQD>«@WKHHOHFWHGSROLWLFLDQVDQG/'$VH[HFXWLYHVKDYH
accumulated knowledge  and experience, and we finally combine the 
GHYHORSPHQWQHHGVRIHDFKDUHDZLWKRXUNQRZOHGJHDQGH[SHULHQFH´,WLV
interesting to note that all these have been said by a mayor with strong 
democratic aspirations following that he has supported the development of 
participatory institutions in his community; not a common practice in other 
local authorities. 31 Consequently, in the LEADER+ project, bottom-up 
approach was related to deconcentration, inter-municipal cooperation, 
community information but in no case did it respond to the core of the concept 
which has been community involvement.                
 
                                                 
31
 ,QSDUWLFXODUKHKDVLQLWLDWHGDQHZSDUWLFLSDWRU\LQVWLWXWLRQLQKLVFRPPXQLW\FDOOHG³2SHQ
FRPPLWWHHVRIDFWLYHFLWL]HQV´ZKHUHFLWL]HQVFDQGLVFXVVDQGH[SUHVVWKHLURSLQLRQRQIRXU
policy sectors: education, culture, environment and development.   
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Regarding local civil society, the main problem was that local civil society was 
not strong enough to respond to that kind of CIV¶ requirements for 
participation. Although the prefecture of Heraklion enjoyed higher levels of 
social capital comparing with the rest of Greece, its social capital still remained 
low in regards to other EU countries like for instance the Nordic ones. 
Consequently, the lack of a solid collective spirit among citizens and the 
emergence of an individualist culture did not easily support the development of 
collective perspectives for the feature of the area. This was evident in the effort 
on behalf of both projects to create clusters among same businesses for 
expanding their product market. Although this example is not directly related 
with community participation, it shows the difficulties of cooperation. Except a 
winery cluster32, all other clusters, that of women cooperatives, agrotourism 
accommodation and potteries, had cooperation problems due to attitudes of 
mistrust and internal competitions quite early on. As the representative of the 
ZLQHU\FOXVWHUUHSRUWHG³,QWKHFDVHRIWKHSRWWHUV¶FOXVWHU'$+VXSSRUWHGDQG
guided them in how to work together and be a team. If they did not want to 
work as a team themselves, the programme would not have managed to make 
them one´    
 
3.2 Programme beneficiaries 
In the case of programmeV¶EHQHILFLDULHV, the same difficulties were also there. 
In my long discussions with representatives of women¶VFRRSHUDWLYHV, the 
reluctance and fear of cooperative action surfaced in addition to the direct 
dependence on DAH. For example, regarding the women's cooperative in 
Zakros, in the beginning, women were very reluctant to participate in this type 
of economic activity. Finally, only 5 decided to go on. These women expressed 
their continuous dependence on LDA in terms of the organisation and 
promotion of their products. They were also hesitant to continue the project 
after the end of the programme IXQGLQJ³:KHQWKHSURMHFWZDVRYHUZHZHUH
very frightened; what were we going to do on our own; we kept on calling 
*LDQQLVWRKHOSXV´President of women's cooperative of Zakros).  
                                                 
32The cluster of winery was the most effective from the others because wine producers had 
previously developed cooperation outside the LEADER project and later on they had come 
across this funding opportunity to support furthermore their initial cooperative effort. 
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,Q.URXVDQLRWLVVD¶VFRRSHUDWLYHFROODERUDWLRQSUREOHPVKDGDOVRarisen, mainly 
competitiveness among women and ignorance of how collaboration could be 
DFKLHYHG³,QWKHEHJLQQLQJZHGLGQ¶WNQRZZKDWZDVJRLQJRQZHGLGQ¶W
KDYHDFOXH7KHPDLQSUREOHPVZHUHWKHODFNRIWHDPVSLULWDQGZRPHQ¶VORZ
educational level. We also had problems of cooperation between our president 
DQGWKHDGPLQLVWUDWLRQERDUG´President of the women's cooperative of 
.URXVVDQLRWLVVD&RRSHUDWLYHV¶GHSHQGHQFHRQ'$+VHHPHGWRUHSURGXFHLQ
a smaller scale, the dependence of Greek civil society organisations on state 
institutions.  
 
Regarding LEADER+ private investors who are the main programme 
beneficiaries, the lack of trust on public institutions was the main problem. In 
this case, we could see again the reproduction of private sector- central state 
relation at a lower level. As at the upper level, when private firms do not trust 
the state for taking over common projects, similarly, at the local level, in the 
beginning investors appeared quite reluctant to join the project - although this 
attitude has gradually changed since the first project results have been positive. 
³:KHQZHYLVLWHGQHZDUHDVLQYHVWRUVZHUHTXLWHFDXWLRXVDQGKHVLWDQW,WZDV
like here in Archanes, when the Mediterranean Integrated Programmes started 
years ago that we proposed to people to renovate their houses and they  got 
DIUDLGWKDWWKH(8ZRXOGWDNHWKHPZKHQWKHUHQRYDWLRQZRXOGILQLVK´
(Coordinator of LEADER+). The private sector mistrust towards the public one 
was also verified in the EQUAL II case regarding actions related to corporate 
social responsibility promotion in private companies. There was a major 
difficulty to convince the companies to cooperate with social enterprises for 
supporting their products (First evaluation report of EQUAL II in Crete, 2006). 
 
 FuUWKHUPRUHWKHLQYHVWRUV¶UHOXFWDQFHKDVEHHQJURZLQJGXHWREXUHDXFUDWLF
burdens regarding proposal submissions and financial management of the 
approved investments. When asked about future plans with regards to ensuring 
funding for their business from other European projects, a private investor 
UHVSRQGHGWRPHLQGLJHQWO\³1RDQG,GRQRWWKLQNWKDW,ZDQWWRKDYHWKLV
H[SHULHQFHDJDLQLQWKHIXWXUH7KHEXUHDXFUDF\LVXQEHOLHYDEOH>«@WKHSXEOLF
VHFWRUUHTXLUHPHQWVKDYHGLVFRXUDJHGXV´ 
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One main difference that I identified between EQUAL II beneficiaries 
(women¶V cooperatives) and LEADER+ private investors concerns the most 
HIIHFWLYHSDUWLFLSDWLRQRIWKHODWWHULQDFWLRQV¶GHVLJQ,QWKHWZRPLQLFDVH
studies of LEADER+, that of winery clusters and of an agro-tourism 
accomodation, the investors had a very clear and realistic view of what they 
wanted to do. Thus, DAH had played a more supportive role by defining the 
possibilities and the limits of their investments in regards to project 
prerequisites and dealing with bureaucratic issues. As a private investor told 
PH³)RUXV/($'(5ZDVDWRROXVHGWRUHDOLVHRXULGHDV´2QWKHFRQWUDU\
in the case of women's cooperatives, the role of DAH was more of guiding and 
VWHHULQJGXHWRWKHZRPHQ¶VLQH[SHULHQFHRf business planning.    
 
7KHSUREOHPRIEHQHILFLDULHV¶OLPLWHGSDUWLFLSDWLRQZDVQRWRQO\D*UHHNRQH
Studying the EU evaluation report of EQUAL, it became obvious that there 
was a tension between EQUAL II requirement of ³SDUWLFLSDWLYHGHFLVLRQ-
PDNLQJ´ and the daily reality in other countries too. In practice, even in those 
cases in which the beneficiaries were regularly involved in different advisory 
groups, key decisions tended to be made by a core of agents despite the risk of 
partnership fragmentation (EU-wide evaluation report of EQUAL, 2006). In 
UK EQUAL II, for example, the evaluators stressed that the involved 
beneficiaries had found it difficult to follow some of the intricacies of project 
management, which finally had a disempowering rather than an empowering 
effect (EU-wide evaluation report of EQUAL, 2006). However, as in the case 
RIFRPPXQLW\SDUWLFLSDWLRQWKHHYDOXDWLRQRIWKHGHJUHHRIEHQHILFLDULHV¶
engagement should take each time into account national and local values and 
established practices that are embedded in it. 
254 
 
Forth rule: The partnership policy process: more technocratic 
than political  
In both CIs, the preparation of their bids and partnership management were 
very complicated and required specific knowledge by experts in order 
decisions to be made and be implemented. Indeed, the significance of 
managerial practices in partnership policies is not only a feature of EU 
programmes but a general trend evident in national policies of member states 
too (Skelcher et al, 2005). According to the authors, this produces a 
technocratisation of partnership policy giving considerable weight to 
professionals and experts in finding solutions for political issues downgrading 
in this way the political aspect of partnership decision-making. As shown in the 
next chapter about the relationship of mayors with the DAH chief executives, 
this phenomenon could strengthen local managers who gradually start to 
regulate local affairs without being controlled by local politicians.  
 
In this section, I argue that the requirement of sufficient knowledge and 
H[SHUWLVHLQERWK&,SURJUDPPHV¶PDQDJHPHQWEHFDPHDYHU\significant 
resource of power, even more important than the political one. In countries like 
Greece, where local (and national) government was not well equipped to run 
these programmes; the agencies that held this type of resources were quite 
influential inside partnerships. In my case study, this power was conceded to 
DAH. In an interview with a mayor, also member of the DAH council, the 
significance of this new power resource in decision-making processes stated 
TXLWHREYLRXVO\³,QWKHGHFLVLRQ-making, those who have knowledge have a 
dominant role. These are the President, the Director and the General Secretary 
(of the DAH). Knowledge is the criterion for the decision-making and we have 
to respect it [«@(YHQLQWKHFDVHWKDWWKHLVVXHDSSHDUVWREHVWULFWly political, 
it is never just political; it is technical, legal and economic too´. Moreover, in 
my interview with one EQUAL II partner, the uni-dimensional managerial 
solutions to political problems had remained an undoubted practice inside 
partnerships sLQFH³7KHUHZHUHQRDOWHUQDWLYHSURSRVLWLRQVRIWDFNOLQJLVVXHV
RWKHUWKDQWKRVHUHODWHGWRJRDOV¶DFKLHYHPHQWRQO\´ 
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Additionally to the knowledge for efficient project management, DAH also had 
the expertise in comparison to other local agencies and local authorities to get 
funding from EU or from Structural Funds directly, in a short time scale and to 
HIIHFWLYHO\SUHSDUHWKHSURJUDPPHV¶SURFODPDWLRQQRWLFHV³'$+KDVDJUHDW
influence. The coordinator knows very well its work, especially how to find 
new projects. These people are professionals (Executive of LDA OADYK).  
 
Once again in the Greek context, where resources were scarce and expertise 
was limited inside local political and socio-economic agencies33, the existence 
of an institution that brought money to the locality was respectful and being 
supported by mayors as well as by all local agencies, particularly the NGOs. 
As reported by the national external evaluator of LEADER+ ³7KHPD\RUV
purposefully build a good relation with the LDAs because they want to find 
resources for their local society and LDAs know well enough where they will 
ILQGPRQH\´ 
 
Furthermore, this knowledge was also highly valued by the NGOs, the 
existence of which depended mainly on their participation in programmes 
funded by EU and the state. Discussing about the funding resources of his 
agency, the ex-SUHVLGHQWRI.2,1232/,7,$PHQWLRQHGWKDW³7KHRQO\
resources are the programmes that are coordinated by agencies like DAH and 
the inter- state programmes in which KOINOPOLITIA participates as partner 
of implementation for an activity concerning its area of intervention; by its 
SDUWLFLSDWLRQLQDOOWKHVHWKHDJHQF\FRYHUVDOOWKHIXQFWLRQDOFRVWV´ 
 
Consequently, the domination of DAH in partnerships was also based on its 
institutional resources in terms of expertise, organisational capacities and 
NQRZOHGJH$VVKRZQEHORZ+D\¶VFRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQRILQGLUHFWSRZHU
                                                 
33
 In the Greek province, one main problem was the lack of experts for managing EU and 
national funded programmes. That is why a lot of interviewees mentioned the development of a 
local bureaucracy as a very significant RXWSXWRIWKHVHSURMHFWV³$IWHUWKHLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRI
LEADER, there are LDAs that are the biggest employer of scientific staff in local 
VRFLHWLHV>«@7KLVLVYLWDOHVSHFLDOO\IRUVPDOOFRPPXQLWLHV1DPHO\ZKHQWKHUHLVRQH
employer who can keep trained staff and run a number of programmes in localities that do not 
have other opportunities , I think this is very important (National external evaluator of 
LEADER+)      
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(Chapter, 1 section 2) could be identified to the power of DAH which 
supported and took advantage of the technocratisation of politics for 
reinforcing its position and shaping the partnership context in which the other 
partners act.    
 
In particular, if I look at the way that partners assessed the power relations in 
decision-PDNLQJWKHVWDWHPHQW³FRQIOLFWLVQRWQHFHVVDU\WRSRZHU´/XNHV
2005) adequately characterises power relations inside both partnerships. All 
partners from both partnerships persistently declared that there was no conflict 
among them. As the coordinator of LEADER+ stated LQWKHLQWHUYLHZ³:H
haYHWKHEOHVVLQJOHW¶VVD\QRWWRKDYHDQ\FRQIOLFWVQHLWKHUDWWKHSROLWLFDO
level, nor at the board and LAG level. The decisions are always unanimous, 
there is not any disagreement, no conflicts; the situatioQLVFRQVHQVXDO´. 
 
 The absence of major conflicts remained a special case when we considered 
potential conflict issues that emerged in cooperative projects in other parts of 
Greece such as "the management framework, the reallocation of budgetary 
resources, the existence of partners with different speeds and the partisan 
FRQIOLFWV´ (National external evaluator of EQUAL II). How did this happen 
especially in a region that localism has been very strong and has been referred 
to as an issue of conflict? The fact that there was no actual disagreement does 
not have to be translated into there being no power relations.   
 
$VDOUHDG\DQDO\VHGDERYHGHVSLWHDOOWKLV³YLVLEOHGLYHUVLW\´RISDUWQHUV'$+
managed to have a very dominant role. Besides its direct formal power, this 
dominant role was additionally derived from its capacity to take advantage of 
the technocratisation of programmes and so legitimatise its decisions by its 
expertise. In this way, DAH successfully managed to keep conflicts covert and 
control the agenda. Through discussions and negotiations with partners, DAH 
has attended the decision-making meetings with all issues settled and in this 
way all potential issues of disagreement were kept out the time of decision-
making. As the EQUAL II coordinator characteristically underlined -
confirming empirically the inadequacy of pluralist theory to identify power 
relations in the formal decision-making process- ³)RUXVWKHSDUWQHUVKLSERDUG
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is not the place to solve our problems. We know our problems, but we come 
here to make some decisions because that is what we have to do. We discuss 
our problems mainly in informal meetings with partners as these happen more 
often. At the partnership board, we meet each other for some formal decisions 
WKDWZHKDYHWRPDNHVRWKHUHDUHQRGLVDJUHHPHQWVDWWKDWWLPH´ 
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Fifth rule: The partnership policy process: more stability than 
innovation  
One principle of the CI programmes was innovation. Innovation did not only 
refer to new policies in terms of their outcomes and delivery but also to 
changes in policy processes and values that promote alternative arrangements 
(The Principle of Innovation in the new ESF Programmes, 2006). Although the 
CIs did not seem to have introduced as much innovation as would have been 
expected, innovation did take place in member states (EU-wide evaluation of 
the Community Initiative EQUAL, 2006; Synthesis of mid-term evaluations of 
LEADER+ programmes, 2005).  Indeed, the UK EQUAL II project went even 
further by approaching innovation as an experimentation process. The 
importance of deriving lessons, evHQIURPIDLOXUHZDVVWUHVVHG³Partnerships 
must ensure that lessons are not wasted or become secondary to the 
achievement of hard outputs. Much can be learnt from innovative approaches, 
ZKLFKDUHXQVXFFHVVIXO´EU-wide evaluation of the Community Initiative 
EQUAL, 2006: 106).  
 
I argue that in Greece, innovation was limited and restricted to a more 
pragmatic and utilitarian interpretation by national and local government due to 
organisational needs for stability and tangible results. As the ex-director of 
.2,1232/,7,$SRLQWHGRXW³7KHFROODERUDWLRQLVLPSRVHGE\WKH
requirements of European programmes, this is very important because we 
always try to implement collaboration under the pressure or the motive of 
funding and in this way we have produced outputs in a functional way 
regarding only two performance indicators: effectiveness  and implementation 
RIJRDOV´ 
 
In particular, the agony for stability and absorption of all the available funding 
had led to the bureaucratisation and standardisation of partnership processes 
DQGRXWFRPHVDWWKHH[SHQVHRILQLWLDWLRQDQGLQQRYDWLRQ³$WWKHEHJLQQLQJ
we have motivation, imagination and enthusiasm, in other words, all these 
elements that make something new. The moment that tables, statistical data and 
fiJXUHVRIIXQGLQJDEVRUSWLRQFRPHWRWKHIURQW>«@ZHVWDUWWRPDQDJHWKLQJV
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without looking at what we wLOOJDLQIURPWKLVPDQDJHPHQW´0ayor of 
Episkopis).     
 
In LEADER +, although the programme outcomes were very satisfactory, with 
the rate of absorption up to March 2005 reaching 40,23%34 of the budget and 
with the LAG of DAH ranked first in the table of all the 40 LAGs of the 
country for the distribution of the reserved funding, its investments were 
classified as less innovative. More specifically, a large part of investment 
interest focused on creating and improving infrastructures of accommodation 
and catering. As one LEADER+ 0$H[HFXWLYHXQGHUOLQHG³:HUHDFKHGWKH
point of mainly running accommodation projects because that was familiar and 
HDV\WRGR´.  
 
Even though in EQUAL II, innovation was achieved at a higher level, the 
initiatives in social economy very much relied on secure practices rather than 
on alternative and creative actions proposed by the partners (Final evaluation 
report of EQUAL II, 2008).  In my interview with an active and passionate 
member of the EQUAL II partnership, it was stated with obvious 
GLVDSSRLQWPHQWWKDW³There is a reproduction of the same standards: there is 
no innovation; if only the activities are safe and efficient to realise, do they get 
LPSOHPHQWHG´.  
 
For instance, inside the EQUAL II partnership, there were ideological tensions 
among partners that supported a more socially based approach for the operation 
of women's cooperatives and those (research centre, DAH) that promoted a 
more entrepreneurial approach for their development. During the meetings, the 
values of efficiency and of maximum possible absorption of project funding 
appeared to be the most beneficial for the partners. Consequently, any 
alternative practices seemed to be inadequate for the programme development. 
As one EQUAL II partner who has been involved in these discussions pointed 
                                                 
34
 Indeed, since 2005, the rate of absorption of the case study LEADER has preceded by far in 
comparison with LEADER programmes in other parts of Greece (Mid- term evaluation report 
of LEADER+, 2005). 
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RXW³7KHUHZHUHGLVDJUHHPHQWVUHJDUGLQJWKHFRQWHQWRIVRFLDOSROLF\ZKR
would be the beneficiaries and what type of organisation would support them.  
However, the coordinator focused mostly on the entrepreneurial part of it i.e. 
the cooperatives being sustainable, selling their products, while we proposed 
alternative solutions for which the coordinator feared thaWWKH\ZRXOGEHULVN\´ 
 
Discussing this issue with the external national evaluator of LEADER+, he 
RIIHUHGVXSSRUWWRP\DUJXPHQWDERXWOLPLWHGLQQRYDWLRQ³,Q*UHHFHZHJRW
to the other extreme where we looked at mainstreaming actions that have a 
greater financial absorption; thus securing that all funds will be used up. This 
practice prevents to a large extent any chance for innovation and bottom-up 
DSSURDFK´ 
 
7KHLQIRUPDOUXOH³DEVRUSWLRQYHUVXVLQQRYDWLRQ´ZDVVXSSRUWHGE\WKHFHQWUDO
state too. The rationale was to make use of any penny. That is why the ex-
general secretary of LEADER+ when asked to evaluate his work, the first thing 
WKDWKHSURXGO\PHQWLRQHGZDVWKDW³P\SODQZDVQRWWRORVHDQ\(XURSHDQ
funding. And during my tenure, we never lost any money and we had also 
UHFHLYHGERQXVHVIURPWKH&RPPXQLW\´,QGHHGWKHRIILFLDOLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI
innovation in EQUAL II QDWLRQDOUHSRUWZDVGLUHFWO\UHODWHGWRHIILFLHQF\³7KH
abstract reference to the modern character of a proposed method or a product 
would not be adequate for its characterisation as innovative. For it to be 
innovative, it should be accompanied by an increase in effectiveness or the 
solution of concrete problems regarding the obstacles in the access to the 
labour market of disadvantaged groups´Final evaluation report of EQUAL II, 
2008: 37).  
 
The downgrading of innovation by the key involved partners and therefore its 
low performance in the CIs of my case study were not only based on the 
general difficulties these projects dealt with in other member states but also on 
endogenous domestic constraints deriving from the negative experience on 
SUHYLRXVFROODERUDWLRQVSXEOLFDJHQFLHV¶GLVRUJDQLVDWLRQDQGORZOHYHORI
trust.  
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Starting from the latter, there were the individualistic attitudes and the lack of 
trust that could each time obstruct the process of cooperation that led to the 
adoption of more common well tested solutions. Talking about the problems of 
cooperation, the EQUAL II FRRUGLQDWRUVWDWHGWKDW³,EHOLHYHWKDWWKHSUREOHm 
that we have in Greece is related to trust and cooperation. It is hard for us to 
trust the other, their good will; we believe that something could be hidden. This 
LVDPDMRUSUREOHP´,QWKLVFRQWH[WRIPLVWUXVWZKHUHSUHYLRXVFROODERUDWLRQV
have failed, something new, for which the effort made by partners would be 
greater and processes and outcomes would be uncertain, is much more difficult 
to be initiated and implemented. 
 
Second, since there has always been a fear of operational failure and disorder 
in the established partnership due to long term organisational problems of local 
government services and public organisations, the main goal of the DAH was 
to secure a stable operating environment for partnership. The organisational 
problems of public agencies were mainly related to there being no skilled staff 
and to an overload of bureaucratic procedures. As a result, partners from public 
sector very often had delays in implementation, which were caused by delays 
to the recruitment of staff and to continuous changes and transformations in the 
composition of their management structure; more specifically changes in 
political personnel were often accompanied by changes in staff (First 
evaluation report of EQUAL II, 2006).   
 
As one partner from the public organLVDWLRQ1(/(QRWHG³7KHUHDUHPDQ\
problems at management level in my agency resulting from the problematic 
RSHUDWLRQRIWKHSXEOLFVHFWRULQJHQHUDOUDQJLQJIURPJHWWLQJWKHSUHIHFW¶V
VLJQDWXUHWRWUHPHQGRXVFKDQJHVLQVWDII´7KLVH[SODLQVZK\RQHPDLQcriterion 
RISDUWQHUV¶VHOHFWLRQE\'$+ZDVORZVWDIIWXUQRYHUDQGH[SHUWLVHLQ
management. Talking about the selection of partners, the EQUAL II 
FRRUGLQDWRUUHIHUUHGWRDSDUDGLJP³)RULQVWDQFH1(/(+HUDNOLRQDQG1(/(
Rethymno have permanent staff and freelancers that are constantly involved in 
consultation programmes, so they have got the required stability and 
H[SHULHQFHWKDW¶VZK\ZHKDYHVHOHFWHGWKHP´ 
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At the national level too, initial delays in programmes' national planning due to 
extended bureaucracy and political games for money distribution per region led 
to the adoption of a more pragmatic attitude by the state. This attitude was 
IXUWKHUUHLQIRUFHGE\WKHQHZSULQFLSOH³Q´(&RI(8WKDW
accelerated the time of funding absorption by member states. Consequently, the 
state was orientated to the implementation of projects meeting their 
requirements to the minimum degree possible, especially those that were 
related to community involvement and to innovation which by their nature took 
more time, effort and risk by policy-makers. In my interview with one 
LEADER+ MA executive, the consequences of this practice were mentioned: 
³$WWKHHQGWKHPDLQJRDOZDVWKHDQQXDOIXQGLQJDEVRUSWLRQ'XHWRFRQFHUQV
that the state would lose money, there were discounts. These discounts affected 
the quantity of actions to the detriment of their quality´.  
 
7KHUHIHUHQFHVWR³GLVFRXQWVGXULQJSROLF\SODQQLQJ´DQG³GRPLQDQFHRI
TXDQWLW\YHUVXVTXDOLW\´UHYHDOHGVWUDLJKWIRUZDUGO\VRPHPRUHJHQHUDODVSHFWV
of the Greek policy-making.  Although this issue does not relate directly to my 
study and it has not been supported by further data, it is interesting to note that 
traditional practices of the Greek state (like  favouritism, party politics, 
sectorial corporatism) impact on policy-making usually in terms of funding 
distribution to potentially more beneficiaries and adjustment of the policy 
design to corporatist demands. An executive of LEADER+¶ MA confirmed the 
above by underlining that ³,Q/($'(5WKH\JDYHsome money to many 
various agencies to cover immediate needs for investment; there is no 
FRPSUHKHQVLYHLQWHUYHQWLRQ´.  
                           
The need for fast funding absorption combined with the aforementioned 
overload and complex system of management has created confusion and 
overtime work for coordinators and involved partners. The LEADER+ 
FRRUGLQDWRUUHSRUWHGWKDW³WKHHVVHQFHRI/($'(5KDVEHHQORVWIRUPH
instead of dealing with the development and the achievement of its strategic 
plan, I have tRGHDOZLWKWHFKQLFDOGDWDVKHHWVDQGWKHLUPRGLILFDWLRQ´So, 
DAH gradually came to have a pure operational role intending to integrate 
PRUHDQGPRUH³HDV\´ programmes in terms of low risk, losing its 
263 
 
GHYHORSPHQWDORULHQWDWLRQIRULQQRYDWLRQ³/'$VDUHUelaxed; they found a 
UROHLQSURFHVVLQJDSSOLFDWLRQVZLWKWKHSULQFLSOH³,SURPRWHZKDWLVRIPRUH
GHPDQG´ (National external evaluator of LEADER+). This happened at 
national level too. One LEADER+ MA executive stated in a cynic way that 
³/($'(5WXUQHGRXW to be a bureaucratic operation and that the MA lost its 
PDLQGHYHORSPHQWDOUROHDQGMXVWGLGWKHPDQDJHPHQW´ 
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Sixth rule: Partnership behaviour: the attitude of dependence 
and the fear of responsibility 
'XULQJP\LQWHUYLHZVZLWKSDUWQHUVDQG0$V¶H[HFXWLYHV,LGHQWLILHGDQ
attitude of dependence from downward to upward and a fear to take over 
responsibilities. I argue that these attitudes have undermined the empowerment 
and autonomy of the involved partners leading to inertia and passive 
LPSOHPHQWDWLRQRISURJUDPPHV$OWKRXJKWKHSURJUDPPHV¶IRUPDOUXOHV
relocated authority and responsibilities downward, from EU, to state and then 
to local authorities and other local actors, these rules did not manage to alter 
DFWRUV¶DWWLWXGHVWRWUDQVIHUWKHUHVSRQVLELOLW\IRULQLWLDWLRQVDQGSUREOHPV
arising to others above them with the ultimate recipient both the state and the 
EU.  
 
,QSDUWLFXODU1*2VSURJUDPPHV¶EHQHILFLDULHVHVSHFLDOO\ZRPHQ¶V 
cooperatives, and local public agencies seem to be dependent on local 
authorities in terms of problem definition and proposed solutions; DAH 
DOORFDWHGDOOWKHSURJUDPPHV¶GHVLJQSUREOHPVWRVWDWHFHQWUDOLVDWLRQZKLOHWKH
MAs complained about the lack of necessary direction and protection by the 
EU.  As noted by one executive of the EQUAL II MA, it was this lack of 
responsibility that led for instance the state to institutionalise the DP by law 
³WKHUHZDVWKHQHHGIRUDFFRXQWDELOLW\,QVLGH'3DOOKDYHWRZRUNDGKHULQJWR
WKHSULQFLSOHRIVKDUHGUHVSRQVLELOLW\SDUWQHUVIHHOFRPPLWWHGª 
 
In particular, at the horizontal level, as already mentioned above, since the 
involved NGOs and the cooperatives have not articulated well enough their 
interests and their functional survival depended on programmes undertaken by 
DAH, they faced DAH as their lifeline and they relied on its directions. 
Additionally, local public agencies, which were not considered as trustworthy 
institutions in terms of organisational capacity, followed the DAH programme 
guidelines since DAH took the risk of including them in partnerships.  
 
In terms of the relationship between local authorities and the state, the local 
authorities demanded their independence from the state but at the same time 
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they were afraid of being totally autonomous. The state must be there to protect 
them. In my interview with the Mayor of Arkalochori, discussing the future of 
/'$VKHQRWHGWKDW³:HZDQWWKHVWDWHWREHDYDLODEOHEXWQRWWRDIIHFWWKH
SDFHZHKDYHDGRSWHGVRIDU´,QSDrticular, the development of local initiatives 
might not be exclusively based on local resources but it has to be mediated by 
WKHVWDWHWRRQHGHJUHHRUDQRWKHU³DOORXUHIIRUWVQHHGIXUWKHUVWUHQJWKHQLQJ
DQGVXSSRUWE\WKHVWDWH´([- president of KOINOPOLITIA).      
 
What is interesting is that if for local level (NGOs, local authorities, local 
public agencies) the attitude of dependence was expected due to the existing 
strong hierarchical intergovernmental relations and weak civil society, it was 
unexpected in the relationship between the state and EU. The need for 
protection by the EU and the fear of undertaking initiatives and risks were 
strongly evident in this relationship. According to the existing literature, the 
Greek state is typically regarded DVD³SROLF\WDNHU´ UDWKHUD³SROLF\LQLWLDWRU´
vis- a- YLVWKH(8³'RZQORDGLQJIURPWKH(8KDVEHHQPRUHUHOHYDQWWKDQ
XSORDGLQJIRU*UHHFH´)HDWKHUVWRQHDQG3DSDGLPLWULRXEvidence 
from this download process had also been identified in my research.  
 
For instance, the EU geographical responsible of EQUAL for Greece 
acknowledged the development of networks between DPs of the same member 
state or among member states in order to support specific measures of EQUAL 
or to continue the funding of specific actions developed under EQUAL from 
other EU programmes. She referred specifically to the passion displayed by the 
director of EQUAL MA in Portugal who has managed to create a very dynamic 
thematic network lobbying specific policies in the EU; she also referred to a 
public official in Germany who participated in an EQUAL DP and initiated a 
new national network. She did not make any reference to initiatives in Greece, 
other than the implementation of the programme itself ending up disappointed 
by noticLQJWKDW³,Q*UHHFHWKHUHZHUHQRVLPLODULQLWLDWLYHVDVLQRWKHU
countries. The political leadership is not keen to support this kind of initiatives; 
LQ*UHHFHWKHV\VWHPLVGHOXVLYH´ 
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Additionally, in my interviews with the MAs executives of both programmes, 
the gradual detachment of the EU interest from supporting these programmes 
was often reported. That was considered by them as a bad practice because 
effectively the MAs felt helpless in their work. In particular, they critically 
commented that EU has been transformed to a bureaucratic mechanism looking 
RQO\DWRQHGLUHFWLRQHIIHFWLYHQHVVLQWHUPVRIIXQGLQJDEVRUSWLRQ³*HQHUDOO\
speaking, the role of the EU has become more and more technocratic. In the 
second round of EQUAL, the EU was transformed into just an observer and 
IXQGLQJRUJDQLVDWLRQ´ (Executive of EQUAL II MA). The same criticisms were 
reproduced in LEADER+ 0$³7KH(8LVPRYLQJQRZWRZDUGVDILQDQFLDO
GHDOUDWKHUWRDGHYHORSPHQWDORULHQWDWLRQ´([HFXWLYHRILEADER+ MA). 
Even if they acknowledged that, because of the subsidiarity principle, EU 
gradually retired from an active role keeping to just a monitoring one; in the 
interviews a general disappointment and an anxiety resulting from this 
development were evident.        
 
Moreover, they complained about the complexity and confusion in the 
principles followed by the projects and consequently to the difficulty to 
XQGHUVWDQGDQGLPSOHPHQWWKHP³)RULQVWDQFHWKHLVVXHRILQQRYDWLRQZDV
XQFOHDU>«@WKHJXLGHOLQHVGLGQRWVSHFLI\DSDUWLFXOar type of partnership, a 
lot of countries needed a detailed guide for implementing the partnership 
SULQFLSOH´([HFXWLYHRIEQUAL II MA).  The same difficulty regarding the 
clarity of rules was also present in LEADER+ 0$H[HFXWLYHV¶FRPPHQWV2QH
H[HFXWLYHQRWHGWKDW³WKHWHUP³DQLPDWLRQ´UHIHUUHGLQSURJUDPPHGRFXPHQWV
has not been clearHYHQQRZLWLVQRWFRPSUHKHQVLEOH´DQGDGGHGWKDW³WKH
WHUP³LQWHJUDWHGGHYHORSPHQW´DOVRUDLVHVTXHVWLRQVEHFDXVHLWGRHVQRW
direFWO\UHODWHWRDJULFXOWXUH´ 
 
On the other hand, when I asked EU officials to comment on these complaints 
and difficulties, I have received a completely opposite argument; according to 
them, EU strongly supported these projects up to the point it had to do so, so as 
to leave the member states free to make choices. It was when the principle of 
subsidiarity was integrated in the regulative framework of  EUQAL II and 
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LEADER+, that the European Commission stopped having voting rights in 
MAs as it had in the preYLRXVURXQGVRISURJUDPPHV³(&LVQRORQJHU
involved in the  decision-making of MAV´(8JHRJUDSKLFDOUHVSRQVLEOHRI
LEADER).  
 
Furthermore, in all the interviews with Brussels officers, it has been stated that 
besides funding, EU has supported the programmes with a number of specific 
actions to a great extent. Some of these actions have been the establishment of 
European thematic networks, the physical presence of experts and in some 
cases of commissioners in each member state, the policy forums which 
politicians from each member state could attend and participate, the ongoing 
renewal of programme guidelines and finally the recommendations from 
evaluations reports. In general, during my visit to Brussels, the interviewees 
gave me the impression that EU was committed to these programmes and 
supported them as needed. For instance, in the EQUAL programme, the 
dedication and passion of experts and commissionaires for the programme 
development was emphasised. The EU geographical responsible of EQUAL 
acknowledged the work RI³two extraordinary experts who had extensive 
experience and in many cases there were more than they ought to be committed 
to the programme´RUWKHGHJUHHWRZKLFKWKH&RPPLVVLRQHUZKRGHVLJQHGWKH
EQUAL programme was passionate and skilful. 
  
 7KHLQWHUYLHZHHVLQ%UXVVHOVH[SODLQHGWKH(8³LQGLIIHUHQFH´DGYRFDWHGE\
Greek executives with a different way that of more freedom to member states. 
In particular, the EU strategy was to provide more guidance at the launch of the 
programme and then to monitor the programme regularly³,QWKHEHJLQQLQJ
the EC WRRNRYHU³EDE\VLWWLQJXQWLOWKHFKLOGUHQJUHZXS´DQGWKHQLWVWRSSHG
this is what happeneGZLWKSURJUDPPHV´(8RIILFHU+HDGRI8QLW7his is a 
strategy that many countries such as the Netherlands, UK and Ireland preferred 
in order to avoid being closely monitored since experience in the programme 
has begun to accumulate (EU evaluator of EQUAL). In fact, in the LEADER 
case, after 10 years of implementation, the familiarity with the programme 
acquired by member states was so great that it ceased being a CI and it was 
incorporated as a horizontal axis in the EU Fourth Programming Period. 
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Therefore, member states have been given the opportunity to integrate all 
LEADER experience into national policies.  
 
The accession of new member states and the diffusion of these programmes to 
more countries have created even more difficulties in EU monitoring; 
therefore, solutions led to greater national monitoring of programmes so as to 
simplify the process. As an EU officer commented on the decentralisation of 
LEADER+ PRQLWRULQJWRPHPEHUVWDWHVGXHWRWKHLUQXPHULFDOLQFUHDVH³:H
have 56 rural development programmes or 27 member states ; in what sense 
can I say to each member state what to do exactly from my ofILFHLQ%UXVVHOV"´ 
 
So, EU officers considered the criticisms towards EU by Greek executives 
XQUHDOLVWLF$Q(8RIILFHUH[SOLFLWO\H[SUHVVHGKLPEHLQJDQQR\HG³WRWHOOPH
that Lithuania, a new member state, cannot implement the programme, I can 
understand it, but to claim the same for Greece after three CSFs and three 
/($'(5SURJUDPPHVLWLVRXWUDJHRXV´ 
 
In relation to the clarity of principles, EU officers argued that programmes 
guidelines gave good instructions and were supported by EU experts and the 
validation of good practices has always been there. So, according to them, the 
principles were clear enough, even though some principles such as the 
principles of empowerment and mainstreaming they were innovative for many 
countries. Therefore, as already noted the EU geographical responsible of 
(48$/FULWLFLVHGWKH*UHHN0$VIRULQHUWLD³ZHFDQQRWH[SHFWHYHU\WKLQJ
IURPDERYHLH(8´ 
 
The expectation of the MAs executive that EU had to do the job and that they 
had to follow was also reinforced by the widespread idea among them that EU 
KDVWKHSRZHUWRFKDQJHHYHU\WKLQJ³0$PD\KDYHWKHLPSUHVVLRQWKHKRSH
that EU could strongly affect the national decision makers at many times but it 
cannot. As I follow the issues of monitoring, in many cases, I get indignant 
because if the state does not invest money and does not manage in the correct 
ZD\ZHFDQQRWFRPSHOLWWRFKDQJH´(8HYDOXDWRURI(48$/,QD
disorganised and inefficiently administrated state, the MAs executives 
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expected from EU, which appeared to be more organised and powerful, to 
intervene and correct all the internal disfunctionalities of their organisation; 
KRZHYHUWKHVHH[SHFWDWLRQVZHUHTXLWHKLJKFRPSDUHGWR(8¶VZLOOWR
influence that type of policies. This dependency attitude createGDPRQJ0$V¶
executives a continuous grief, a transfer of responsibility for problems that 
arose to EU and finally a lack of enthusiasm and initiation to put forward 
partnership developments. 
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 Comparison of the LEADER+ and EQUAL II programmes  
The significance of institutional legacies and dominant values in national and 
local political organisation are quite apparent when I compare the LEADER+ 
and EQUAL II projects. In this research project, I methodologically treat these 
two programmes in a more complementary way for a comprehensive selection 
of data than in a comparative way for explaining differences and 
commonalities. However, selective conclusions derived from their comparison 
illuminate and support my argument about the way that the institutions embody 
the political norms of their environment.  
The different policy sector that these partnerships supported, the economic 
versus social development and the different size of their budget had an impact 
on the articulation of power relations in policy-making processes. The role of 
policy sector in policy process is also evident in other research too (John and 
Cole, 2000; Rhodes, 1997) which conclude that policy sector matters. Harding 
PDNHVDGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQWKH³JRYHUQDQFHRIXUEDQFRPSHWLWLYHQHVV´
and the ³JRYHUQDQFHRIXUEDQVRFLDOFRKHVLRQ´. According to them, the policy 
sector could strongly influence the type of membership and the mode of 
cooperation inside collaborative activities.  
I argue that the EQUAL II programme had remained closer to formal rules than 
the LEADER+ programme whatever this meant about the diversity and equity 
RISDUWQHUVDQGEHQHILFLDULHV¶HQJDJHPHQW,QSDUWLFXODUGXULQJLQWHUYLHZV,
became aware that in the EQUAL II project, there was a greater diversity of 
partners than in LEADER+; the partnership was larger and more substantial 
with the participation of NGOs, networks of local authorities and research 
centre.  
Moreover, always in comparison to the LEADER+ project, the participation of 
beneficiaries was more systematic and the implemented actions more 
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innovative35. Although the beneficiaries were not aware of their needs and it 
was the first time that they participated in such projects, DAH was more 
responsive to their needs and demands. Finally, in EQUAL II, the role of the 
H[HFXWLYHVZDVPRUHLQGHSHQGHQWIURPPD\RUV¶SROLWLFDOZLOOVDQGWKHWKHPDWLF
groups more organised and efficient than those of LEADER+.  As the 
coordinator of LEADER+ QRWHG³the thematic networks of LEADER are not as 
developed as in EQUAL II´.  
But why all these differences? Looking back at the institutional legacies and 
established political values at local and national level could provide answers to 
the above question. First of all, the EQUAL II project has not been a top 
priority for mayors and ministers. And this has been for two reasons: The first 
is related with the budget size and the second one with the undermining of 
social policy by state and local government. For them, social policy, when it 
existed, meant infrastructures such as building schools and hospitals or big 
programmes of social integration. All other actions of social policy were 
judged as soft actions without a real meaning for local social development. The 
ORZSULRULW\WKHVWDWHDVVLJQHGWRVRFLDOSROLFLHV¶GHYHORSPHQWwas also 
confirmed by two more facts: a) by the percentage of social policy funds in the 
Greek GDP. Greece as Italy and Portugal representing the Southern European 
block of countries in EU spend less than Luxembourg, Denmark and the rest of 
Northern countries on social protection. In 2003, total social spending 
amounted to 28% of the Greek GDP while the relevant one for Denmark is 
31%  (http://ec.europa.eu/esf/home/jsp), b) by the high percentage of the 
European Social Funds contribution (ESFs) to national VRFLDOSROLFLHV¶EXGJHW
The contribution of ESFs to the expenditure of national social policies was 
quite crucial in Greece in comparison to other countries reaching 58. 4%. (EU-
wide evaluation of the Community Initiative EQUAL, 2006: 61).  
                                                 
35
 The actions of EQUALII could easily be characterised as more innovative than that of 
Leader+ since social policy in Greece is not well developed; so, slightly innovative for other 
countries social policies remained quite innovative for the Greek reality. 
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The national external evaluator of LEADER+ comment took me by surprise by 
saying that all the programmes funded by the ESFs was a waste of money 
EHFDXVHWKH\ZHUH³VRIW´LQWHUYHQWLRQVWKDWLQFOXGHGIDUWRRPDQ\SDUWQHUVDQG
KDGQRHIILFLHQWUHVXOWV³7KHDSSURDFKRI(6)to involve many partners, in 
SUDFWLFHFUHDWHVDELJEXUHDXFUDF\>«@$WOHDVWLQLEADER+, there are some 
investments. Bad or good, they exist. EQUAL II LQFOXGHVPDQ\³VRIW´DFWLRQV
ZLWKRXWWDQJLEOHUHVXOWV´ 
The focus on efficient outcomes and the unawareness of social policies by 
politicians and executives were there once again. In the same direction, the 
Director of Lasithi LDA stated about EQUAL II WKDW³$WILUVW,ZDVVFHSWLFDO
I thought this is another social programme without significant funding, with 
only advisory actions but eventually it helped, in a practical way, the women 
LQYROYHGDORW´ 
In this context, mayors regarded the social policy interventions of EQUAL II 
as something not worth of their direct involvement and they left partnership 
development and implementation to executives. The elected politicians were 
involved only in cases in which their intervention was important for 
overcomiQJDVSHFLILFSUREOHPDQGLQEXGJHWUHGLVWULEXWLRQ³7KHSUHVLGHQWVRI
LDAs (mayors) left much room for partners; there was freedom and trust. The 
presidents attended the partnership board meetings only in cases when there 
were changes in the budget or a pDUWQHUZDVWRZLWKGUDZ´([HFXWLYHRILDA 
ANKOM). Instead in LEADER+, the political control was stronger since half 
of the partners of LAG were locally elected politicians with high managerial 
posts in DAH.  
In relation to budget size, the budget of LEADER+ was quite bigger than the 
EQUAL II budget. In LEADER+, the total budget with the additional funding 
after the budget review reached 13.274.051euro while the total budget of 
EQUAL II did not exceed 1.250.000 euro. As one executive from the LDA of 
Sitia saLG³7KLVLVDVPDOOSURJUDPPHZLWKDORZEXGJHWHVVHQWLDOO\DQ
DX[LOLDU\SURJUDPPH´7KDWPHDQVWKDWEHVLGHVWKHORZSULRULW\LQVRFLDO
policy, there were additionally financial reasons for which this project was not 
so significant to mayors. This also explains in its turn why they left much 
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flexibility and freedom to coordinator to run the programme without political 
interventions and pressures for adjustments to their interests. An executive of 
the LDA AKOM, discussing the lack of interest on behalf of mayors, stated 
WKDW³ZKHUHWKHUHLVDORWRIPRQH\WKHUHLVERWKJUHDWHUUHVSRQVLELOLW\DQG
more conflicts too; here (in EQUALII project) the money is not much, so the 
PD\RUV¶LQWHUHVWUHPDLQVORZ´6RZKLOHWKHLEADER+ programme was a 
mayors' game, the EQUAL II project remained with managers who adopted the 
formal programme rules as much as possible. 
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Conclusions 
This chapter has demonstrated that in fact there is a difference between formal 
and actual decision-making processes. Decision-making and organisational 
issues management in both LAG and DP have primarily been dealt with by few 
motivated mayors with the support of chief executives of DAH rather than by 
IRUPDOSDUWQHUV¶DVVHPEOLHV1HJRWLDWLRQVE\WKLVJURXSLQSULYDWH
accommodated common agreement and conflicts with the other partners had 
been managed before they arrived to the formal decision-making arena.  
 
So, the study of informal rules in decision-making raised important questions 
about power in these collaborative spaces. Power imbalances were obvious in 
ERWKSDUWQHUVKLSV¶FRPSRVLWLRQDQGSDUWQHUV¶UHVRXUFHV$OWKRXJKDOOWKH
partners ought to participate in an equal footing, hierarchical relations existed 
where stronger actors with particular skills and expertise dominated the 
partnership agenda. Additionally, informal networking at the horizontal and 
vertical level influenced the distribution of power and aggregated prevailing 
ideas about approaching and implementing a policy. Some of these networks 
were old and highly hierarchical like the vertical one and other were newer and 
OHVVKLHUDUFKLFDOOLNHWKHQHWZRUNVRI³2OG0D\RUV´ 
 
In regards to community involvement, although formal participation was 
secured, it appears that the actions of public participation and beneficiaries 
involvement were developed to a certain degree as far as they facilitated the 
implementation process rather than as an issue of citizen rights and democratic 
governance. On the one hand, mayors did not want to lose the control of local 
affairs and on the other hand, civil society and beneficiaries in particular were 
not empowered to the extent that it was needed in order to actively undertake 
their participative role with the result being that few citizens and beneficiaries 
were actually involved. 
 
Both partnerships embodied a tension between democratic governance through 
the engagement of community and beneficiaries in the process of design and 
implementation of CIs goals for assuring community interest and effective 
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implementation for ensuring tangible outcomes. Between these two poles, 
efficiency dominated in the detriment of democratic quality and as a result 
output legitimation was strengthened and input and throughput legitimation 
were undermined. This fact led to partnership democratic deficit since the 
quality of democracy needs a balance between all the types of legitimation 
(chapter 2, section1.2.2). The democratic deficit was accentuated by one more 
factor: the central player, DAH, was a hybrid body because it incorporated 
principles, organisationally and politically speaking, both from the private and 
the public sector creating fluidity in terms of its role in defining the ends and 
means of the public policy delivered. Moreover, the enhanced role of the 
executives inside DAH and their lack of electoral mandate undermined 
partnership legitimation IXUWKHU&RQVHTXHQWO\DUHDO³ERWWRP-XS´ approach of 
democratic empowerment and decision-making had not been possible.  
 
Regarding intergovernmental relations, even though the principle of 
VXEVLGLDULW\ZDVDQLQWHJUDOSDUWRIERWKSURJUDPPHV¶SUHUHTXLVLWHVVWURQJ
vertical hierarchical relations between state and local authorities had developed 
demonstrating the persistence RI³VWDWLVW´VHOHFWLRQDQGFRRUGLQDWLRQRIPDLQ
CIs directions. The centralised state had confirmed its established power in two 
ways; a. politically by decision-PDNLQJRQNH\SURJUDPPHV¶LVVXHVDQGE
bureaucratically by adopting overload and complex controls.  
 
Moreover, the desire to secure a stable operating environment in order to 
absorb as soon as possible the funding in total and to efficiently implement 
programmes activities, had created an imperative of goal implementation in the 
detriment of innovation and opening up of the partnership agenda to partners 
with different values and demands. National contextual features such as low 
cooperative culture and trust, ineffective administration of local authorities and 
public organisations as well as complex and robust state control systems are 
some explanatory factors for low innovation.   
 
Low innovation was combined with the technocratisation of policy-making; as 
a result all the different ideological issues were transformed to technical issues 
with DAH e[SHUWV³NQRZLQJ¶¶EHWWHUZKLFKZHUHWKHVROXWLRQVWRSROLWLFDO
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problems. Consequently, partnerships were undermined into organisational and 
managerial instruments with concrete tangible ends losing their political and 
ideological character. In this way, management knowledge became a new 
political resource that stood next to other political resources. In a paradoxical 
way, the political character of the projects was maintained, in a slightly 
GLVWRUWHGZD\WKURXJKSDUW\SROLWLFVDQGSROLWLFLDQV¶SHUVRQDOPRWives at 
national level and localist claims at local level.  
 
Finally, attitudes of dependence and fear of responsibility spread in the 
relations among all the territorial levels from the lower to the upper one, made 
much more difficult the undertaking of initiations. It is interesting that although 
formal rules offered a great freedom to the state and local partners in terms of 
selecting programmes actions, partners finally selected the path dependent 
behaviour of passive implementation and secured low risk actions.   
 
Consequently, if in the case of formal rules, it was EU and to a lesser degree 
the state, which set the rules of the game, in the case of informal rules, it was 
the state and local partners that played this role. In the case of state and local 
partners, there constantly was a role change between acceptance and 
implementation of formal rules and creation of informal rules, which 
demonstrated the procedural character of partnership and the dynamics of rules 
configuration at horizontal and vertical level.    
 
I concluded that in my case study, the informal rules interplayed with the 
formal rules and created a new particular system that permitted, with different 
processes as opposed to the rational and democratic ones proposed by formal 
rules, partners to work together and deliver partnership outcomes. 
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Chapter 7:   Agency:  Institutional entrepreneurs and 
local leaders    
 
Introduction 
In the previous chapters, I have analysed the configuration of formal and 
informal rules, or in other words, the rules-in-use that guide EQUAL II and 
LEADER+ partnership processes and I have identified the main factors from 
the larger socio-economic, cultural and institutional context that had influenced 
the development of informal rules and their power relationship with the formal 
ones.  
    
In this chapter, I will discuss the role of the agency and I will focus on the way 
that the agents¶ strategic behaviour interacts with the established formal and 
informal rules in order to produce evolution in the partnership process in terms 
of preservation or change of rules-in-use. As the national external evaluator of 
EQUAL II VWDWHG³7RDFKLHYHDSDUWQHUVKLSSHRSOH¶VSDVVLRQDQGHQJDJHPHQW
LVQHHGHG´ 
 
More specifically, the analysis of formal and informal rules revealed how 
agency embedded deeply in the existing normative environment, interpreted 
IRUPDOUXOHVLQDSDUWLFXODU³GRPHVWLF´ZD\,QWKLVFKDSWHU,ZLOOPDLQO\
illustrate the purposive actions of agent, the conscious pursuit of their motives, 
individual or societal, that transform partnership processes. I argue that in these 
SDUWQHUVKLSVDJHQF\ZDVUHDOLVHGE\WZRFDWHJRULHVRIDFWRUVWKH³LQVWLWXWLRQDO
HQWUHSUHQHXUV´DWORFDODQGQDWLRQDOOHYHODVZHOODVWKHHVWDEOLVKHGORFDO
leaders. Both categories of actors supported particular formal rules and tried to 
change the direction of informal rules in favour of the first. In particular, the 
redistribution of power and resources that introduced the formal rules of the 
partnership accompanied by new ideas and narratives of policy-making have 
EHHQXVHGE\WKHVHWZRDFWRUV¶FDWHJRULHVLQWKUHHZD\VD. by selecting and 
UHLQIRUFLQJVSHFLDOIHDWXUHVRIIRUPDOUXOHVWKDWLPSDFWRIDJHQW¶VIUHHGRPE. 
by promoting and sharing concrete values and practices to partners and finally 
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c. by providing a positive and enabling partnership context for the smooth 
introduction of formal rules.            
The chapter is divided in two sections; each section focuses on the strategic 
behaviour of each DFWRU¶V category and its impact on partnership initiation and 
development. 
 
Section 1: Institutional entrepreneurs   
The institutional entrepreneurs comprised local and national executives that 
were actively involved in the promotion and evolution of partnerships. In 
SDUWLFXODUDWORFDOOHYHO,UHIHUWRVRPHSDUWQHUV¶UHSUHVHQWDWLYHVDQG
programme coordinators while at national level I refer to executives of MAs.  
  
1.1 Local institutional entrepreneurs  
,QP\LQWHUYLHZVZLWKORFDOSDUWQHUVWKHLQYROYHPHQWRIVRPH³LPSRUWDQW
SHRSOH´WKDWZHUHDSSRLQWHGIRUWKHHYHU\GD\RSHUDWLRQRIWKHLURUJDQLVDWLRQDV
members of the partnership or officially represented it has been quite often 
revealed. These people have supported the participation of their organisation in 
WKHSDUWQHUVKLSDQGWKH\KDYHZRUNHGKDUGIRUWKHSDUWQHUVKLS¶VDFWLRQVWREH
carried out.  
 
Regarding public organisations in which apathy and resistance for new 
initiations have been dominant practices, their participation in the partnership 
depended directly on the personal motivation of their management team, i.e. on 
personal interest, time available and capacities of the people in charge. There 
were some employees in the public sector that were more active and ambitious; 
interested in a more substantial way in the well-being of their communities. By 
substantial way, I mean that they have taken a distance from the existing 
overloaded bureaucratic practices and inertia in policy-making towards more 
dynamic, collaborative and responsive to local needs behaviours. These were 
the employees that had proposed to their senior political managers the 
involvement of their public organisation to the partnership and they were then 
responsible for all the contractual commitments and activities resulting from 
this participation.  
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The traditional attitudes of civil servants was so deeply established in public 
sector that these employees needed to convince their colleagues and the 
partners that their active role did not stem from rational motives (mainly 
economic) but from their interest in the community. Once again, it was due to 
the Greek culture that behaviours overcoming the expected individualistic way 
of doing things in the public arena were greeted with suspicion.  In the 
interview with one civil servant in NELE, I was impressed with his persistence 
on explaining why he decided to be involved in the EQUAL II SDUWQHUVKLS³,
did not have any economic profit from this story, it would not offer me 
anything financially. If I had had a different attitude, I would have done my job 
as prescribed by the Civil Servant Code and I would not have bothered dealing 
with something new that incurred H[WUDWLPH´DQGKHFRQWLQXHGE\HPSKDVLVLQJ
WKHSHUVRQDOHQJDJHPHQWRIKLVVWDIILQWKHSURMHFW³,WZDVDWHDPRISHRSOH
who worked hard, they would stay up all night but they would feel good. There 
was a feeling of reward, of personal satisfaction´.  
 
In the DAH, the personal commitment of the coordinators of both projects was 
also apparent. Their effort to support the partnership was so strong that they got 
to the point to devote their own free personal time and resources for the 
partnership's sustainability. For instance, the coordinator of EQUAL II stated 
that she used her own car to move the products of one women's cooperative 
located in a village far away from Heraklion to a product exhibition in 
+HUDNOLRQFRPPHQWLQJWKDW³,ZDVTXLWHLQYRlved in this project. Its success 
KDVEHFRPHDSHUVRQDOPDWWHUQRWRQO\IRUPHEXWDOVRIRUDOORIWKHVWDII´ 
 
(YDOXDWLQJSDUWQHUV¶ZRUNWKHH[-director of KOINOPOLITIA underlined the 
H[HFXWLYHV¶FRPPLWPHQW of DAH ³7KH'$+ does the work for other partners 
that have been paid to do it. Why do they do that? For the sake of the 
FROODERUDWLRQDQGWKHSURMHFWWKDWWKH\KDYHXQGHUWDNHQ´6RPHH[HFXWLYHV¶
commitment to the project activities was also evident in other LDAs too. An 
executive from the LDA of OADYK reported that he was so deeply involved 
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LQWKHSURJUDPPHWKDWKHHYHQQHJOHFWHGKLVIDPLO\+HMRNLQJO\VDLG³LQWKH
HQGP\FKLOGUHQKHDUG³(48$/´DQGWKH\UXQDZD\´ 
 
In the case of the research centre EDAP, its director has also been characterised 
by the partners as a key actor for his innovative ideas and personal interest in 
WKHSURMHFWµ7KH7HFKQRORJLFDO3DUNKDVDYHU\LPSRUWDQWSHUVRQWRRLWV
GLUHFWRU>«@ZKRKDGDOVRJLYHQWKHSDUWQHUVKLSQDPH,QJHQHUDOKHLVIXOORI
new ideas and enthusiasm for work (EQUAL II coordinator).      
 
At the level of beneficiaries and particularly of women's cooperatives, it was 
usually one woman that had encouraged and motivated all the other women of 
the community to set up a cooperative. For example, in the case of 
.URXVDQLRWLVVDFRRSHUDWLYH³WKHUHZDVDFDSDEOHZRPDQZLWKOHDGLQJVNLOOV
who managed to get twenty women out of their houses, to unite them, to take a 
loan and become  businesswomeQ´EQUAL II coordinator). Indeed, when she 
resigned from the cooperative due to family reasons, this resulted in a gap in 
WKHRUJDQLVDWLRQ¶VFRRUGLQDWLRQ 
 
1.2 National institutional entrepreneurs            
At the level of the MAs in both programmes, there were employees who were 
dedicated to the project and they have been committed to it. In the case of 
EQUAL, the EU officer, evaluator of EQUAL, stated for the MA of Greece 
WKDW³those involved with the programme were passionate because it had a lot 
to do with supporting and helping vulnerable groups in a different way from 
WKHWUDGLWLRQDORQH´0RUHRYHUanother EU officer, Head of Unit, said for 
LEADER that there were employees who had ideas and wanted the programme 
WREHVXFFHVVIXO³,FRXOGVD\WKDWVRPHH[HFXWLYHVLQ0$GLGHYHU\WKLQJWKH\
could to promote this programme. They had ideas and persistence ...´ 
 
%XWZKRZHUHWKHVHHQDEOLQJ³SHRSOH´LQWKH0$V"7KHH[LVWLQJOLWHUDWXre on 
Europeanisation supports that the facilitation of the EU rules implementation is 
supported by a number of individuals, often national executives and politicians, 
who have previous experience in EU policy-making and they adapt these rules 
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in the national context (Borzel and Risse, 2000). The findings suggest that this 
has also happened in my case study. 
 
In EQUAL, the first director of the MA was a public entrepreneur that had 
interpreted and managed the formal rules of the programme. She was a civil 
servant in the Ministry of Labour and she had worked as a national expert in 
Brussels. When EQUAL was launched by the EU, she returned to Greece and 
she was appointed as a MA director. Her managerial skills and her knowledge 
of European policy-making sustained her effort to organise in an effective way 
the MA and implement EQUAL according to EU requirements. Furthermore, 
the management model she adopted was far from that of the established narrow 
political party influences, which helped those involved to believe in and 
support the project principles. As one of her colleagues said with respect: ³6KH
had a specific culture that she brought with her from Brussels. She supported 
that the state must provide for citizens. She had excellent organisational skills 
and maintained her professionalism to a high standard. Although quite 
centralised at work, she encouraged the transfer of know-how among her 
colleagues. She believed in the efficient use of management tools and in 
WUDQVSDUHQF\6KHKDGDYLVLRQDQGVKHPDQDJHGWRGLIIXVHLWDPRQJVWDII´
(Executive of EQUAL II MA).  
 
Her role was so crucial that there was the impression by the EQUAL II MA 
staff and the EU officer, geographical responsible for the program, when she 
OHIWWKDWWKHSURMHFWORVWLWVUHDOP³ȉhe programme began with a vision and a 
good feeling and then just after she left, the programme extension was a 
fDLOXUH´. 
 
In the LEADER project, the first general secretary of LEADER had already 
ZRUNHGLQWKH*HQHUDO'LUHFWRUDWH'*RI$JULFXOWXUHRI(86R³KHDOUHDG\
knew about EU SURFHVVHVDQGSURJUDPPHV´H[- general secretary of 
LEADER+). He and the two Directorates of the Ministry of Agriculture, the 
Directorate of Agriculture Policy and the Directorate of Programming which 
³DOUHDG\ZHUHUHVSRQVLEOHIRUWKHLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIWKH0HGLWHUUDQHDQ 
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Integrated  Programmes and they knew how to manage European programmHV´
(ex- general secretary of LEADER+) grounded LEADER rules and they 
RUJDQLVHGWKHLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIWKHSURMHFW³$WWKDWWLPHWKHUHZDVDJRRG
juncture in terms of good executives that liked the idea of LEADER 
programme and they were passionate about it ´([HFXWLYHRIWKHLEADER+ 
MA).    
 
So, it seems that the effectiveness and sustainability of collaboration in 
partnerships may not be just a matter of formal rules that determine how the 
partnership should be implemented. They also need the engagement and 
passion from all involved actors who operate on an everyday basis upon these 
rules and make the necessary arrangements and adjustments in order to link the 
formal rules with opportunities and constraints of the domestic context in 
which they have to be implemented. What was important for them was to make 
things happen by using different strategies: either by filling with their own 
work the existing gaps left by other partners, like in the case of coordinators or 
by managing efficiently their organisation such as in public organisations; 
either by framing and adapting the formal rules to the domestic context and 
motivating others to follow, as in the case of national entrepreneurs; or finally 
by mobilising and supporting others to participate as in the case of the 
president of the women's cooperative  
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Section 2:  Local leaders  
Moving on from the institutional entrepreneurs who in everyday operation have 
facilitated and supported partnerships, I focus on established local leaders and 
their strategic behaviour that has led the partnership as a whole. I consider two 
features: the partnership formal/informal rules that have created concrete 
demands on leaders' behaviours or in other words the leadership type, and 
leaders' behaviours within partnerships or in other words the leadership style. 
In a way, I revisit rules but I indicate their normative and regulative features 
WKDWFRQVWUDLQHQKDQFHOHDGHUV¶EHKDYLRXU,GRWKDWEHFDXVHDVDOUHDGy shown 
in the theoretical part (Chapter 2, section 3), both type and style constitute 
indispensable features for understanding how leadership is exercised in 
collaborations.        
 
Based on the identification of leaders by reputation (Chapter 2, section 3) it has 
emerged from interviews that there was more than one leader in each 
partnership. There was a strong recognition by the partners that different 
people brought different skills and there were times when different individuals 
took on the leadership role. Consequently, it appears that a sharing leadership 
model came to the fore. The following individuals were identified as leaders: in 
EQUAL II project, the director of the DAH as well as the ex- president of 
KOINOPOLITIA. In my interview with the president of KOINOPOLITIA and 
EQUAL II partner, it has been quite clearO\UHSRUWHGWKDW³/HDGHUVKLSILJXUHV
are the ex- president of KOINOPOLITIA and the director of the DAH. They 
both are knowledgeable, they understand the demands of the project, they 
FRPELQHWKHQHHGVZLWKWKHUHTXLUHPHQWVRIWKHSURMHFWVWKH\KDYHYLVLRQ´.  
 
In the LEADER+ project, the reputation for the leadership enactment resided 
between the president and the director of the DAH. Only in some cases, the 
JHQHUDOVHFUHWDU\RIWKH'$+%RDUGKDVEHHQVWDWHGDVOHDGHU³$VLQRWKHU
LDAs, the people that usually lead are the president and the director. They deal 
ZLWKWKHSURMHFWWKHGLUHFWRUGRHVVRHYHU\GD\WKHSUHVLGHQWTXLWHRIWHQ´
(Mayor of Episkopis).   
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$OWKRXJKPDQ\³QDPHV´KDYHEHHQPHQWLRQHGLQWKHOHDGHUVKLSDUHQDZKHQ
the questions became more focused about the way that leadership was 
H[HUFLVHGDOPRVWDOOWKHDFFRXQWVUHIHUUHGWRWKHGLUHFWRU¶VEHKDYLRXUDQGRQO\
few to tKHSUHVLGHQW¶V7KH1(/(H[HFXWLYH QRWHG³,WKLQNWKDWGXULQJWKH
process, the director had the most catalytic role because in all issues of main 
VLJQLILFDQFHWKHUHZDVDGLUHFWFRRSHUDWLRQZLWKKLP´0RUHRYHUWKHGLUHFWRU¶V
leadership realm appeared also in the frequency of the listed virtues underlined 
E\WKHLQWHUYLHZHHVIRUWKHSDUWQHUVKLS¶VOHDGHU,QWKLVFRQWH[WLWDSSears that 
WKHGLUHFWRUKDGSOD\HGDUROHRI³SURFHVVFDWDO\VW´0DQGHOODQG.HDVW
in both collaborations. It is striking to realise that actually only one person, the 
director of the DAH exercised many tasks of leadership while the role of the 
president was limited to a more strategic orientation of the whole DAH; also 
sharing this with the director. So, there was actually a shift from single 
leadership to shared leadership but this shift concerns exclusively the sharing 
of power between the political and executive leaders. 
 
Finally, another individual who has been mentioned quite often by the 
interviewees as the leader was the founder of DAH and ex- president of DAH, 
0U6WDYURV$UQDRXWDNLV+HZDVD³OHDGHURQDQKRQRUDU\EDVLV´VLQFHKLV
activity has not been connected directly with the two current partnerships but 
with the creation of the DAH years ago and other programmes of that period. 
Nevertheless, he was efficient in his job and he introduced a managerial style 
of leadership for the first time. The LEADER+ coordinator ecstatically noted: 
³,QP\H[SHULHQFHDOOPHPEHUVRISROLWLFDODQGH[HFXWLYHVWDIIUHFRJQLVH Mr. 
Arnaoutakis as the leader of DAH; he was the person who took over DAH, 
while it was still in paper. He developed it to what it is today including 
LQIUDVWUXFWXUHVWDIIDQGHYHU\WKLQJHOVH´ 
 
With the exception of the cases of ex-president of KOINOPOLITIA(who was 
still directly connected with the DAH as a result of him being a  municipal 
councillor of Archanes and founder of KOINOPOLITIA) and of Arnaoutakis 
(who was no longer responsible for the current partnerships), the reputational 
identification of leadership has been identical with the formal position of 
leadership: both the president and the director had the political and managerial 
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authority respectively in DAH which was the coordinating agency of the two 
programmes.  
 
However, the formal authority and responsibility that derived from this 
position were to organise and support the collaborative activity of the 
partnership. Or as Vangen and Huxham (2003: 63) note for leaders in 
FROODERUDWLRQ³VWULFWO\WKHUHIRUHWKH\UHSRUWWRUDWKHUWKDQGLUHFWWKH
PHPEHUV´For the leaders of the case study, there is evidence that their role 
has been expanded outside their formal direct authority of steering towards 
influencing and directing the partnership members through a specific vision 
with concrete rules and ideas.  
 
*LYHQWKHGLIIHUHQWLDWLRQRIOHDGHUV¶EHKDYLRXULQUHODWLRQWRWKH prerequisites 
of their institutional position, I will explain the configuration of opportunities 
and constraints that local context and partnership rules informally offered to 
leaders and the way that leaders had developed them for pursuing their own 
goals and interests in these local collaborative settings.    
      
2.1 Leadership type  
But how have context and rules directed concrete behaviours in leaders?  
2QHPDLQFKDUDFWHULVWLFWKDWWUDQVFHQGHGWKHGLUHFWRU
VDQGSUHVLGHQW¶V
behaviour was a tension between two styles of leadership: the traditional one 
which was related to authoritarian style of leadership and a new one, the 
responsive style which further supported the collaborative activities. Research 
has demonstrated that this tension in partnership leadership is also evident in 
other countries too, like in UK where the political leadership is traditionally 
less strong and the political culture is less individualistic that what it is in 
Greece. According to Vangen and Huxman (2003), there is a permanent 
dilemma between facilitating leaders who establish and nurture the spirit of 
FROODERUDWLRQDQGGLUHFWLYHOHDGHUVZKRSOD\³FROODERUDWLYHWKXJJHU\´UROHV
focusing in a pragmatic way on the realisation of the desired goals.  
 
:LWKRXWXQGHUPLQLQJSRVVLEOHGLIIHUHQFHVLQOHDGHUV¶EHKDYLRXULQORFDO
partnerships of other countries and in Greek ones, this conclusion is quite 
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significant because it generally assumes that partnership rules concerning 
collective action are so demanding that do not leave space for manoeuvres by 
leaders. Since leaders choose to exercise their power, they have to experience 
the enactment of both styles in order to be efficient in leading the collaborative 
activity and achieving outcomes. 
 
In Greece, this tension was further reinforced by a contradiction inherent of the 
local context. On the one hand, the institutional and cultural context promoted 
a strong political leadership model that enhanced more directive and 
authoritarian behaviours36 and on the other hand, the lack of trust and 
cooperative culture created needs for more responsive leader behaviours.   
 
In regards to the directive style, as aforementioned (chapter 4, section 1) the 
electoral system supported the development of a strong mayoral management 
of local affairs. The mayor was a highly visible person in the local society, 
he/she enjoyed a strong mandate the local council and he/she is the key 
decision maker in local politics. The mayor could be likened to the father of a 
traditional family who develops hierarchical relations with its members, cares 
personally about the well-being of the family and all the members depend on 
him.  
 
Furthermore, since the Greek political culture valued highly hierarchical 
authoritarian relations, a strong directive leadership could be easily established. 
Based on the analysis of the responses to the question regarding the role of 
leadership in the decision making of a collective setting, almost all partners 
recognised that it is one leader that sets the agenda and then all members 
                                                 
36
 In general, the strong dependence of policy-making by party politics is a characteristic of the 
Greek political system. As a result there is a discontinuity in policy-making, especially after 
changes in government. The lack of a strong bureaucracy independent from political parties 
and politicians and the weak institutional implementation that could resist the particular 
motivations of politicians (Tsoukalas, 1993) make a policy vulnerable to their irrational 
intentions. This argument could be further strengthened by my own experience working with 
mayors in development programmes or as a civil servant in the Ministry of Internal Affairs. 
Each time that there was a change of minister in the above ministry or of a mayor in a local 
authority, many policies that had been implemented in the previous period were withdrawn and 
this entailed a high cost in terms of money, human resources, and infrastructures as new 
policies and institutions replaced them. Consequently, quite often, citizens deal with 
inconsistencies or duplications in policies and public services.   
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together make the decisions, while 80% acknowledged that strong leadership is 
the necessary condition for the successful completion of a collaborative activity 
(Appendix B, responses).  
 
These attitudes had direct implications for the leadership role in partnerships 
since partners expected and accepted a more top down exercise of power by 
one individual on whom the partnership's success depends. In the interview 
with the EQUAL II coordinator, the anxiety that has been created after the 
FKDQJHVRIGLUHFWRUVLQ.2,1232/,7,$DQG'$+ZDVFOHDUO\UHSRUWHG³7R
me, the leader is very important. He/she is the number one. Since the old 
director left KOINOPOLITIA, I wondered what would happen. He has been 
replaced by someone else with potential too; but the organisation has 
encountered obstacles during the change. The same happened with our agency, 
when the previous director left, we thought that the agency would not manage 
to continue. But OK, things worked out; although in the beginning we were 
SDQLFNLQJ´ 
  
In regards to the responsive style, formal and informal rules directed new, more 
consensual behaviours to leaders. In a context of mistrust and low cooperative 
culture in the community as well as of EU demands for policy-making through 
partnership, strong leadership appeared to be more necessary than anywhere 
else in order to achieve the desired goal of collaboration. The leader was 
expected by all members to forge collaboration with their main task being the 
VXSSRUWRI³ZRUNLQJWRJHWKHU´SUDFWLFHVWKLVZDVH[SHFWHGPRUHWKDQRWKHU
potential leadership activities like providing strategic direction or 
empowerment of participative structures. The ex-president of KOINOPOLITIA 
stated DERXWWKHUHVSRQVLYHIHDWXUHRIOHDGHUVKLS³:KHQZHWDONDERXWORFDO
partnership, this is a very complicated issue; it is still in research because there 
is no suitable culture for this cooperation; so the coordination and facilitation 
of the collaboratiRQE\RQHOHDGHULVDQDEVROXWHQHFHVVLW\´&RQVHTXHQWO\WKH
informal partnership rules and the embedded norms of strong leadership 
provided a leadership type that had to be directive both in terms of goal 
achievements and responsive to specific features of collaboration like creation 
of trust and confidence among partners in order to sustain collaboration. 
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Following the typology of Sweeting et al (2004) (chapter 2, section 3.2), this 
OHDGHUVKLSW\SHFRUUHVSRQGVWRWKH³IRUPDWLYHDQGHPHUJHQWOHDGHU´ZKRLs 
called by the partnership rules to play a key role generating consensus and trust 
among partners in order to promote collaboration with concrete results.  
 
Two more partnership rules, formal this time, have enhanced a particular 
behaviour from leaders. The first has been related to the development of inter-
municipal cooperation and the second one to the improvement in programme 
RXWFRPHVJLYLQJ³JUHDWHURSSRUWXQLW\IRUPDQDJHULDOGLVFUHWLRQ´6XOOLYDQDQG
Skelcher, 2002: 12). In regards to the first one, both projects but especially the 
LEADER+ project, has contributed to a large number of municipalities seating 
at the same table. The inter-municipal cooperation was consistently 
strengthened by the inclusion of all the municipalities of the prefecture in the 
DAH board.  
 
&RQVHTXHQWO\WKHWUDGLWLRQDOSRVLWLRQRIWKHPD\RUDV³.LQJ´RILWVPXQLFLSDO
ERDUGZDVUHVWULFWHGE\RWKHUPD\RUV¶ZLOOZKRDOVRKDGVDFULILFHGWKHLU
autonomy aiming to benefit from the collaborative advantages of these 
projects. The president of the DAH, who was a mayor too, had to negotiate his 
traditional authority role with the other mayors involved in programmes 
dispersing in this way his authority to them in order to balance conflicts and 
motivate the involved partners. In the interview with the director of the DAH, 
LWKDVEHHQDGHTXDWHO\QRWHGWKDWLQWKH'$+%RDUGPD\RUVµDUHREOLJHGWR
cooperate in a number of issues that each mayor cannot solve alone. There is 
QRZDFXOWXUHRIFRRSHUDWLRQ´  
 
The second rule was related to a shift from a pure political leadership towards a 
combination of political and executive leadership.  Mayors were obliged by the 
SURMHFWV¶PDQDJHULDOUHTXLUHPHQWVWRJLYHFRQVLGHUDEOHGLVFUHWLRQDQGDXWKRULW\
to full time managers to run these projects because they were unable to manage 
the projects themselves. They did not have the expertise and experience 
required to monitor these projects. Discussing the issue of technocratisation of 
projects, the ex-president of KOINOPOLITIA emphasised the role of 
executLYHV³7KHFRQWULEXWLRQVRIWKH'$+GLUHFWRUDQGH[HFXWLYHVZKRDUH
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VSHFLDOLVHGLQHDFKSURJUDPPH¶VDFWLYLWLHVDUHTXLWHGHFLVLYH,QRXUGD\VWKH
programmes are extremely demanding and they need in depth expertise 
regarding specialist knowledge and management during preparation and 
LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ´0RUHRYHUPD\RUVTXLWHRIWHQIRXQGWKHPVHOYHVLQDGLIILFXOW
position due to pressures exercised both by voters and the party they were 
DIILOLDWHGWR+RZHYHUWKHSDUWQHUVKLS¶VPDQDJHULDORULHQWDWLRQDQGWKH
aFKLHYHPHQWRIWDQJLEOHRXWFRPHVGLGQRWDOORZIRUPD\RUV¶DPDWHXULVPDQG
detrimental political interventions such as clientelism and favouritism. As 
characteristically the DAH director emphasised by criticising the irrational 
SUDFWLFHVRIPD\RUV³:KDWZHwant is the implementation of our goals. This is 
our basic principle but the elected politicians always want to intervene, to 
achieve what they want for the favour of their followers; to develop a 
clientelistic network. Our agency has not adopted this attiWXGH´ 
 
In this context, there was a dilution of limits between political vision setting by 
political leadership and its completion by senior managers. One mayor, 
member of the DAH board, reported about the processes of decision-making: 
³7KHGLUHFWRUKDVa lot of potential and he has his way; he makes decisions and 
KDVD³KDQGVRQ´ attitude. Now the president (mayor) and the director must 
complement each other, combining both political and executive capacities, 
because the agency also has a political dimenVLRQQRWRQO\DWHFKQRFUDWLFRQH´ 
 
The DAH executives who were mainly responsible for these two partnerships 
were the director and the two administrative coordinators, one for each 
programme. It was these people that were equipped to deal with problems 
arising from the partnership operation, provide strategic advice to politicians 
and finally prepare the agenda-setting for the final decision-making; gradually 
EHLQJWUDQVIRUPHGDFFRUGLQJWR.ODXVHQDQG0DJQLHU¶VGLVWLQFWLRQ
IURP³FODVVLFDOEXUHDXFUDWV´WR³SROLWLFDOEXUHDXFUDWV´ (chapter 2, section 3.2). 
(PSKDVLVLQJWKHVLJQLILFDQFHRIWKH/'$¶VGLUHFWRUWKHH[-general secretary of 
LEADER+ QRWHG³WKHVXFFHVVHYHU\WKLQJGHSHQGVRQWKHGLUHFWRURIWKH/'$
In reality, it is the director that implements the whole project´. 
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Furthermore, the technocratisation of politics and the ability this offered to the 
executives to apply local public policies without the everyday involvement of 
politicians had led to a gradual self-reliance on LDAs. In my interview with the 
national external evaluator of LEADER+ who was aware of what happened in 
all the LDAs of the country, it was noted that ³WKHUHDUHPDQ\ELJ/'$VOLNH
DAH which because of their size, have managed to become independent from 
PD\RUV¶LQIOXHQFHV´. 
 
Particularly in the DAH, the director affirmed that even changes of mayors did 
not affect anymore the operation of the DAH because there were established 
values and practices that promoted a rationalisation in policy-PDNLQJ³7KH
change of mayors does not influence our work, because of the way that our 
DJHQF\LVRUJDQLVHGZLWKPDQDJHULDODQGRSHUDWLRQDOSULQFLSOHV´7KH
autonomy process of executives from politicians was also evident in the case of 
KOINOPOLITIA. The director enjoyed a degree of independence from the 
ERDUGZKLFKPDLQO\FRQVLVWHGRIPD\RUV³$VGLUHFWRU,KDYHJUHDWIOH[LELOLW\
LQZKDW,DPGRLQJJUDQWHGE\WKHDGPLQLVWUDWLYHERDUG´'LUHFWRURI
KOINOPOLITIA). So, it seems that these programmes have nurtured the 
development of a local bureaucracy, which differed from its traditional role of 
execution by its active involvement in local policy-making.         
 
However, elected members weakening of power towards experts and chief 
executives in partnership operation, which is also confirmed in the UK 
literature (Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998) raises questions about the legitimacy 
DQGDFFRXQWDELOLW\RIWKHSDUWQHUVKLS¶VOHDGHUVKLS:KLOHWKHSUHVLGHQWRIWKH
DAH had a strong representational mandate, the director appointed by the 
DAH board, lacked the authority provided by elections. Nevertheless, he was 
accountable in an indirect way: he was appointed by the DAH board which 
mainly comprised of mayors, through a representative process, and he had to 
operate within the overall policy framework that the DAH board had defined. 
Additionally, a closer look to the DAH board revealed the strong legitimacy of 
the mayors involved in this board. All mayors were elected again and again; 
some of them held this position more than 10 years and had a long history of 
activism in local affairs (chapter 4, section 2.2.2). Consequently, the input 
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legitimation of director was empowered indirectly through the political weight 
of mayors.  
 
7KHSDUDGR[ZDVWKDWHYHQLIPD\RUV¶UROHKDGEHHQZHDNHQHGLQSDUWQHUVhips 
and political decisions were made by the DAH director who was not subjected 
to electorate mandate, he managed to preserve his legitimation in two more 
ways: first, by implementing programmes which their formal rules demanded 
information and consultatiRQZLWKSURJUDPPHV¶EHQHILFLDULHVDVZHOODV
communication with citizens; second, by his capacity to deliver outcomes. In 
particular, the director of the DAH was visible to the local society with his 
presence in partnership meetings and during the processes of information and 
consultation of the beneficiaries and citizens.  
 
Additionally, what kept him accountable to the citizens was the securing of 
specific outcomes based on the value of good management and day-to-day 
solutions of the partnership beneficiaries' needs. Consequently, the legitimation 
of the director depended on his visibility and contact with local citizens and his 
capacity to produce efficient outcomes rather than on electoral representation. 
In this way, throughput and output legitimation were more enhanced that input 
legitimation. The EQUAL II coordinator explained the high visibility and 
DFFHSWDQFHE\ORFDOSHRSOHRIWKH'$+DQGLWVGLUHFWRUE\QRWLFLQJWKDW³WKH
director has been in contact with people and he knows what their needs are [...]. 
Overall, the DAH is an agency that operates also as an information and 
consultation point for the community. We receive phone calls every day, we 
IROORZDSDUWLFXODUPHWKRGRORJ\DQGZHJXLGHSHRSOH´ 
 
2.2 Leadership style  
In this section, the behaviour of the DAH director and president are further 
analysed in order to identify the ways that these leaders enacted leadership type 
as it had been formulated by the constraints and the potentials of partnership 
formal and informal rules. One EU officer, Head of Unit, stated about the 
LPSDFWRIOHDGHUV¶EHKDYLRXURQWKH/'$VGHYHORSPHQWWKDW³7KHUHZHUHJRRG
DQGEDGSUHVLGHQWVDQGJRRGDQGEDGGLUHFWRUV«ZKRDFFRUGLQJO\PDGHD
VXFFHVVIXORUXQVXFFHVVIXO/'$´ 
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Further down, I identify 6 traits of leaderV¶EHKDYLRXUWKDWUHLQIRUFHGDQGRU
changed the requirements of partnership rules. Most of them exclusively 
characterised the director, while others were shared with the president. 
 
2.2.1 Building trust and respect   
The primary intention of the director was to build trust and respect among 
partners and towards him. His straightforwardness and honesty acknowledged 
by all partners. Taking into account the informal values of distrust and 
avoidance of taking responsibility in the Greek society as well as the unequal 
power relations within the partnership, the above-mentioned values carried an 
unusual for the existing reality importance. This was especially significant for 
the partners of public institutions whose involvement in collaborative settings 
depends solely on the motivations and ambitions of their managers. The respect 
and trust towards these institutions by the partnership leader was mostly an 
ethical award and recognition for their effort to participate in collaborative 
projects. As reported by a partner of WKHSXEOLFLQVWLWXWLRQ1(/(³)LUVWRIDOO
WKHUHZDVDUHODWLRQRIWUXVW>«@WKHIDFWWKDWZHFRXOGJXDUDQWHHWKDWZKDWKDG
to be done, would be done. The leader trusted us and he cooperated directly 
DQGKRQHVWO\ZLWKXV´ 
 
The significance given to trust and honesty by the director was also confirmed 
in the actions of the DAH as whole which particularly strengthened some 
formal rules like clarity, transparency and stability as already seen in chapter 5. 
 
2.2.2 Facilitator of the partnership process  
The followiQJIHDWXUHVRIOHDGHUV¶EHKDYLRXUKDGIDFLOLWDWHGWKHFROODERUDWLRQRI
partners.  
x Make things happen  
According to interviewees, the director handled efficiently the different, 
eventually conflicting, powers in the partnership and supported the partners to 
work successfully with each other. In this way, he finally managed to direct 
collective action for achieving expected results. The coordinator of LEADER+ 
VWDWHGDERXWKLP³+HGHDOVZLWKDQ\PDWWHUWKDWDULVHVSHUVRQDOO\UDQJLQJIURP
293 
 
a cleaner's and X staII¶VSUREOHPVWRSDUWQHUVDQGWKHPLQLVWU\KHLVTXLWH
diplomatic and clever, two features that are quite important for moving 
FROODERUDWLRQIRUZDUG´7KHH[-president of KOINOPOLITIA speaking 
generally about his experience reflected on the negotiating role that the leader 
KDVWRSOD\LQFROODERUDWLRQKHQRWHG³$OOSDUWQHUVLQLWLDOO\DJUHHZLWKWKHZRUN
WKDWKDVWREHGRQH,QWKHEHJLQQLQJWKH\VD\³\HV´WRHYHU\WKLQJDQGWKHQ,
feel that sometimes I have to give in to agreements or to back down in 
proFHVVHVVRDVQRWWRDGYHUVHO\DIIHFWWKHSDUWQHUVKLS´ 
 
6RQHJRWLDWLRQDQGGLSORPDF\DSSHDUHGWREHNH\FRQFHSWVLQOHDGHUV¶
perception regarding leadership enactment. Having in mind the complexity of 
the situation, they tried to find solutions to the problem. The issue of 
partnership continuity was so demanding that a lot of back steps and work were 
done by the leader with the aim of keeping the desired balance between 
partners. Talking about the negotiations for the agenda setting in the DAH 
council, a PD\RUDQGPHPEHURIWKH'$+ERDUGUHIHUUHGWRGLIIHUHQWPD\RUV¶
SROLWLFDOSUHVVXUHVDQGWKHFDWDO\WLFUROHRIWKHGLUHFWRU³2IFRXUVHWKH
SUHVLGHQWDVDSHUVRQLQYROYHGLQSROLWLFVNQRZVYHU\ZHOOPD\RUV¶SRVLWLRQV
and their weaknesses. That is the political pressure; in this case, the director 
plays an intermediate role to all these; trying to find solutions until we have a 
UHVXOWZKLFKLVDVZHOOEDODQFHGDVSRVVLEOH´,QWKHLQWHUYLHZZLWKWKH
EQUAL II coordinator, it was also reported the capacity of director to advance 
SUREOHPDWLFVLWXDWLRQVWRVROXWLRQ³:KHQWKHUHDUHPDMRUSUREOHPVDQG
because the director is a person that has generated ideas, he intervenes and he 
ILQGVVROXWLRQVVROXWLRQVWRPDLQSUREOHPV´ 
  
x Good management skills    
The director was also characterised by all partners for professionalism and high 
quality management capacities, free from political pressures. As it has already 
been mentioned in chapter six, the traditional provision of the strategic policy 
direction in the partnHUVKLSE\SROLWLFDOSDUWQHUV³LVQRZVXEMHFWWRQHJRWLDWLRQ´
by executives (Leach and Lowndes, 2007: 11). This informal rule was further 
enhanced by the director to the point that rivalries have arisen between the 
involved in the partnership mayors and the director himself. His own personal 
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view for his role cuts across the established role of the executive who 
traditionally ensured effective policy implementation and the traditional role of 
the elected politicians, which was to provide the strategic policy direction of 
the partnership. That is why it created an underlying competition between 
mayors and the director in particular and more generally betweens mayors and 
LDAs. 
   
In particular, according to him, the strategic direction of the DAH and the 
specialisation of the partnership actions were issues that concerned him 
GLUHFWO\7KHGLUHFWRUVWUHVVHGWKDW³7KHUHDUHWZRNLQGVRIFRQIOLFWVLQWKH
DAH board. One is the philosophy that we have in relation to the DAH and the 
development of the region; the second one is related with choices, evaluations, 
financing; mayors believe that we have to favour or support residents who live 
in their municipality or for other reasons. In both cases, I had a personal 
discussion challenging this attitude and I have proposed different and more 
FRQFUHWHVROXWLRQV´6RWKHGLUHFWRUSHUFHLYHGKLPVHOIDVKDYLQJWKHOHJLWLPDWH
role in directing the agenda making and making absolute judgments of how to 
put forward the DAH. When he was analysing his ideas about the ways that the 
SDUWQHUVKLSVKRXOGIXQFWLRQKHTXLWHRIWHQXVHGWKHWHUP³IRUWKHJRRGRIWKH
'$+¶DVKHZDVWKHRQO\SHUVRQIURPDOOSDUWQHUVZKRNQHZLQGHSWKKRZ
things should have been dRQH³,KDYHWROGWKHERDUGWKDWXQOHVVZHZRUNZLWK
an objective and integrative management system instead of a fragmentary way, 
,ZLOOUHVLJQWKHQH[WGD\IRUWKHVDNHRIWKH'$+´ 
 
According to the director, mayors were good to have mainly for negotiations 
with the upper level of government (region, state, EU) rather than for their 
local policy-PDNLQJ³0D\RUVDUHLPSRUWDQWZKHQWKH\UHSUHVHQWXVDWWKH
upper level; in other words, if we have 4-5 mayors who do this work 
efficiently, it is good to have WKHPKHUH´7KLVPDQDJHULDOVW\OHRISROLWLFV
transcended the whole culture of the people working in the DAHs. For 
instance, there was a belief held by DAH staff that partnership working was an 
issue for experts and not for politicians. In my interview with the EQUAL II 
coordinator, talking about the representatives of partner organisations, she 
DIILUPHGWKDWSDUWQHUVKLSGHFLVLRQVVKRXOGEHDQLVVXHIRUH[HFXWLYHV³:KDW
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ZHZDQWDQGZHKDYHILQDOO\DFKLHYHGLVIRUWKH/'$V¶GLUHFWRUVRUIRUWKH
people who are involved in the implementation to work on a daily basis 
WRZDUGVWKHDLPVRIWKLVSDUWQHUVKLS>«@%HFDXVHLIWKHSUHIHFWWKHYLFHSUHIHFW
RUHDFK/'$¶VSUHVLGHQWZHUHDWWHQGLQJZHFRXOGQRWKDYHUHVXOWV>«@6RZH
solve the problems among us, the executives who are actually working on the 
SURMHFWHYHU\GD\´ 
 
)RUPD\RUVWKHUHH[LVWHGDIHDURIORVLQJWKHLUSROLWLFDOSRZHUJUDGXDOO\³2XU
fear for DAH and for our municipal council is it ending up a technocratic 
managerial mechanism, and this is not good, not just for us, but also for the 
FLWL]HQV´0D\RURI(SLVNRSLV+RZHYHUIRUWKHPSDUWQHUVKLSDQG
PDQDJHPHQWZHUH³QHFHVVDU\´WRWKHH[WHQWWKDWWKH\KDGXQGHUVWRRGWKDW
without these practices, they could not have access to EU and state funds. It 
was not a response to regional development deriving from a political ideology 
EXWWRQHZ³LPSRVHG´YDOXHVWKDWWKH\KDGWREHOLHYHLQDQGDFFHSWLQRUGHUWR
get more money. If partnership and management were not as strongly promoted 
by EU regulations and principles, partnership structures and managerial 
practices would not have been developed by mayors.   
 
It looks like as if mayors felt a tension between the adoption of a rational and 
managerial policy-making and the abandoning of their traditional localist and 
politicised way of applying policy. Mayors finally ended up supporting the 
H[HFXWLYHV¶PDQDJHULDOYDOXHVDQGWKH\WULHGWRNHHSWKHPRVWRIWKHLUFRQIOLFWV
in undertones. In my interview with the president of DAH, the tension between 
political and managerial motivations among the DAH board members was 
UHYHDOHG³7KHVHLVDSURFHVVZKHUHZHFRPELQHHDFKPD\RU¶Vvision with the 
existing technocratic experience in the DAH and we arrive to a political 
canvass where both of them co-H[LVWWKLVKDVDJUHDWGLIILFXOW\´ 
 
Even if playing politics was something that was not the main practice for the 
director, sometimes he got involved and dealt with different political interests 
LQRUGHUWRSURWHFWWKHSDUWQHUVKLSRSHUDWLRQIURPPD\RUV¶SROLWLFDOFRQIOLFWV,Q
this case, his aim was to overcome political disagreements that could block the 
GHOLYHU\RIRXWFRPHV³7KHUHDUHORcal authorities participating in the 
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LEADER project. They elect a committee that manages the budget and 
consequently we have to keep a sense of political balance. How do you achieve 
this balance? In this way, we all play politics in favour of the development but 
ZHGRQRWRSHUDWHZLWKFOHDUSDUWLVDQFULWHULDEHFDXVHZHZLOOIDLO´'LUHFWRU of 
DAH).   
 
+RZHYHUWKHGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQ³FOHDUSDUWLVDQFULWHULD´DQGSROLWLFDORQHVLV
PDUJLQDO,QWKHVDPHLQWHUYLHZWKHGLUHFWRUVWDWHG³:HSURYLGHIRUDQGZH
have very good relations with the government and the political parties on a 
basis of cooperation and information but it is not us who will raise the flag of 
transparency and apolitical behaviour. We have transparency but we are not 
fighting for it. We do our job quietly by nicely keeping a distinctive distance 
from politics. This does not mean that they (the politicians) do not have the 
power to intervene and that we do not use political intervention in some 
LVVXHV´6RILQDOO\SOD\LQJSROLWLFVZDVQRWRQO\ related with the management 
RIGLIIHUHQWSDUWQHUV¶FRQIOLFWLQJGHPDQGVDYRLGLQJLQWKLVZD\WKHFROODSVHRI
the partnership but also, more directly, with party politics and political 
interventions. 
 
The competition between elected politicians and executives was also evident at 
state level. The ministers and the general secretaries of the MAs who were 
appointed by them, promoted a more partisan management of programmes, 
while managers a more professional one. However, unlike the local level at 
which there was finally a combination of these different motivations with the 
predominance of the managerial discourse, at the national level, politics had 
the first say. Talking about the partisan Greek state, an EU officer reported 
³7KHUHLVDSHUPDQHQWSUHVVXUHWKDW the staff (of MAs) has been subjected to by 
ministers and this does not leave room for them to express themselves as they 
would like to. Someone that has ideas, which are revolutionary for the status 
quo, they clip their wings because they disturb the existing partisan 
HVWDEOLVKPHQW´ 
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x 7KHULJKWSDUWQHUV¶VHOHFWLRQ 
$QRWKHUIHDWXUHRIWKHIDFLOLWDWLRQVW\OHRIWKHGLUHFWRUZDVWKH³ULJKW´VHOHFWLRQ
of partnership members. This was decisive because it related both to the 
democratic quality of the partnership by the inclusion/exclusion of partners and 
to the efficiency of the partnership since the selection of the most suitable to 
the project partners guaranteed its continuity. In this regard, the director had a 
major concern to ensure that not only the organisations involved but also the 
UHSUHVHQWDWLYHVRIWKHVHRUJDQLVDWLRQVZHUHDEOHWRZRUNWRJHWKHU³,QHDFK
partnership, we have to select and consolidate the right institutions and the 
individuals that represent these institutions. What is important is that the 
LQGLYLGXDOVZKREHFRPHLQYROYHGVWD\ORQJDQGDUHDFWLYHZHFDQ¶WDIIord 
changes every 2-PRQWKV´'irector of DAH).  
 
However, the embracing of new members in partnership was not implemented 
DORQJZLWKWKHLUVXSSRUWIRUEHLQJDEOHWREH³RQERDUG´WRXQGHUVWDQGKRZWKH
partnership worked. The integration process of new partners was not 
institutionally organised by the leader but it was left to the motivation and 
SDWLHQFHRIWKHSURMHFWV¶FRRUGLQDWRUV³:KHQWKH;PD\RUFRPHVIRUWKHILUVW
time and he does not know anyone, in the beginning, he is a little suspicious, 
especially when he is a new mayor and had competed with the ex mayor. This 
happens until he gets the grips and trusts us. So, I picked up the phone and I 
said to the mayor that I wanted the annual report and I had to explain to him 
ZKDWDQDQQXDOUHSRUWLVZKDWKHKDGWRZULWHDQGZKHQWRVHQGLW´LEADER+ 
coordinator). 
 
Finally, it is very interesting to demonstrate how each of these features of 
OHDGHU¶VVW\OHUHJDUGLQJSDUWQHUVKLp facilitation had a different weight in 
SDUWQHUV¶SHUFHSWLRQ7KLVYDULHGSHUFHSWLRQGHSHQGHGRQWKHLU different needs. 
For the LDA Sitia, which did not have sufficient experience in programmes 
and it felt like the outsider of the programme because of its geographical 
isolation and organisational backwards, the director was positively 
FKDUDFWHULVHGE\KLVIDLUQHVVDQGKLVFDSDFLW\WRSXWHYHU\WKLQJLQRUGHU³7KH
director knew how to manage a conversation. He did not let anyone feel having 
298 
 
been unfairly dealt with and he managed to be imposed on others (Executive of 
LDA Sitia).  
 
The rest of the LDAs, which were more familiar with programmes and 
partnerships, underlined other qualities of the director like his open mindedness 
professionalism and vision. One executive in LDA AKOM noted WKDW³7KH
director is social, he has a dynamic character and he has so far shown quite a 
JRRGSURIHVVLRQDOFDUHHU´$nother executive from the LDA Lasithi added 
³7KHGLUHFWRULVYHU\DFWLYHZLWKa concrete policy vision; even if he used 
particular tactics and he is a bawler, his leadership is good because he 
RUJDQLVHGWKHZKROHWKLQJ´ZKLOHWKHH[HFXWLYHIURP LDA OADYK 
XQGHUOLQHG³7KHGLUHFWRULVYHU\RUJDQLVHGKHORYHVWKHZKROHWKLQJKHKDV
many years of experience in the field. If he listens to an idea, he will promote 
DQGVXSSRUWLW´&RQVHTXHQWO\LWDSSHDUHGWKDWWKHGLUHFWRUKDGDOVRDQRWKHU
way for taking the partnership ahead. He was responsive and he had the 
capability to understand the particular needs of every partner and respond to 
these effectively.   
 
2.2.3 Visionary  
The president and the director promoted a particular vision in the partnership 
policy agenda. They did not only solve existing problems but they also directed 
the partnership to new projects; they supported the sustainability of the 
partnership by exploring new funding resources. As the national external 
evaluator of EQUAL II UHSRUWHG³7KH'LUHFWRULVYLVLRQDU\KHORRNVDKHDGª 
 
The last time that I visited the DAH, I found all the chief executives of the 
DAH with the director around a table discussing how they were going to 
organise their actions to get new projects for the 4th EU programming period 
WKDWZRXOGRSHQLQDIHZPRQWKV7KHGLUHFWRUVDLGWRPH³,WLVIRUFHUWDin that 
LQWKHQH[WSHULRG,PXVWGHYRWHRIP\WLPHLQSODQQLQJ>«@EHFDXVHULJKW
now the new funding period starts. If we are not going to do the right planning 
before the 4th EU  SURJUDPPLQJSHULRGVWDUWVWKHQZKDW"´ 
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Interestingly, it was mainly the director who felt obliged to plan and give a 
strategic direction to the DAH, and not instead the president and the mayors of 
the board who as politicians have to offer and support a strong vision for their 
local societies. The strategic direction did not only fit in to the perception of a 
GLUHFWRU¶VUROHEXWLWKDVEHHQH[SHFWHGE\WKHH[HFXWLYHVRIWKH'$+³+HKDV
to prepare proposals, to create new partnerships, to make contacts, to select 
QHZSDUWQHUVDQGVXEPLWDOOWKHVHWRWKHERDUG´LEADER+ coordinator).    
 
Independently of the different level of strategic intervention by the president 
and the director, both leaders shared the same vision: a new, good management 
of policies for local development and inter municipal cooperation. In particular, 
they supported the development of advanced local authorities moving towards 
a more rationalised and integrated policy-making. Usually, in Greece, mayors 
believe that the citizens will judge them positively and vote for them again, if 
they develop more and more infrastructures. Consequently, the mayors who 
were partners in DAH, fight for getting more money for public investments 
HYHQLIWKHVHLQYHVWPHQWVGLGQRWUHVSRQGGLUHFWO\WRWKHLUFRPPXQLWLHV¶QHHGV 
 
On the contrary, the president and the director shared a more integrated 
approach of policy-making. According to it, policies in different municipalities 
could complement each other for the development of the whole area. The 
SUHVLGHQWRIWKH'$+VWDWHG³:HWKHPD\RUVKDYHWRXQGHUVWDQGWKDWD
mayor will not be judged on the basis of having completed 2 instead of 5 
public infrastructures; it is far more complicated an issue than the simple 
competition of mayors for more infrastructures; it is an issue of attitudes, 
SROLFLHVDQGVHUYLFHVWRR´+HDOVRDGGHG ³7KHUROHRI'$+LVQRRWKHUWKDQ
WRGHYHORSDQHZYLVLRQRIGHYHORSPHQWLQUXUDODUHDV´,QWKHVDPHVSLULWWKH\
thought of the DAH as an extended partnership in which the participating local 
authorities would work under a collaborative spirit and they would be ready to 
SXUVXHJRDOVWKDWZRXOGEHQHILWWKHUHJLRQ¶VGHYHORSPHQWDVDZKROH 
 
$FFRUGLQJWRWKHGLUHFWRU¶VYLVLRQORFDODXWKRULWLHV³KDYHWRXQGHUVWDQGWKDWZH
must have the tools for programming so as to be prepared for the national 
allocation of resources, to be prepared for good qualitative projects so as to 
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implement them quickly. This is the first step; the second step is that local 
authorities have from now on to cooperate in issues that are not able to solve 
on their own. This is my philosRSK\´1HYHUWKHOHVVLQWKLVLPDJHRIWKHIXWXUH
ZKDWZDVPLVVLQJZDVWKHFRPPXQLW\DQGEHQHILFLDULHV¶LQYROYHPHQWLQORFDO
decision-making as already identified above.  
 
This vision of cooperation and integration had its roots in the past. This was 
³LQKHULWHG´IURPWKHSUHYLRXVSUHVLGHQWZKRVHYLVLRQZDVWRPDNHWKH'$+DQ
established organisation that would include all the local authorities of the 
region. His concern was to reach the most isolated places of the region and 
inform the citizens about the D$+SURMHFWV³:HZHUHOXFN\WRKDYHDV
president of the agency, Stavros Arnaoutakis who was very consensual and 
YLVLRQDU\+HWROGWRWKHFLWL]HQV³9LVLWRXUDJHQF\FRQVXOWZLWKRXUVWDIIDV
many times as you wish, find the right experts to support your proposal and we 
will accept all of them. And this had happened (LEADER+ coordinator).   
        
2.2.4 Instrumental empowerment of beneficiaries   
7KHKLJKOHYHOLQYROYHPHQWRIEHQHILFLDULHVZDVQRWRQO\DEVHQWIURPOHDGHUV¶
vision but also from their everyday practices. The beneficiaries were 
empowered only in cases when major problems had arisen and when there had 
been a risk of someone withdrawing from the programme. So, leaders related 
EHQHILFLDULHV¶SDUWLFLSDWLRQZLWKWKHLQVWUXPHQWDOSULQFLSOHRIHIIHFWLYH
outcomes. During interviews, the project beneficiaries (women's cooperatives 
and investors) as well as the project coordinators acknowledged that the 
director made the effort to strengthen the skills and the confidence of the 
beneficiaries for continuing their involvement in projects. The coordinator of 
LEADER+ also acknowledged this behaviour of the director by noticing that 
³KHOLVWHQVWRWKHGLIIHUHQWYLHZVRIWKHSDUWQHUVEXWWKLVGRHVQRWPHDQWKDWKH
accepts all of them. If he gets convinced that this is right in regards to effective 
RXWFRPHVKHZLOOVXSSRUWLW´ 
 
+RZHYHUZKHQSUREOHPVRFFXUUHGWKHOHDGHU¶VLQYROYHPHQWZDVGLUHFW)RU
instance, describing a problem of one women's cooperative regarding the 
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succession of their president, the coordinator of EQUAL II underlined that 
³ILQDOO\WKH\FDPHKHUHWRDVNDGYLFHIURPWKHGLUHFWRUEHFDXVHWKH\WUXVWKLP
DORWKHKDGKHOSHGWKHPPDQ\WLPHV´7KHVDPHKDSSHQHGZLWKWKHSUHVLGHQW
RIWKH'$+³7KHSUHVLGHQWKLPVHOIKDGJRQHWRFRRSHUDWLYHVDQGKHKDG 
discussions with the women involved in these, when they had serious problems 
ZLWKWKHLUFROODERUDWLRQ´LEADER+ coordinator). 
 
7KHGLUHFWRU¶VRZQSHUFHSWLRQDVOHDGHUHQFRPSDVVHGTXLWHREYLRXVO\KLV
GLUHFWLYHUROHIRUHIILFLHQF\³WKHPRVWLPSRUWDQWLVWRbe successful in our job; 
we treat partners equally so that all partners take advantage of the outcomes but 
what primary concerns us is the efficient implementation of the programmes. 
6RLQKLVSHUFHSWLRQWKHOHDGHU¶VNH\UROHZDVPHHWLQJWKHSDUWQHUVKLS's goals 
rather than building a new totality through participation in partnership 
processes. In this way, the collaboration did not consist of a value on its own, 
but rather a means to another end.  
 
2.2.5 Authoritarian style  
Regardless of the cases for which the two leaders developed a responsive style 
WRZDUGVSDUWQHUVDQGEHQHILFLDULHV¶SUREOHPVWKHUHZHUHDOVRFDVHVRIGLUHFWLYH
style in which the leaders made everything needed to be done in terms of 
meeting the partnership¶VJRDOV7KHILUVWHYLGHQFHRIGLUHFWLYHVW\OHZDVWKH
concentration of most powers mainly to the director and to a lesser extent to the 
president. Although the director empowered the weak partners and tried to 
mobilise them, he did all these on his own; he did not create infrastructures 
through which the partners could actively participate; on the contrary, he liked 
controlling everything. Partners reported to him directly or via the coordinator 
and with his personal intervention, the problems got solved. In general, there 
were not any formalised communication processes that facilitated problem 
solving and consensus building among partners; on the contrary, it was his 
personal involvement that played that role.  
 
Consequently, the power centralisation reacKHGDSRLQWWKDWDOOWKH'$+V¶
RSHUDWLRQLQJHQHUDODQGERWKSDUWQHUVKLSV¶RSHUDWLRQLQSDUWLFXODUEHFDPH
depended on one person, i.e. the director. A DAH executive referred in a 
302 
 
FKDUDFWHULVWLFZD\WRWKHFHQWUDOLVDWLRQRIKLVSRZHU³,WKLQNWKDWKHODFNVthe 
DELOLW\WRGHOHJDWH>«@KHZDQWVWRFRQWUROHYHU\WKLQJEXWWKHV\VWHPLV
RYHUORDGHGEHFDXVHULJKWQRZ³HYHU\WKLQJ´PHDQVVRPDQ\WKLQJV+HLVRnly 
RQHPDQDQGKHQHHGVWREH³FHOOFORQHG´ LQRUGHUWREHHYHU\ZKHUH´ 
 
Nevertheless, the perception of the director vis-a-vis power sharing came in 
contradiction with the findings from the executives' interviews who were 
working in the DAH. Regarding the use of power, the director noted that 
³+HUHP\UROHLVFOHDUO\DFRRUGLQDWLQJRQH1RGLUHFWRUFDQVROYe every 
problem. If you do not encourage executives who can take initiatives and 
develop their activities, no agency will manage to be developed; the secret lies 
LQWKHUHEHLQJFRPSHWHQWH[HFXWLYHV>«@,IWKHGLUHFWRUVHHVWKHGHYHORSPHQW
of the executives as antagonistic to his position, that they will replace him, then 
LQDVKRUWWLPHYHU\TXLFNO\KHZLOOIDLO7KDW¶VFHUWDLQ´ 
 
The director impressively gave in a very clear statement the reason for the 
exercise of his centralised power. The centralised power was not a way of 
doing things in a better way but an addiction to power, the preservation of 
power. The leader usually did not share responsibilities and initiatives because 
he was afraid to lose it and not because he believed that it is a more effective 
practice. Here, one can see elements of the Greek political culture emerging: 
³7KHUDWLRQDOHLVTXLWHVLPSOH7KH*UHHNOHDGHUVOLNHSRZHU,WLVDOZD\VWKDW
RQO\RQHPXVWGHFLGHIRUHYHU\WKLQJ´Director of DAH ).   
 
Moreover, what he means by sharing power with his executives has a different 
meaning and degree in other countries like U.K. where there already 
established institutions supporting the decentralisation of power in policy-
making exist as opposed to Greece where in an authoritarian hierarchical 
policy context, power sharing starts from scratch. If for the director, the 
decentralisation of power means that one controls everything offering someone 
little space for one's own initiatives as project coordinator, it is certain that this 
is not exactly an exercise of sharing power. However, it is a starting point for 
IXWXUHFKDQJH³7KHGLUHFWRUOHWXVGHYHORSVRPHLQLWLDWLYHVDVH[HFXWLYHVEXW
he always knows YHU\ZHOOZKDWZHDUHGRLQJ´(xecutive of DAH). 
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In any case, there was always the danger of the director abusing his power, 
which could strongly challenge the legitimacy of his institutional position. 
Generally speaking for all the LDAs, the national external evaluator of 
LEADER+ UHSRUWHGWKDWULVN³7KH/'$VKDYHJUDGXDOO\EHFRPHDXWRQomous 
>«@7KHGLUHFWRUVRIWKH/'$VKDYHEHHQWUDQVIRUPHGWRORFDONH\SHUVRQV
who change the established power balance without having the relative 
legitimacy. They can now intervene politically more and, in many cases, they 
compete against mayors, especially in cases when they are from opposite 
SROLWLFDOSDUWLHV´'XULQJLQWHUYLHZVWKHUHZHUHLQGLUHFWFRPPHQWVPDGHE\WKH
SDUWQHUVIRUWKLVNLQGRIEHKDYLRXUGLVSOD\HGE\WKH'$+GLUHFWRU³+H
sometimes exceeds the limits of his power; personally, I do not care because I 
do not wish to have a leadership position, but there are some people who are 
DQQR\HGE\WKLV´EQUAL II partner).      
 
%HVLGHVWKHFHQWUDOLVDWLRQRIWKHGLUHFWRU¶VSRZHUWKHSUHVLGHQWDOVROLNHGWR
control everything starting from complicated issues like the preparation of the 
agenda to simple things like publicity and other administrative processes. A 
'$+H[HFXWLYHFRQWLQXHVE\VD\LQJWKDW³7KHUHLVQRWKLQJWKHH[HFXWLYHVKDYH
done that the president does not know about it. If I send a letter to X, it is ok 
but for more important tasks either the simplest ones like the publicity of a 
programme proclamation or more complicated ones like what we are going to 
GLVFXVVLQDPHHWLQJ,KDYHWRPHHWKLPRUFDOOKLP´ 
 
The centralisation of power was also accompanied by authoritarian ways of 
power exercise. When I recall the interview with the director, I am thinking of 
him as a dynamic person who was trying to keep a balance between 
stubbornness and diplomacy. He was certainly a man with temperament who 
could easy blow up and make decisions right away. As a DAH executive 
UHFRJQLVHG³0DQ\WLPHVWKHWHPSHUVEHFRPHIUD\HGKHFDXVHVWKDWEHFDXVH
he is irritable and temperamental and the situation is getting tense. But because 
of that, he says what he has to say, he does what he has to do and then he 
DSSURDFKHVWKHRWKHUSHUVRQZLWKGLSORPDF\´,QWKLVZD\OHDGHUV¶
centralisation of power obstructed the collaborative spirit of partnership.  
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Conclusions   
Agency played a crucial role in both partnerships. As reported by the EQUAL 
II FRRUGLQDWRU³WKHUROHRIWKHLQGLYLGXDOLVvery decisive for the success of an 
LQVWLWXWLRQ´7ZRPDLQJURXSVWKDWRILQVWLWXWLRQDOHQWUHSUHQHXUVDWQDWLRQDODQG
local level and that of established local leaders impacted on partnership altering 
the power relations between formal and informal rules.  
 
Regarding institutional entrepreneurs, they played a key role in the partnership 
development either by their efforts to get their organisation in the partnership 
or by their personal engagement in the implementation of partnership goals. In 
regards to the latter, they have used many techniques like interpreting and 
adapting formal rules to the Greek reality, motivating others to follow and 
making things happen with their own personal work.  
 
Regarding leadership type, the formal partnership rules have been pushed 
IRUZDUGWRWKUHHPDLQVKLIWV)LUVWJLYHQWKHSULQFLSOHRISDUWQHUV¶
egalitarianism (at least in papers) and the independence of partners with 
regards to the implementation of activities, leadership moved towards a more 
sharing leadership. Leadership was not vested in a single individual but it was 
dispersed among a number of individuals who influenced partnership 
development in different time frameworks and in different ways. In this 
context, the traditional hierarchy of mayor ± followers gave its place to a 
process of emergent leaders who shared the responsibility of influence and 
direction in partnership. 
 
Second, the formal rules led to a more facilitative and less authoritarian 
leadership style regarding influence and direction of partners as a result of the 
partnership collaborative culture. Both shifts are also supported by the 
literature, especially by the work of Vangen and Huxman (2003) who refer to 
the collaborating leadership in partnerships and networks. Third, the 
technocratisation of partnership management changed the relations of mayors 
with chief executives. Mayors depended more and more on the expertise and 
the managerial tools at the disposal of chief executives who in their turn 
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became more and more involved in policy-making, getting less dependent on 
the political interventions made by mayors.   
 
Regarding leadership formal rules enactment, the director and the president 
supported and facilitated partnerships to the extent that they managed to sustain 
a successful collaboration always in relation to other parts of Greece where 
collaboration had generally been difficult to sustain. In particular, the director 
did that by practices such as ensuring consensus building, making things 
happen and selecting partners. The director played DUROHRI³KRQHVWEURNHU´
(Ansell and Gash, 2007) among others too; as a result all the partners could 
eventually trust and respect him. The building of trust by the leadership 
implied also the maintaining and reinforcement of some formal rules like the 
transparency and stability ones. Moreover, the director and the president shared 
a common vision for local development, which supported collaboration and a 
managerial policy-making.  
 
Additionally, the role of executives came to the front. It appeared that the DAH 
executives guided by the director opted for the opportunity offered by formal 
rules to introduce new managerial practices to the established political 
practices of mayors and gradually to the established way of local policy-
making. This practice had created a competition against mayors who were 
finally forced to follow due to the new circumstances created by partnership 
formal rules but also due to their own personal attitudes for modernisation of 
local policy-making.  
 
Nevertheless, the director as well as the president did not use the new 
opportunities of formal rules for community participation in the same way. 
Their focus on the accomplishment through planning and control of the 
prescribed partnership goals led to the support and empowerment of partners in 
an instrumental way for outcome achievement.   
 
)XUWKHUPRUHZKLOHWKHUHZDVDVKLIWLQOHDGHUV¶SUDFWLFHVIURPDOHVV
authoritarian behaviour to a more influencing and relational behaviour towards 
partners, the traditional centralised and hierarchical authority remained the key 
306 
 
tool to run politics. In many cases, when the negotiation processes failed, the 
director intervened in a direct and authoritarian way shaping the agenda of the 
partnership in his effort to move forward the collaboration for having tangible 
results. Or, the limits between the role of the facilitator leader and the role of 
the directive and authoritarian leader became diffused in favour of the latter.  
 
Concluding, it would be interesting if I could compare the impact of agency on 
policy-making in Greece with other western European countries. My 
assumption is that in Greece, the activity of an agent has more significant 
influence on policy-making than in other countries since the over-regulation 
and the confusion followed by it or the institutional vacuum in many policy 
areas leave room to the agent to support or change the existing combination of 
formal and informal rules. In the interviews, it has quite often been reported 
that such and such people achieved this in public organisations or influenced in 
a right or wrong direction the operation of their organisation. As the EU 
officer, who is GreeNHPSKDVLVHG³,QIDFWZKHQRQH refers to Greece, it is a 
matter of the persons´ 
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Conclusions 
The research data has revealed the dynamic relation between formal/ informal 
UXOHVDQGDFWRUV¶VWUDWHJLFEHKDYLRXUZLWKLQSROLWLFDOLQVWLWXWLRQV,SURSRVHWKDW
an institution can neither be analysed merely as a set of formal rules nor as a 
set of formal/ informal rules but as a totality where formal/ informal rules and 
DFWRUV¶VWUDWHJLFEHKDYLRXULQWHUDFW7KLVWRWDOLW\RSHUDWHVLQDVSHFLILFVSDWLDO
and temporal context that impacts upon it, and in turn, leads to (gradual) 
institutional change.  
 
The key issue here is to identify the power relations between the three 
constitutive elements of the institution - rules, agency and context - to reveal 
their interconnections and to articulate explanations. For instance, the operation 
RIWKH³FLYLFSDUWLFLSDWLRQ´ formal rule depends sequentially on established and 
contextually specific practices, the operationalisation of these practices inside 
the partnership, and finally the meaning that strategic actors give to civic 
engagement. Moreover, the institutional manifestation of these different, even 
in some cases conflictual, rules and behaviours depends on the established 
SRZHUUHODWLRQVDQGRSSRUWXQLWLHVIRUFKDQJHRIIHUHGE\WKHFRQWH[WDQGDJHQWV¶
intentionality.  
 
The conclusions are structured in four sections. In the first section, I will 
EULHIO\RXWOLQHHDFKFKDSWHU¶VFRQWHQW,QWKHVHFRQGVHFWLRQ,ZLOOVXPPDULVH
the main findings of the case study research. The third section will consider the 
distinctive contribution of my study to knowledge and the limitations that I 
have identified in the course of the research project. The fourth section will 
propose new areas of research.      
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1. Summary of the chapters   
The first chapter reviewed neo institutional theory and concluded that the 
study of institutions should include the configuration of formal/informal rules 
DQGDJHQWV¶VWUDWHJLFDFWLRQ6WDUWLQJIURPWKLVSURSRVLWLRQLWIXUWKHUPDSSHG
the relationship developed among these three institutional components and the 
contextual factors that influenced this relationship. In doing this, it applied a 
synthesis of different NI and sociological theories. Regarding rules, research 
recognises that institutional rules could be formal and informal and their 
relationship could be complementary, substituted or conflicting. In the case of 
conflicting rules, changes could occur due to particular factors such as the 
redistribution of resources and changes in beliefs and expectations.  
 
Regarding the agent/rules relationship, the research starts from the normative 
NI assumptions about the norms and values of institutions that define an 
appropriate behaviour in individuals. But, following critical realism and its 
arguments about structure/agency, the research acknowledges the capacity of 
individuals to integrate knowledge into their activities and pursue their own 
goals strategically. On the one hand, the degree to which the rules allow for 
individual freedom and structure power relations enables/constrains particular 
LQGLYLGXDOVLQIROORZLQJWKHLUPRWLYDWLRQV2QWKHRWKHUKDQGWKHDJHQWV¶
capacity to use/transform the available power resources directly and indirectly 
in order to respond to their intentions could preserve or change the rules. The 
power relation between rule/agent is the central point that defines the degree of 
institutional change.  
 
Finally, it is argued that these dynamic interactions are not developed in a 
contextual void. Four contextual factors have been identified as most 
influential in the development of the institution: 1. the socio-economic context; 
2. the institutional legacies; 3. the institutional configurations; and finally 4. the 
culture (political culture and social capital). 
 
The second chapter aimed to relate this NI theoretical framework to the 
operation of local partnerships through a review of three theories of urban 
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politics: a) urban regimes, b) urban governance and c) existing NI approaches 
on local partnerships. From the theories of urban politics, I have identified the 
following key issues that have been related to my research: a. the significance 
of a learning process and the purposive role of ideas in collaborative activity; b. 
WKHUHVRXUFHV¶LQWHUGHSHQGHQF\DQGFRPSOH[LW\RIDFWRUV¶PRWLYDWLRQFWKH
interdependency of agent/structure in urban politics, and finally d. the critical 
DQDO\VLVRIWKHSDUWQHUVKLSFDSDFLWLHVUHJDUGLQJSUREOHPV¶FRRUGLQDWLRQDQG
legitimation.  
 
Additionally, the review of neo institutional approaches to partnerships pointed 
out that partnerships are processes governed by informal rules, dependent on 
other institutions at local and national level and embodying a dynamic 
FKDUDFWHUZKHUH³ROG´DQG³QHZ´FRH[LVW0RUHRYHUVLnce the partnerships 
under consideration are EU funded, I also borrowed concepts and empirical 
evidence from the Europeanisation theory and in particular the analytical 
categories of EU policy features and the role of mediating domestic institutions 
DQGHQWUHSUHQHXUV¶SUDFWLFHVLQSURPRWLQJSUHYHQWLQJWKHDGDSWDWion to EU 
SURJUDPPHV¶UHTXLUHPHQWV 
 
Finally, the chapter reviews theories of urban leadership from management and 
SROLWLFDOVFLHQFHLQRUGHUWRXQGHUVWDQGDJHQWV¶SXUSRVLYHEHKDYLRXULQ
partnerships. It is argued that partnership leaders embody a tension between the 
exercise of strategic direction and generation of collaboration and consensus 
among partners. However, their behaviour is still dependent on the 
formal/informal partnership institutional rules. Moreover, it is stressed that the 
SDUWQHUVKLSV¶Uequirements for management and planning had led to an 
overlapping leadership role between politicians and chief executives. 
    
The third chapter focused on the research methodology. This research adopted 
the critical realism stance, which acknowledges a reflexive approach to reality 
DQGWKHUHVHDUFKHU¶VDFWLYHSDUWLFLSDWLRQLQGDWDLQWHUSUHWDWLRQ'XHWRWKH
complexity of the partnership processes and the limited previous research in 
the Greek context, I have selected an embedded case study strategy in which 
the in-depth research can provide a comprehensive picture of all the variables. 
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6R,IROORZ2VWURP¶VDUJXPHQWDERXWWKHDYRLGDQFHRIJHQHUDOLVDWLRQLQ
institutional analysis and the support of case-by-case study of an institution. 
 
Regarding research methods, I have applied a triangulation approach by using 
different methods like interviews, questionnaires, storytelling, observation and 
documentation. Finally, data analysis, following the adopted epistemological 
approach of this research recognised alongside the critical realism approach, 
the cyclical and reflexive procedure of data analysis. Techniques like data 
reduction by coding and matrix, data display and pattern matching have been 
XVHGLQRUGHUWRH[SODLQYDULDEOHV¶LQWHUFRQQHFWLRQV 
 
The case study findings were presented and analysed in the next four chapters. 
The fourth chapter offered a short description of the case study and analysed 
the specific socio-political Greek context in which the partnerships under 
consideration have been developed. It tried to explain the way that the local 
socio- economic, institutional and cultural context had enabled or prevented the 
development of collective action in partnerships. The fifth chapter focused 
exclusively on the formal rules of both partnerships while the sixth chapter 
explored the power of informal rules and their relationship with the formal 
rules. Finally, the seventh chapter looked at the strategic behaviour of 
established local leaders and ³LQVWLWXWLRQDOHQWUHSUHQHXUV´ and their impact on 
the preservation/change of rules. The main findings from the empirical 
chapters are discussed below. 
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2. Summary of findings   
2.1 The dynamic configuration of formal/informal rules   
The analysis demonstrated that the formal rules of the partnerships do not 
always determine what actually happens in practice. It is the configuration of 
formal and /informal rules that provides a deeper understanding of partnership 
operation. Regarding this configuration, I concluded that some elements of the 
formal rules have been effective, such as openness of decision-making and 
good management, although with variations.  Other elements of the formal 
rules have mostly remained on paper, like community participation, 
decentralisation and innovation. In these cases, it is the informal rules that have 
shaped how formal rules have been interpreted.  
 
%DVHGRQ/DXWK¶VW\SRORJ\DERXWWKHGLVWLQFWLRQRISURFHVVHVDQG
outcomes in formal/informal rules configuration, I present in the following 
table the respective configuration for my case study partnerships. This table 
summarises the findings of formal/ informal rules configuration in a 
parsimonious way for offering to the reader the possibility to understand in a 
comprehensive way the type of their relationship. In each vertical colon, I 
identify the formal rule and the relevant informal one while in the horizontal 
colon I explain what it was expected to be done by the formal rules, what is 
was actually done by the informal rule and the type of their relationship.              
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Formal rule (FR) /informal rule 
(IR)  
Processes Outcome  Type of relationship  
FR: Openness of decision-making 
Networking     
1. Diversity of local partners  
2. PDUWQHUV¶DVVHPEOLHVZLWKHTXDO
footing 
3. Consensus and argumentation  
outside the official channels of 
local government 
4. Thick learning 
5. Strong identity    
Efficient outcomes for 
partnerships:  
1. Sustainability of the 
partnership  
2. Implementation of all 
actions successfully  
Complementary  
IR: The domination of a 
centralised and mayoral local 
government  
1. Local authorities domain   
2. Hierarchical power relations 
Efficient outcomes for 
partnerships:  
1. Sustainability of the 
partnership   
2. Implementation of all 
actions successfully 
    
FR: Empowerment of local 
authorities 
Networking  
1. Delegation of financial 
management 2. Supportive and 
well staffed MA  
3. Institutionalisation of DP  
4. Alternative solution for LAGs  
5. Development of relationships 
with other local authorities  
Autonomy of local level:  
1. Empowerment of DAH and 
other inter-municipal 
cooperations  
2. Integration by consultation 
of local authorities and NGOs 
to national programming  
3. Development of local poles 
of growth  
Conflictual  
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IR: Centralised and highly 
politicised state Attitude of 
dependence  
1. Strong political and 
bureaucratic control  
2.Vertical informal network  
Dependence on local level   
    
FR: Participation and 
empowerment of local community  
1. Participation  
2. Empowerment  
3. Capacity building  
Democratic governance 
(balance among all three types 
of legitimation)  
Partially complementary Conflictual 
regarding input legitimation  
IR: Dissemination of information 
to the local community  
1.Information  
2. Soft consultation  
Output legitimation  
    
FR: Good management  1. Programming  
2. Monitoring 
3. Evaluation  
Effective organisation and 
implementation of 
programmes 
Complementary  
IR :Technocratisation of policy-
making  
Recognition of management 
knowledge resources by partners 
Effective organisation and 
implementation of 
programmes 
      
FR: New policy goals  Innovative actions in local 
integrated  development  
Enhance local 
entrepreneurialism and 
innovation 
Conflictual  
IR: Stability and secured results  
Attitude of dependence  
1. Secured results  
2. Low risk practices 3. Fear of 
responsibility  
Prevent local 
entrepreneurialism and 
innovation  
Table 23: Formal/Informal rules configuration in EQUAL II and LEADER+ partnerships 
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First, the formal rules of openness of decision-making and good management 
have been implemented even though they were new for the Greek context. The 
redistribution of resources to partners and beneficiaries through EU funding 
appears to be critical for the partnership formation, confirming in this way the 
theoretical propositions of North (1990) about the resource redistribution as 
key explanation of institutional change in a context where conflictual rules 
exist. On the one hand, local authorities had economic problems due to limited 
state financial subsidies and on the other hand, there was a flow of money from 
EU followed by clear and consistent EU rigorous funding rules. Both factors 
obliged partners to participate in a collaborative process and to rationalise 
policy-making in order to reassure the unhindered flow of funding. The logic 
was simple: if they wanted the money, they had to cooperate and implement 
the rules in an effective way.  
 
Moreover, these EU programme management and partnership requests were 
also accompanied by a policy discourse circulated through policy papers and 
PDQDJHUV¶SUDFWLFHVZKLFKDIILUPHGWKDWSDUWQHUVKLSLVVRPHWKLQJ³JRRG´What 
creates opportunities for development and benefits in policy- making. This 
GLVFRXUVHKDVEHHQVRGHHSO\HPEHGGHGZLWKLQSROLWLFDODFWRUVDQGH[HFXWLYHV¶
EHKDYLRXUWKDWLWZDV³SROLWLFDOO\LQFRUUHFW´WRDUJXHWKDWDSDUWQHUVKLSZDVQRW
always the most appropriate tool of policy-making. Nevertheless, although the 
outcomes of the rules-in-use were the desired ones (i.e. efficiency, 
sustainability and local development), the processes were different from the 
desired ones.  
 
In the case of partnership rule, WKHPD\RUV¶LQIRUPDOQHWZRUNSOD\HGWKHPRVW
important role in decision-making while the other partners had not participated 
in an equal way due to a low level of organisation in civil society. In regards to 
the management rule, there was an excessive privilege of technical expertise in 
policy-making by the domination of chief executives who possessed 
management knowledge. This has pushed mayors to share their power in 
decision-making with chief executives.  
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,QWKHFDVHVRIORFDODXWKRULWLHV¶HPSRZHUPHQWDnd of formal rules of 
community involvement and innovation, the relationship with the informal 
rules appeared to be conflicting, leading to different results than those 
H[SHFWHG,QWKHFDVHRIORFDODXWKRULWLHV¶HPSRZHUPHQWWKH&,VZHUH
considered as projects that enhanced local autonomy in terms of actions and 
targets definition. However, the state remained centralised allowing for 
³FRQWUROOHGIUHHGRP´WRORFDODXWKRULWLHV&HQWUDOSROLWLFDOGHVLJQDQGFRQWURO
over specific objectives and targets, as well as intensive auditing and 
evaluations of spending and targets, squeezHGWKHORFDOLW\¶VGLVFUHWLRQIRU
strategic policy capacity. By contrast, there was an emergence of local 
bureaucratisation and managerial processes in policy-making. As Davies 
(2001) argued regarding the features of intergovernmental relations in local 
SDUWQHUVKLSVLQ8.WKHODWWHUILQDOO\KDYHEHHQGHYHORSHGXQGHU³WKHVKDGRZ
RIKLHUDUFK\DQGUHODWLRQVRIGHSHQGHQFH´ 
 
Regarding community engagement, this was more concerned with information 
DQG³VRIWFRQVXOWDWLRQ´UDWKHUWKDQGLUHFWGHFLVLRQ-making. In this way, input 
legitimation remained low and was realised only through the traditional means 
of elections. Finally, new creative ideas and practices have been abandoned in 
favour of stability and guaranteed outcomes. Persisting domestic national 
values and practices, as well as specifically local legacies, have been embedded 
in informal rules and made them more powerful vis-a-vis the formal ones. 
 
)RUWKH&UHWDQFDVHGHPRFUDF\ZDVDQ³REOLJDWRU\´ZD\WRDUULYHWRHIIHFWLYH
outcomes because the programmes asked for that. For partners and 
coordinators, citizen and beneficiary involvement had been included within the 
management function in order to secure delivery of the required programme 
activities. So, funding and efficiency appeared to be more powerful principles 
than bottom up collaboration and democratisation. 
 
Finally, although in this research, the two CIs are treated methodologically in a 
complementary way, there are some interesting points drawn from their 
comparison. As already stated in the last section of Chapter 6, the different 
policy sector that these partnerships supported, the economic policies versus 
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social policies and the different size of their budget had an impact on the 
articulation of power relations in policy-making processes. In particular, the 
EQUAL II programme remained closer to formal rules than the LEADER+ 
SURJUDPPHLQWHUPVRISDUWQHUV¶HTXLW\LQGHFLVLRQ-making processes and 
diversity in their selection.  This happened because EQUAL II had a lower 
budget and it coped with a policy sector, that of social policy, which did not 
belong to the immediate priorities of the Mayors. In this way, the coordinators 
of the programme felt free to implement the programme more independently 
from political pressures and established political practices that enhanced the 
dominance of informal rules.     
               
2.2 $JHQWV¶VWUDWHJLFEHKDYLRXU 
The research has illustrated that resource redistribution, change in beliefs 
regarding partnership, and finally the stronger enforcement of formal rules are 
not the only explanatory factors for institutional change. In contrast to less 
successful partnerships in other parts of Greece, which have suffered from the 
same economic pressures, the sustainability of my case study partnerships has 
FRQILUPHG*RRGLQ¶VSURSRVLWLRQDERXWWKHGHFLVLYHUROHRILQWHQWLRQDOLty 
LQLQVWLWXWLRQDOFKDQJH7KHSRZHURIWKHDJHQF\DSSHDUV³IURPDQRWKHUGRRU´
by the interpretation of the formal/informal rules. Although EU rules were 
clear and consistently applied through auditing and evaluations, not leaving 
much room for deviations LQSXUVXLWRIDFWRUV¶LQWHUHVWVVRPHDFWRUVILQDOO\
managed to serve their intentions.  
 
In Greece there is in general a loose implementation of formal institutional 
arrangements due to the dominance of many informal rules that come to shape 
the formal rXOHVDORQJVLGHD³IUHHULGHU´DWWLWXGHWKDWDOORZVLOOHJDOEHKDYLRXU
Consequently, agents tend to have more opportunities to exercise strategic 
behaviour. These opportunities are further enhanced by the fact that the 
LQWURGXFWLRQRI³IRUHLJQ´(8UXOHVFreates an intermediate period during which 
old and new rules coexist. In this context, the agency can act strategically to 
influence the direction of change and exercise indirect power upon the other 
partners.      
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Two categories of actors, the ³LQVWLWXWLRQDOHQWUHSUHQHXUV´DQGWKHHVWDEOLVKHG
local leaders (politicians and executives), have influenced the configuration of 
formal/informal rules by sustaining some formal rules, which serve their 
individual/collective interests, while reproducing some informal rules. In terms 
of institutional entrepreneurs, they have exercised their powers by taking 
advantage of the partnership rules regarding management and planning. 
Political leaders took advantage of their established power position in the local 
society. Three strategies have supported their intentions: 1. they have selected 
DQGUHLQIRUFHGVWDELOLW\FODULW\DQGSXEOLFLW\UXOHVWKDWUHVWULFWHGDJHQWV¶
freedom, 2. they shared values and practices of efficiency and trust with the 
members of the partnership and finally 3. they provided a positive and enabling 
partnership context for the smooth introduction of the formal rules. 
Nevertheless, the way in which power was exercised remained authoritarian; 
the participatory discourse and actions have been downgraded in favour of 
efficiency and management.     
       
2.3 Contextual variables   
The case study findings showed that there is a number of contextual variables 
which have facilitated or discouraged the implementation of formal rules. 
These variables UHODWHGWRWKH³VWDUWLQJFRQGLWLRQV´LQZKLFKWKHSDUWQHUVKLSV
have emerged (Ansell and Gash, 2007). Some of these variables were quite 
broad and related to the national and local Greek political system in general. 
Other variables emanated exclusively from the local context in which the 
partnerships were developed. Some of the variables, like the local socio-
economic context and institutional legacies, had enabled partners to participate 
and sustain collaborative activity; others like individualist culture, lack of trust 
and localism had blocked the collaborative process. However, since partnership 
is not a linear process, these latter contextual variables have then created 
internal demands within the partnerships for commitment and fairness, to 
which local leaders have responded through specific strategies.  
 
In particular, one main institutional legacy, which is worth mentioning, is that 
of the previous experience of local actors in European funding programmes 
(Getimis & Demetropoulou, 2004; Bache et al, 2011). Their engagement with 
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(8SDUWQHUVKLSSURJUDPPHVLQWKHFRQWH[WRI(6)¶VWZRIXQGLQJSHULRGVDQG
CIs opened up a learning process of new practices and attitudes regarding 
collaborative activity and programming. Additionally, it created a stable 
network of cooperation to which the project coordinators came back and 
looked for partners.  
 
2.4 Institutional change  
Institutional change is a concept that infuses the current research because 
change processes were mentioned by the partners as something that happened 
by their learning in previous collaboration and thematic networks, as 
something that was realised during the partnership development by the exercise 
of agency, and as something that would happen in the future due to partnership 
rules and the impact of agency on other national and local institutions. 
Regarding the latter, Ostrom (2005) explores the interdependence of 
institutions and argues that changes in one rule could open the way for changes 
LQRWKHUUXOHV7KLVSURFHVVORRNVOLNHWKH³$HROXV¶EDJ¶¶2QFHLWZDVRSHQHG
adjustment and changes started to spread in all directions of the political 
processes; either directly because the programme required it or indirectly by 
DGGLWLRQDODGMXVWPHQWVQHHGHGWRDFKLHYHWKHSURJUDPPH¶VJRDO7KHVH
processeVOHGWRDQ³Europeanisation a la grec´DVRQHH[HFXWLYHRIWKH
LEADER+ Monitoring Authority reported. 
 
So, change appears in relation to the past, present and future, and as an ongoing 
process that gradually alters the existing situation. Although some formal rules 
were not effectively applied e.g. community participation, because they were 
relegated by the power of respective informal rules, they left behind them 
³traces´ of something new and different that destabilised existing institutional 
practices. Finally, as one moves to lower territorial levels, the changes were 
more and more significant, creating a chain of interactions; but when one 
moves upwards, at the state level, the changes were less and confronted greater 
resistance. One explanation could be the fact that the state was responsible 
more for the design of programmes and less for their implementation. On the 
contrary, at the local level, implementation and resources management allowed 
for easier experimentation.  
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In the rest of the section, I present the main changes that resulted from the 
partnership operation.  
 
2.4.1 Policy-making through the development of partnerships and networks 
The Community Initiatives have changed local policy-making. They have 
created new possibilities for the participation of new actors in the local policy-
making process and the establishment of networks.  Additionally, they have 
changed the attitudes of mayors and the local community towards collaboration 
DQGWUXVW$VWKH'LUHFWRURI.2,1232/,7,$KDGXQGHUOLQHG³(xecutives and 
mayors were gradually trained in procedures of collaboration and they got used 
WRWKDW´7KLVKDVQRWKDSSHQHGRYHUQLJKWEXWLWKDVEHHQWKHUHVXOWRIDOHDUQLQJ
process in which all the involved actors came to appreciate and recognise their 
opportunities, and their mutual interdependencies. For instance, while at the 
EHJLQQLQJRIWKHSDUWQHUVKLSSDUWQHUV¶ILQDQFLDOPRWLYDWLRQVDSSHDUHGWREH
critical to the success of the partnership, other motives have gradually 
emerged, such as resource independency and collective interests. In other 
words, since the first networks were established (i.e. /'$¶VQHWZRUNDVWHSE\
step process of networking development has started (i.e. ZEUXIS network), in 
many cases, through the initiatives of the original networks.  
 
In particular, the mayor was not anymore the king of their locality and he/she 
had to challenge his/her power on local policy-making. New players won a 
more active role in the public space (DAH, local society organisations, 
associations, informal network of LDAs), the independence of the old players 
has increased (inter-PXQLFLSDOFRRSHUDWLRQDQGSROLWLFDOSDUWLHV¶GRPLQDQW
position has weakened.  As shown in the following figure (17), even if the 
mayor still made the final decision, his/her own personal view was restricted 
E\DQXPEHURIRWKHUDFWRUV¶SRVLWLRQV$GGLWLRQDOO\WKHGHJUHHRISRZHUWKDW
the new actors were able to influence decision-making depends upon the policy 
sector. For instance, in the LEADER+ economic development projects, 
PD\RUV¶SROLWLFDOGHFLVLRQVZHUHPRUHGHFLVLYHLQWKHDJHQGDVHWWLQJWKDQLQWKH
EQUAL II social policy projects.  
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Figure 17: Changes in actors involved in the local policy-making 
 
However, most changes have been identified in the internal administration of 
local authorities rather than in their relationships with the private and civil 
society sector. In particular, there was a rebalancing of the relationship 
between mayors and DAH executives in favour of the latter, through the 
emergence of a local bureaucracy. The presence of a high degree of formalised 
regulations of programming and management by the EU and the Greek state 
alongside the partnership principle has impacted upon the local policy-making 
by the rationalisation of planning and management. This new procedure led to 
re- evaluating the position of managers towards the political decision makers. 
Moreover, there was increasing inter- municipal cooperation which facilitated 
the development of informal policy networks among mayors. This new 
situation has led to a political mix where single local government hierarchies 
coexisted with less hierarchical networks like that of LDAs.   
 
 
2.4.2 Local development becomes both a local issue and a global one  
These programmes have also changed the local policy agenda by increasing the 
activity of local authorities in policies like economic development and social 
economy. The Mayor of N. Kazantzakis and president of DAH stated the shift 
RIPD\RUV¶DWWLWXGHVLQDFOHDUZD\³Now, the new role of local authorities is 
GLUHFWO\UHODWHGWRDYLVLRQRIGHYHORSPHQW´. So, on the one hand, the local 
authorities felt more responsible for the development of their area; on the other 
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hand, the local community realised that local authorities could provide them 
with advice and suggestions for local investments and funding projects.    
 
Moreover, participation in national and international networks offered to local 
authorities a vision of a global treatment of local problems, in which solutions 
to their problems should be based upon a common platform with other local 
authorities in Greece and in member states as well as with the EU policy. The 
development of more holistic approaches to the issues addressed helped the 
local authorities to feel part of a bigger community, which shared the same 
concerns and common solutions through weakening in this way the domination 
of the state.  
 
$OOWKHVHSURFHVVHVUHGXFHGWKHFHQWUDOVWDWH¶VSRVLWLRQE\FUHDWLQJQHZ
SRVVLELOLWLHVIRUEURDGHQLQJORFDODXWKRULWLHV¶DXWRQRP\)RULQVWDQFHWKH
integration of policy proposals, developed by local authority groupings inside 
the thematic national networks, in national legislation has increased the local 
DXWKRULWLHV¶YLVLELOLW\DQGHPSRZHUPHQW7KHVDPHKDSSHQHGZLWKWKHWUDQVIHU
of the acquired knowledge of local executives to ministries regarding EU 
SURJUDPPHV¶LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ6SHDNLQJµZLWKDFRPPRQYRLFH¶DERXWORFDO
development, local authorities could more easily exercise political influence at 
the KLJKHUOHYHO³7KHSDUWLFLSDWLRQRI'$+LQORFDOGHYHORSPHQWSODQVKDV
HPSRZHUHGORFDODXWKRULWLHV¶role not only in local community but also in the 
state too´Mayor of Gorgolainos).  
 
2.4.3. Building a civil society: Re-evaluation of NGOs and local vulnerable 
groups position        
First, the implementation of the partnership principle, especially in the EQUAL 
II programme, has initiated and/or stimulated the involvement of local 
organisations with knowledge of specific target groups. This has led to their 
capacity building in terms of participation in programmes and to the 
LPSURYHPHQWRIWDUJHWJURXSV¶NQRZOHGJHLQDPRUHV\VWHPDWLFDQGFRQFUHWH
way. Additionally, the local organisations gained credibility among their 
members and in the local society because they became more visible to citizens 
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by undertaking successful project activities. As the director of ZEUXIS 
UHSRUWHG³2XUSRVLWLRQWRZDUGVRXUPHPEHUVKDVEHHQUHLQIRUFHGEHFDXVHRXU
members have seen real results. We have also evolved our management 
practices and we have been standing next to big public institutions; all these 
RIIHUXVFUHGLELOLW\DQGSUHVWLJH´ 
 
Second, there have also been direct results in terms of empowerment of 
vulnerable groups who have been marginalised or forgotten by policies and 
institutions ³EQUAL has widened the opportunity for vulnerable groups to 
EHQHILWIURPSURMHFW¶VDFWLRQVGHVLJQHGHVSHFLDOO\IRUWKHP´Executive of the 
LDA ǹȀȅȂ The creation of new employment opportunities for people 
facing difficulties in the labour market, such as the women¶VFRRSHUDWLYHVWKH
disabled people or even the wine producers has not only supported them 
economically but also socially; these groups saw that their social position has 
improved. Women or disabled people had got out of their home and had 
become active entrepreneurs, engaging in business, thus becoming less 
marginalised. ³7KHZRPHQ¶VFRRSHUDWLYHVKDYHQRZLQFUHDVHGWKHLUSUHVHQFH
\RXFRPHDFURVVWKHLUSURGXFWVHYHU\ZKHUH´Executive of NELE). Moreover, 
the creation of clusters between these groups gave to the participants the 
opportunity to exchange views and ideas and to develop joint actions in order 
to address and solve common problems.  
 
All the above procedures have enhanced the vulnerable groups and the NGOs. 
In this way, the gradual building of a civil society has started, which could 
impact on the re-balancing of local authorities/local community relations.    
2.4.4 Increase of social capital    
A number of practices based on Community Initiatives principles like bottom-
up participatory development processes, partnerships and networking can be 
seen as investments in local social capital. Although these rules have not been 
implemented fully, even their narrow implementation has step-by-step 
strengthened the degree of collaboration in local communities, with the 
building up of values of shared trust and reciprocity in order to achieve mutual 
benefits. Some of the Community Initiatives positive effects on local social 
capital are: a. the participation of excluded social groups in programme 
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activities, b. the development of collaborative learning processes (trust building 
and sharing understanding) which had resulted from the participation in 
partnership and in national and transnational networks, and finally c. the 
strengthening of local ties and identities. A municipal councilor and partner of 
/$*GLVFXVVLQJWKHSDUWQHUVKLS¶VEHQHILWVVWDWHGWKDW³,Jained experience in 
understanding the other person, my perspectives have widened and I became 
more sociable´ 
 
In relation to the findings of other studies on the governance effects of EU 
cohesion policy in Greece (see chapter 4, section 2.2.2), it is argued that this 
research has identified more deep and extensive changes in (local) governance. 
These changes are not only restricted to the administration system regarding 
PDQDJHULDOHIILFLHQF\DWVWDWHOHYHO$QGUHRXRUWRD³WKLQ´
learning of lessons from abroad or from previous failures regarding 
partnerships (Paraskevopoulos, 2005). These changes are deep but gradual 
(Mahoney and Thelen, 2010); there is a profound dynamic process of change in 
social norms and individual preference at the local level too regarding attitudes 
and behaviours towards collective action, managerial efficiency, evaluation of 
local development and the role of NGOs in local policies.   
 
These findings verify the wider literature on the domestic effects of partnership 
and programming requirements in the EU. Bache (2008) argues that if at the 
beginning RIWKHLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIWKH(6)VWKHUHZDVHYLGHQFHRID³WKLQ
OHDUQLQJ´IURPWKHPLG-V³DIWHUVHYHUDO\HDUVRIDUHODWLYHO\VWDEOH
structural policy framework-WKHUHZDVJUHDWHUHYLGHQFHRI³WKLFN´OHDUQLQJLQ
the EU15, in which key actors involved FKDQJHGWKHLUJRDOVDQGSUHIHUHQFHV´
(Bache, 2008: 154). Regarding in particular Southeast Europe, there is 
evidence that an Europeanisation process is taking place by reorienting 
practices and preferences in a way that resembles to EU policies even if these 
changes are incremental as in my case study (Bache, 2010).  However for each 
case, these changes had their own tempo and time is not always the most 
significant variable for their activation (Bache, 2008). So, the need for case 
study research appears once again in order to reveal in each time the dynamics 
of all the domestic variables.  
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3. Contribution of the research and limitations   
In the research on political institutions, two main NI theories are dominant, that 
of rational choice theory and normative NI. The main theoretical contribution 
of the current thesis is the study of institutions through an interdisciplinary 
approach in which, alongside to political science, sociological and public 
management theories have also been applied. The sociological theories 
reoriented the study of political institutions from the configuration of 
IRUPDOLQIRUPDOUXOHVWRWKHUROHRIDJHQWV¶EHKDYLRXUWKXVHQKDQFLQJ
understanding of the structure/agent relationship.  The public management 
theories enriched the analysis with the study of the purposive agents and 
SDUWLFXODUWKDWRIOHDGHUV¶VWUDWHJLHV7KHWKHRUHWLFDOFRQVLGHUDWLRQVRIWKHILUVW
chapter regarding the contribution of critical realism to the two NI approaches 
(rational choice and normative NI) was further supported by the empirical 
evidence from  my case study, which showed  that an institution is an ongoing 
process in which formal and informal rules, and agency interrelate in the 
production of outcomes. Institutions comprise the rules, formal and informal, 
EXWDOVRWKHDJHQWV¶VWUDWHJLFEHKDYLRXUVKDSHGE\WKHLUVRFLDOLVDWLRQWRWKHVH
rules and the promotion of their interests. Although this proposition could be 
considered as complex and extended because it included many variables, it 
goes beyond traditional distinction between calculus and cultural as drivers of 
action within institutions, acknowledging that actors have the capacity to 
select, preserve or change rules.                
 
This study has elaborated a methodological design that approaches political 
institutions at a micro level. It has collected information by going to places and 
asking people how things had been done on the ground, in the manner 
proposed by Ostrom; but without adhering to rational choice assumptions. The 
paucity of micro level analysis of political institutions compared with meso and 
macro case study analysis (within the normative and historical institutionalist 
tradition) has enhanced the methodological originality of this work. This 
methodological design also involved a systematically reflexive and 
comprehensive analysis of a political institution. Since the theoretical 
framework comprises so many variables, causing a relative complexity in data 
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gathering, I have tried to provide a clear and detailed account of the way in 
which I have designed and conducted the research project.  
 
Additionally, my reflexitivity in relation to the selection of theoretical 
approaches has also been incorporated into the methodology by taking into 
DFFRXQWWKHDJHQWV¶LQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIUHDOLW\7KLV practice not only facilitates 
the identification of the hierarchy of explanatory variables but also the neglect 
and/or discovery of new ones. Finally, being so close to the case study as 
events unfolded offered me the opportunity to recognise the complexity of the 
institutional processes and to distinguish in a more clear way the formal and 
informal rules.       
 
The research has enriched knowledge about partnerships in Greece and to some 
extent in Southern Europe, since both share common socio-economic features 
and historical factors. With regards to Greece, the institution of partnerships, 
and particularly local partnerships, has not been not systematically studied. 
Although many of the research conclusions are often discussed informally 
among executives and politicians, they have never been recorded and 
documented in an integrated theoretical and methodological way.   
 
Furthermore, the study revealed the significant role of some contextual factors 
like social capital and political legacies in support of collective action. It has 
also shown the dynamic role of leaders in contexts where previous weak 
institutionalisation aQGLQVWLWXWLRQDOVKLIWVOHIWVSDFHIRUDJHQWV¶GLIIHUHQW
behaviour. These conclusions could carefully be applied to other countries in 
Southern Europe in order to inform future comparative studies.    
 
Finally, the case study could offer lessons and policy guidelines37 in respect of 
the EU cohesion policy, the dynamic relationship between efficiency and 
democracy of partnership as a policy tool and finally the significant role of 
both budget size and type of policy sector in policy-making.  
                                                 
37
 Instead of the term generalisation, I prefer to use the term lessons and policy guidelines. 
)ROORZLQJ<LQ¶VDUJXPHQWZKHQWKHUHVHDUFKHUDSSOLHVDVLQJOHFDVHVWXG\WKH\FRXOG
RQO\XVHWKHILQGLQJVIRU³DQDO\WLFDOJHQHUDOLVDWLRQ´DQGQRWIRU³VWDWLVWLFDOJHQHUDOLVDWLRQ´VHH
also chapter 3 on methodology). 
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In relation to EU cohesion policy, I argue that the design of more adaptable and 
IOH[LEOHWRGRPHVWLFIHDWXUHV¶SURJUDPPHVWKDWDOORZWKHFDSLWDOLVDWLRQRIHDFK
FRXQWU\¶VSDUWLFXODULWLHVLVQHHGHG,QSDUWLFXODUWKHSROLF\PDNHUVVKRXOGWDNH
into account that the convergence agenda of the EU follows the dominant 
principles of policy making of the West European countries persistently. The 
UHVXOWKDVEHHQWKHLQFUHDVHRI³PLVILW´RI(8UXOHVEHWZHHQWKH:HVWHUQDQG
Southern countries. It appeared from the case study that for instance the 
partnership rule had a greater difficulty to be implemented in the Greek context 
where cooperation especially with the private sector is rare as compared to the 
Nordic context for instance where the cooperation had a long tradition. 
 
In this context, the implementation of partnership in Greece conditions a high 
probability of failure even from the beginning since it does not fit well into the 
existing organisation of private and public space. As the EU evaluator of CIs 
stated  accurately in the interview "the LEADER programme worked better 
with the private sector in the Nordic countries which were used to this type of 
cooperation; it is a matter of culture. In other countries, like Greece, the private 
sector was not particularly involved, tKHUHZHUHPDQ\GLIILFXOWLHV´ 
 
On the contrary, in Greece, there are many semi public institutions supported 
by the state for which the CIs programmes could foresee their participation 
from the beginning. Consequently, special attention should be given to each 
area of policy implementation because each area is a unique entity with special 
characteristics, different institutional and political traditions, a different 
environment of policy making with varying institutional learning and 
adaptation capacity. This means that different mechanisms should be used in 
different cases for promoting adaptation to the EU requirements.  
 
Moreover, the engagement of political leadership in policy-making is important 
in Greece and without it, the implementation of a programme could be loose or 
even unsuccessful. So, an additional question is raised about the extent to 
which the establishment of the new networks supported by the CIs replaced or 
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even destroyed the old ones creating in the local society a gap between old and 
new types of social coordination. Instead of trying to put aside the established 
system of coordination like the strong public sector or the significance of 
leadership, it would be more useful to integrate them by clarifying in a more 
detail way their level of involvement.      
 
Regarding partnership as a policy tool, I conclude that the national and European 
policy makers should re-evaluate the democratic and efficient credentials of 
partnership and network and rethink them as not WKHXQLTXH³VXFFHVVIXOVROXWLRQ´
to policy problems and coordination. Additionally, it is also suggested that 
checks and balances processes that ensure the actual implementation of 
democratic practices should follow their operation. In particular, networks and 
partnerships as promoted by EU policies appeared to be powerless forms of 
policy-making in which conflicts are replaced by consensual agreements and 
hierarchical relations by equity and openness to other partners. In this way, 
these political forms affirm that partners and local people could have the same 
RSSRUWXQLWLHVWRLQIOXHQFHGHFLVLRQVWKDWSROLF\PDNLQJLVVRPHWKLQJ³QHXWUDO´
ZLWKRXWLQWHUHVWV¶FRQIOLFWVDQGVROXWLRQWRSUREOHPVFRXOGEHVPRRWKO\
realised. However, as it has already been demonstrated in my case and in other 
research projects too (Davies, 2010), in reality, unequal relations as well as 
LQWHUHVWV¶FRQIOLFWVGRH[LVWDQGLPSOHPHQWDWLRQKDVQRWDOZD\VUHVSRQGHGWR
the initial policy goals. So, this consensual style of governance appeared not to 
be successful at all times in producing social coordination by rearticulating the 
power relations and the way that problems are articulated and solved.      
 
Regarding the budget and policy sector, policy makers should be aware that the 
budget size and the type of policy matter. Both could strongly influence the 
type of membership, the mode of cooperation and the degree of efficient 
outcomes inside collaborative activities. In this context, different designs and 
controls should be taken into account for counterbalancing or further 
supporting their specific features. 
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Alongside the contributions of this research as described above, there are also 
limitations. Doing a small project imposes limitations in terms of time and 
resources. However, as the work for the research project progressed, I have 
understood that there were some issues that could fine-tune the research design 
if I had the chance to do the work again or advise another researcher in a 
similar position. First, some of my research questions could have been 
addressed in more depth.  The research was designed to study many aspects of 
the partnership institution and, in this way, many variables had to be analysed. 
The problem is that addressing so many questions in a small-scale research 
project could not give complete answers to them all. I suggest that the 
UHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQDJHQWV¶EHKDYLRXUDQGUXOHV- in- use could have been 
more thoroughly studied, through additional work in terms of both concept 
formation and data collection.  
 
In relation to the methodology, as already mentioned in the relevant chapter, 
the questionnaire was administrated to a small number of participants;  in 
future research, a bigger survey addressed for instance to all the citizens of the 
locality would be more appropriate. Regarding data collection, further data 
could have been gathered regarding the relationship between mayors and local 
corporate interests, and the degree to which the EQUAL II and LEADER+ 
partnerships embedded this relationship and underlying power relations. 
Finally, another potential source of evidence would have been data from actors 
who were excluded from partnerships, like opposition mayors and potential 
beneficiaries, in order to consider how processes and outcomes could have 
differed.  
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4. Issues for further research  
The analytical and methodological framework of this study could be applied in 
other political institutions, beyond local partnerships. Especially in a country 
like Greece where institutional change is a complex process, due to powerful 
and resistant informal rules, the study of political institutions is a challenge for 
the researcher.  
 
Moreover, in a period in which the Greek policy context is in transition due to 
severe social and economic problems, there are new research opportunities for 
studying the implications of these changes for the actual relationship between 
efficiency and democracy inside collaborative settings like partnerships, and in 
the leverage of social capital. Additionally, it would be interesting to map the 
direction of change. How do informal rules work in this new context? How 
deep and permanent might these changes be, after the implementation of new 
institutions?  
 
Further research could be done on thHVWXG\RIWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQDFWRUV¶
behaviour and institutional rules. In my research project, many questions have 
DULVHQDERXWWKHZD\LQZKLFKWKHUHVHDUFKHUFRXOGGLVWLQJXLVKEHWZHHQDFWRUV¶
behaviour and informal rules, or the degree to which aFWRUV¶LQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI
rules overcomes the reproduction of established norms and involves strategic 
behaviour for the pursuit of their goals. The combining of insights from the 
methodological tools of rational choice and the theoretical principles of 
normative institutionalism could profoundly help in addressing these new 
research goals.          
 
Regarding new research areas for partnerships in particular, one is the 
emergence of comparative studies of local partnerships in other parts of Greece 
(and in Southern Europe) which share common socio-economic features, in 
order to understand better the impact of contextual variables upon partnership 
operation. More specifically, an appealing research project would be an 
analysis of the relationship between social capital and partnership rules, i.e. in 
which way the level of social capital infuses formal and informal partnership 
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UXOHVDVZHOODVSDUWQHUV¶EHKDYLRXU)RULQVWDQFHZKHQWKHUHVHDUFKHU
identifies low level of trust or high level of civic engagement in society, what 
does this mean in terms of specific rules and behaviours inside a collaborative 
activity?  The development of an analytical framework concerning the 
relationship between trust and institution could offer the opportunity to learn 
more about the ways in which social capital and institutions mutually affect 
each other and evolve over time.             
 
Finally, the following up of the case study partnerships could offer useful 
insights into the conditions for partnership sustainability. It is interesting to 
identify the extent to which the established networks will continue to cooperate 
for the realisation of common goals after the end of the official projects. Is the 
value of the partnership so strongly embedded in the behaviour of EQUAL II 
and LEADER+ partners that they could mobilise their networks in future 
initiatives? Which contextual variables shape their potential for sustainability 
over time? Which features of the network have remained stable and which have 
changed?    
 
So, the neo institutional analysis is likely to continue to stimulate new research 
questions about innovation in local governance, and to generate propositions 
that can inform policy development.    
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Appendix A 
Interview questions  
Study: Explaining institutional dynamics within local partnerships: the case of 
EQUAL II and LEADER + in Crete.  
Researcher: Despoina Grigoriadou. 
 
A. Interview questions for the members of the partnerships 
 
1. Could you please describe what your role is in the partnership?  
Prompts: obligations, rights, resources, activities, relation with the 
representative organisation 
 
2. Why have you been involved in the partnership?  
Prompts: motivation, goals, level of goal achievement, negotiation of initial 
objectives    
 
3. Explain how decisions are made?   
Prompts: who sets the agenda, who participates in the official processes, 
negotiation procedures, conflicts and ways of resolution  
 
4. How would you characterise your relationship with the other members 
of the partnership?  
Prompts: cooperation versus conflict, problem solving  
 
5. Are there some members with who you seat together in the table and 
you exchange views and opinions? 
Prompts: networking, influence, common framework of thinking   
 
6. In your experience, who are the most influential people in the 
partnership and why? 
Prompts: resources, behaviour  
 
350 
 
7.  In your opinion, who is the leader of the partnership and what makes 
him/her leader? 
Prompts: leadership resources, behaviour, conflicts for the leadership position  
 
8. Could you describe how you get informed about the partnership events?  
Prompts: procedures of communication, access to information, problem 
solving   
 
9. During your partnership involvement, did you have the opportunity to 
change or break the ordinary way of doing things? 
Prompts: influence, change  
 
10. Do you have any previous experience in partnerships? If yes, how has 
the previous experience influenced your way of doing things in this 
partnership? 
Prompts: cooperative culture, empowerment, management knowledge  
 
11. In your experience in previous partnerships, in which areas is this 
partnership different?  
Prompts: new and old established attitudes, policy making, membership 
  
12. To what extent has your participation to transnational thematic 
workshops changed your way of thinking and doing?  
Prompts: only to the members of the thematic workshops 
  
13. In which way, has your participation in this partnership made a 
difference in your role in local community and local politics? 
Prompts: empowerment, change of attitudes, influence  
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The following questions will be addressed exclusively to the project 
coordinators additionally to the interview questions for the members of the 
partnership 
1. Could you please explain how the partnership started?  
Prompts: How did the action start? Who were the initiators and what was their 
contribution? How were the needs identified? How were the partners identified 
and involved? Which partners were excluded? 
 
2. What were the mechanisms for getting the target group involved in both 
design and implementation of the project and what was the interaction 
with the target group like?  
Prompts: goals of involvement, strategies, access, problems/conflicts 
 
3. Did you disseminate information about the action and its results to the 
public?  
Prompts: goals, strategies of communication, access to information 
4. How well is the project working?  
Prompts: How were the actions managed? Problems of management, methods, 
changes in regards to the initial planning and for what reason 
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B. Interview questions for the beneficiaries of the partnership 
 
1. Could you please describe the activity? 
 Prompts: activities, problems of implementation  
 
2. Describe how things got started  
Prompts: how you get informed, selection criteria  
 
3. Have you been involved in the design and implementation process of 
the activity? 
Prompts: methods of consultation/participation, problems/conflicts, solutions, 
priorities and needs integrated in the design  
 
4. In your experience, have all your propositions been finally integrated to 
the activity? 
Prompts: which propositions have been excluded and why?  
 
5. How do you characterise your relation with the partnership board? 
Prompts: previous networks, types of advice and support, conflicts/difficulties 
and how they have been solved  
  
6. Do you have any previous experience in similar projects (partnership 
with the involvement of target groups)? If yes, how has the previous 
experience influenced your way of doing things in this project? 
Prompts: cooperative culture, empowerment, management knowledge 
  
7. In which way, has your participation in this project made a difference in 
your role in local community and local politics? 
Prompts: empowerment, change of attitudes, influence  
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C. Interview questions for the leaders of the partnership 
1. Could you please explain how the partnership started?  
Prompts: How did the action start? Who were the initiators and their 
contribution? How was the need identified? How were the partners identified 
and involved? Which partners were excluded? 
  
2. As a leader, could you describe what you are trying to achieve in this 
partnership? 
Prompts: vision, goals, level of achievement, difficulties 
  
3. What were the mechanisms for getting the target group involved in both 
design and implementation of the project and what was the interaction 
with the target group like?  
Prompts:  goals of involvement, strategies of empowerment, access, 
problems/conflicts  
 
4. Describe your role in the partnership board   
Prompts: obligations, rights, resources, activities, relation with the 
representative organisation 
 
5. Explain how decisions are made?  
Prompts: who send the agenda, who is participating in official processes, 
negotiations procedures, conflicts and ways of resolution? 
 
6. How well are things going with the other members? 
Prompts: cooperation versus conflict, how the problems are solved 
  
7. Did you try to develop networking or did you facilitate it? 
Prompts: Why? How did you go about doing this? 
 
8. How did you keep the various partnership members involved 
WKURXJKRXWWKHSURMHFW¶VOLIH" 
Prompts: Leadership behaviour  
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9. During your partnership involvement, did you have the opportunity to 
change or break the ordinary way of doing things? 
Prompts: influence, change  
 
10. Could you please describe your relation with the ministry?  
Prompts: cooperation, types of support, political interventions, resistance, 
legal framework (simple and clear) 
    
11. How has your previous experience in partnerships influenced your way 
of doing things in this partnership? 
Prompts: cooperative culture, empowerment, management knowledge, new and 
old established attitudes  
 
12. In your experience, which challenges and dynamics open this 
partnership to the local community and local political system in terms 
of attitudes, practices and power relations? 
Prompts:  empowerment of new groups, cooperative culture and management, 
established networks, change of relations between politicians and managers, 
change of politician attitudes  
  
       13. In your opinion, is there a future for this partnership?  
Prompts: sustainability, networking    
 
355 
 
D. Interview questions for the Greek MAs and Brussels officers 
         1. In which way has the implementation of EQUAL or LEADER been 
facilitated in Greece?  
Prompts: institutions, key persons, resources redistribution, political culture 
 
         2. What has the role of the Greek state been?  
 
         3. How would you characterise the principles and rules of the 
programme?  
Prompts: clear, simple, new 
  
         4. To what extent has the EU facilitated the programme implementation?  
Prompts: legitimation, physical presence, monitoring and control, thematic 
networks, learning processes 
  
          5. To what extent has there been a resistance to CIs principles and why?  
3URPSWVHVWDEOLVKHGQRUPVFLYLOVRFLHW\LQWHUHVW¶JURXSVSDUW\SROLWLFV 
 
          6. How do you assess your cooperation with the Greek state and the 
MAs? (for EU officers only )  
 
          7. According to your opinion, is there an Europeanisation of local policy-
making after the implementation of EQUAL and LEADER CIs? 
Prompts: new practices, new attitudes, new institutions  
 
          8. In relation to the implementation of EQUAL and LEADER in other 
countries, which are the main differences with Greece?  
Prompts: role of state and parties, institutions of implementation, local culture, 
local policy making 
 
  
356 
 
List of interviewees by job title and role in the partnership 
a/a Job title  Role in partnership  Date of 
interview  
1 Executive of DAH  EQUAL II coordinator  17/03/2008 
2 Director of DAH  EQUAL II partner  18/03/2008 
3 Mayor of  N. Kazantzakis-
President of DAH   
EQUAL II and LEADER+ 
partner  
19/03/2008 
4 Mayor of Episkopis  Member of DAH board  14/04/2008 
5 Ex-president of 
KOINOPOLITIA- 
Municipal Councilor   
EQUAL II partner  18/03/2008 
6 Director of ZEUXIS  EQUAL II partner  16/04/2008 
7 Director of EDAP-ETEK EQUAL II partner 14/04/ 2008 
8 Director of 
KOINOPOLITIA 
EQUAL II partner 16/06/2008 
9 Executive of NELE 
Rethymnon  
EQUAL II partner 16/06/2008 
10 Executive of OADYK  EQUAL II partner 22/04/2008 
11 Consultant of Port 
Authority of Heraklion 
EQUAL II partner  23/04/2008 
12 Executive of the LDA 
AKOM  
EQUAL II partner  23/04/2008 
13 Director of  the LDA 
Lasithi  
EQUAL II partner  17/06/2008 
14 Executive of the LDA 
Lasithi  
EQUAL II partner  17/06/2008 
15 Executive of the LDA Sitia  EQUAL II partner 21/04/2008 
16 Executive of DAH  LEADER+ coordinator  19/03/2008 
17 Municipal councilor of 
Archanes  
LEADER+ partner   20/05/2008 
18 Mayor of Arkalochori  LEADER+  partner   20/05/2008 
19 Mayor of Gorgolainos  LEADER+  partner   21/05/2009 
20 President of the Industrial 
Park of Arkalochori 
(BIOPA) 
LEADER+  partner   20/05/2008 
21 Executive of the 
agricultural cooperative of 
PEZA  
LEADER+  partner   21/05/2008 
22 3UHVLGHQWRIWKHZRPHQ¶V
cooperative of Zakros 
EQUAL II beneficiary 
(storytelling) 
9/07/2008 
23 3UHVLGHQWRIWKHZRPHQ¶V
cooperative of 
Krousaniotissa  
EQUAL II beneficiary 
(storytelling)  
7/7/2008 
24 Owner of a tourism 
accommodation 
LEADER+  beneficiary 
(private investor) 
(storytelling)  
8/7/2008 
25 President of  winery cluster  LEADER+  beneficiary 
(private investor) 
(storytelling) 
8/7/2008 
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26 Consultant of private 
company  
National external evaluator 
of EQUALII  
15/09/2008 
27 Consultant of private 
company 
National external evaluator 
of LEADER+ 
23/10/2008 
28 General Secretary of the 
EQUAL II Greek M.A.  
EQUAL II Greek M.A.  16/10/2008 
29 Executive of EQUA LII 
Greek M.A.  
EQUAL II Greek M.A. 19/09/2008 
30 Executive of EQUAL II 
Greek M.A. 
EQUAL II Greek M.A.  19/09/2008 
31 Ex-General Secretary of the 
LEADER+  Greek M.A.  
LEADER+  Greek M.A.  13/01/2009 
32 Executive of LEADER+  
Greek M.A. 
LEADER+  Greek M.A.  19/01/2009 
33 Executive of LEADER+  
Greek M.A. 
LEADER+ Greek M.A.  19/01/2009 
34 EU officer  Head of Unit, DG 
Agriculture-Unit 3, Rural 
Development programmes 
Denmark, Lithuania, Poland 
22/01/2009 
35 EU officer  Principal Administrator, 
Rural Development 
Programmes for Bulgaria, 
Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, 
United Kingdom 
22/01/2009 
36 EU officer  DG Employment, Social 
Affairs and EQUALII 
Opportunities, Unit 
EMPL/B4,  
Geographical responsible for 
EQUALII in Greece  
23/01/2009 
37 EU officer  DG Employment, Social 
Affairs and EQUALII 
opportunities, Unit 03-
Evaluation and Impact 
Assessment. 
23/01/2009 
38 Executive of the vocational 
training center DION 
EPEKA   
 
Coordinator of EQUAL II 
³6XSSRUWIRU
entrepreneurialism of Greek 
5RPD´$WKHQV 
05/09/2008 
39 Manager of the Thessaly 
ORFDOEUDQFKRIWKH³*UHHN
agency for development 
DQGORFDOJRYHUQPHQW´ 
Coordinator of EQUAL I 
³.('$9526´9RORV
(pilot) 
15/11/2007 
40 Civil servant of Volos 
municipality   
Member of the management 
team of EQUAL I 
³.('$9526´9RORV 
(pilot) 
15/11/2007 
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Appendix B 
Questionnaire 
(Questionnaire for the local partners and selected beneficiaries of the 
partnerships)  
 
Thank you for taking part in this study, which aims to explore the institutional 
dynamics within the EQUAL and LEADER partnerships in Crete.   
 
This questionnaire should take about 10 minutes to complete. Please return the 
questionnaire to the researcher or send it by e-mail to the following address: 
des_grigoriadou@hotmail.com. 
 
1. Generally speaking, could you please tell me whether the statement 
³PRVWSHRSOHFDQEHWUXVWHG´UHSUHVHQWVSHRSOH¶VEHKDYLRXULQ\Rur 
community?  
A lot  Somewhat Not very much  Not at all  
    
 
2. Overall, would you say that trust between social and economic groups 
in your community is strong or weak? 
Very strong  Strong  Somewhat Weak  Very weak  
     
 
 
3. Overall, what would you say the level of cooperation between local 
authorities and local associations is?  
Very strong  Strong  Somewhat  Weak  Very weak  
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4. Overall, what would you say the level of cooperation between local 
authorities and business is? 
Very strong  Strong  Somewhat  Weak  Very weak  
     
 
5. Could you please tell me whether the following statements represent 
SHRSOH¶VEHKDYLRXULQ\RXUFRPPXQLW\" 
a. People are always interested only in their own welfare 
A lot  Somewhat Not very much  Not at all  
    
 
b. Most people from the same social and professional environment are 
willing to help each other.   
A lot  Somewhat Not very much  Not at all 
    
 
6. Which of the following statements do you think represents best 
FLWL]HQV¶EHKDYLRXULQ\RXUFRPPXQLW\" 
A. Citizens stick to their role of electing leaders and holding them 
electorally accountable. 
B. Citizens participate actively in the process of setting the local political 
agenda and important local decision-making. 
 
Clearly 
prefer A  
Prefer A  
Equally 
prefer A& B  
Prefer B 
Clearly 
prefer B  
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7. In your experience, when there is a decision to be made in a group, how 
does this usually come about?  
 The leader decides and informs the other group members  
 The leader asks group members what they think and then decides  
 The group members hold a discussion and decide together  
 Other 
8. 2YHUDOOKRZHIIHFWLYHLVWKHJURXS¶VOHDGHUVKLS" 
Very effective Somewhat  Not effective at all 
   
  
9. Overall, in your experience, are the same people members of different 
groups or is there little overlap in membership?  
 The same people   
 Little overlap 
 
10. Do you think that citizens can influence decision-making affecting their 
local area?  
A lot  Somewhat Not very much  Not at all  
    
 
11. Which of the following statements best describes the relation of citizens 
in your community with the local government?  
 They feel responsible for what the local government is doing 
 They are interested in the part that concerns them directly  
 They are indifferent of what the local government is doing 
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12. Do you agree or disagree that political parties are playing a significant 
role in local politics?  
Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree 
    
 
Job title: «««««««««««««««««««««««« 
Town of employment: .......................................................................................... 
7RZQRIKRPHDGGUHVV««««««««««««««««««««« 
5ROHLQSDUWQHUVKLS«««««««««««««««««««««« 
 
Thank you for your participation.  
 
Despoina Grigoriadou 
PhD student, School of Politics and International Relations, Nottingham 
University 
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Responses  
        
Q1  
A lot  Somewhat Not very 
much  
Not at all  
  
  
  21,74% 56,52% 21,74% 0,00%   
   
 
 
       
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
Q2 
Very 
strong  
Strong  Somewhat Weak  Very 
weak  
  
  4,35% 47,83% 43,48% 4,35% 0,00% 
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47,83% 
43,48% 
4,35% 
0,00% 
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Q3 
Very 
strong  
Strong  Somewhat Weak  Very 
weak  
  
  8,70% 43,48% 39,13% 8,70% 0,00% 
   
 
 
       
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
Q4 
Very 
strong  
Strong  Somewhat Weak  Very 
weak  
  
  13,04% 13,04% 56,52% 17,39% 0,00% 
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Q5A 
A lot  Somewhat Not very 
much  
Not at all  
  
  
  56,52% 34,78% 8,70% 0,00%   
  
        
 
 
       
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
Q5B 
A lot  Somewhat Not very 
much  
Not at all  
  
  
  8,70% 82,61% 8,70% 0,00%   
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Q6 
Clearly 
prefer A 
Prefer A Equally 
prefer A & 
B  
Prefer B Clearly 
prefer B  
  
  34,78% 34,78% 13,04% 8,70% 8,70% 
   
 
 
       
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
Q7 
The 
leader 
decides  
The 
leader 
asks and 
then 
decides  
Decide 
together  
Other  
  
  
  4,35% 21,74% 60,87% 13,04%   
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Q8 
Very 
effective 
Somewhat  Not 
effective 
at all  
    
  
  73,91% 26,09% 0,00%     
   
 
 
       
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
Q9 
The same 
people 
Little 
overlap       
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Q10 
A lot  Somewhat Not very 
much  
Not at all  
  
  
  30,43% 60,87% 8,70% 0,00%   
   
 
 
       
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
Q11 
Feel 
responsible 
Partly 
interested  
Indifferent  
    
  
  13,04% 86,96% 0,00%     
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368 
 
        
Q12 
Strongly 
agree  
Agree Disagree Strongly 
disagree  
  
    26,09% 56,52% 17,39% 0,00%   
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Appendix C 
Maps and Photos 
 
Photo 1: Municipality of Archanes 
 
 
 
Map 1: Crete 
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Map 2: Heraklion prefecture  
 
 
Map 3: Intervention area of the local C.I. LEADER+ 
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Photo 2: Tourism accommodation of Katalagari 
 
Photo 3: Winery cluster of Heraklion  
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Photo 4: :RPHQ¶VFRRSHUDWLYHRI.URXVDQLRWLVVD 
 
 
Photo 5: :RPHQ¶VFRRSHUDWLYHRI=DNURV 
 
 
 
 
